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(ii) 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with an examination of the available 
domestic retention capacity and the demand for international reinsur-
ance in the Arab World. The study has been broken down into the 
following basic components: 
1. The development of the insurance markets of the Arab countries 
is traced against the background of the economic, political, 
demographic and other changes, including the growth of demand 
for insurance, that have occurred in the region over the last 
few decades. 
2. Insurance legislation and supervision, which varies greatly 
throughout the Arab region, is examined in order to identify 
the effect it may have on the development of national markets. 
3. The market capacity required for the insurance of large risks 
and natural hazards is analysed, revealing that normal rein-
surance arrangements and local retention capacity can absorb 
only a very small proportion of those risks; and that Arab 
insurers have a growing need for catastrophe excess of loss 
reinsurances. 
4. The performance of Arab reinsurance companies and ;:lools as 
a means of improving retention capacity is examined based 
on data collected from two reinsurance companies and five 
pools, to demonstrate how retention capacity can be improved. 
5. Finally, a theoretical and empirical investigation is conducted 
into the determination of retention limits. Factors relevant 
to decisions on fixing retention limits are examined, and 
(iii) 
the relationship of company objectives to retention limits 
and the effect of different forms of reinsurance on the size 
of retained premium income are discussed. 
The study ends with an analysis of the fire. marine cargo 
and motor reinsurance programmes of two Arab insurance companies 
to see whether their retention policies are in line with accepted 
reinsurance practice or whether they could retain more of their 
business for their own account. 
The Arab insurance industry is still in its infancy, with 
all the attendant inadequacies such a state implies which brings 
with it ttvo major problems the inability of retention capacity 
of local insurers to respond sufficiently rapidly to changes in 
the economies of Arab countries and the heavy reliance on foreign 
reinsurance, which in turn leads to low retained premium income. 
It is hoped that this thesis will have provided an insight into 
ways in which Arab insurers and reinsurers could themselves meet 
more of their countries' insurance needs. 
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1.1 Introduction 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Retention capacity is the most difficult problem facing any 
insurance market in the developing world, and this study is an attempt 
to analyse the relationship between available domestic retention 
capacity and the demand for international reinsurance in the Arab 
\·lOrld. The analysis also seeks to determine the behaviour of the 
Arab insurance market towards a willingness to absorb locally written 
risks. Furthermore, an integral and important part of the study 
is to discover how self-sufficient are these markets in reinsurance. 
The purpose of this introduc tory chapter is to summarise the 
objectives of the study, the methodology used, and its structure 
a brief outline of the significance of the study is also provided. 
1.2 Significance of the Study 
Hith the development of the economy of the Arab world there 
has been a concomitant growth in the demand for insurance throughout 
the region but particularly in the oil producing states. The decade 
following the oil price rises of 1973 has been a period of rapid 
economic growth for most Arab countries and both the numbers and 
sizes of insured risks have increased rapidly. This growth in demand 
for insurance has been met by increases in both domestic retention 
capacity and by imports of international reinsurance. The need for 
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reinsurance protection is considerable. It is larger than in devel-
oped countries because of the limited retention capacity of local 
insurance companies which generally are both relatively small and 
write highly unbalanced insurance portfolios. 
A study of the development of the Arab insurance industry 
in general and of its retention capacity in particular is of import-
ance for a number of reasons. 
First, it provides an insight into the difficulties encountered 
by many third world countries that are seeking to develop their own 
insurance industries and to reduce their dependence on foreign insurers. 
Secondly, although in the last decade Arab insurance markets 
have had to cope with an exceptionally rapid increase in demand for 
insurance, a difficulty they share in common with many other develop-
ing countries is the increasing number of large individual risks 
and the growth of urban and industrial areas exposed to natural 
hazards. In both cases the potential losses may be several times 
greater than the total domestic premium income of small countries. 
Thirdly, the limited ability of national insurance markets 
to retain risks locally, and thus their relatively high level of 
demand for foreign reinsurance, is a mat ter of concern to Arab and 
other developing countries. This study will examine in particular 
the effects of international insurance and reinsurance transactions 
on countries I balance of payments, and the steps that may be taken 
to increase local retentions. 
Finally, the policies adopted by insurance and reinsurance 
companies in fixing their retention limits considerably affec t not 
only the balance of payments but also their o\,n security and operating 
results. Therefore an investigtion into present practices should 
3 
be of interest from an insurance supervisory standpoint too. 
1.3 Objectives and Methodology 
In view of the general characteristics of the insurance indus-
try in the Arab world, and the limited retention capacity available 
in the region, the need for information relating to those factors 
affecting the demand for reinsurance is obvious. The issues to 
be addressed in the study are; tvill local Arab insurance markets 
be able to provide sufficient underwriting and retention capacity 
to meet the substantial development of insurance business? And 
if not, what will be the magnitude of the demand for international 
reinsurance, and how can it be reduced? 
The study sets out to provide a theoretical and empirical 
approach to the problem of retention capacity and the demand for 
foreign reinsurance. It does not at tempt to produce a model to 
serve as a practical aid for determining retention capacity; 
rather, 
it seeks to analyse present market capacity trends and suggest 
some 
likely developments, in the hope that, with modification and improve-
ment, it might act as a basis for further study of the retention 
capacity situation. 
The key issues of domestic retention capacity dealt 
wi th in 
the study are those of, (a) the restraints imposed on retention capa-
city, (b) ways of improving retention capacity, and (c) considerations 
regarding the fixing of retention limits. 
These issues are key problems in relation to the demand for 
re insurance , as they are the components which determine market per-
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formance. Influences on retention capacity include; ( a) the ca p-
italisation and number of companies; (b) various restrictions 
imposed by insurance legislation and supervision; and (c) the degree 
of expertise possessed by companies. Of these factors, insurance 
regulations constitute a framework in which the market capacity 
develops, and it will be demonstrated that inadequate insurance 
regulations and supervision can adversely affect a market's insurance 
development. It is also hoped to show that the increase in the 
number and size of large risks, and the trends towards high values 
and denser population in areas exposed to natural hazards, place 
unusual demands on market capacity. The approach employed in the 
study is, firstly, to describe how insurance legislation and super-
vision, hazardous and high value risks, and natural hazards have 
strained market retention capaci ty, and, secondly, to consider any 
relevant measures which could provide a solutionto this problem. 
It \.;ill be demonstrated that the establishment of pools and 
national/regional reinsurance companies are two measures by which 
substantial increases in retention capaci ty can be achieved. The 
Arab pools have failed to work satisfactorily in practice, however, 
since their membership and underwriting capacity remain very l i ~ i t e d d
relative to the number of companies in the region and size of the 
risks that require insurance. Unlike the pools, national/regional 
reinsurers have made significant contributions to increasing domestic 
retention capacity, and thus reducing their markets' relative depend-
ence on foreign reinsurance. 
Central to the question of retention capacity and the demand 
for reinsurance are the difficulties encountered by insurers in deter-
mining their retention limi ts. It is a universal problem, common 
to both developed and developing countries. The reason is that 
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the process of fixing retention limits requires a mixture of analy-
tical and judgemental techniques; it is not a problem amenable to 
solution solely by using mathematical models. To da te no one has 
been successful in producing a neat actuarial formula capable of 
taking into account all of the factors TNhich are relavant to the 
fixing of retention limits, including various policy decisions that 
have to be taken by top management. 
company's corporate objectives. 
Among those decisions are the 
As market capacity is the sum of the retention capacity of 
all companies operating in a market, the importance of the various 
factors which generally are regarded, from a theoretical standpoint, 
as being of relevance to decisions on retention limits are examined. 
Then an attempt is made to establish to what extent the retention 
policies pursued by Arab companies are related to certain key factors. 
The methodology employed for the study comprises the twin 
methods of theoretical and empirical observations. At each stage 
of the process, conceptual frameworks are erected to allow a suffic-
ient depth of analysis and interpretation for the further understand-
ing of the nature of retention capacity and the demand for internat-
ional reinsurance in the Arab world. 
Information and data for this study was obtained from a variety 
of sources. Besides an extensive survey of all relevant literature, 
including conference and other reports, insurance legislation and 
administrative directives, original research material was obtained 
from: 
Ca) Contacts established during the course of the stud 
Y. 
which included personal interviews and 
correspondence 
with certain international and Arab insurance and 
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reinsurance companies, and insurance representatives 
within the Arab States. 
(b) A visit made to Iraq in 1981 to collect data. 
(c) A questionnaire sent to 143 insurance and reinsurance 
companies in the Arab world, and replies were received 
from 46. 
1.4 Chapter Structure 
The study is divided into four main parts. Part one, compri-
sing chapters two and three, deals with the economic development 
of the Arab world and its insurance industries. Chapter two examines 
the present economic situation and development trends in the Arab 
States, and also provides an important background to the study of 
demand for insurance and reinsurance which follows in subsequent 
chapters. Chapter three concentrates on the growth of Arab insurance 
markets and their characteristics, structures, and problems. A 
comparison of insurance development in the Arab - i ~ o r l d d with ot her 
developed and developing countries is made in order to give an indica-
tion of the importance of the Arab insurance industry. The future 
of the industry is also e x a ~ i n e d . .
Part Two, comprising chapters four, five, and six, concentrates 
on a close examination of insurance legislation and Supervision as 
well as examining the demands for underwriting capacity. The main 
theme of chapter four is related to the statutory regulation of insur-
ance and the scope of legislation; in addition it attempts to provide 
a clear picture of the effects of insurance regulations 
on insurance 
development. The problems of a rapid increase in the number and 
7 
size of individual large risks and their impact on the portfolio struc-
ture of insurance companies are presented in chapter five. Chapter 
six examines the magnitude of the problems of natural hazards, and 
the extent to which towns and development projects in the Arab World 
are exposed to these hazards. It also seeks to establish the criteria 
by which natural hazards should be carefully assessed, and why catas-
trophe cover is necessary for insurance and reinsurance companies. 
Part Three, comprising chapters seven and eight, considers 
the implications raised in Part T\,;o regarding the need for domestic 
as well as foreign insurance and reinsurance. Chapter seven attempts 
to evaluate the ability of Arab pools and national/regional reinsur-
ance companies to increase domestic retention capacity. The chapter 
also examines the main factors which might affect the development 
of the pools and reinsurance companies, with the objective of assess-
ing their achievements. Chapter eight discusses the effect of inter-
national insurance and reinsurance transactions on the balance of 
payments. 
Part Four, comprising chapters nine, ten, eleven, and t\vel ve, 
deals with the problems of determining a company's retention limits 
so as to provide a clear picture of the context in which retention 
capacity and the demand for reinsurance can be evaluated. Chapter 
nine lists the factors influencing retention limits, 
and also concen-
trates on the inter-relationship of these factors and the level of 
retention. Chapter ten is concerned with the key retention decision 
areas in relation to company objectives, and a deta;led 1 
.... ana ysis 
of the implication of prime objectives for retention l;m;ts . 
........ 15 also 
provided. Retention limits according to different forms 0: 
reinsur-
ance are examined in Chapter eleven, which has the O b j e c t l · V ~ ~ f 
- '-' 0 showing 
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how the different forms of reinsurance affect retained premium income 
and, consequently, the size of reinsurance premiums ceded. Chapter 
twelve investigates the relationship between retention limits, net 
premium income, and s h a r e h o l d e r ~ ~ funds, with the intention of discov-
ering whether or not insurance companies do relate their retention 
limits to these two variables. 
A summary of, and conclusions to, the study are presented 
in chapter thirteen. 
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CHAPTER !lom 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARAB WORLD 
2.1 Introduction 
Like many other producers, the suppliers of insurance can, 
to a degree, create a demand for their products through their market-
ing activities. However, even the most imaginative and aggressive 
marketing cannot create the risks that can be handled by insurance. 
Fundamentally, the potential demand for non-life insurance in any 
country depends on two factors; 
(i) the stage of economic development, viz, the numbers 
and size of buildings, vehicles, aircraft, ships, etc. 
for which insurance may be required, and 
(ii) the levels of real income. Therefore, this chapter 
will examine the economic development of Arab States 
before turning to the development of insurance in the 
Arab World. 
2.2 Population 
The Arab World in West Asia and North Africa comprises twenty-
one countries with an estimated 1981 total population of 168.68 
million, an increase of 4 5 ~ ~ million since 1970 (see Figure 2.1). 
Five countries with populations exceeding 10 million (Algeria, Egypt, 
Iraq, Morocco and Sudan) account for 69 per cent of the total 
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Figure 2.1 
Population of the Arab World (1970-81) 
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population of the area; at the other extreme Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, 
and U.A.E., each have populations of less than one million. 
During the 1970 I S few countries in the World experienced a 
rate of population growth as high as that of the Arab region (see 
table 2.1). Although the annual average growth rates of individual 
Arab countries varies widely, ranging from 0.8 per cent per annum 
in war-torn Lebanon up to 11.5 per cent in the United Arab Emirates 
(see table 2 .1A), everywhere in the region population grew faster 
than in the industrialised countries of the Western World. 
Relatively, the largest increases in population occurred in 
the oil-rich States of the Arabian Gulf, particularly in the small 
countries, most notably U.A.E. (11.5 per cent p.a.), Qatar (7.7 
percent) and Kuwait (6.4 percent) ,an increase largely due to immigra-
tion. However, everywhere factors such as improvements in public 
health and medical care leading to falling death rates, high birth 
rates associated with a young population, and improvements in living 
standards contributed to the growth of population (Morris, 1972, 
p.39l). 
Although population density in general is low, it varies con-
siderably between count ries. In 1979, the total area of the Arab 
World was approximately 12,011,622 square kilometres, with an dverage 
density ranging from Bahrain I s 498 persons per sq. km. to an average 
density in Mauritania of two persons per sq. km. The establishment 
of ne\. urban centres in many Arab countries, particularly the oil 
producing countries, has led to a large drift of population into 
towns. The major concentrations of population are along the 
Mediterranean and the valleys of the ~ i l e , , Tigris and Euphrates. 
which combine fertile land with an abundance of water . ana mild weather. 
TABLE 2.IA 
--------
T I ~ 5 ~ ~ ) I . J t ~ h h and Densi l y of P < ~ ! ! l ~ ~ i i ( ) I ~ _ ~ ~ ~ A r a h h J0rl rI 
~ - - - - ----------y---- - ~ - ~ - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - , - - - -----,-
COUNTRY 
Algeria 
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The remainder of the region is less fertile, with a substantial 
portion of uncultivable desert. 
Table 2.1 
Average Annual Growth of the World's Population 
1970-1981 
Country Group 
L . . (l) o w - ~ n c o m e e countrles (2) 
Xiddle-income countri(3) 
High-income countries 
Industrialized countries 
Non-market industrial economies 
Arab World (unweighted) 
Average 
annual growth 
of population 
(percent). 
1.9 
2.4 
4.9 
0.7 
0.8 
2.9 
Source: (The World Bank, 1983, pp.284-5). 
Note: (1) Include two Arab countries. 
(2) Include eleven Arab countries. 
(3) Four Arab countries only. 
2.3 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its Growth. 
To produce an accurate analysis of economic growth in the reg-
ion, account must be taken of the sharp increase in crude oil prices 
in the 1970's. Therefore, the rate of growth in the GDP and GDP 
per capita at current prices will be broken down into sub-periods 
to identify the impact of the oil price increase on the 
Arab states. During the period 1970-1979 the economies of most 
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Of the Arab states witnessed a considerable rate of economic growth; 
"but the year 1973 constitutes a landmark. in the economies of the 
~ e g i o n n as a whole, and of the oil producing states in particular. 
Measured at current prices, both the gross domestic product 
<GDP) and the GDP per capita rose sharply in all Arab countries 
(see table 2.2). For example, in 1980 the GDP of Saudi Arabia 
"'as more than 22 times higher than its 1970 level, and in Oman, 
Syria and Kuwait the 1980 GDP figures were respectively 17.1, 8.1, 
<3.nd 7.8 times greater than for 1970. The average (unweighted) 
growth of GDP at current prices in local currencies for the ,.;hole 
region for the period 1970 - 1980 was 23.1 per cent p.a. The simul-
taneous increases in population reduced the average annual growth 
of GDP per capita to 18.7 per cent (see table 2.3A). Both of those 
figures are, however, significantly higher than the underlying rate 
of economic grm.;th due to the inflation that occurred in all of 
the countries during the 1970's. 
After allm.ing for the inflationary factor by measuring GDP 
in constant prices, the average annual rate of growth for the region 
VIas still above 6 per cent for each of the last two decades (table 
2. 3A). As shown by table 2.3, during the 1970' s the Arab iJorld 
achieved a far faster rate of economic growth than most of the rest 
of the world. 
Although in general the oil producing states achieved the fastest 
rates of economic grm.,th in the 1970' s, there were exceptions. 
For example, after its rapid growth in the 1960's the Libyan econ0my 
grew at only a modest 2.2 per cent p. <1. in the 1970' s, Hhereas the 
non-oil States of Syria and ~ o r t h h Yemen recorded high rates of gro"th 
of 10.0 per cent and 9.2 per cent respectivel:;. 
1970 1971 
Country Currency 
Gill' (;OP GOP GDP 
per per 
apita capit, 
Algeria A.llill. 22. 900 159B 23.500 1591 
B'lhrai 11 B.illll. n.a n.':) n.fI n.a 
IllJj I !>ou tl O.ll n." Il.a fl.a 
~ . ~ y l ' ' t Lf 2971 b') 1146 9Z 
Iraq I.Dln. 17H2.5 136 1465.1 150 
.Iordan .I.llln • 1/4.4 76 186.2 78 
Kuwait K.IlIIl. ')61 12'1'J 1346 1703 
).('0.11100 1..£ Il.d n.d l1.a n.a 
Ll bya L.Oln. 14lt. 717 1627 775 
Tahle 2.2 
! ~ ! , ! I I __ G ( l P _ ~ ~ _ ~ ~ _ P " - ! _ _ G a J > ! ~ - " " ~ f . ! - _ h ~ ~ A ! - ~ b b ~ I a _ t e - " " at Cune"t I'rlces 
l H . ! J ! i ~ l ! ! _ : : I.,!c-'"l ~ ~ ~ ! , " ! 1 . c ! , " ' ! l l
1912 1973 1914 1975 1976 1911 
GOP GOP (alP GOP Gill' GIlP l;OP GDP GllP GDr GDP 
per per I"" per per 
-apita ( dpitd capJla (oll'lla t.aptl il 
27.400 17'l/, 12. IiIO 2036 48.S0() 2979 53.800 nOI> 64.700 3740 Bl.900 
n.a n.a Il.a n.,q n.a n.B Il.a n.a n.a n.a lI.a 
n.,] n.a n.;) n.a n,lt n.'1 n.n lI.a (l.a Il.a n.a 
3417 9B 3663 103 4197 155 4!l1l(' 112 6276 166 7341 
1475.0 146 1626.4 156 l378.0 324 4022.4 jlll 4 8 ~ 6 . 8 8 422 H8!1.0 
207.2 A4 lIB.3 86 247.3 94 278.6 103 287. 9 104 472.0 
1521 1810 2155 2421 3511 1735 3216 1194 ",72 3431 3885 
fl.a n.iI Il.a Il.a B.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1799 841 221.,6 1003 3973 1705 3780 1556 4907 1940 5732 
1976 1979 1 'IB( 
GDP Gnp (;OP (;1)1' GOP (;11I' 
pe. per per 
capil Cl i .J.(lila <-ilpila 
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Source: (aH: ltlF. IUlelnattoll.i11 FIII.UHt .. ) S L . l t i s t l c . ~ ; . . YPilrhquk IYJY,f o l Ihf' pcriod 1970 lIt Yt'illhook 19H1 f(n the years 197tl ancl1919, dlld ¥Cdlbtlok 
I ~ l i l l I". Ihe year 1 ~ 6 0 . .
r ~ ( l t t e: 
Ir,}q Jor J'J1/: United Naf tOilS, \Jot 1(1 Slat i ~ ; f f h q 11l II1 tef. 11th efl., 1979. 
(;VI' fH'( capita: c;tlculalc(1 lly the Hulltol. 
Flgur-C!"1 ar-c III billions illr Algf"r1.t, tltlrt)(cn, S. Arabia alII. 1I.A.E. 
n.a. : 11<11 avallahle. 
Il.a 
GIll' 
, ... 
, "plt,\ 
H'i 16 
n.a 
11. et 
397 
Il.d 
lOll 
'i43') 
n.a 
(I. ,1 
194/)1 
31.,,)J 
](14'1 
11.<1 
43059 
Il.a 
H.d 
SIJ24 
54') 
1)0411 
2o'il 
n.t-i 
--
~ ~
U1 
16 
Table 2. 3A 
Annual Average Growth Rates of GDP a n ~ _ Q Q f _ E e r r capita in Local 
Currencies for the Period (1960-70) and (1970-80) 
I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l lAverage amrual ~ o w t h h at Average amrual growth at constant P r i c e ~ ~current pnces C GDP tGDP per GDP CNP per ountry . caplta capita 
~ - - - _ - - - - - - - l ~ Q ~ Q - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~____ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~__ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - ~ ~ ~ o , ~ ~ - - l l
% % % ~ ~
Algeria 21.4 18.2 4.3 7.0 3.2 
Bahrain n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Dujibouti n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Egypt 18.9
B1 
16.1 B1 4.3 7.4 3.4 
Iraq 24.0 19.8 6.1 l 2 . ~ ~ 5.3 
Jordan 19.1 15.0 6.6 7.0· 5.7 
Kuwait 22.7 15.4 5.7 2.5 -1.1 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
S. Arabia 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
U .A.E. 
Yemen (N) 
Yemen (S) 
n.aB2 
20.9 
12.9 
15.2 
32.8 
n.a 
36.3 
n.a B3 
19.3 
23.3 
16.4 B4 42.1 
21.1 
n.a 
23.1 
n.aB2 16.1 
10.0 
12.2 
28.7 
n.a 
31.4 
n.a B3 
16.2 
19.6 
13.9B4 29.2 
19.0 
n.a 
18.7 
4.9 
24.4 
8.1 
4.4 
n.a 
n.a 
n.a 
1.0 
1.3 
4.6 
4.7 
n.a 
n.a 
n.a 
6.2 
n.a 
2.2 
1.7 
5.6 
n.a 
n.a 
10.6 
3.4 
4.4 
10.0 
7.5 
n.a 
9.2 
n.a 
6.5 
n.a 
5.2 
1.6 
2.5 
n.a 
n.a 
8.1 
n.a 
-0.2 
3.7 
4.8 
4.3 
4.5 
12. 1 
4.2 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - -
Source: (1) 
(2) 
B1: 
B2 : 
B3: 
B4: 
N : 
Compiled from table 2.2 
Growth rates at constant prices: The World Bank 
(1982, pp.ll0-113) 
Figures are for 1970-77. 
Figures are for 1970-79. 
Figures are 1970-78. 
Figures are for 1972-80. 
Figure is for 1970-78. 
Note: The Arab oil producers are: Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and U.A.E. 
I 
I 
I 
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The differences between Arab countries' income per capi ta 
are large. Apart from Algeria, the most heavily populated countries 
(Egypt, Morocco and Sudan) are amongst the poorest countries in 
terms of GDP per capita. Conversely the highest levels of income 
per capita occur in the smallest countries in terms of population, 
e.g. the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Table 2.3 
The Growth Rates of the World's GDP at Constant Prices 
1970-80 
I 
Country Group 
countries 
(1) I 
Low-income ( 2 ) 
Middle-income countries 
Industrialized countries 
Non-market Industrial economies 
Arab World (unweighted) 
Source: The World Bank (1982, pp.112-13 
Note: Weighted average 
(1) Include two Arab countries. 
(2) Include nine Arab countries. 
Average Armual 
Growth of GDP 
(percentage) 
4.6 
5.6 
3.2 
6.4 
6.5 
To summar ';se, in general, the oil-produc';ng st t h -'- .... a es ave wit-
nessed h ';gher rates of growth ';n the';r GDP and GDP .... .... -'- per capita than 
the non-oil producing states. But in respect of GDP per capita 
too much reliance should not be placed on these f'; f -,-gures or n.,;o 
reasons: firstly, the unreliability of the statistics, . 1 e s p e c ~ a ~ l y y
population figures, and secondly, the high degree of . ~ n e q u a l i t y y
';n income distribution in the whole reg';on, and.; h 
-'- .... ....n t e oil states 
in particular. 
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2.4 The Industrial Sector 
Certain Arab states have a relatively long history of indust-
rialization, whilst others have only just begun the process. The 
initial stage of industrialization is related to the processing 
of primary products, for export; in the case of agricultural commod-
ities, only elementary operations are performed, whilst oil producing 
states may well begin with refineries and petro-chemical plants. 
The second stage of the industrialization process is the transform-
ation of raw materials into consumer goods for the local market, 
(Adams, 1971, pp. 442-43). 
During the past decade, the various states of the region have 
adopted plans for industrial development. Some states have posit-
ively sought to diversify their economies to avoid their dependence 
on one product as a major source of income. Other states have 
channelled some of their substantial oil revenues into industrial 
projects largely because of the lack of other opportunities for 
investment. A considerable rate of growth in industrial and manu-
factured output has been achieved as a result of these efforts. 
During the periods 1960-1970 and 1970-1980, industrial production 
in Arab countries increased at an average annual rate of growth 
at constant prices (unweighted mean) of 6.3 percent and 5.7 percent 
respectively, whilst the average annual rates of growth in manufact-
uring output were 5.7 percent and 7.7 percent for the same periods. 
The Arab countries, during the period 1970-80, have achieved the 
second highest rate of gro'vth (after middle income countries) for 
industry, and the highest rate for manufacturing, (see tables 2.4 
and 2.5). 
I 
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Table 2.4 
Average Annual Growth Rate of Agriculture, Industry and 
Manufacturing Production, and Distribution of GDP (percent) 
Agriculture Industry at Manufacturing Distribution of 
at constant constant at constant GDP : 1980 
Country prices prices prices 
1960- 1970- 1960- 1970- 1960- 1970- Agri- 100- Manu-
1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 cul- ustry factur-
ture ing 
'" 
01 % 0/ 0/ % 0/ 01 I 0/ '0 ,0 ,0 /0 " ,0 '0 
Algeria 0.1 3.1 11. 6 7.9 7.8 11. 4 6 57 14 
Egypt 2.9 2.7" 5.4 6.8 4.S 8.0, 23 35 28 
Iraq 5.7 -loS' 4.7 13.6', 5.9 14.4' 7 73 6 
Jordan n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 8 32 16 
Kuwait n.a 7.4 n.a -1. 8 n.a 9.2 0 79 6 
Lebanon n.a 6.3 n.a 4.5 n.a 5.0 n.a n.a n.a 
Libya n.a 11.1 n.a -2.3 n.a lS.9 2 72 4 
Nauritania n.a -1.1 n.a 0 n.a 0.2 26 33 8 
~ o r o c c o o 4.7 0.8 4.2 6.6 4.2 5.8 18 32 17 
S. Arabia n.a 5.3 n.a 10.2 n.a 6.5 1 78 4 
Somalia -0.6 3.0 3.4 -2.6 4.0 -3.8 60 11 7 
Sudan n.a 2.6 n.a 3.1 n.a 1.3 38 14 6 
Syria 4.4 8.2 6.3 9.6 5.6 7.9 20 27 21 
Tunisia 2.0 4.9 8.2 9.0 7.S 11.2 17 35 13 
Yemen ( ~ ~ ) n.a 3.7 n.a 14.7 n.a 12.2 29 16 6 
Average 2.7 4.0 6.3 5.7 5. 7 7.7 18.2 42.2 11.1 
I 
Source: The World Bank (1981, pp. 136-37) and(1982, pp. 112-15). 
N: Figures are for 1970-79, not 1970-80. 
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Table 2.4 also shows that the distribution of industrial prod-
uction to GDP is higher in oil-producing states than in non-oil 
producing states, because the oil industry constitutes a large prop-
ortion of the industrial sector. In 1980 the share of industrial 
output at current prices (in local currencies) in the GDP amounted 
to 79 percent in Kuwait followed by S. Arabia (78 percent), Iraq 
(73 percent), Libya (72 percent) and Algeria (57 percent). In 
non-oil producing states, the highest share of industrial production 
in the GDP was 35 percent in Egypt and Tunisia, and the lowest share 
was 11 percent in Somalia. In contrast to industry, the contribu-
tion of manufacturing output to GDP is higher in non-oil produc-
ing states than in oil-producing states for the same year. 
Table 2.5 
Comparison of Growth of Production for Agriculture, 
Industry and Manufacturing in Arab Countries With Rest of 
World at Constant Prices for the Periods, 
(1960-70) and (1970-80). 
Average Annual Growth Rate(percent) 
r.ountry Group Agriculture Industry rlanufacturing 
1960- 1970- 1960- 1970- 1960- 1970-
1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 
Arab c o u n t r i e s ( p e ~ ~ t t ~ ~ e e 4) 2.7 4.0 6.3 5.7 5.7 7.7 
Low-income count r ~ e s s . (2) 2.2 2.2 7.0 3.6 6.3 3.7 
Middle-income c o u n t r ~ e 5 5 3.5 2.9 7.4 6.6 6.8 6.4 
Industrialized countries 1.4 1.4 5.9 3. 1 5.9 3.2 
Centrally planned economies n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Source: The l,Jorld Banl< 
(1) Include: 
(2) Include: 
(1982, pp.1l2-3) 
Somalia and Sudan 
Egypt, Yem&n(N), Yemen(S), Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, 
and ~ l a u r i i tania. 
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The rapid growth of the industrial sector in recent years has 
partly been due to countries of the region having placed industrializa-
tion high on the scale of priorities for their development and has 
led them to expect further rapid growth in the future from this sector. 
The oil-producing states are witnessing considerable activity in 
the area of heavy industry, and since 1978 major developments have 
included: 
The opening of the Saudi Lube-oil refinery. 
The addition of further LNG capacity in Algeria. 
The opening of Kuwait's NGL and LPG plant. 
The opening of Iraq's iron and steel complex. 
The opening of Dubai's massive dry dock and ship repairing 
facility. 
Many other large projects are in operation and under construc-
tion. A more detailed picture of the number and investment costs 
of the principal projects in some Arab countries COrganiza tion of 
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OAPEC) is given in Table 2.6 
\vhich shows the large investment costs of these industrial projects. 
Attiga (1982, p.18) has pointed out that, in the major oil 
exporting states, more than 80 percent of industrial investment is 
in refining and gas processing, petrochemicals, fertilizers, basic 
metallurgy and cement. Table 2.7 illustrates the OAPEC investment 
expenditures of the main industrial projects by sector and by country. 
The highest share of investments amounts to 33.3 percent of the total 
investments listed in the following table in Saudi Arabia, while 
the lowest share was 1.2 percent in Bahrain. Cl ) 
Cl) It has been estimated that during the next ten years the value 
of investments in oil projects throughout the Arab World \-.'ill 
amount to US.IOO bn. -120 bn. (Roger,1981,p.III). 
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Table 2.6 
Number and Investment costs of the Main Industrial Projects in some 
Arab countries at the end of 1981 
I 
Egypt am Syria Algeria and Iraq S. Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Total O.A.P.E.C. 
D.A.E. Qatar & Bahra:in. 
~ ~
Type of Projects No.of Invest nent ~ o . o f f Invest !lent No.of Invcstrnt No.of InvestnE'nt 
pro- Aroounts pro- Aroounts pro- i\m:mnts pro- AIIDunts 
jects U$ million % jeets U$ million % jects U$ mi 11ion I % jects 1$ million % 
Refinillg and 
Gas processing SO 1825 12.8 17 6700 30.7 23 IS 713 35.8 120 27238 30.S 
Petrochemical 
and Fertilizer 12 1300 9.1 20 4376 20.0 30 15205 29.1 62 20S81 23.6 
Basic 
Metallurgy 3 1957 13.7 2 1130 5.2 9 7403 14. 1 14 10490 11.9 
Cement 19 lS13 12.7 19 2231 10.2 14 2281 4.4 52 6325 7.2 
Sub Total 114 6895 48.3 5S 14437 66.1 76 43602 S3.4 248 64934 73.5 
Other 
Hanufacturing 169 7395 51.7 258 7398 33.9 741 8655 16.6 1168 23448 26.5 
Total 2tn 14290 100.0 316 21835 100.0 S17 52257 100.0 1416 88382 100.0 
------ -----------
Source: ENI, vol. 1, 1981. 
N 
N 
Refining & Gas 
Processing 
Country 
Almunts % 
Algeria 2500 23.1 
Bahrain 400 38.1 
Egypt 1392 12.9 
Iraq 4200 38.1 
Kuwait 500 38.2 
Libya 1218 10.9 
Qatar 850 30.3 
S. Arabia 12495 42.) 
Syria 433 12.4 
U.A. E. 3250 49.6 
Total 27238 30.8 
Table 2.7 
Investment cost of the Principal Industrial Projects 
~ e c t o r r and by Country at the end 1981. 
(US million) 
Pet nxhemica 1 Basic Cemenl: Sub Total 
& Fertilizers r-t;tallu rgy 
Anounts % Almunts % ~ u n t s s % Allounts % 
1376 12.8 500 4.6 750 6.9 5126 47.4 
300 28.6 300 28.6 - - 1000 95.3 
744 6.9 1957 18.1 I 869 8.1 4962 46.0 
3000 27.2 630 5. 7 1481 13.4 9311 84.4 
720 55.0 - - - 1220 93.2 
3500 31.4 d!6 37.3 610 5.5 9478 85.1 
1310 46.7 423 15.1 50 1.8 2633 93.9 
8575 29.2 680 2.3 1486 5.0 23236 79.0 
556 15.9 - - 944 27.0 1933 55.3 
800 12.2 1850 28.2 135 2.1 6035 92.1 
---
20881 23.6 10490 11. 9 6325 7.2 64934 73.5 
Other t-lanu- Total 
facturing GAPEC 
Anounts % Allounts % 
5675 52 6 10801 100.0 
50 4.7 1050 100.0 
5830 54.0 10792 100.0 
1723 15.6 11034 100.0 
90 6.8 1310 100.0 
1656 14.9 11134 100.0 
170 6.1 2 ~ b j j 100.0 
6174 21.0 29410 100.0 
1565 44.7 3498 100.0 
515 7.9 6£56 '100.0 
.-
23448 26.5 88382 100.0 
- -- -- ~ - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - -
(1) Includes all 'intcgratcd' iron-steel project. 
(2) To be added an 'integrated' oil project (U$2,500 milli()n). 
Source: As for table 2.6 
N 
W 
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Such investment is not limited to OA?£C countries, the non-
oil states have also recently engaged in planning or implementing 
rather ambitious programmes with a considerable amount of invest-
ment allocated. 
2.5 The Agrarian Sector 
Although the relative importance of agriculture in the region 
has gradually decreased over the past 20 years, due to depopulation 
of the land, and developments within other industries, it remains 
a sector of vital importance in the region's economy. Agriculture 
is by far the largest single employer and the main source of live-
lihood in many Arab states and accounts for a significant share 
of regional exports. 
As shown in Table 2.4, over the period 1960-70 agriculture 
in the region achieved an annual average growth rate at constant 
prices of 2.7 per cent, which increased to 4 per cent for the period 
1970-80. 
Relatively, agriculture makes the largest contribution to 
GDP in the non-oil producing countries, for example in 1980 it 
amounted to 60 per cent of GDP in Somalia and 38 per cent in the 
Sudan. In the oil-producing states, agriculture is practically 
non-existent or of negligible importance, except in Algeria and 
Iraq, whereit makes a modest contribution to the economy. However, 
agriculture has never been, and is never likely to be, of major 
economic importance in Bahrain, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates 
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due to the hot arid climate and the infertility of the soil. 
In other Arab countries, the agricultural situation is as 
follows (Lloyd's Bank, 1978 and 1980): 
1. The agricultural potential of a large part of Saudi Arabia 
is severely limited, and agriculture has been slow to develop. 
No significant improvement is expected in the near future. 
2. Libya, before the discovery of oil, was primarily an agri-
cultural economy; almost 80 percent of the population 
lives in rural areas and agriculture provides almost 60 
per cent of GDP and the bulk of exports. However, by 1980 
agriculture accounted for only 2 percent of GDP, and approxi-
mately 80 percent of Libyan food demands are now supplied 
from abroad. 
3. In Egypt agriculture is still of major economic importance, 
employing about 40 percent of the labour force in 1977, 
accounting for 23 percent of GDP at current prices in 1980, 
and 60 percent of the total value of exports. 
4. Agriculture is also significant in the economy of Tunisia, 
and an abundance of e a ~ i l y y cultivable land is one of Tunisian's 
prime agricultural assets. 
5. Agriculture in Morocco employs about 62 percent of the active 
labour force; it accounts for 80-90 percent of the country's 
domestic food requirements, almost 30 percent of total export 
value, and contributed 18 percent of GDP in 1980. 
6. Jordan since the 1967 war, has been effectively deprived 
by the Israeli occupation of the most prosperous farming 
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land in her territory. In Lebanon the proportion of the 
total labour force employed in the agricultural sector has 
fallen from 40 percent to about 20 percent at present, as 
the population has tended to concentrate in urban areas. 
Finally, in other Arab states agricultural development has 
varied from country to country. For example, in Syria and North 
Yemen t his sec tor has grown by 8.2 percent and 3. 7 percent at 
constant prices during the period 1970-1980, and made a contrib-
bution to the GDP of 20 percent and 29 percent respectively at 
current prices in 1980. 
2.6 Arab Construction Markets 
In some Arab countries, construction spending has peaked 
because of the satiation of needs. Selection of industrial 
projects has become more sophisticated and greater attention is 
being paid to social programmes such as housing, education and 
hospitals. Estimates by Plantecon (Overseas) Research (Financial 
Times ,1980) show that the construction market of the Arab states 
in the eastern part of the Arab World excluding Libya and Algeria 
was worth US $20.1 billion in 1977 almost doubling to US $38.4 
billion in 1978. The major share of the market was taken by Saudi 
Arabia with 58.6 percent, followed by Iraq with 16.3 percent. 
But the highest average annual rate of growth has been achieved 
by Iraq at 60.2 percent and in Jordan by 57.1 percent during the 
period 1977-79 (see table. 2.8). 
In 1979 the market as a whole gre\.,r by 5.8 percent to US 
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$40.6 billion with Saudi Arabia still growing at an above average 
overall pace, and with Iraq significantly expanding at the second 
fastest rate of growth (13.1 percent) and totalling US $7.1 billion 
(1) Even in Jordan, where expansion was on a smaller scale, 
there was an increase of 35 percent during 1979. 
Plantecon also estimated that the size of the Arab construc-
tion markets is likely to change significantly over the next few 
years. For example, the Saudi market will reach a peak of US 
$24.1 billion in 1980, a marginal increase over the 1979 figure. 
But thereafter it will decline until it reaches US $15.1 billion 
in 1985; even then it would be more than twice the size of any 
other Arab market assessed for 1979. The notable exception amongst 
the Eastern Arab oil producers is Iraq. Most observers are agreed 
that this market will continue to expand, especially after the 
war with Iran, in order to rebuild the economy after the heavy 
damage it has sustained during the Gulf War. In the Maghreb area 
(comprising Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), Algeria 
is probably the only state with an expanding construction market. 
Elsewhere in the region there are countries without 
the huge oil revenues held by some of their neighbours but which 
have nevertheless started extensive development programmes. 
countries include, Sudan,North Yemen, South Yemen and Egypt. 
These 
(1) In 1981, Iraq was the largest construction market in the 
Arab World and worth at least U.$ 23 billion, which put it ahead 
of Saudi Arabia, (Financial Times, December 22nd ,1982). 
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Table 2.8 
Some Arab Construction r ~ r k e t s s (1977-1979) 
(U. $ million) 
Average 
Change Change Armual 
Country 1977 1978 1978 over 1979 1979 over Growth(per 
1977 Cl( 1978 -centage) 10 
Bahrain 320 370 15.6 350 -5.4 4.6 
Egypt 1713 2350 37.2 2460 4.7 19.8 
Iraq 2750 6240 264.1 7060 13 .1 60.2 
Jordan 320 585 82.8 790 35.0 57.1 
Kuwait I 1020 1480 45.1 1340 -9.5 14.6 Oman 483 565 17.0 610 8.0 12.4 
Qatar 461 480 4.1 440 -8.3 -4.8 
S. Arabia 10390 22500 116.6 24000 6.7 52.0 
Sudan n.a 485 - 526 8.5 -
Syria 630 1590 152.4 1450 -8.8 51. 7 
U .A.E. 1960 1740 -11.3 1570 -9.8 -10.5 
Total 20047 38385 91. 5 40596 5.8 38.6 
Source: (Financial Times, 1980). 
Note: (1) Year 1977: (Financial Times, 1979). 
(2) Figures for 1978 and 1979 at 1978 prices. 
2.7 Transport and Communication 
Generally, the development of communications networks - road, 
sea, air and telecommunications - has gone ahead at extraordinary 
speed. Most Arab States have realized that adequate communications 
are a pre-requisite to economic progress. 
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2.7.1 Growth in Air Travel and Airports Expansion 
Recent studies by the International Air Transport Association 
indicate that in the period from 1979 up to 1984 passenger air travel 
between Europe and the Middle East was expected to grow at an average 
annual rate of about 10.6 percent. The major airlines of the Arab 
World (Air Algerie, Alia of Jordan, Egyptair, Gulf Air, Iraqi Airways, 
Kuwait Airways, Libyan Arab, Middle East Airlines of Lebanon, Saudia 
of Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab and Tunisia Air) collectively carried 
in 1979 more than 17 million passengers, or just over 10 percent 
more than in 1978, and this figure is expected to increase consider-
ably in the future (Financial Times, 1980). 
The biggest single expansion by any airline was recorded by 
Saudi Arabia whose traffic rose by about 26 percent to reach just 
over 8 million. This is expected to rise further during the period 
1983-1987, reflecting the very substantial contribution that civil 
Cl viation is making to the country I s internal as well as the inter-
national development. To increase carrying capacity and replace 
some ageing aircraft, the Arab states should order some 300 jet air-
liners worth US $5 billion over the next decade. 
It is estimated that during 1979 the major airports in the 
Arab countries handled between them more than 20 million passengers, 
a rise in the service of about 30 percent, reflecting the booming 
air traffic to, from, within and through the region. For the near 
future it seems likely that the Arab states in general. and those 
of the Middle East in particular, will continue to enjoy a period 
of considerable expansion. Throughout the developing world as a 
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whole some £40 billion (US $93.5 billion), is likely to be spent 
on airports and their ancillary services over the next decade, and 
that of this sum perhaps one-third is likely to be spent in the Arab 
States. (Financial Times, 1980). By far the biggest programme of 
airport developments in the Arab World is that being undertaken in 
Saudi Arabia, where the Saudi Arabian International Airports project 
has been set up specifically to administer the construction of the 
three major new international airports in Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dhahran. 
A new international airport at Baghdad, with an annual handling 
capacity of 10 million passengers was completed in 1982. 
2.7.2 Arab Fleet Growth 
The size of the Arab shipping fleet has been growing consider-
ably faster than the overall world shipping fleet. In 1967 it 
amounted to just 1 million grt., as against a world fleet of 182 
million grt. With the first rise in oil prices at the end of 1973, 
the Arab fleet totalled 3.3 million grt. (22.0 percent average growth 
rate during the period 1967-73), compared with the total world fleet 
of 290 million grt. with an annual average growth rate of 8.0 percent 
for the same period. (Financial Times, 1980). 
Table 2.9 shows the further rapid growth between 1978 and 1982 
during which time the number of ships over 1000 grt increased from 
486 to 705. Saudi Arabia is the world's fastest growing major 
shipping nation. 
Country 
Algeria 
Bahrain 
Dujibouti 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
S. Arabia 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
U.A.E. 
Yemen (N) 
Yemen (S) 
Total 
(1) 
Source: 
31 
Table 2.9 
(1) 
Arab Fleet Growth (1978-82) 
(1000 grts) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
No. Grt No. Grt 
63 1044 77 1180 
- - - -
-
- - -
78 402 88 437 
28 1116 31 1216 
- - -
-
73 1910 96 2228 
61 180 66 204 
26 466 28 529 
- - - -
41 299 48 322 
2 3 2 3 
2 80 2 80 
52 911 63 1129 
4 14 4 14 
7 38 7 38 
5 10 13 30 
18 92 21 104 
26 142 16 118 
-
- - -
- - 1 2 
486 6707 563 7634 
Ships over 1000 grt. 
13.8% 
Barber (1982, p7). 
No. Grt. No. Grt 
78 1217 76 1284 
1 1 4 7 
- - - -
91 465 94 449 
30 1208 51 1405 
- - - -
105 2611 79 2229 
74 211 80 215 
27 622 25 619 
- - -
-
46 331 48 334 
2 3 - -
3 82 6 92 
74 13211110 1956 
4 14 3 11 
12 83 10 91 
11 28 9 
I 
23 
22 121 19 124 
10 81 17 105 
- -
-
-
2 3 2 3 
592 8402 633 8947 
10.1 % 6.5% 
1(82 
No. Grt 
74 1353 
2 5 
- -
99 475 
51 1389 
2 11 
68 2033 
90 257 
28 875 
1 2 
48 334 
- -
12 190 
166 3716 
3 11 
10 91 
7 22 
20 129 
22 149 
- -
2 1 3 
705 11045 
23 . 4 ~ ~ ~
Given the recession in the shipping industry, future 
I 
I 
I 
I 
growth is likely to be slower than in the past. Nevertheless the 
number of orders for new ships placed in 1982 (see table 2.10) indica-
tes that Arab fleets will continue to grow and increase their share 
of total world shipping from the current 2%. 
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Table 2.10 
Ships ordered by Some Arab States 
(as at 1.1.1982). 
Country No. Grt(OOO's) 0' 
'" 
Kuwait (1) 15 806 
S . Arabia 4 140 
U .A.E. 7 124 
Morocco 7 112 
Egypt 5 92 
Tunisia (2) 3 34 
Iraq 4 15 
Libya 1 8 
share 
60.6 
10.5 
9.3 
8.4 
6.9 
2.6 
1.1 
0.6 
Total 46 1331 100.0 
(1) Includes 9 vessels on order for VASC which 
when delivered will fly the flags of the 
various member countries. 
(2) Includes an unconfirmed order by Cotunav 
Source: Barber (1982, pS). 
2.7.3 Telephone and Pipeline Systems 
Some Arab countries have allocated unexpectedly large amounts 
in their development planning to modernize their telephone system. 
The Iraqi government, for instance, has installed the most modern 
computerised telephone system at a cost of US $10 billion. At the 
end of 1981 Saudi Arabia completed the world's first entirely computer 
controlled metropolitan telephone system, and plans to spend US $5 
billion over the current third five-year plan (1980-85). Bahrain 
possesses the most efficient telecommunication system in the ~ 1 i d d l e e
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East; and Egypt, which also has plans for a total overhaul of the 
telephone system over the next 20 years, could spend up to US S 5 
billion. 
There have been pipelines from some of the oil-fields to the 
Mediterranean coast and the Arabian Gulf for many years, but given 
the rapid rise in oil exports some of the Arab states have invested 
heavily in new pipelines, including: 
Iraq's Haditha-Fao 'strategic' pipeline to the Gulf, 
and the pipeline from Northern Iraq to Dortyol on 
, d' Cl) Turkey s Me ~ t e r r a n e a n n coast 
Algeria's 2500 km trans-Mediterranean pipeline through 
Tunisia and Sicily to Italy 
Egypt's SU?1ED pipeline (half owned by a consortium of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Qatar) from Ain Al-Sukhna 
to the west of Alexandria 
Saudi Arabia's pipelines from the Gulf coast to the 
eastern Hediterranean at Sidon, Lebanon (1718 km) and 
a 1250 km pipeline under construction between the Ghawar 
oil field to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. 
(1) The stoppage of the Iraqi oil exports through Syria and the 
Port of Basra, due to the present war between Iraq and Iran, 
has encouraged the government to build two new pipelines. the 
first through Saudi Arabia and the second through Jordan. 
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2.8 Trade Sector Growth 
2.8.1 Volume of Trade 
The rise in the volume and value of the region's external trade 
has been considerable since the second World War. The major factors 
relating to the growth in the volume of imports are: 
(i) the drive for development which necessitated the 
importation of raw materials, intermediate and capital 
goods; and 
(ii) the increasing need for consumer goods, mainly foodstuffs, 
',.,There domestic production is unable to keep up with the 
demand. The major factors in regard to the increasing 
volume of exports are; the discovery of the natural 
resources of crude oil in many Arab states, iron ore 
in the Maghrib area, and phosphate rock in other states. 
Bet\.Jeen 1970 and 1980 Arab exports as a proportion of ',.,Torld 
trade increased from 4.3 percent to 12.4 percent, and imports from 
2.6 percent to 5.9 percent. Table 2.11 shows that during the period 
1970-80 the average (unweighted mean) annual growth rate at current 
prices for imports was higher than the growth rate of exports, due 
mainly to an increased capacity to import through rising oil exports 
earnings. Overall, the major factor \.;a8 the rise in price of oil 
which cut the growth in the volume of oil exported. rtm.;e\'er, during 
the same period, the average growth rate of imports at constant prices 
\.Jas more than six times the av'erage annual gcO\.Jth rate of exports. 
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Saudi Arabia, of the oil-producing states, and Jordan of the non-
oil producing states, have achieved the highest growth rates of im-
ports of 35.2 percent and 13.5 percent respectively (see table 2.11). 
Table 2.11 
Annual Average Growth Rate of Trade in the Arab countries, and 
Exports as a Percentage of GDP in Local Currencies (percent). 
1 
Country 
Algeria 
!Bahrain 
IDUjibouti 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Mauritania 
l'lorocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
IS. Arabia 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
V.A.E. 
Yemen (N) 
Yemen ( S) 
Average 
Source: 
Exports at Imports at At constant I Exports as al 
current prices current prices prices I percentage of ~ r t s s Imports GDP at current I 
1970-80 1974-80 1970-80 1974-80 1970-80 1970-80 
Prifes 
1970 i 1979 
26.5 17 .8 20.9 16.3 2.2 12.7 I 21. 71 30.2 
29.3 18.0 27 .3 19.8 I n.a n.a 
I 
n.a n.a 
n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1 
n.a n.a n.a n.a 
20.5 23.8 25 ~ ~ 24 1 -0.7 8.8 
I 
11.1 10.3 
38.4 25.9 2 7 ~ ~ 1 5 ~ ~ ~ I 2.2 20.5 23.6 n.a 
30.3 22.9 26.9 28.8 18.4 13.5 7.0 17.0 
24.4 10.0 23.0 25.3 -8.5 16.3 62.9 74.8 
n.a n.a n.a 1 : ~ 6 6 0.7 2.4 n.a n.a 20.8 21.1 25.9N -6.5 16.8 71.1 57.5 
6.1 1.4 15.5 15.8 I -1.1 5.6 52.5 24.2 
14.6 4.4 17.1 12.5 2.1 8.5 14.6 12.2 
30.0 19.4 54.7 28.1 n.a n.a 76.8 63.8 
33.9 17.3 34.4 30.4 n.a n.a I n.al n.a 
41. 5 20.5 41.1 46.5 5.4 35.2 
1 
60.8
1 
79.1 
14.8 14.7 18.3 13 .4 5.5 7.2 
n.al ~ ~ ± ±10.1 14.2 22.9 21. 3 -5.7 3.5 14.8 
26.7 19.0 27.9 23.5 6.8 13 .0 12.1 16.6 
25.0 14.4 24.5 19.6 4.8 10.6 12.6 24.7 
41 ~ ~ 2 0 r : J ~ ~ 38 ') 29 3 6.1 27.7 n.a 65.0 1 6 ~ ~ O. 4 9 0 ~ ~ 5 1 ~ ~ n.a n.a 0.9
1 
3.5 
16.9 22.7 20.3 24.1 n.a n.a 82.3
1 
n.a 
24.6 16.2 28.5 24.2 2.1 13.5 I 35.0 34.8 
(1) Compiled from I.M.F., International Financial 
Statistics, Year-book 1982. Country pages. 
(2) The World Bank (1982, pp.124-5). 
Nl: Figures are for 1970-78 and 1974-78, not 1970-
80 and 1974-80. 
N2: Figures are for 1970-79 and 1974-79, not 1970-
80 and 1974-80. 
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Table 2.11 also shows the importance of exports to the gross 
domestic product in 1970 and 1979. In general, the percentage con-
tribution of exports to GDP in Oil-producing states was higher than 
in non-oil producing states, due to the dominance of oil exports. 
An interesting comparison can be made between the periods 1960-
70 and 1970-80, concerning the growth of Arab trade with other regions 
in the world. Arab exports achieved the highest growth rate of 
13.2 percent per annum at constant prices for the first period and 
declined to 2.1 percent in the second period. As regards imports, 
during the 1960 I s the Arab countries had the lowest average annual 
growth rate but that position was reversed during the 1970s. Then 
the rate of increase of 13.5 percent per annum was over four times 
that of the low income countries, over three fold that of both the 
middle income and the industrialized countries, and over two fold 
that of non-market industrial economies (see table 2.12). 
Table 2.12 
Comparison of Growth of Foreign Trade at Constant Prices 
of Arab Countries With Rest of the World (1960-70)(1970-78). 
Country Group Exports 
196(}-70 I 
Arab countries (unweighted mean) 13.2 
Low-income countries 
(1) 
5.0 
~ l i d d l e - i n c o m e e countries ( 2 ) 5.4 
Industrialized countries 8.5 
Non-market industrial economies 9.0 
Source: The World Bank (1982, pp.124-S) 
(1) Include Somalia and Sudan 
I 
1970-80 
2.1 
-0.4 
3.9 
5.8 
7.1 
Imports 
1960-70 
I 
1970-80 
4.5 13.5 
5.4 3 . 1 
6.4 4 .) . "-
9.5 4.4 
I 
7.9 6.6 
(2) Include Egypt, North Yemen, South Yemen, ~ o r o c c o , , Syria, 
Tunisia. Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria and ~ I a u r i t a n i < 1 . .
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2.8.2 The Balance of Trade 
The overall picture of the current trading position of the 
Arab countries is shown in table 2.13. 
by the table are: 
The main factors revealed 
(a) the fundamental difference between the trading positions 
of the oil states (which apart from Algeria, all earned 
trade surpluses) and the non-oil states which all incurred 
trade deficits, (except for Mauritania) in the period 
1970-75; and 
(b) although throughout the period the aggregate Arab trade 
balance was positive, it fluctuated substantially, largely 
in response to increases in oil prices. 
As shown in table 2.14, oil accounts for over 90 percent of 
the total exports earnings of the oil producing countries. The size 
of the increases in both oil prices and the trade surpluses of the 
oil-States since 1973 has had profound effects on the structure and 
performance of not only those countries, but on the rest of the world 
as well. Although the fall in oil prices and cuts in production 
implemented since 1982 have reduced earnings, in general terms the 
Arab oil producers are expected to remain in surplus for the foresee-
able future. 
2.8.3 The Trade Structure 
There are tlVO major facets to Arab exports. Firstly, they 
are heavily dependent on the primary production of mainly agrari.an 
products and crude oil, and secondly most Arab countries concentrate 
Country Group 1970 
Oil-States 6.181 
Non-oil States -1.200 
Balance 4.981 
Table 2.13 
Balance of Trade in the Arab World al Current Prices 
for 1970-1980 
(U.$ billion). 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
7.434 7.872 11.854 52.882 44.3]3 52.623 48.380 34.980 
-1. 500 -1.514 -1.723 -3.466 -7.376 -7.755 ]] .184 11.347 
5.934 6.358 10.131 49.416 36.937 44.868 37.196 23.633 
1979 1980 Average g.rate 
81.884 131.277 35.7 
12.738 -14.481 28.3 
69.146 116.796 37.1 
Source: Compiled from I.M.F. International Financial Statistics, Yearbook (1979, pp.63-9) and 
(1980, pp.67-73). 
w 
<Xl 
r----
Country 1970 
Algeria 67.5 
Iraq 92.5 
Km.Jait 94 ·2 
Libya 99.7 
Oman 99.5 
Qatar 96.2 
S. Arabia 93.5 
U.A.E. 95.0 
Table 2.14 
Values of Oil Exports as a ~ r c e n t a g e e of 
Total Country's Exports During 1970-80. 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
71. 7 78.8 80.6 91.0 9] .3 90.8 
94.3 92.2 94.5 98.6 98.5 98.3 
94.4 92.7 91.2 89.9 97.5 91.1 
99.8 99.8 99.9 99.95 99.9 99.9 
99.4 99.5 99.5 99.9 99.8 99.7 
96.3 96.2 97.3 98.2 97.2 96.7 
99.9 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.6 99.7 
95.9 95.7 96.6 98.7 97.8 96.5 
- - -- - -- -
1977 1978 1979 
92.9 93.4 90.9 
98.5 98.1 99.0 
89.6 90.5 91. 9 
99.9 99.9 99.9 
99.7 99.4 99.4 
98.7 98.9 96.1 
99.8 99.7 99.8 
96.1 94.9 94.3 
Source: Compiled from I.M.F.,Internationa1 Financial Stati.slics Yearbook 1980, Country pages. 
1980 
91. 6 
99.2 
91.8 
99.96 
99.6 
95.0 
99.9 
93.8 W 
\0 
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highly on just one or a few commodities. Primary agricultural 
products occupy a significant position in the exports of many states, 
notably Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Morrocco and North Yemen, and in 
Egypt and Sudan, for example, cotton is expected to maintain its 
dominance as the leading crop. 
The imports of individual states are more diversified than 
exports, and include consumer goods, capital goods, food stuffs and 
raw materials. In many Arab countries, the rise in imports is due 
to the growing number of industrial and construction projects, inc-
reased consumption of consumer goods and increasing opportunities 
for re-exports. 
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2.9 The Oil Industry 
Having reviewed the development of various economic sec tors, 
this section makes some attempt to show the importance of the oil 
industry in the economies of Arab oil producers. 
2.9.1 Oil Production and Revenues 
There have been some marked changes in the pa t tern of world 
petroleum production over the last two decades. The world leaders 
in total production are shown below: 
1960 1969 1974 1981 1982 
First place U.S .A. U.S .A. U.S .A. U.S.S.R. U.S.S.R. 
35% 24?1, 1 7 . 3 ? ~ ~ 2 1 . l ? ~ ~ 22.n 
Second place Venezuela U.S.S.R. U.S.S.R. S.Arabia U. S .A. 
13.63% l5.3?6 lS.9?6 17 . O ~ ~ ~ 1 8 . 4 ~ 6 6
Third place U.S.S.R. Venezuela S.Arabia U .S.A. S.Arabia 
1 3 . 5 6 ~ 6 6 8 . 7 ~ 6 6 14.3?'; 16.7?(' 11. 9 ? ~ ~
Source: (1) BP (1979 and 1981, p. 18) • 
(2 ) IPIS (1970, p.2) , (1982, p.3) and (1983, p. 2) . 
The most critical factor in the production of petroleum since 
the second Horld War has been the extensive development of Arab oil 
fields. 
As shown in table 2 .1S, the general trend tmvard increased 
production has been accompanied by periodic declines in the output 
of individual states, particularly Kmvait, Libya, Oman, and Qatar. 
Country 
Algeria 
Iraq 
KU\Jai L 
Libya 
Oman 
Qatar ~ 1 ) )
Neutral ID e 
S· Arabia 
U .A. E. 
--
Total 
~ ~
( 1 ) 
Source: 
1971 
780 
1700 
2975 
2765 
285 
430 
545 
1 ~ 5 4 4 5 
1060 
15085 
Table 2.15 
Arab Oil Production and Annual Average Growth Rate for 1971-81 
(Thousand Barrels Daily) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1916 1977 1978 1979 1980 
1060 1095 1010 1020 1075 1150 1230 1225 1105 
1465 2020 1970 2260 2415 2350 2560 3475 2645 
3055 2810 2330 1885 1965 1835 1945 2270 1425 
2240 2180 1520 1480 1930 2065 1985 2090 1790 
280 295 290 340 365 340 315 295 285 
485 570 520 435 495 435 485 510 470 
565 535 540 50U 465 390 470 570 535 
5785 7440 8350 6970 8525 9235 8315 9555 9990 
1205 1525 1680 1695 1945 20]5 1820 1815 1705 
r----- - - - ~ - - 1---------
16140 18470 18210 16585 19180 ] 91:115 19125 21805 1 l) 950 
1981 
1010 
900 
965 
1120 
315 
405 
370 
9990 
1510 
-----
16585 
---
---
Km.ait and Sau(jj Arabia each possess a half 1.nterest jn Lhe Neutral Zone. 
Compiled from 13.1'. (1981, p.19). 
~ - - -
Yearly cik.nge 
81/71 81/76 
% 0, 10 
2.4 -1.5 
-6.2 -18.0 
-10.7 -13. '3 
-8.6 -10.4 
1.0 -2.9 
-0.5 -4.0 
-3.8 -4.6 
8.1 3. 1 
3.6 -5.0 
1.0 -2.9 
.po. 
N 
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On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia, there is an exceptional position 
derived from its possession of at least one-quarter, perhaps as much 
as one-third of the non-Communist world's reserves. Her produc tion 
has increased sharply from 4.545 million bid in 1971 to reach a record 
of 9.990 million bid in 1981, thus achieving the highest growth rate 
in the area at 8.1 percent per annum, followed by UAE. 
The world oil glut had a marked effect on the Arab oil produc-
tion in 1982. For example, in Saudi Arabia output fell to its lowest 
since 1972, leading to a large drop in revenue in 1982. A continued 
low level of oil exports in 1983 combined with lower oil prices means 
that it is possible that some oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait for example, may announce a government budget defici t, 
at least in short term. 
As regards oil revenues, table 2.17 illustrates that the income 
from oil exports increased markedly over the period 1970-80 and espec-
ially after the oil embargo in 1973, with accompanying huge rises 
in oil prices. The sharp increase in oil revenues was due princi-
pally to the increases in oil prices. Table 2.17 also shows that 
the average annual growth rate for oil revenues in all Arab oil expor-
ting states reached 32.8 percent (at current prices) for the period 
1970-80 and 23.0 percent for the period 1975-80. However, inflation 
eroded the real values of those export earnings and as a result heav-
ier financial burdens are being imposed on Arab oil producers in 
recent years. 
Table 2.16 
Arab Oil Production as a Percentage of Total World Production 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 ] 976 1977 1978 1979 
29.7 30.2 31.6 31.1 29.8 31. 9 31. 7 30.3 33.2 
--- ._---
Source: Table 2.15 and B.P. (1981, p.19). 
-.-
Country 1970 1971 
Algeria 3360 3016 
Iraq 279.9 379.2 
Kuwait 569.9 763.0 
Libya 1010.2 1025.0 
Oman 81.7 87.6 
Qatar 1076 1421 
S.AralJia 9.89 14.92 
U.A.E 2307 3803 
_____________ -l 
Table 2.17 
Oil Revenues in Arab Oil Producing Countries for the 
Period 1970-80 at Current Prices 
(million - local currencies) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
4614 6030 17838 16963 20157 23554 23380 33181 
340.3 555.3 1921.0 2414.6 2691. 4 2806.9 3204.2 6287.0 
779.5 894.7 2722.5 2443.9 2617 . 2 2515.3 2591.6 4634.6 
813 .0 ]035.8 21 09. 7 1786.9 2456.7 2885.8 2809.4 4506.7 
88.2 114.8 392.4 497.1 539.5 541.8 5]9.0 743.3 
1674 2400 7813 6906 8467 7817 8889 13494 
18.84 28.93 11 0.54 104.54 136.91 154.98 128.56 197.12 
4541 6953 249661 27006 
I 
33]23 36138 33528 49078 
1980 
47998 
7718.3 
4929.0 
6680.6 
1133.2 
19701 
339.37 
72125 
Source: T .r-1.t'. International Financial StaU.stics, Yearbook 1982, Country Pages. 
Nute: Figures for Saudi Arabia are in billions. 
1980 1981 
31. 8 28. I 
Average Grm.Jth 
rate 
70-80 75-80 
30.5 23.1 
39.3 26.2 
24.1 15.1 
20.8 30.2 
30.1 17.9 
33.7 23.3 
42.4 26.6 
41.1 21.7 
32.8 23.0 
I 
I 
Oil Rev-
Ilue t.o 
GDP ill 
191.9.---
27.5
1 
I 
n.a. 
68.7 
57.4 
63.4 
n.a. I 
79.01 
61 .3 
-- ____ 1 
59.6 
"'" 
"'" 
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2.9.2 Future Prospects 
The future contribution of oil to the economies of Arab coun-
tries will depend upon many factors, which include; 
(a) the size of oil reserves and the rate of extraction; 
and 
(b) their refinery capacities (which will determine the 
extent to which they can export higher priced refined 
petroleum products, instead of crude oil). 
Proven oil reserves at the end of 1982, measured in terms 
of both aggregate reserves and produc t i on years at 1982 extrac tion 
rates, are shown in table 2.18. It was estimated that the total 
oil reserves of OAPEC states accounted for 52.4 percent of total 
world oil reserves at the end of 1979 (the annual report of OAPEC, 
1979, p.S): at the end of 1982 that figure could have risen to 
60 percent. The size of reserves is such that the Arab region as 
a whole will continue to earn considerable oil revenues until the 
middle of the next century which will provide the finance for future 
industrial and commercial development. 
It has been estimated that there will be 47 refineries in 
OAPEC countries by 1985, with a combined capacity of 6,378 thousand 
bid as shown in table 2.19, or 49 percent of the total OAPEC Out-
put (except Syria) at the 1982 rate of production. 
I 
I 
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Table 2.18 
Proven Oil Reserves in OAPEC Countries at the End of 1982 
I 
Proven Oil Reserves 
Total output 
Country (Thousand bid) Total reserves Number of years 
(million barrels). production at 1982 
eo",",....,,..+-; ~ n n ~ ~ t - A " "
Algeria 835 9440 31 
Bahrain 194 197 3 
Egypt 710 3325 13 
Iraq 980 41000 ll5 
Kuwait 695 67150 264 
Libya ll65 21500 51 
Qatar 340 3425 28 
Saudi Arabia 6690 N 165320 68 
Syria 182' 152l 23 
Tunisia n.a 1860 n.a 
U.A.E. 1230 32354 72 
13006 347092 73 
Source: (1) Oil reserves; Oil and Gas Journal, 27.12.1982. as 
cited in OAPEC Bulletin (1983, p.15). 
(2 ) 
Country 
Algeria 
Bahrain 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
Libya 
Qatar 
S. Arabia 
Syria 
Tunisia 
U.A.E. 
Total I 
BP (1982, pp. 18]19) . Oil Production; (a) 
(b) 
(c) 
N 
OAPEC (1983, p.16) for Bahrain. 
OAPEC (1981, p.16) for Syria. 
Figure is for 1981. 
Table 2.19 
OAPEC Refinery Capacities, 1982 
(1000 bid) 
Installed Underwav Planned 
521 - -
250 - -
332 20 250 
335 200 200 
560 150 -
138 220 -
13 50 -
865 995 550 
224 - -
30 100 I -I 
135 60 
! 
180 
3403 I 1795 I ll80 I 
Total 
521 
I 250 
I 602 
735 
710 
358 
63 
2410 
224 
UO 
375 
I 6378 
Source: OAPEC (1983, pp.16-17). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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2.9.3 Gas Production and Reserves 
The build-up of natural gas production and known reserves 
during the 1970s is shown in tables 2.20 and 2.21. Algeria is 
likely within the near future to be the world's largest gas exporter, 
having signed contracts with many European and other countries. 
In order to fulfil its commitments, it is investing heavily in 
liquifaction plants, tankers and pipelines. 
I 
Table 2.20 
Production of Natural Gas in the OAPEC Countries 1970-79 
(Thousand bdoe) 
Country 1970 1973 1977 1978 
Algeria 47 57 134 155 
Bahrain 8 10 52 55 
Egypt - 15 
I 
44 50 
Iraq 13 73 67 55 
Kuwait 0 24 I 88 89 
I 
Libya - 20 I 231 172 I 
Qatar 3 
I 
33 22 7 
S. Arabia 
I 
-
- 57 48 
Syria - - 33 26 
U.A.E. - - 79 58 
Total 75 202 818 730 
Source: OAPEC Bulletin (1980, p.37). 
Note: Information after 1979 as well as the values of 
production/exports is not available. 
1979 
142 
31 
46 
25 
98 
75 
13 
96 
16 
31 
573 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Table 2.21 
Reserves of Natural Gas in the OAPEC Countries, 70-79 
(Million boe) 
Country 1970 1973 1977 1978 1979 
Algeria 24310 18266 21551 18103 22759 
Bahrain 862 690 517 1207 1552 
Egypt 862 724 552 517 517 
Iraq 3190 3793 4828 4793 4741 
Kuwait 7241 6293 5862 5828 5777 
Libya 5172 4655 4431 4172 4138 
Qatar 1379 1379 6897 6897 10345 
S. Arabia 9224 9466 15096 16621 16505 
Syria 129 121 535 259 259 
U.A.E. 1767 2586 3707 3724 3534 
Total 54136 47973 63996 62121 70127 
Source: OAPEC Bulletin (1980, p.38). 
Note: Information after the year of 1979 not available. 
I 
I 
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2.10 Planning for Development 
All Arab governments have drawn up plans to direct invest-
ment into the development of their economies. Although the precise 
content and form of those plans vary according to the political 
systems and ideologies of the countries, their resources and stage 
of development, in many cases the industrial sector ranks as a devel-
opment priority. Especially in the oil producing countries almost 
unlimited funds have been made available to finance new invest-
ment. For example, Saudi Arabia I s expenditure under the second 
development plan (1975-80) reached SR 700 billion (VS $210 billion) 
against its planned expenditure of SR 498 billion, and in its third 
plan (1980-85) expenditure is expected to exceed SR1000 billion 
(VS $300 billion). As can be seen from table 2.22, the government 
expenditure of the oil producing countries has grown rapidly. 
Table 2.22 
Annual Average Growth Rate of Oil Income and 
Government Expenditure (in percent). 
Country Oil revenue Government Time period 
expenditure 
Algeria 41. 5 22.3 1972-79 
Iraq 65.0 35.7 1972-79 
Kuwait 31.2 38.2 1972-79 
Libya 29.8 20.0 1972-78 
Qatar 116.0 50.0 1972-79 
S. Arabia 46.5 42.7 i 1972-79 V.A.E. 43.7 39.0 
I 
1972-79 
Average 53.4 35.4 1972-79 
I 
Source: OPEC Bulletin (1981) and OPEC Statistical Bulletin (1979), 
as cited in Griffin and Teece (1982, p.84). 
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There are three crucial factors which may affect the Arab 
world's economic development, these are: 
1. The continuation of the Middle East conflict. Despite the 
agreements signed between Egypt and Isra el, instability and 
an increase in the arms race in the Middle East have currently 
reached their highest level. 
2. The conflict between Iraq and Iran, that broke out in 1980, 
is another serious problem, in that it has brought to a head 
the political differences between Arab countries. Enormous 
amounts have been allocated in some Gulf States to improve 
b "l" " (1) their defence capa 1 ltles. 
3. The fall in the world demand for oil has reduced the money 
available for investment, and may force countries to modify 
their development plans. Consequently some countries, such 
as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, are concentrating on the 
completion of unfinished projects, particularly in the indus-
trial sector. It seems likely that these countries are pre-
pared to draw on reserves to finance their budgets. 
1. Because of the powerful influence of politics, joint projects 
such as manufacturing among Arab countries, frequently come 
to nothing. 
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2.11 Conclusions 
The Arab region comprises 21 countries varying widely in geo-
graphical size, population, stages of economic development, and 
levels of income. The sharpest distinction is bet\veen the oil-
producing and non-oil producing states. The large increases in 
oil prices which have occurred since 1973 have principally benefited 
those oil producers who have used some of the greatly increased 
export earnings to embark on ambitious economic development prog-
rammes aimed at diversifying their economies, besides improving 
living standards for their peoples. However, some of the benefits 
of the oil boom have spilled over into the rest of the region, where 
some development projects have been financed by borrowing from the 
oil producers. 
Consequently, in contrast to most of the rest of the world, 
the last decade has been one of rapid economic growth in the Arab 
region. For the insurance industry that has meant a large increase 
in the demand for all classes of insurance, which can be expec ted 
to continue to grow. However,the manner in which the economic devel-
opment has occurred, particularly in the oil-producing states, has 
meant that a large proportion of the demand for non-life insurance 
has been concentrated on large individual risks (e.g. oil install-
ations and refineries, steel plants, oil pipe lines, super tankers 
and major construction projects). \ ~ h a t t that fact implies for the 
region's insurance industries will be considered in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN THE ARAB WORLD 
3.1 Introduction 
In mcient times, the Middle East enjoyed, through the Code of 
HaI:lmurabi of the Babylonians, one of the first systems for the 
spreading of risks, and for generations most Arab communi ties have 
had social arrangements to assist those members who, through misfor-
tune, suffered injury or loss. However, it was not until the advent 
of the Europeans in the 19th Century that the modern system of insur-
ance was introduced to the Arab world, and even then it was confined 
to the protection of European owned enterprises. The emergence 
of national insurance markets has been, in large measure, the product 
of the ending of colonial status, and the large increase in the 
demand for insurance following the rapid economic development of 
the region over the last two decades (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
The purpose of this chapter is: 
(a) to describe the development of Arab insurance markets: 
(b) to analyse their main characteristics; and 
(c) to consider their future development. 
3.2 Historical Evolution 
Insurance business commenced in the Arab ivorld in the late 
19th century \.Jith the establishment of European insurance company 
agencies in the capitals of the Arab countries where European owned 
enterprises were in operation. Table 3.1 lists the first insurance 
CompanL 
Algeria 
Bahrain 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Nauritania 
Norocco 
Qatar 
S. Arahia 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
U.A.E. 
Yemen (S) 
Source: 
Table 3.1 
First Foreign and National Insurance Company Operating in the Arab World 
First Insurance Company Operating 
Name 
N.a 
N.a 
Date 
Various British and 
French companies 
Provincial Ins. and 
First half of 
19th century 
Guardian (British) 
Royal Insurance Co. 
(British) 
Royal Insurance Co.(British) 
Guardian Insurance Co.(British) 
N.a 
N.a 
La Espanola (Spanish) 
N.a 
American Inter.Underwriters(USA) 
Liverpool, London & Global 
(British) 
N.a 
N.a 
(British) 
(French) 
Caisses Agricoles Regionales 
(French) 
N.a 
North Brjtish & Mercantile 
(British) 
1920 
N.a 
1950 
1919 
1879 
1953 
1954 
1898 
1919 
N.a 
1881 
First National Company 
Name 
CAAR 
Bahrain Insurance Co. 
National Insurance Co. 
Rafidain Insurance Co. 
Jordan Insurance Co. 
Km.Jait Insurance Co. 
La Union National 
Libya Insurance Co. 
SOMAR 
Le Narco 
Qatar Insurance Co. 
None 
SICOS 
Sudanese Notor Ins. Co. 
Societe d'Assur.Syrienne. 
Agriculture Mutual,CTAMA. 
Duhai Insurance Co. 
National Ins. & Reinsurance Co. 
(1) Extracted from Swiss Re (1964), country pages. 
(2) GAIF (1977), country pages. 
Date 
1963 
1971 
1900 
1946 
1951 
1960 
1947 
1964 U1 
1974 UJ 
1916 
1964 
1972 
1952 
1953 
1912 
1970 
1970 
54 
companies to operate in the region. 
1900 saw the establishment of the first Arab national insurance 
company (the National Insurance Company of Egypt), but between then 
and 1945 few other similar companies were founded. However, after 
Arab countries gained their independence, and especially in the 
1960's and 1970's, many more domestic companies were established 
(see table 3.1). 
Even following the formation of national companies, foreign 
companies continued to dominate the Arab insurance market for some 
years. That position has been reversed in the last two decades, 
through the domestication and sometimes nationalisation of many 
of the markets. The replacement of foreign insurance companies 
by locally-owned companies between 1960/61 and 1982 is shown in 
table 3.2 Although the number of Arab companies has almost trebled 
during that time, they still account for only 1. 6 percent of the 
total number of companies operating worldwide (see table 3.3), and 
under 10 percent of the companies incorporated in developing count-
ries (see table 3.4). 
The ratio of foreign companies to domestic companies operating 
in the Arab region as a \.;hole is still far higher than in other 
developing regions of the world (see table 3.4). However the posi-
tion varies between countries. As shown in table 3.2, no foreign 
companies now operate in Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Mauritania, ~ I o r o c c o , ,
Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria and Tunisia, having either 
been expelled by law, or having chosen to withdraw rather than comply 
with supervisory authorities' requirements. Typically in the latter 
case the insurer had only a small amount of business in the country, 
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Table 3.2 
Number of National and Foreign Insurance Companies 
in the Arab World (1) 
Number of companies 1960-61 Number of companies -1982 
National Foreign C o ~ ~ Total National Foreign Co Total 
Country companies &/or a g e n t ~ ~ companies &/or agent 
Algeria n.a n.a n.a 4 0 4 
Bahrain n.a n.a n.a 4 11 I 15 Dujibouti n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Egypt 17 41 58 7 2 9 
Iraq 4 17 21 3 0 3 
Jordan 1 17 18 21 11 32 
Kuwait 1 31 32 5 15 20 
Lebanon 3 69 72 42 
I 
49 91 
Libya n.a n.a n.a 1 0 1 
Mauritania 0 24 24 1 I 0 1 
rlorocco 22 225 247 19 0 19 
Oman 0 0 0 1 12 13 
Qatar 0 n.a n.a 1 4 5 
S. Arabia 0 10 10 0 150 150 
Somalia 0 10 10 1 0 1 
Sudan I 2 63 65 13 0 l3 
, Syria I 1 71 72 2 0 2 
Tunisia 
I 
4 50 54 12 0 12 
U.A.E. 0 n.a n.a 19 52 71* 
Yemen (S) 0 40 40 1 0 1 
Yp.mp.n (N) 0 n a n.a 3 0 3 
Total 55 668 723 160 306 I 466 
*Figures for 1979. 
Source: Swiss Re (1964) for number of companies as at 1960/61. 
(l) The number of insurance companies are constantly changing 
as new companies are set up or conversely mergers and 
takeovers occur. 
I 
I 
! 
I 
S6 
Table 3.3 
Number of Arab Insurance Companies Compared 
with World Companies (1982) 
Total No. (1) Total No.o 
of World co's oper-Type of '" % company 
companies ,0 ating in 
Arab regioh 
Domestic Companies 10,146 79.7 160 34.3 
Foreign Branch Office 2,580 20.3 306 65.7 
Total 12,726 100.0 466 100.0 
Sources: Ca) Sigma, No. 11/12, 1982, p.3. 
(b) Table 3.2 
ICD'S o_a 
tUlg 1.n 
Arab regior 
U ~ ' ; ; T { : r r '"'r. '" 
1.6 
11. 9 
3.7 
Note: (1) The 10,146 figure represents the domestic private 
insurance companies operating world-wide, and their 
foreign branch offices which total 2,580. 
Table 3.4 
Insurance Companies in the Arab World Compared 
With the Rest of the Third World 
Dome- For-Country Group 
stic 01 eign 01 Total /0 10 
Latin America 771 47.8 290 27.6 1061 
Asia (excl. Arab States) 430 26.7 339 32.3 769 
Africa (exc1 Arab 
States) 251 15.6 114 10.9 365 
Arab World 160 9.9 306 29.2 466 
01 
'0 
39.9 
28.9 
l3.7 
17.5 
Total 1612 100.0 1049 100.0 2661 100.0 
Sources: As for table 3.3. 
Foreigl 
Total 
27.3 
44.1 
31.2 
65.7 
39.4 
I 
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usually written through an independent general agent, so that, for 
example, a requirement to incorporate locally was vie\.;ed as unecon-
omic. 
Conversely, there has been a large inflow of foreign insurers 
to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, attracted by their 
large development potential, and the lack of insurance regulation. 
Whereas in 1979 the 71 insurers operating in the U .A.E. shared 
a total premium income of only US S133 million, of which over 40 
per cent was written by the largest company, in Saudi Arabia there 
was afar larger volume of business available. Nevertheless, in 
both countries intense competition has forced down premium rates 
to such an uneconomic level that some companies are now withdrawing. 
Prior to 1970, the premium income of all Arab insurance markets 
was very small indeed (see table 3.5). Although insurance business 
has grown rapidly since then, the Arab insurance markets are still 
in their infancy. Table 3.6 shows the premium income in eight 
Arab countries split between domestic and foreign companies in 1960. 
The split of the total premiums written between domestic and for-
eign companies for the years 1974-79 will appear in section 3.8. 
3.3 Structure of Arab Insurance Market 
The market structures of the insurance industries operating 
in Arab countries, which range from monopolies to highly competitive 
markets, largely reflect their different political systems. 
can be classified broadly into four types (see figure 3.1); 
They 
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Figure 3.1 
Structure of Arab Insurance Market 
Arab Insurance 
Market Structure 
1 
Nationalised Nationally Mixed Foreign 
~ l a r k e t s s awned markets incorporated 
companies insurers 
oniv oniv 
Algeria Egypt Bahrain Saudi 
Arabia 
Iraq Morocco Jordan 
Libya Tunisia Kuwait 
Mauritania Yemen(N) Lebanon 
Somalia Sudan Oman 
Syria Qatar 
Yemen(S) U.A.E. 
I 
Country 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Mauritania 
~ o r o c c o o
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Table 3.5 
Distribution of P r ~ u m m Income into Life and 
Non-Life Business in 1960 (US$OOO's) 
Non-life Life 
19,803 16,953 
5,431 657 
455 210 
1,716 -
6,838 965 
154 3 
35,328 3,292 
Saudi Arabia 1,061 38 
Syria 2,801 1,031 
Tunisia 7,565 1,603 
Total 
36,756:1 
6,088 
665 
1,716 
7,803 
157 
38,620:1 
1,099" 
3,832
N 9,168" 
Total 81,152 24,752 105,904 
Source: Compiled from Swiss Re (1964), Country pages. 
N: Figures are for 1961. 
Table 3.6 
Share of Premium Income Distributed Among Domestic 
and Foreign Companies in 1960. 
Country ~ o m e s s ic Compa ies Foreign Companies 
~ o n - l i f e e
Percentage Percentage 
Life pf the Non-life Life of the 
US $000 US $CXXl otal US $CXXl US $CXXl total 
lrarket market 
Iraq n.a n.a 45.0 n.a n.a 55.0 
Jordan 98.9 1.1 27 .0 58.9 41.1 I 73 .0 
Kuwait 0 0 0 100.0 0 100.0 
Lebanon 76.1 23.9 25.4 87.4 12.6 74.6 
Mauritania 0 0 0 98.4 1.6 100.0 
Morocco 99.1 0.9 26.1 88.8 11.2 73.9 
S. Arabia 0 0 0 n.a n.a 100.0 
Tunisia 92.1 7.9 35.1 75.2 24.8 64.9 
27.8 72.2 
Source: Compiled from Swiss Re (1964), Country pages. 
60 
(1) The nationalised insurance markets of Algeria, Iraq, Libya, 
Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Southern Yemen, which 
may be further divided into: 
(a) Nationalised insurance markets with only one direct 
insurance company, such as Libya, Mauritania, Syria, 
and Southern Yemen, and 
(b) nationalised markets with more than one direct company, 
such as Algeria, Iraq and Sudan. (1) 
(2) Insurance markets where only locally owned private and/or 
government owned companies operate, such as Morocco, Tunisia 
and North Yemen. 
(3) The mixed insurance markets where foreign and local insurers 
operate together. Within this group are Bahrain, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, and U.A.E. 
(4) Saudi Arabia, where only foreign insurers operate because 
the incorporation of insurance companies locally is prohibited. 
Therefore Saudi owned insurance companies are incorporated 
in other countries in order to be able to operate in the mark-
ket. The contradiction between the adoption of insurance 
throughout the Saudi economy and the Islamic objections to 
insurance is still acute. 
Before 1974 Egypt, with three nationalised direct insurance 
companies, fell into category (1). Following the open door policy 
of that year, it permitted the formation of: 
(1) Sudan has allowed foreign companies to participate to a limited 
extent in its market. UNCTAD (1982, p.6) has pointed out 
that the EI-Nillien Insurance Company has been formed \,]ith 
the participation of Hogg Robinson (London insurance broker 
with 20 percent of total capital). 
61 
(a) 100 percent locally owned companies to operate in its 
domestic market; and 
(b) joint-venture companies with foreign interests in the 
Free Zone to write both foreign and Free Zone business. 
Other developing countries have insurance markets with similar str-
uc tures to those of the Arab world. According to a recent study 
by UNCTAD (1982, pp. 8-15), there are at least 9 Asian and Pacific, 
19 African, and 6 Latin American nations that have monopolistic 
insurance markets. The gro\olth in the number of local companies 
and a decline in the foreign presence is also a feature of non-
Arab developing countries. In addition, where foreign insurers 
are able to remain, their market shares usually decline. 
Both monopolistic and highly competitive insurance markets 
have potential disadvantages for consumers. 
an insurance monopoly are: 
The dangers of creating 
a low quality of service for consumers; 
premium rates that in general are too high and insuffic-
iently discriminate between different risks; 
Lack of product innovation and market expansion; 
Limited underwriting and retention capacity. 
On the other hand, unrestricted entry to markets can lead 
to excessive competition leading to high marketing costs and the 
failure of under - capi talised companies. Therefore, there is a 
case for all Arab countries creating competitive markets but restric-
ting the companies operating in any market to a number commensurate 
\olith the volume of business available. That could be achieved 
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by either supervisory regulations raising minimum capital require-
ments, or set ting minimum premium incomes Ivhich new entrants "\vould 
be required to achieve within a specified period. Ei ther type 
of regulation would force certain companies in some Arab count ries 
either to leave the market or merge with other companies. 
3.4 Problems of the Insurance Market 
The following major problems are commonly found in Arab insur-
ance markets: 
1. 
2. 
Lack of effective insurance legislation and insurance super-
vision. There are very significant differences in the legis-
lation in different Arab countries. Chapter four will discuss 
the problem of insurance regulation and its effect on the 
development of insurance business. 
Lack of trained company staff. This is a problem for all 
Arab insurance markets, though to some extent is varies between 
countries. The major shortcomings lie in the need to develop 
middle management and technical staff. Efforts towards 
training staff are being made in this area, but inevitably 
much time is needed to acquire good practical experience. 
3. There is still great difficulty in compiling premium rates, 
and in many Arab countries insurance policies are written 
in foreign languages. 
4. Effective claims management often suffers from the negligence 
of policyholders Ivho delay in reporting accidents or provide 
tendentious accounts of them. 
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5. The markets suffer from bad organization and from lack 
of co-operation between companies. In some countries there 
are a large number of companies (domestic and foreign) 
operating in a relatively small market in terms of premium 
income, whilst elsewhere there is only one domestic company 
do minating the w hole market. 
6. An acute problem for some Arab insurance markets is the ex-
cessive competition between insurers, which in some cases 
has forced premium rates below the technical rate. 
7. The rapid development in many Arab countries has created 
im balanced insurance portfolios. because m uc h of the business 
is either motor or large risks, rather than medium sized 
corn mercial business, resulting in high exposures and co m-
8. 
plexity of risks. 
heavily abroad. 
This obliges all insurers to reinsure 
A lack of insurance consciousness. rlany peo pie are stili 
not a ware of the benefits of insurance; consequently insur-
ance expenditure in the Arab world as a \vhole remains 
low. 
9. :-Iany millions of Hoslems still regard insurance as contrary 
to the tenets of their faith. and full social acceptance of 
insurance will not occur until it is more widely understood 
by the mass of people. 
3.5 Continued Activity of the Arab Insurance M a r ~ e t t
Since the formation of the General A.rab Insurance Federation 
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(G.A.I.F.) in 1964, the Arab countries have intended to fulfil 
a number of initial objectives, of which the most important \.Jas 
the retention of a larger proportion of premium income either within 
the country of origin or at least within the Arab world. A number 
of measures at local and regional level have been adopted, including: 
1. The nationalization of insurance in Egypt (1961), Syria (1963), 
2. 
Iraq (1964), Algeria, (1967), Libya (1969), Southern Yemen 
(1970), Somalia (1972), Sudan (1970) and Xauritania (1973). 
However these were political moves being part of a general 
process of the nationalisation of wide sectors of the economy. 
The domestication of insurance markets. Insurance companies 
operating in Morocco, and Tunisia must be wholly owned by 
nationals. In Kuwait only locally owned companies are now 
allowed to enter the market, and only domestic insurers can 
write government business. 
3. The formation of national reinsurance companies to receive 
cessions, either voluntarily or compulsorily, from the local 
direct insurers. At present there are seven national reinsur-
ance companies in the region, in Egypt (formed in 1957), Iraq 
(1960), Morocco (1961), Kuwait (1972), Sudan (1974), Algeria 
(1975), and Tunisia (1981). 
4. The formation of reinsurance pools to achieve a greater degree 
of co-operation among Arab insurers and reinsurers, and better 
utilisation of Arab capacity by local business. The Aviation 
and Engineering pool were formed in 1968, the Fire pool in 
1971, the Harine cargo pool in 1972, and the :larine Hull 
pool in 1974. Both Arab reinsurance pools and reinsurance 
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companies, will be examined in detail in Chapter seven. 
5. The formation of the following Arab regional reinsurance 
companies: 
the Arab Reinsurance Company was established in Beirut 
in 1972 and owned by the national companies which are 
members of the G.A.I.F. 
the Arab Union Reinsurance Company was formed in 1976 
in Damascus by the governments of Egypt, Libya and 
Syria. Following the 1978 boycott, Egypt withdrew 
from the Arab Union Re. 
the Mediterranean Insurance and Reinsurance Company, 
established in London in 1978 by the governments of 
Algeria and Libya. 
the Arab Insurance Groups was formed in Bahrain in 1980 
by the governments of Kuwait, Libya and U.A.E, and is 
backed by US 3 billion of capital, of which US 150 
million is paid up. 
6. Joint arrangements have been established to insure the joint 
venture Arab projects listed below. Insurance of some Arab 
airlines and shipping fleets has also been arranged on joint 
slips. In doing so, Arab insurers are aiming to provide 
adequate rates for the insured and to utilise the available 
Arab capacity. 
The Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company at Bahrain. 
The Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company. 
The Iraqi, Jordanian and Syrian Airlines. 
The United Arab Emirates Shipping Company. 
The Algerian, Libyan, Mauritanian, Morocco, and Tunisian 
Airlines. 
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The ~ o r o c c a n n and Tunisian Shipping Companies. 
3.6 Development of Insurance Business 
As indicated in chapter two, the realignment of oil prices, 
resulting in a considerable increase in oil revenues to the Arab 
oil producing countries, has enabled those countries to allocate 
substantial sums for development projects and larger appropriations 
for consumer goods. Because of this development, insurance has 
been required and provided for various classes of business. As 
economic activities have grown, so insurance has developed in regards 
to both the types of risk covered, as well as in the size of premium 
income. 
The rapid growth in premium volume of the Arab insurance mark-
ets during the second half of the 1970s is shown in table 3.7 and 
figure 3.2 Unfortunately, reliable figures on the Saudi Arabia 
market are unavailable. However, Arab and international insurance 
experts, when questioned, estimated that the premium income for 
Saudi Arabia was at least US 1200 million in 1979; 
one-third of total Arab premium income. 
that is, over 
The growth of premium incomes (at local currencies) over the 
years 1974-1979 (shown in table 3.8), reflect high rates of inflation 
but, with the sole exception of Sudan, the annual average rates 
of inflation during the period were much less than those of premium 
income. Clearly the region experienced substantial real growth 
of premium income. 
Generally, the demand for insurance has an income elastici ty 
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Figure 3.2 
Arab Direct Premium Income for the Period 1974-79 
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Table 3.8 
Growth Rates of Direct Premium Income 1974-79 
in local currencies millions 
Country 1974 
Non-life Life 
Algeria 524.7 12.5 
Bahrain 1.2 0.2 
Egypt 29.2 9.0 
Iraq 23.1 1.7 
Jordan 2.4 0.8 
Kuwait 13.8 1.7 
Lebanon 74.5 -
Libya 22.2 O. ] 
Hauritania n.a n.a 
l'Iorocco 463.6 53.7 
Oman 1.4 -
Qatar 27 .6 -
Saudi Arabia n.a n.a 
Somalia 24.6 -
Sudan 5.2 0.4 
Syria 59.0 O.B 
Tunisia 15.B 0.5 
U.A.E. 50.0 -
Yemcn(N) 2.3 -
Ycmen(S) 0.9 0.1 
---- --------
Nl: Growth rate for 1975-79 
N2: Growth rate for 1974-78 
Average Armua1 Growth Rate 
1974-79 
1979 
Total Non-life Life Total Non-life Li.fe Total 
537.2 1253.9 93.2 1347.1 19.0 49.5 20.2 
1.4 8.1 - 8.1 46.5 - 42.1 
38.2 98.8 19.0 117.8 27.6 16.1 25.3 
24.8 80.1 5.5 85.6 28.2 26.5 28.1 
3.2 10.9 2.0 12.9 35.3 20.1 32.2 
15.5 56.3 5.1 61. 4 32.5 24.6 31. 7 
74.5 88.2 24.6 112.8 3.4 - 8.7 
22.3 45.7 1.3 47.0 15.5 67.0 16.1N 
n.a 229.5 - 229.5 15.4 - 15.4 
517.3 1048.9 163.0 1211.9 17. 7 24.9 18.7 
1.4 13.8 - 13 .8 58.0 - 58.0 
27.6 178.8 - 178.8 45.3 - 45.3 
n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
24.6 57.3 - 57.3 18.4 - 18.4 
5.6 11.3 0.4 11.7 16.8 - 15.9 
59.8 206.1 3.9 210.0 28.4 37.3 28.6 
16.3 42.4 2.6 45.0 21.8 39.1 22.5 
50.0 50B.6 - 50B.6 59.0 - 59.0 
2.3 53.B - 53 ' ~ 3 3 87.8 - B7.8 
1.0 3.0 0.1 3.1 27.2 - 25.4 
31.B 33.9 31. 5 
N3: GAIF, ]3th General Meeting, Amman, Jordan, 1980 
Source:(l) As for table 3.7 
(2) IMF (1981) 
Not e: Inflation percentage change in consumer prlCC!'. 
Average 
Amlllal 
Gn)\vLh 
Rate of 
Inflation, 
1974-79 ' 
11.7 
14.7 
10.8
N2 9.0 
11.8 
7.4 
n.a 2 
15.1 N 
10.6 
9.4 
n.a 
n.a 
n.a 
15.5 
IB.2 
8.8 
6.9 
n.a 
18.2 
6.6 
] 1.6 
0\ 
\0 
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of demand greater than one, so that it responds directly to the 
fluctuations of the economic cycle. A study by the Swiss Reinsur-
ance Company, the results of which are shown in figure 3.3, revealed 
that world-wide real premium income declined during the two periods 
of global recession in 1974-75 and 1979. However, given the substan-
tial economic development that occurred in the oil-producing count-
ries following the large oil price increases of 1973 and 1979, the 
real premium income of the Arab world continued to grow throughout 
the 1970s. 
A more detailed review of the development of the Arab insurance 
markets in relation to the rest of the world is provided by tables 
3.9 to 3.11. 
Even if the estimated premium income for Saudi Arabia was 
added to the Arab world total in table 3.9, it would still mean 
the Arab region, with a total population of 168 million people, 
generates only 0.82 per cent of the total world premium income (ex-
eluding the communist bloc). That is approximately the same as 
Spain, one of the poorest European countries, 'vith a population 
of only 37 millions. Expenditure per capita on life insurance 
is particularly low in Arab countries compared with developed count-
ries. 
Table 3.10 shows that the fastest rate of premium growth during 
the 1970s was achieved in non-OECD countries, including the Arab 
countries, though in 1980 the Third \,,1orld still accounted for only 
5 per cent of world premium income. rlore than half of the Third 
World's premiums are generated by the fifteen largest insurance 
markets (excluding Saudi Arabia) shown in table 3.11. 
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Figure 3.3 
Real Premium Growth over the Economic Cycle: 
Total, Life and Non-Life Business 
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Table 3.9 
Gross Direct Premium Income in 1974 and 1979 
(U $ billions) 
~ ~
Country 1974 
Group Non-life % to Life % to Total % to Non-life 
~ r l d d \ ~ r l d d oorld 
North 60 51.88 35 45.42 95 49.30 118 
.l\m2rica 
EEC 32 27.67 19 24.fJ6 51 26.47 70 
On:;D 19 16.43 20 25.96 39 20.24 40 
Rest of 4 3.46 3 3.89 7 3.63 10 
the ~ r f c \ \
Sub-Total 115 99.44 77 99.93 192 99.64 238 
!Arab HorJ( 0.646 0.56 0.055 0.07 0.701 0.36 3.080(3 
---uT 
Total 115.646 100.00 77.055 100.00 J92.701 100.00 24] .080 
Source: (a) Compiled from Swiss Re, Sigma Nos. 5, 1976 and ]981. 
(b) Table 3.7. 
Note: (]) Excluding Arab countries. 
(2) Exc lucting Communist COllllt rics. 
(3) Saudi Arabia fir,urcs are included. 
% to 
\ ~ r l d d
48.95 
29.03 
16.59 
4.15 
98.72 
1. 28 
100.00 
1979 
Life % to 
\.JlJrld 
57 37.46 
43 28.26 
46 30.23 
6 3.95 
152 99.90 
0.157 0.10 
152.157 100.00 
Total 
175 
113 
86 
16 
39Q 
3.237 
393.237 
: ) ~ ~ to 
\..Drld 
44.50 
28.74
1 
I 
I 
21.87 
4.07 
I 
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~ ~ _ 8 ~ 1 1
0.82 
100.00 
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-..J 
N 
1970 
Country Group 
Non-life Life 
EEC 14.680 9.321 
Rest of Europ( 2.505 1.384 
North America 44.714 27.146 
Japan 2.930 5.033 
Rest of OECD 1.126 0.962 
OECD 65.955 43.846 
Non-DECD 1. 950 1.396 
-
World Total 67.905 45.242 
-
Table 3.10 
World Shares of Premium Income and their 
Growth Rates (1970 and 1980). 
(U. $ Billion) 
1980 
0/ in 
'" 
wrld Total 
voluIlE Non-life LHe Total 
24.001 21.2 71.895 45.888 117.783 
3.889 3.4 13.974 8.637 22.611 
71.860 63.5 132.268 69.943 202.211 
7.963 7.0 18.666 40.513 59.179 
2.088 1.9 4.575 2.806 7.381 
109.801 97.0 241.378 167.787 409.165 
3.346 3.0 13.881 7.490 21.371 
113.147 100.0 255.259 175.277 430.536 
Source: S\oJiss Re, Sigma, No. 2, 1983. 
~ ~ ~ in 
wrld 
V01UIlE 
27.3 
5.3 
47.0 
13.7 
1.7 
95.0 
5.0 
100.0 
Average Armual growth rate 
1970/80 
Non-life Life Total 
17 .2 17.3 17.2 
18.8 20.1 19.3 
11. 5 9.9 10.9 
20.3 23.2 22.2 
15.0 11.3 13.5 
13.9 14.4 14.1 
21.7 18.3 20.4 
14.2 14.5 14.3 
-.,J 
w 
I 
Country 
India 
Brazil 
Mexico 
South Korea 
Venezuela 
Nigeria 
Taiwan 
Philippines 
Malaysia 
Algeria 
Iran 
Colombia 
Indonesia 
Morocco 
Thailand 
Total 
74 
Table 3.11 
The Leading Accounts in the Third World 
Insurance Markets: 1980 Premiums 
(US $ millions) 
Non-life Life Total 
592 1,201 1,793 
1,482 280 1,762 
1,070 439 1,509 
587 915 1,502 
901 209 1,110 
546 137 683 
271 326 597 
281 203 484 
328 145 473 
414 42 456 
358 20 378 
293 81 374 
239 96 335 
274 42 316 
154 136 290 
7,790 4,272 12,062 
Source: Swiss Re, Sigma, No. 5, 1982, pp.10-12. 
Share in I world 
volume 
0.41 
0.41 
0.35 
0.35 
0.26 
0.16 
0.14 
0.11 I 
0.11 I 
0.10 I 
0.09 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07 
0.07 
2.8 
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3.7 Premium Expenditure and Insurance Density. 
The size of per capita premiums in various countries provides 
a good picture of the state of d e v e ~ p m e n t t of their national insurance 
industries. However, it should be borne in mind that per capita 
premiums may be affected by various factors, such as: 
1. The degree of economic development, including industrialis-
ation and motorisation; 
2. The growth of population, which in conjunction with 1. deter-
mines: 
3. GNP per capita; 
4. The degree of inequality in the distribution of income; and 
5. How far the people are insurance conscious. 
In most Third World countries the GNP per capita and the degree 
of industrialisation are often limited. This is coupled with a 
relatively high 
nce awareness. 
population growth rate and a low level of insura-
Also the insurance market is often restricted to 
the major cities and therefore the per capita premiums are not r.ec-
essarily of great informative value. 
Premium expenditure per capita in the Arab world is still 
small, as shown in table 3.12. The figures in this table s11O\ .... 
that the highest levels of premium per capita expenditure occur 
in the smallest Gulf States in terms of population, notably Kuwait, 
Qatar and U.A.E. 
Table 3.13 shows premiums per capita in the Arab world compared 
with other regions of the ,",orld. There is a marked di f f erenu; in 
the premiums per capita between developed and developing countries. 
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POI'U]at Ion - Table 2.IA CI.,lpter tWIJ. 
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The LOwpdrlsorl ledvt!s no duu.bt :.h.:H t h ~ ~ rest Lt the world, dS well 
as thl! Arab wurld, are dltferent I dnd per L:diJlta premiulDs .lre much 
lU\ofer those j n t n ~ ~ V.LC.D.(I). the considerable 
p r r l g r ~ s s s in many c o u n [ r l ~ s s u u . t s i d ~ ~ t t l ~ ~ ( ) . ~ . ( : . D D .• the ln$urance 
~ X P e n d i t L . . . l r e e 1s still saldll dr.d will rt!!D.Jln. for the foreseeable 
future. tiny by E ~ r o p e a n n ~ t a n d a r d ~ . . due to the low i n c o ~ e e per capita. 
H a v ! . n ~ ~ said that. in the non-O.E.C.O, 6fowth rate of premiuMs 
~ " r r caplta has recent ly shown signs of being faster t:lan that of 
the v.E.C.D. 
I 
1974 1 ~ ~ 7Y r ~ ~Country Group \tOJal 
. UoIth 
Sorrllfej Ute I Total ~ r d 1 f e ' ' Ute Tuwl R.1te 11 r:"'" _]Q 
105.1 I 
I 
North AlIIe r i ca 283.0 448.1 526.8 254.5 781.3 11.8 
EEC 119.9 72.21 192 .1 25".8 158.7 418.5 10.9 
I Other OECD 73.3 74. 1 147.4 142.8 164.1 306.9 15.8 i 
I I 
I 
Total OECD 
1 
150.0 99.4 2 4 ~ . 4 4 295.2 18d.5 483.7 14.2 
I 
3.4 I I Rest uf the 2 .2 5.6 7.1 4.4 11. 5 15.5 
I Arab lior1d 
lior Id I 4.11 0.4 5. 7 11.9 1.0 12.91 17.7 
I 
Total \lorld 56.9 37.5 94.4 103.9 65.8 169.71 12.4 
* Excluding COllUllun1St countries. 
Sources: C o m ~ 1 1 e d d from: 
(1) Swiss R", S1gma N o ~ . . 5 1976 and 1981 (preMiums) 
(2) The liorld Bank Atlas, 1976 and 1981 (population). 
(3) Table 3.6 and Table 2.1, Chapter two for the Arab 
\lorld. 
(1) In 1980 fur ~ x a m p l ~ , , notdb1e exceptions were KUWdit 
with USS177.77, Argentina w1th U ~ ~ 1 2 ) . 0 9 , , South Africa 
with USS120.36, dnd Sil11!apOre with USS120.09 where th" 
per capita premiums were c o n s i d ~ r a b 1 y y hither thdn 1n 
Spain (USS90.15), Portugd1 (U::$61.98) Grt!t!Ce 
(U 541.80) and Turkey (U 53.6d) (Sigma, No. 2. 1983). 
(2) T h ~ ~ population uf the regions under the study for the 
year 1974 ana 1979 stoud at: 
1 Y 74 IqN 
~ o r t h h AlIIerlca 212 mil11un l24 million 
LEC 267 m. 2e9 ID 
OLeD 263 m cb8 m 
Rest ,)t the liorld 1157 ID un m 
.\rab liur1d 137 m 164 ID 
Source: [1) world Bank AtlaS, IY70 and l,lH. 
(2) Table 2.1 Chapter twU for the A r a ~ ~
Countries. 
J 
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A direct comparison of the growth of premium expenditure per 
capita in each of the Arab countries with that in one of the world's 
most developed insurance markets, the United States of America, 
during 1974-79 is provided by tables 3.14 and 3.15 using the follow-
ing equation: 
C Px / Yx 
P Y 
A ff" A the coe lClent of insurance expenditure relative where C 
to that in the USA 
P premium expenditure per capita in Arab country x. 
x 
PA premium 
expenditure per capita in the U.S.A. 
Y G}lP per capita in Arab country x. 
x 
YA GNP 
per capita in the U.S.A. 
Thus the table shows: 
(a) the comparative levels of GNP and premium expenditure per cap-
ita in each Arab country for each year compared with the U.S.A. 
(b) What progress, or otherwise, each of the Arab countries made 
over the period compared with the U.S .A. in relation to both 
income and premium expenditure; and 
(c) Whether premium expenditure relative to income per capita 
in each Arab country is less than (C< 1) or greater than 
(C > 1) in the U.S.A. 
From table 3.14 it can be seen that income per capita in 
the Arab World grew faster than income per capita of the V.S. 
In some cases for example, Kuwait, Qatar and U.A.E. it went up sub-
stantially due to the high oil revenues. Only in rlauritania it 
fell from 4.35 in 1974 to 2.83 in 1979. There can be no doubt that 
over the same period, premium per capita in the Arab World grew 
Tahle 3.14 
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rapidly. In some countries, the growth of p r e m i ~ m m per capita rel-
ated to the U.S. rose at a slower rate. In Kuwait, Qatar and U.A.E. 
for instance, it was much higher than in the D.S. There is some 
evidence that the growth of premium expenditure per capita in rela-
tion to the GNP per capita in the Arab world grew more rapidly than 
in the U.S. This table also demonstrates that elasticity demand 
for insurance was greater than one, and three countries (i.e. Kuwait, 
Qatar and U.A.E.) had much higher elasticity than other Arab coun-
tries. 
If only non-life business is considered for the purpose of 
this comparison, it can be seen that the growth of premium per cap-
ita, as well as premium per capita in relation to income per capita, 
in the Arab World was rather faster than in the U.S. as shown in 
table 3.15. This can be attributed to the fact that over the period 
1974-79 the share of non-life business in total business ~ " a s s more 
than 90 percent in most Arab countries, Hhile it was much lower 
in the D.S. 
The empirical evidence indicates that one of the primary ele-
~ e n t s s affecting per capita premiums is the level of per capita income 
in a country. When people have a relatively high income and there 
are more assets to protect, they tend to buy insurance because they 
are able to afford it. This hypothesis is illustrated in table 
3.16 and the scatter diagrams shown in figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 
3.7, which shOt" the premium expenditure per capita for life and 
non-life business and the GNP per capita in fifty one countries. 
Logarithmic plotting was preferred to linear plotting as this 
method absorbs the large variation in the data of these countries. 
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Table 3.16 
GNP Per Capita and Premium Exp. Per Capita (1980) 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ll. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27 . 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
Switzerland 
United States 
West Germany 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Grea t Britain 
Canada 
Norway 
Finland 
Japan 
Denmark 
Australia 
Belgium 
France 
Austria 
Luxembourg 
Qatar 
U.A.E. 
Ireland 
~ e , v v Zealand 
Kuwait 
Italy 
Argentina 
South Africa 
Singapore 
Spain 
Venezuela 
Portugal 
Uruguay 
Greece 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Algeria 
Chile 
Ivory Coast 
Mexico 
Tunisia 
Morocco 
Iraq 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Kenya 
Philippines 
Nigeria 
Peru 
Thailand 
Egypt 
Turkey 
India 
(X) 
GNP per capita 
16,440 
11,360 
13,590 
11,470 
13,520 
7.920 
10,130 
12,650 
9,720 
9,890 
12,950 
9,820 
12,180 
11,730 
10,230 
14,510 
26,080 
30,070 
4,880 
7.090 
22,840 
6,480 
2,390 
2,290 
4,480 
5,350 
3,630 
2,350 
2,820 
4,520 
1,520 
1,670 
1,920 
2,160 
1,150 
2,130 
1,310 
860 
3,020 
2,050 
1,180 
420 
720 
1,010 
930 
670 
580 
1,460 
240 
50. Indonesia 420 
51. Pakistan 300 
Source: (1) GNP per capita - World Bank 
(2) Premium per capita - Sigma, 
and U.A.E. 
Premium Exp. ?er Capita 
(Y) (Y) 
Non-Life 
492.8 
548.8 
383.3 
361. 9 
321.4 
269.0 
307.1 
336.7 
170.3 
159.9 
296.7 
319.6 
325.4 
305.9 
283.5 
275.0 
222.0 
199.2 
150.3 
135.2 
162.0 
110.4 
115.2 
34.6 
86.6 
78.9 
64.8 
56.7 
46.6 
37.0 
15.4 
24.4 
22.3 
17.8 
21.1 
14.9 
16.5 
13.7 
12.8 
12.0 
10.8 
8.5 
5.8 
7.1 
7.9 
3.3 
3.6 
3.6 
0.9 
1.6 
1.3 
Atlas 1981. 
~ o . . 2, 1983, 
Life 
467.8 
284.9 
270.6 
241. 2 
257.5 
285.7 
213.3 
176.5 
339.1 
347.0 
205.8 
162.2 
120.1 
113.3 
93.7 
80.6 
7.2 
6.3 
139.4 
123.8 
16.1 
16.7 
8.0 
86.5 
32.2 
11.2 
15.0 
4.9 
3.3 
6.5 
24.0 
10.8 
2.2 
4.7 
0.7 
6.1 
1.1 
2.1 
1.5 
2.3 
3.0 
2.8 
4.2 
1.8 
0.5 
2.8 
0.8 
0.1 
l.8 
0.6 
0.7 
except Qatar 
<'0 
..., 
,,.. 
-<'0 
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Figure 3.4 
~ o n - L i f e e Premium Income Per Capita and GNP Per Capita (1980) 
51 countries 
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Figure 3.5 
Life Premium Income Per Capita and GN P Per Capita (1980) 
51 Countries 
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Figure 3.6 
Non-Life Premium Income Per Capita and GNP Per Capita (1980) 
8 Arab Countries 
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Figure 3.7 
Life Premium Income Per Capita and GNP Per Capita (1980) 
8 Arab Countries 
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Similar plotting has been produced separa[ely for the data relating 
to the size of Arab countries. One marked disadvantage of logarith-
mic plotting, however, is, that it reduces the differential between 
the developed and developing countries as far as the relationship 
between premium expenditure per capita and the GNP per capita is 
concerned. 
The regression lines drawn in the four scatter diagrams 
show the following relationship between premium income per capita 
and the GNP per capita. 
Nodel Y. a + bx. + U. 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
,.;rhere Y. Log 10 (premium income per capita) 
~ ~
X. Log 10 (GNP per capita) 
~ ~
This Model can be used in order to illustrate the relationship bet-
ween X and Y. The results show that the t value for all countries 
as well as the Arab countries is highly significant at l ~ ~ level. 
Nevertheless, it is required to estimate the parameters a and b 
using the least square method. Using the data shown in table 3.16, 
we obtain 
. ~ O . O f f R2 Non-life R2 Life V a r ~ a b l e e I ountr- Coeffic- Std. T- Coeffic Std. T-
lies ient Err. value ient Err. value 
!:1l 
Countries 51 
Constant { 0.884 -2.986 0.243 -12.240 {0.583 -3.632 10.586 -6.195 
GNP-Log 1.317 0.068 19.364 1.354 0.163 8.283 
Arab 
--
Countries 8 
Constant {O.929 -1. 756 0.376 -4.664 {0.814 -1.621 0.411 -3.944 GNP-Log 0.911 0.102 8.866 0.576 0.112 5.138 
The regression equation expresses the relationship between 
premium income per capi ta and GNP per ,.:apita. The v(}luc of b in non-1i fe 
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insurance, for instance, indicates that an increase of l ~ : ' ' in the 
GNP per capita will be accompanied by a 1.317% increase in the prem-
ium income per capita for all countries and smaller, i. e. O. 9 1 l ~ ~ ~
for Arab countries. Also for life insurance, the increase in the 
premium income per capita is much smaller than that of the all coun-
tries. There are some reasons contributing to the limited premium 
expenditure per capita in the eight Arab countries. These :;::easons 
are: 
(i) the low level of knowledge and awa:;::eness of insurance and its 
benefits; 
(ii) the limited degree of development of the various economic 
sectors; 
(iii) the relatively new insurance markets; and 
(iv) the religious attitude. 
The economic significance of insurance in various countries is 
also 
(GNP) . 
illustrated by the ratio of premium/gross national product 
Although part of the growth was attributed to inflation, 
as mentioned earlier, the premium volume in the Arab World increased 
from US $701.5 million in 1974 to US$2037.4 million in 1979. In 
the same period the GNP (World Bank-Atlas, 1976 and 1981) rose from 
us $86.610 billion to US $212.580 billion. However, the ratio 
premiums/GNP, having risen from 0.81 percent in 1974 to 1.03 percent 
in 1978, dropped slightly to 0.96 percent in 1979 (see table 3.17 
and fig u r e 3. 8 ) . This drop was attributed mainly to the [act that 
the ratio of premium/GNP in six oil producing countries '."as dec lining 
in 1979. This was largely due to the massive increase in their 
oil revenues t"hich constitute most of their national income, and 
Country 
Algeria I 
Bahrain 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
~ a u r i t a n i a a
Morocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
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Table 3.17 
Premium as % of Gross National Product 
(Market Prices) 1974-78 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1.16 1.14 1. 05 1.10 1. 23 
0.57 0.95 0.75 1.08 1.07 
0.96 1. 30 1. 37 0.70 0.79 
0.70 0.94 1. 00 0.94 0.85 
0.82 0.99 1. 08 1. 52 1. 50 
0.57 0.45 0.66 1.10 1.06 
0.99 - - - -
0.72 0.66 0.61 0.69 0.69 
- 0.71 0.92 0.73 ('i. n<=; 
1. 6 7 1. 75 1. 79 1. 84 1. 94 
0.32 0.28 0.38 1. 40 1.45 
0.51 0.42 0.48 1. 86 1. 68 
Saudi Arabia - - - - -
Somalia 1. 34 1.15 1. 33 1. 53 1. 70 
Sudan 0.47 0.57 0.59 0.42 0.50 
Syria 0.40 0.47 0.57 0.53 0.50 
Tunisia 1.05 1. 22 1.27 1. 60 1. 45 
V.A.E. 0.21 0.27 0.33 0.87 0.96 
Yemen (N) 0.04 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.29 
Yemen (S) 0.75 0.54 0.70 3.22 3.01 
0.81 0.84 0.89 1.01 1.03 
Sources: (1) Premiums - Table 3.7. 
(2) GNP World Bank Atlas (1976-81). 
1979 
1.08 
1.06 
0.86 
0.85 
1. 61 
I 0.85 
-
0.65 
1.04 
2.04 
1. 31 
1. 05 
-
-
0.34 
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I 0.68 0.49 I 
-
0.96 
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Figure 3.8 
The Ratio of Premium/GNP in the Arab World 
% 
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Source: Table 3.17 
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also in 1979 the growth rate of the Arab's GNP was 38.3 per cent over 
1978, compared with the premium income of 28.2 per cent. 
Moreover, the ratio of premiums/GNP gradually increased in 
most Arab countries during the period 1974-79. In 1974 four coun-
tries showed a ratio of more than one percent, ten did so in 1977 
as well as in 1978, and seven in 1979. An obvious feature of 
table 3.17 is that, in some countries the ratio of premiums/GNP 
has declined during a period of economic growth, so income elasticity 
has been less than 1. In short, the variable factors mentioned 
earlier provide a viable explanation of the lower ratio of premiums/ 
GNP of these countries. However, in the case of oil producers, 
the sharp increases in oil incomes intervene as well. 
Comparing the ratio of premiums/GNP on a world-wide basis 
shows that in North America the ratio rose by 10.5 percent between 
1974 and 1979, compared with 11.9 percent for the EEC, 10.3 percent 
for the rest of O.E.C.D, 23.1 percent for the rest of the world 
and 25.0 percent for the Arab world, as shown in table 3 .18. Anoth-
er insight into the relationship between premium volume and GNP 
for three decades is provided by tables 3.19 and 3.20, and figure 
3.9. The highest ratio of premiums/GNP during the period 1950-
80 was registered by North America, because of its very high economic 
development and because the insurance industry is highly developed. 
The increase was from 5.16 percent in 1950 to 7.0 per centin 1980, 
<.ith an average annual growth rate of 1.0 per cent. In the EEC 
,.here the increase was from 2.67 per cent to 4.50 per cent the annual 
grol-lth rate was greater than in North America i.e. 1.8 per cent during 
the same period. The growth rate in the non-O.E.C.D. countries 
was faster than of the O.E.C.D and registered 2.8 per cent although 
it followed the same broad cycle. 
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Table 3.18 
Premiums as a percentage of Gross National Product 1974-79 
I 1974 19/':.1 I Country 1979/1974 
I Group Non-life Life I Total !Non-life Life I Total °1 I ,0 
I I N orth ~ r i c a a 4.2 2.5 6.7 5.0 2.4 7.4 10.5 
EEC I 2.6 1.6 4.2 2.9 1.8 4.7 11.9 
I Other OECD 1.9 2.0 3.9 2.0 2.3 4.3 10.3 
Total OECD 3.0 2.0 5.0 3.3 2.1 5.4 8.0 
Rest of the 
llirld 0.8 0.5 1.3 1.0 0.6 1.6 23.1 
Arab World 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.1 1.0 25.0 
I Total World 2.8 1.8 4.6 2.9 1.9 4.8 4.3 
* Excluding Communist countries. 
Sources: Compiled as for Table 3.14. 
Table 3.19 
Premiums as a percentage of Gross National Product, 1950-80 
Country Group 1950 1960 1970 1980 I 
North Arerica 5.16 6.15 6.70 7.00 I 
EEC 2.67 3.27 3.80 4.50 
Other OECD 4.24 4.86 5.30 5.50 
Rest of the 
World 0.61 0.83 
I 
1.10 1.40 
, 
Total World 3.61 4.24 4.70 4.80 I 
*Exc1uding Communist countries. 
Source: Sigma No. July/August 1981 and No. 2, 1932. 
Log Scale 
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Figure 3.9 
Premiums as a Percentage of GNP 1950-80 
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Source: Table 3.19 
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Countr:t: 
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Table 3.20 
Annual Rate of Change of Premiums 
as % of GNP 
1950/1960 1960/1970 1970/1980 
North America 1.8 0.9 0.4 
EEC 2.0 1.5 1.7 
Other OEeD 1.4 0.9 0.4 
Rest of the 
World 3.1 2.9 2.4 
Total World 1.6 1.0 0.2 
1950/1980 
1.0 
1.8 
0.9 
2.8 
1.0 
The above tables show very clearly that the grmvth of insurance 
business has been in excess of that of the world economy as a whole 
during the period 1950-80. Although income elasticity generally 
was greater than 1, as income rose the coefficient declined as sho,yn 
by figures 3.4 - 3.7. 
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3.8 Main Features of the Arab Insurance Market 
and its Insurance Business Structure 
The main features of the Arab insurance market will be summed 
up under five headings: 
1. The low volume of premium income. 
Despite the rapid grm"th of the Arab market premiums 
during the 1970s, the premium income of the Arab World never-
theless is still small compared with its relatively large 
area and population. The problem is more acute with life 
insurance, the demand for which remains slow due to: 
Ca) the low standard of living in most Arab countries, 
(b) the cultural and religious influences, 
(c) the lack of solid base of personal risks, 
Cd) the Im. investment returns on the life funds (as 
compared. say, lVith Europe or America), and 
(e) the application of social security provisions 
in some countries. 
Thus, it is clear that the ma iority of the Arab population 
still remain uninsured. For example in Egvpt, out of the 
total population of about 41 million, at the end of 1979 there 
were only 689,049 individual life policies in force (i.e. 
1. 78 percent of the total population), with an average sum 
insured of E£568 (EGID, 1979, P.15). For the same year, 
in the U.A.E. there were 4381 individual policies (i.e. 0.63 
oercent of the total pODulation) in force with an average 
sum insured of DH. 82,106 (MinistrY of Planning, 1982, p.8). 
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2. The continued decline in the dominance of foreign insurers 
Reference has been made to the policies pursued by some Arab 
States of establishing national insurance companies in order to 
reduce their dependence upon foreign insurance companies. The 
success of the three countries in reducing the market shares of 
foreign insurers, in respect of direct insurance business, is shown 
in table 3.21. It does not necessarily follow, however, that they 
have been equally successful in increasing the proportion of the 
domestic business retained by local companies. 
Table 3.21 
Percentage of premium Income Written by National and Foreign 
Companies in U.A.E., Jordan and Kuwait 
U.A.E. Market Jordanian Market I Kuwaiti Market Year National I F o r e i ~ ~ National Foreign I N a t i o ~ l l Foreign 
companies compames companies companies compames companies 
share share share share share share 
1974 37.5 62.5 55.0 45.0 - -
1975 44.7 55.3 54.7 45.3 - -
1976 53.7 46.3 62.0 38.0 - -
1977 60.4 39.6 69.8 31. 2 - -
1978 60.8 39.2 69.5 31. 5 75.0 25.0 
1979 57.5 42.5 71.1 28.9 80.0 20.0 
Sources: Extracted from: 
(1) GAIF (1980), for Kuwaiti and Jordanian markets. 
(2) Ministry of Economic and Commerce (1980) 
for the years 1974-78, and Ministry of Planning 
(1982) for the year 1979, (U.A.E. Market). 
I 
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3. The composition of insurance portfolios 
Two classes of insurance - motor and marine cargo - account 
for above a half of the total non-life premium income of most Arab 
countries (see table 3.22). Generally both classes are compulsory, 
though whereas in the Arab countries of North Africa motor liability 
insurance is required for both bodily injury and property damage, 
in most of the Middle Eastern countries only third party bodily 
injury cover is compulsory. 
Motor insurance is the single most important class of non-
life insurance in many countries, including the highly developed 
insurance markets of the major industrialised countries (see figure 
3.10). The uncharacteristic feature of many Arab insurance markets 
is the importance of marine cargo insurance, which in some countries 
is the largest single class of business. 
for this phenomenon: 
Three factors may account 
(i) regulations requiring all imports to be insured loc-
ally; 
(ii) the increase in the volume of imports during the 
1970s; and 
(iii) the low levels of demand for other classes of insuran-
ce. 
I 
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Table 3.22 
The share of Marine Cargo and Motor of the Total 
Non -life Premium Income 
in Some Arab countries 
Pe rcentage of premium incor.J.e 
Country Period to total business 
Marine cargo Motor 
Egypt 1975-79 33.0 27 .6 
Iraq 1971-80 47.6 16.0 
Jordan 1975-79 32.9 42.7 
Morocco 1969-79 6.8 44.2 
Sudan 1969-77 45.8 n.a 
Syria 1977-79 46.0 27 .6 
V.A.E. 1974-79 36.2 26.4 
Yemen (S) 1977-79 56.0 8.1 
Sources: For Jordan and V.A.E. as for Table 3.21. 
Iraq: Annual Report of National Insurance Co. 
i 
Morocco: Annual Report of Societe Central de Reasurance. 
Egypt: E.G.I.O., 1976-79. 
Syria and Yemen(S): GAIF (1980). 
Sudan: Insurance Controllers, Office Records (1969-79). 
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Figure 3.10 
Share of Motor Third Party Liability Premiums in Total 
Non-Life Business 1970-1979 
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4. The lack of balance between premium income and risk exposure 
As shown in chapter two, rapid industrialisation in the Arab 
World has brought new projects associated with large risks. Indivi-
dual risks have become very substantial in value today. In the 
last few years, insured values of hundreds of million U .S. dollars 
on a petrochemical plant or a conventional power plant have become 
usual in the Arab countries. The transport industry has moved 
to the adoption of large capacity vessels and aircraft. Every 
national fleet comprises a small number of very high value vessels 
or aircraft. Given the limited retention capacity available in 
the Arab insurance markets, a large proportion of the risks have 
to be placed in the international reinsurance market. The following 
problems illustrate the imbalance between loss potentials and the 
direct premium income of an Arab country in 1980. 
Class of Insurance 
Fire-petrochemical plant. 
Aviation - a 747 Boeing. 
Marine Hull - a vessel. 
Sum Insured 
U$400 million(EML) 
U$265 million (hull 
and liability) 
U$ 25 million 
Total gross prem-
ium of the whole 
market portfolio 
for that class 
of insurance. 
US 43m. 
U$ 7m. 
US l3m. 
Although the insurance of marine hull risks has been arranged 
in joint slips by some Arab countries, the imbalance between loss 
potential and premium income is still unresolved, as shown below 
(figures for 1983): 
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Fleet Number of Values per Average Value Total premium 
vessels fleet per vessel for the fleet 
---
A 25 U$835m U$33.4m U$3.25m 
B 9 350m 38.9m 1.40m 
C 10 350m 35.0m 1.50m 
D 13 lOOm 7.7m 1.OOm 
E 15 350m 23.3m 1.70m 
72 U$1985m U$27.6 U$8.85m 
5. Generally favourable claims results. 
Generally, the claims experience of Arab insurance markets 
bear a fair comparison with those of the developed countries. 
As can be seen from table 3.23, results vary considerably between 
classes. Compulsory motor liability insurance tends to be partic-
ularly bad, not least because of government restric tions on rate 
increases. Also claims ratios tend to display larger fluctuations 
than in the case of the developed markets, particularly in the small, 
badly unbalanced marine hull and aviation accounts. 
Six of the Arab countries included in table 3.23 (viz, the 
U.A.E., Jordan, South and North Yemen, Tunisia and Libya) have exper-
ienced lower average claims ratios than the developed countries 
in almost all classes. Iraq has lower average ratios for fire and 
other motor business; Egypt's claims ratios are lower for fire, 
accident, marine cargo and aviation. 
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3.9 Future Development of Arab Insurance Business 
Although the fall in oil prices in 1982 has caused some cut-
backs in economic development plans, the demand for insurance in 
the Arab World should continue to grow at a relatively fast rate. 
Oil reserves are sufficient to provide continuing export earnings 
that can be used to finance economic development plans for several 
more decades. (1) Therefore, Arab insurers and reinsurers can expect 
their premium incomes to continue to grow. 
All classes of insurance should benefit from the continuing 
economic growth discussed in chapter two. Fire premiums should 
increase with the construction of new industrial, commercial, housing 
and other social projects and the trend towards higher insured values. 
The further expansion of Arab trade should also lead to a consider-
able increase in premium volume in marine insurance. 
The growing need for transport as a result of the expanding 
economy and increasing passenger traffic, and the demand for very 
large airports and jumbo jets will have an effect on the development 
of aviation insurance in the near future. A further expansion of 
Arab air traffic should be expec ted in the coming years. As far 
as the future pro spec t for engineering insurance is concerned, ::. t 
seems probable that the scale of investment in cunstruction in the 
Arab World will continue to decline. This means that a lower growth 
rate in premium income will be expected. 
The accelerated revenue growth of many Arab countries has 
resulted in a rise in the income of their people and led to an expan-
(1) Ironically, the War between Iran and Iraq gave an added boost 
to developments in the Arab World. 
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ding demand for cars, a trend which can be expec ted to continue 
for many years to come (see table 3.24). Likewise, rising real 
i ~ c o m e s s should increase the present very 10\. demand for other classes 
of personal inusrance. However, despite the fact that the number 
of motor vehicles in the Arab countries has grown rapidly during 
the period 1970-78, the Arab market is still very small. In 1970, 
out of 21 Arab countries, 12, with a population of 78.59 million, 
had 1,073,983 vehicles ji.e.14 vehicles for every thousand persons; 
by 1978 that number had grown to 28. Hence, compared with the 
developed nations, there is still a very low development rate in 
motor vehicle traffic in the Arab World. (1) 
Although satisfactory insurance developments have been achieved 
in recent years, there is still much to be done in order to increase 
the volume of insurance business in the Arab World. There are sever-
al specific areas of importance: 
(i) It is regrettable that the agricultural sector is still 
a long way from providing adequate insurance coverage. 
Some Arab countries have no crop insurance programmes 
in operation. Others, where the agricultural sector 
is of great importance to their economies, have limited 
and insufficient crop insurance programmes. Therefore 
the insurance companies together with the government 
need to pay greater attention to the development of 
crop insurance. UNCTAD (1980, pp.7-10) suggests a 
number of conditions must exist, which would thereby 
increase the likelihood of successful crop insurance. 
These conditions are: 
(1) In 1980 the United States, with a population of 227.7 million, 
had 151.9 million motor vehicles, i.e. one vehicle for every 
1.5 person. The United Kingdom, with a population of 56 mill-
ion, had 19.2 million licensed motor vehicles, that is one for 
every 2.9 persons. 
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(a) farmers shotd understand and appreciate a crop insurance 
programme. 
(b) farm sizes should not be extremely small and ,.,ridely 
scattered. 
(c) personnel involved in crop insurance programmes should 
have considerable knowledge of the complexities involved 
in efficient farming and insuring. 
(d) a crop insurance programme should be based on sufficient 
statistical data regarding crop losses experienced in 
the past. 
Ce) a crop insurance programme should be supported by comple-
mentary agricultural programmes, such as using efficient 
farming techniques to increase farm production, fixing 
a system of appropriate transportation, storage, and 
processing facilities. 
(ii) It was demonstrated earlier that motor third party insurance 
in some Arab countries does bring in a high share of the pre-
mium. This does not mean, however, that motor premium income 
is well developed. In many Arab countries the premium income 
is still relatively small. This is due to the still low 
level of motorisation in many of the countries. (see table 
3.24). In the meantime the absence of motor liability legis-
lation, in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon for instance, has led 
to a considerable decrease in motor premium income. In Saudi 
Arabia for example, there are only 30 percent to 40 percent 
of vehicles insured. Efforts are needed to find new sales 
channels to reach the hitherto uninsured 60 percent to 70 
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percent. 
(iii) A possible increase in the size of premium income for life 
insurance may depend on: 
(1) the popularisation of life insurance through insurance 
education and adequate marketing methods; 
(2) tackling the effect of inflation on life business; 
(3) As the prices of life insurance in most Arab countries 
are high, it is advisable for individual companies to 
review their prices and make them more attractive from 
the consumer's point of view. The argument against 
high prices in life insurance can be clearly seen in 
the following example on the Egyptian market. El-
Mansoury (1978, p.25) has pointed out that in industrial 
life insurance the price for a term policy to a person 
aged 30 years, for a period of 10 years, \oJit h a sum 
insured of £1,000, is about £12.6 in an Egyptian company, 
whilst in a U.K. company it would be £1.75. Similar 
1 b f d · h f l·f . (1) examp es may e oun In at er types 0 l e lnSl1rance. 
(iv) There are still several classes of insurance such as, credit 
insurance, bonding insurance, Fidelity insurance, Medical Mal-
practice insurance and many others, which are undeveloped 
or unknown in many Arab insurance markets. The expansion 
of these classes of insurance is highly dependent on the 
efforts of insurance companies. 
(1) Despite the absence of data, the life expectancy in Egypt 
is much lower than in the U.K., so the higher premium. 
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3.10 Conclusions 
Insurance in the modern sense was introduced to the Arab World 
by European insurance companies. These companies have dominated 
the Arab insurance markets for a long time. Gradually, since the 
1960s, the number of national companies has increased and with a 
consequent decrease (except Saudi Arabia and U.A. E.) in the number 
of foreign companies. The rapid development of the Arab economies 
has resulted in a high demand for insurance, and premium income 
nearly tripled during the period 1974-79. The rate of premium 
growth during the 1970s ranks foremost amongst many of the developing 
and developed countries. The fastest growth in many Arab insurance 
markets is seen in the two classes, e.g. marine cargo and motor 
insurance. where insurance is compulsory. 
Life insurance continues to be the least developed of all 
classes, and different factors continue to be the deterrent to the 
growth and spread of this class. There is a need for the insurance 
companies in the Arab World to educate consumers about the value 
of life insurance. Once this is achieved, life premium income ,vill 
grow considerably. 
Given the substantial premium income growth that has occurred 
in the Arab World. the expenditure per capita on insurance also 
has grmvn very fast. However, premium expendi ture per capi ta in 
the Arab region still remains relatively small compared with the 
developed countries. 
Furthermore, with the exclusion of motor insurance business, 
the unden,;rri ting results of insurance business in the region have 
generally been profitable during the 19705. 
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It may be concluded that the future for the insurance indu3try 
in the Arab World looks bright. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REVIEW OF INSURANCE A l ~ D D REINSURANCE LEGISLATION 
AND SUPERVISION IN THE ARAB WORLD 
4.1 Introduction 
The governments of many Arab countries exercise considerable 
direct control of their economies. Often the state is either the 
only or the main sponsor of major new investment projects, and be-
sides operating the normal public services, state owned corporat-
ions control large sections of industry and commerce too. Insurance 
is no exception. In some countries insurance and reinsurance insti-
tutions have either been formed by their respective governments, 
or certain forms of help were made available to them. Even in the 
countries where insurance is still privately owned the state often 
exerts considerable influence on both the structure of the insurance 
market and on the way insurance is practised. 
In general. both the operations of insurance companies and 
of contracts of insurance are subject to supervision. Besides 
being governed by the ordinary law of contract, insurance contracts 
are also subject in every Arab country to specific provisions. In 
some countries those proviSions are contained in a special law (e.g. 
Lebanon), whereas in other countries insurance contracts are covered 
by separate chapters in the civil or commercial code, or other codes 
of law (e.g. Iraq). 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine insuranc2 legisla-
III 
tion and supervision in the Arab i..Jor1d and to provide a frame\v'ork 
for the consideration of the present regulations and their effect 
on the development of the Arab insurance industry. 
4.2 The Objective of the Insurance Legislation and Supervision. 
Most governments in formulating insurnnce legislation often 
to some degree have conflicting objectives, notably: 
the protection of policyholders; 
the development of the national economy including the 
building up of locally-owned insurance industries in order 
d h · d d f·· (1) to re uce t elr epen ence on orelgn lnsurers. 
A good example of the conflict between these objectives is 
in the field of solvency margin regulation. The absence in most 
Arab countries of specific provisions for determining minimum solvency 
margins direc tly clashes Hith the obj ec ti ve of protec ting policy-
holders and third party claimants against loss due to an insolvency. 
The problem is more acute if one compares the local absence of solv-
ency margins with the imposition of such margins on international 
insurers by the supervisory laws of their own countries. 
Another example is the exclusion of large international insurers, 
that both enjoy economies of scale and possess the skill to discrim-
inate fairly in the rating of their policyholders I risks, in favour 
of local insurers that may not possess such advantages. 
(1) In Europe, insurance supervision has one common aim: "to safe-
guard proposers, policyholders and beneficiaries and any other third 
party interested in the due performance of the contract. Their 
essential function is to see that insurance concerns conduct their 
business properly and remain solvent, and, in most countries, that 
the contracts conform to the laH. Certain countries carry the princ-
iple of protecting the insured still further, particularly as re-
gards the supervision of premium rates and the limiting of profits of 
insurance concerns" (OEeD, 1963, p.lO). 
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4.3 State Legislation and Insurance 
In Europe and the U.S.A, insurance supervision in its normal 
sense dates from the late 19th/early 20th centuries. For example, 
regulations for life insurance were enacted in Norway in Hl1. and 
the United Kingdom in 1870. 
Insurance statutes in Arab countries may differ in their formu-
lation, but they are derived from two main sources: 
(a) The United Kingdom legislation and tradition; 
(b) Legislation of other Western European countries, espec-
ially France. 
The adoption by Arab countries of one or the other of these systems 
is usually the consequence of their colonial past. For instance, 
in Morocco and Tunisia insurance control and legislation in many 
ways reflects the French influence, whereas in Egypt and Jordan 
the laws follow those of the United Kingdom. 
State intervention in insurance may take many forms; for 
example: 
the state may participate by becoming a shareholder in some 
existing insurance companies (e.g. Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan),or 
it may advance part of the capital in new mixed enterprises 
and support them by special securities (e.g. Kuwait), or 
the state may eliminate all foreign insurance enterprises 
operating in the local market, requiring them either to \vind 
up their businesses or to sell their shares in the domestic 
market (e.g. Algeria, Iraq, Libya); or 
the state may merely enact regulations aimed at improving 
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insurance security (e.g. Jordan, Lebanon). 
The present degree of intervention and supervision came about 
by stages. For example: 
(a) in some countries supervision goes back 50 years (e. g. Egypt 
and Iraq) ~ v h e r e a s s in others it is fairly recent (e .g. Jordan 
and Oman); 
(b) in a number of cases the insurance regulation process has been 
over-taken by nationalisation; 
(c) attitudes to the participation of foreign insurers vary con-
siderably; 
(d) in a f e ~ v v countries, notably Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and United 
Arab Emirates, there are currently no regulatory authorities 
or supervision of insurers or insurance intermediaries, a 
fact which is beginning to cause concern in relation to the 
insurance industry and the public interest. In these coun-
tries, commercial company law is the only regulation applicable 
to insurance and reinsurance companies. 
In conclusion, we are dealing with countries with widely diff-
ering political regimes and attitudes towards insurance. 
exist: 
There 
(i) those countries which still have some degree of free enter-
prise competition; and 
(ii) the socialist countries with nationalised markets. 
However, the discussion contained in this chapter (viz, on 
the supervision of insurance) obviously does not apply to those 
Arab countries where there is no such supervision. 
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4.3.1 Regulations Applicable only to Competitive t'larkets 
4.3.1.1 Commencing Insurance Business 
In those countries with competitive markets (as listed in 
table 4.1), companies are required to obtain prior authorization 
by the state to commence insurance business. This authorization 
takes the form of an administrative act which is ~ s ~ e d e i t h e r r directly 
by the Minister responsible or the responsible authority, usually 
the insurance supervisory service. 
Table 4.1 
Prior Authorization by the State to Commence Business 
Not applicable Applicable 
Nationalised Markets with no Competitive 
Markets supervisory laws i-Iarkets 
Algeria Bahrain Egypt S\! ciqlt 
I Iraq Saudi Arabia Jordan 
Libya U.A.E. Km.Jai t 
Mauritania Lebanon 
Somalia Morocco 
Syria Oman 
South Yemen Qatar 
Tunisia 
North Yemen 
n ;; h,.., t i 
Detailed below are some examples of the various conditions 
that must be met in different countries by insurance companies seek-
ing authorisation: 
(a) In Jordan, no company may be granted a licence to engage in 
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insurance unless it has completed the registration formalities 
in accordance with the law. Also, before commencing business, 
it must furnish a deposit in the form of money or its equiv-
alent in shares and bonds amounting to JD 20,000 if the company 
deals in life insurance, or JD 10,000 in respect of other class-
es of insurance. A foreign insurance company which applied 
to open a branch in the Kingdom must submit several kinds 
of documents, e.g. proposal forms, general policy conditions 
etc. According to the entry in "Insurance in the World IS 
Economies" (1982, p.405),since 1975 Jordan has stopped licens-
ing ne,ol foreign insurers. Nor has there been, since 1981, 
new licensing of domestic companies, in order to prevent the 
fragmentation of this small market. 
(b) Licensing of insurers, insurance agents, actuaries and assess-
ors is required in Km"ait. All registration formalities, 
including those required by company la,ol, must be completed 
before a licence is given. A licence must be renewed annually 
for each class of business accepted. Only Kmolaiti nationals 
can be licensed as agents: likewise nowadays an insurance 
company must be owned by Kuwaitis (Financial Times, 1979, 
pp.19-20). Like Jordan, Kuwait discriminates against foreign 
insurers, no new licences have been granted to foreign insurers 
since 1961. 
(c) In Lebanon, each insurer and intermediary must be constituted 
as a corporation, and comply '''ith minimum c.:lpital and reserve 
requirements, before a licence is granted. 
(d) l'lorocco and Tunisia have used the licensing regulCltions to 
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reduce the numbers of companies operating in their markets. 
Both countries have introduced regulations requiring licensed 
insurers to conduc t a minimum volume of business. ~ l o r o c c o o
first introduced such legislation in 1965 with the follow-
ing results: 
Year Minimum net (of reinsurances 
ceded) premium income 
Number of 
companies 
Before After 
1965 1 million dirhams (U$254,OOO)(1) 130 54 
1968 
operative from 1968 
4 million dirhams (operative 
from 1971) 
54 30 
By 1977 only 19 companies, all of them at least 50 per cent 
Moroccan owned, were still operat ing. In Tunisia the Im.J 
of 31st December 1974 required companies to maintain a minimum 
net premium income of TO 500,000 (U$ 1,145,475)(2) or lose 
their licence. 
(e) In Qatar, despite the fact that foreign insurers are allmved 
to operate in the country, no new licences are now being issued 
to foreign insurers. (iJood, 1983). 
It is common to specify in the licence the class(es) of busi-
ness the company is authorised to write. If the company decides 
in the course of its business to engage in some other class of inSllr-
ance it must make the appropriate application to the competent auth-
ority. This is important in countries where financial guarantees 
are required for each class of business transacted. 
The authorization to carry on insurance business miJY be, and 
generally is, withdrawn when the legal requirements and the condi-
(1) US converted at 3.9367 dirhams. 
(2) TO 0.4365 was equivalent to one US$ in 1974. 
117 
tions on which the authorization was granted arc no longer fulfilled. 
In Jordan and Kuwait, for example, the licence is withdrawn if 
there is a loss of one-half of the company's paid-up capital. 
In Lebanon the licence is withdrawn if the enterprise has not commen-
ced business during the period for which the licence \Vas granted. 
Determining whether or not a company's financial base is unsatis-
factory is left to the supervising authorities. 
Lastly, in the case of Norocco and Tunisia the licence may 
be \.;rithdrawn if the company's volume of business falls below the 
specified minimum. The practical effect of the authorities' efforts 
to eliminate marginal companies has been the disappearance in recent 
years of a large number of small companies. 
4.3.1.2 The Legal Conditions 
In order to set themselves up in business, insurers are as 
a rule, required by the authorities to assume a particular legal 
foro; usually the forms recognised are the joint stock company 
with limited liability, and the co-operative or mutual company. 
Legislation to this effect has been enacted in Tunisia. In Lebanon 
mutual companies may conduct only life, sickness and personal acc-
ident insurance business. In Morocco, although there are no special 
requirements in this regard, all the national companies are of the 
joint or mutual type. In Egypt, Jordan and Oman national companies 
must be stock companies. In no country are individuals or partner-
ships allo\Ved to underwrite insurance business, though in Jordan 
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and Lebanon business can be placed with Lloyd's of London. 
Basically, insurance law is supposed to regulate two broad 
fields; the functioning of insurance companies. and the contract-
ual relationship between insurance companies and policy-holders. 
The obligation to submit to the supervisory authority those docu-
ments which form the basis of the contractual relationship with 
policy-holders, exists in most Arab countries. In addition, many 
countries have laid down rules which apply to contracts for specific 
classes of insurance, generally compulsory forms of insurance. such 
as motor vehicle and workmen's compensation(e.g. Jordan and Kuwait). 
Reinsurance operations in the majority of Arab countries are 
usually carried on under much less stringent legal restriction, 
even though reinsurance is universally accepted as an essential 
factor for the financial stability of local insurance. Regulations 
aim mainly to ensure that technical and financial principles are 
observed, and the requirements of the lmv usually do not go beyond 
the stipulation that copies of treaties and other contractual docu-
ments shall be submitted by ceding companies to the relevant author-
ity. 
4.3.1.3 The Financial Conditions 
As one of the essential purposes of insurance legislation 
and supervision is to ensure that companies are always able to fulfil 
their commitments, the lmvs define the financial guarontees that 
must be offered by these companies. Insurance companies are usually 
required to have a minimum share capital, the requirements for which 
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vary from country to country, and change with the course of time. 
The amount may also vary according to the class of insurance under-
taken, the highest amount being required as a rule in life insurance. 
In most countries, the supervisory authority's requirements in this 
regard are specified by law. For example: 
(a) In Lebanon, insurers are required to have minimum capital 
of LL 1 million (except for Lloyd's, which has special provis-
ions. 
(b) In Egypt, companies owned by Egyptian persons or corporations 
are required to have a minimum share capital of LE 2 million, 
half of ~ . h i c h h must be paid-up. Similar requirements apply 
to companies operating in the Free Zone. 
(c) In ~ o r o c c o , , an advisory committee exists which may recommend 
a minimum share capital relating to individual cases. This 
is consistent with the government policy of enhancing local 
retention by encouraging the formation of large units. 
(d) In Tunisia, the minimum share capital is 1 million Tunisian 
dinars. 
(e) In Oman, local companies should have a minimum share capital 
of OR 300,000. 
Share capital requirements often differ between f o r e i ; ~ n n and 
domestic companies; Km.aiti companies, for example, must be entirely 
Km.aiti oHned and have paid-up capital of KD 150,000, whilst foreign 
insurers must have a paid-up capital equivalent of KD 225,000. 
The paid-up capital of a Jordanian insurance company :nily not be 
less than JD 100,000, ivhilst that of a foreign company may n\)t be 
less than the equivalent of JD 250,000, (Financial Times, 1977, 
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pp.4l9-20). Recently Jordan announced a proposed new law which 
would require an increase in paid-up capital to JD 1. S million for 
all companies operating in the market. The government's main object-
ive is to reduce the number of smaller companies (ReActions, 1982, 
p.ll) . In U .A.E. a minimum paid-up capital is required of Dh 1 
million for local companies, Dh 2 million for companies from other 
Arab countries and Dh 3 million for foreign companies (Wood, 1983). 
In addition, companies in some Arab countries are also required 
to effect deposits in respect of life and non-life business as shown 
below: 
Country 
Egypt 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Oman 
Deposits required 
Life 
E£ 2S,OOO 
JD200,OOO 
KD 45,000 
L1100,OOO 
ORlSO,OOO 
Each class of non-life 
E£ 2S,OOO 
JD150,OOO 
KD 30,000 
L1100,OOO 
OR 7S,OOO 
Source: (1) (Wood, 1983) for Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon and Oman. 
Note: 
(2) (Crowe, 1982, p.406) for Jordan. 
Deposits for foreign insure€ must be twice the amounts 
required of Omani companies. 
Arab countries are not alone in discriminating betl.Jen local 
and foreign companies. Supervisory regulations in many developed 
and, especially, developing countries, so discriminate in regard 
to financial requirements. However, a larger share capital per 
se provides no guarantee that a foreign insurer will be able to 
fulfil its obligations to local policyholders. Far more satisfQctory 
are solvency regulations equally binding on all companies, plus, 
possi bly in t he case of foreign insurers, a requirement t ha t they 
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maintain adequate funds locally to cover their liabilities to local 
policyholders. 
Nevertheless, insurance control in the competitive Arab insur-
ance markets varies from country to country. For example, to protect 
policyholders rights against unfair treatment, companies in Egypt 
and Tunisia must submit their contracts, premium rates, and tariffs 
for approval. In Kuwait the general conditions of insurance contrac-
ts are not controlled, but copies of policy forms have to be submit-
ted to the Insurance Controller, (Crowe, 1982). 
4.3.2 Regulations Applicable to Both Competitive and 
Nationalised Markets. 
4.3.2.1 Reserving Regulations 
Generally insurers receive premiums at the incept ion of the 
period of insurance, but do not discharge their liability under 
most of their insurance contracts during the accounting year in 
which the premium is received. They must, therefore, make provision 
in their accounts for possible future payments. This provision 
is made by what are known as technical reserves. In life insurance, 
such reserves are based on actuarial valuations, employing assumed 
mortality rates and future intenst rates, of the present values 
of prospective claims less prospective premiums in respect of pol-
ieies in force. In non-life insurance at least three forms of reser-
ves are necessary: ( i) the out standing claims reserves; (ii ) 
the ine urred but not reported (I BNR) e laims reserves; and (iii) 
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the unearned premiums reserves. 
Any soundly managed insurance or reinsurance company must 
in the process of carrying on insurance, establish reserves equiva-
lent to the most accurate estimate possible of the funds which the 
company must possess at any time in order to be able to pay both 
outstanding (including IBNR) claims, and claims (capital sums, annui-
ties, indemnity) ~ v h i c h h may arise under its policies by maturity 
or other stipulated contingency. In motor third party liability, 
Horkmen I S compensation, and liability insurance, loss reserves are 
important as the actual results may not be known for five or more 
years. If the reserves cannot be estimated accurately, then a larger 
fluctuation of underwriting results will be produced, and vice versa. 
In some Arab countries the reserve for unearned premiums must 
be calculated as a fixed percentage of the premiums written in the 
course of the year. The proportion tends to range from 15 to 50 
per cent as shown below: 
Country Harine business Non-Narine business 
Egypt 2 5 ~ b b 4n, for motor 1. P.L. 
40% for other non-
marine 
Jordan 3 0 ~ ~ ~ 40?'; 
Kuwait 1 5 ~ ~ ~ 3 0 ~ ~ ~ (Both on gross 
premiums) 
Lebanon 2 5 ? ~ ~ 40% 
Oman n.a 45 ? ~ ~
Source: (1) (Crowe, 1982) for Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and Oman. 
(2) (UNCTAD, 1982, p.l8) for Egypt. 
Usually insurance laws expressly require the establishment 
of reserves for losses which have occurred but have not yet been 
settled by the date of the balance sheet. Such laws in most Arab 
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countries seldom specify the method to be employed for their calcula-
tion. Therefore both insurance and reinsurance companies generally 
are free to calculate their outstanding claims reserves according 
to either actuarial principles or other rules, although a fixed 
minimum is sometimes prescribed. The one exception is the Arab 
countries in North Africa (whose insurance la\vs are based on that 
of France) which require insurance companies to calculate their 
outstanding claims on a 'file-by-file' basis (UNCTAD, 1972, p.53). 
In none of the Arab countries do the insurance regulations 
specify the method of calculation of IBNR reserves. It can only 
be assumed that supervisory authorities take an empirical view in 
the light of the experience of insurance companies operating in 
the local market. 
Reinsurance adds a new element to technical reserVes. Insurance 
companies can transfer part of their liability to reinsurers against 
payment of a reinsurance premium, but they still remain fully liable 
vis-a-vis the insured and other third parties. Insurance companies 
are allowed to deduct from their technical reserves the part charge-
able to their reinsurers; when such deductions are made the resid-
uals are known as 'net reserves'. The difference between the gross 
reserve system and the net reserve system is important, particularly 
where the law provides that a sum equivalent to the technical reser-
ves must be i n ~ t e d d locally. 
4.3.2.2 Investment Regulations 
The regulations discussed above regarding the calculation 
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of technical reserves and, in some cases, solvency margins, are 
one aspect of the security for policyholders. Some countries go 
further in specifying the forms of securities in which the assets 
covering those liabilities must be invested. For example, Kuwait 
requires 40 per cent of the reserves to be in cash deposi ted in 
Kuwaiti banks, not more than 25 per cent in foreign stocks, not more 
than 30 percent in Kuwaiti companies, and the balance in local prop-
erty development. In Norocco, at least 50 per cent of the under-
writing reserve must be invested in securities or other documents 
of title guaranteed by the Noroccan government, and the remainder 
may be invested in real estate (or mortgages, mortgage bonds and 
the like) or securities quoted on the Casablanca stock exchange. 
Insurance regulations in Arab countries very seldom permit 
the investment of funds abroad. The feH known exceptions are 
Kuwait, as noted above, and Lebanon, which allows insurance companies 
to purchase foreign shares and bonds approved by the Hinister for 
the National Economy, to an amount not exceeding the mathematical 
reserve for life insurance contracts expressed in foreign currencies, 
and up to a maximum of 50 per cent of the total mathematical reserves. 
In the countries which make express provisions about investment, 
these are usually intended for the benefit of the national economy, 
and hence investments are limited to local markets (e.g. Tunisia). 
The supervisory authority may go even further in tailor-making 
his regulatory control of investment by specifying the percentage 
and forms of investment for each class of business (e.g. Jordan). 
In countries where private companies are not allo'iled to oper-
ate, all insurance business being in the hands of state concerns 
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(Algeria, Iraq, Libya, ~ a u r i t a n i ~ ~ Somalia, Southern Yemen and Syria), 
investment is nevertheless subjec t to certain rules, like\llise aimed 
at ensuring that assets are invested in such a \.Jay as to satisfy 
both the technical requirements of the companies and the needs of 
the national capital market. Because in these countries the object-
ives pursued may be achieved to some extent by more direct state 
action, the law may be much less explicit and can continually be 
Cldapted in a much more flexible manner to the needs of the moment. 
For example, in Egypt and Iraq, the governments have interfered 
Hith companies management to achieve social objectives, such as 
investment in housing. 
The criteria of security, yield and liquidity must be taken 
into account \IIhen investments are selected. 'lany Arab countries 
have specific limitations (an authorised list of investments) on 
a life or non-life insurer I s investment. A l ~ h o u g h h similar policies 
are pursued in many other developing countries, in many cases capital 
markets are not well developed so that there are fe\.Jer investment 
activities and opportunities in these countries than in the developed 
countries. This may impose further limitations on investment pol-
icy and the choice of types of investment. In the Arab countries, 
some of the most extreme restrictions are those of Iraq and Syria. 
For example, in 1970, 43.1 per cent of the total investments of 
the three Iraqi insurance and reinsurance companies \IIere deposited 
\.Jith government banks at an interest rate of approxir:lately 6 per 
cent. The share of deposit of the total investment increased sub-
stantially during the period 1970-78 and reached 82.1 per cent in 
1978 (see table 4.2). Such a policy was not attributed to supervi-
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Table 4.2 
The Share of Deposit at Banks of the Total A m ~ u n t t
of Investment in the Iraqi Market 
(I.DOOO's) 
National Ins. Co. Iraqi Life Ins. Co. Iraq Re 
Deposit Total Deposit Deposit Total Deposit Deposit Total De Qosit 
at banks invest- total at banks invest- total at mnks tnvest- total 
lll2nt inv. nent inv. lICnt tnv. 
2250 5254 42.8 1352 2934 46.1 1370 3345 41.0 
2750 6568 41. 9 1247 3284 38.0 2340 4382 53.4 
2900 8105 35.8 1514 3384 44.7 3345 5485 61.0 
4150 9775 42.5 1925 4052 47.5 4275 6701 63.8 
6750 12301 54.9 2543 4887 52.0 5669 9920 57.1 
13200 20440 64.6 3538 6074 58.2 9888 13198 74.9 
26200 34205 76.6 4325 7205 60.0 13412 16957 79.1 
34500 40600 85.0 5180 8494 61.0 16154 20105 80.3 
38125 44721 85.3 6569 10043 65.4 20201 24298 83.1 
Source: Annual reporLs of the General Insurance Organization, Iraq. 
Total 
Deposit Total 
at banks invest-
nent 
4972 11533 
6337 14234 
7759 16974 
10350 20528 
14962 27108 
26626 39712 
43937 58367 
55834 69199 
64895 79062 
I 
DeQQsH I 
total : 
inv. I 
I 
43.1 
44.5 
45.7 I 
50.4 
55.2 
67.1 
75.3 
80.7 
82.1 
...... 
N 
0\ 
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sory regulation or government direction. All three companies were 
incompetently managed due to the inexperienced and unskilled invest-
ment personnel. The central concern in this investment policy 
is that the interest rate never exceeded 6 per cent which was far 
below the inflation rate, bearing in mind the companies ,.]ere not 
required to follow such a policy. In this case companies were there-
by endangering the welfare of both their policyholders and their 
national wealth. Given the lack of management expertise possessed 
by many companies throughout the region, a case could be made for 
the enactment of legislation requiring companies to invest in a 
diversified range of assets. 
4.3.2.3 Control of Premium Rates. 
State control of premium rates is common in many countries. 
The objectives may be to ensure that premiums: 
(1) are not inadequate because that would imperil the insurer's 
financial stability; 
(ii) are not excessive; and 
(iii) discriminate fairly between different classes of risk. 
Thus government supervision may aim to protec t consumers from the 
dangers of monopoly power on the one hand and destructive competition 
on the other. However, rate regulation itself may have disadvant-
ages, for example if it delays changes in premium rates in response 
to changing risk factors or inhibits innovation in premium rating, 
so possibly acting as a barrier to new competition. 
Amongst the 21 Arab countries, premium rates are subjec t to 
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state regulation in 11 countries. The commonest form of regulation 
involves the supervision of minimum tariff rates for some classes 
of insurance (notably, fire, motor and marine cargo) which are bind-
ing on all insurers operating in the country, as, for example, in 
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia and Syria. 
The case for tariff rates rests on the op eration of the law 
of large numbers; that is, instead of each insurer having to fix 
premiums on the basis of his own limited claims experience, a tariff 
association can pool the claims data of all of its members and there-
by reduce the degree of sampling error in its claims analysis. Desp-
ite such advantages, it does not necessarily follow that uniform 
tariffs binding on all insurers are in the best interests of cons-
umers (see the U.K. l'1onopolies Commission Report, 1972, pp.16-19), 
and the above technical argument in favour of tariffs obviously 
does not apply if individual insurers do not maintain adequate rec-
ords, or the combined experience of the whole market is too limited 
to provide reliable loss statistics. Unfortunately. that is the 
case in many Arab countries. For example, mortality tables, which 
are the basis for life assurance tariffs, are produced only in Egypt 
and Iraq: insurers in other Arab countries have to rely on foreign 
mortality statistics. 
Consequently apart from the larger Arab countries, notably 
Egypt, Iraq, Morocco and Syria, where tariff associations calculate 
their m·m premium rates, tariffs are often based on British, French 
and other data. 
Whatever the technical basis or the origin of the tariff, 
it usually has to be submitted to the supervisory authority, though 
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in some countries, e.g. Kuwait, the authority only supervises the 
tariff structure for compulsory motor 
. (l ) 
~ n s u r a n c e . . However even 
when law confers certain powers on the supervisory authorities, they 
often leave insurers considerable liberty in tariff matters, and 
only ask to be informed of the rates or the technical bases used. 
In the countries where insurance is nationalized, rate fixing 
is rarely left exclusively to the insurance companies; usually 
tariff control is left to the same body which is in charge of insur-
ance supervision. In Egypt this role is performed by the Egyptian 
General Insurance Organization and in Iraq it is performed by the 
State Insurance Organization and its Technical Committees; in Syria, 
the approval of the Hinistry of Economic Affairs and Foreign Trade 
has to be obtained (UNCTAD, 1972, p.67). According to the same 
source(pp.101-4) the governments of North Yemen, Lebanon and Sudan 
do not regulate their tariffs. 
Only a few governments control commission and management expen-
ses. The strictest regulations in this field are to be found in 
the countries where the tariffs are controlled. Except in a few 
special cases in life assurance, commissions are usually related 
to premium income Hith maximum permitted loadings varying from 10 
per cent to 30 per cent. 
(1) In many Arab countries, following a decision of the supervisory 
authorities, motor tariffs, for instance, have been increased due 
to the poor experience of the last few years. For example, particu-
lar measures have been taken in ~ l o r o c c o o to reorganise the premium 
rates of motor insurance. These measures are (UNCTAD, 1980, p.20): 
"(a) merit rating; rating \"ill depend not only on the use and power 
of the vehicle but also on the age of the driver, how long he has 
had his driving licence, his previous ace ident record and t he age 
of the vehicle, (b)penalization of bad drivers; the premium increase 
can be up to 100 per cent of the basis premium; drivers who have 
not caused an accident \Vill receive a rebate of up to 30 percent 
of the basic premium, and Cc) adaptation of tariffs to cost of living 
increases and the price of the spare parts. the 1973 tariff has 
been increaseolby 30 percent to take account of rises in this respect." 
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In :'lorocco the supervisory authority allmvs .3 maximum commi-
sion of only 18 per cent for agents and 15 per cent for brokers. 
In Tunisia, commission on motor vehicle business is subject to 
an upper limi t . It is difficult to apply similar control over 
the management expenses, and in most of the countries this factor 
is excluded from the legislation. Morocco, however, is an except-
ion: a l'1inisterial Order of 1967 imposed a management expense 
ceiling of 27 percent of the premium income for insurance companies 
in the motor vehicle branch, which they may not exceed under penalty 
of withdrawal of their licence, (this follows French practice). 
4.3.2.4 Reinsurance regulation 
There are many factors which determine the proportion of risks 
to be retained by insurers and reinsurers. Insurers are free in 
all Arab countries to decide the size of their retention capacity. 
Retention limits are a function of the size of the risks and the 
financial capacity of the insurer, who is faced \.ith the problem 
of balancing his commitment according to the number and size of risks, 
with a safety margin added to the pure premium and the accumul.:lted 
free reserves. These are complicated problems which, it is thought 
can best be solved by the insurer concerned. The supervisory author-
ities refrain from interfering even though mistakes may gravely 
affect not only the stability of a company but even a country's 
balance of payments in the event of excessive recourse to reinsurance 
abroad. In some countries measures are taken to influence retention 
limits in an indirect way, such .:lS the policy of the Moroccan govern-
ment of concentrating the market on fe\ver but larger insurers, or 
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the nationalisation of other markets. 
Regulations governing reinsurance institutions in Arab countr-
ies are very much connected to their status and relationship to 
the state. Accordingly a distinction must be made between those 
applying to reinsurance institutions functioning in the public sec-
tor, which enjoy a total or partial monopoly of the reinsurdnce 
in their respective markets, and those governing reinsurance institu-
. (l) 
tions in the prlvate sector. 
In the countries in which reinsurance institutions are state-
owned, they are given a partial monopoly of reinsurance. If direct 
insurers have to make compulsory con·cessions to these state institu-
tions, they are free (except in Algeria) to cede the excess over 
their retention capacity to foreign reinsurers. This is the case, 
for example, in Egypt, Iraq, Kmvait, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. 
In Algeria, the Compagnie Centrale de Reassurance has 100 percent 
of the surpluses of domestic insurers and it retrocedes its surpluses 
abroad. Table 4.3 shows the government participation in reinsurance 
written in Arab countries. 
(1) Gerathe\vohl (1980, pp.578-79) has pointed out that some 
countries like Belgium, France, Luxenbourg, tre Netherldlrls, and 
a large number of developing countries do not hdve any kind 
of reinsurance company supervision, while others, such dS Aust-
ria, Germany, U.K. and U.S.A., do have such supervision, but 
along very different lines. In Europe (O.E.C.D., 1963, :).31), 
except in the Netherlands and the U. K, the la\.;r relating to 
direct insurance contracts does not apply to reinsurance. 
I 
I 
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Table 4.3 
Government Participation in Reinsurance Underwriting 
country 
Algeria 
Bahrain 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Historical Development 
All insurance companies 
were nationalised bet-
ween 1966 and 1967. A 
pool was created in 1971 
to write all reinsurance 
business. The Compagnie 
Centrale de Reassurances 
was formed in 1975 as a 
state owned enterprise. 
Present Position 
The 'CCR' has a mono-
poly of placing reinsur-
ances abroad. 5% of 
each reinsurance treaty 
must be ceded to the 
African Re. 
No history of government No government participa-
participation in reinsur tion in reinsurance 
anceunderwriting. underwriting. 
All insurance companies 
were 'Egyptianised' in 
1957. The 'Egypt Re' 
was formed in the same 
year. Nationalisation 
took place in 1961. 
The National Insurance 
Co. of Iraq was formed 
by the government in 
1950 to operate in a 
free market. The 
'Iraq Re' was formed in 
1960. Nationalisation 
took place in 1964. 
No history of government 
participation in rein-
surance underwriting. 
The Kuwait Re was formed 
in 1972. 
No history of government 
participation in rein-
surance underwriting. 
The 'Egypt Re' receives 
a 3 0 ~ ~ compUlsory cession 
introduced when the 
Company was formed. 5% 
of each re insurance 
treaty must be ceded to 
the African Re. 
The 'Iraq Re' receives 
a compulsory cession of 
25% of all types of 
business as well as writ 
ing more than 40% of all 
reinsurance treaties. 
No government participa-
tion in reinsurance 
underwriting. 
Companies cede 20% of 
their insurance business 
to Kuwait Re on a vol-
untary basis. 
No government participa-
tion in reinsurance 
underwriting. 
J 
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Table 4.3 continued 
Country 
Libya 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Historical Development Present Position 
Insurance was national-
ised in 1969. The Libya 
Insurance Company became 
the sole company. 
The government has a 
one-half interest in the 
'Arab Union Re' which 
receives a 10% compul-
I
, sory cession of non-life 
Libyan business. Libya 
Insurance Company cedes 
Insurance under m o n o ~ y y
control of the state 
company, the 'Societe 
Maurl.tanl.enne 
d'Assurances et de 
Reassurances. 
also 25% of its reinsur-
ance treaties to the 
Mediterranean Insurance 
and Re Company. In 
addition, 5% of each 
reinsurance treaty must 
be ceded to the African 
Re. 
The SMAR may Hrite in-
Hards reinsurance 
business and also has 
full control over the 
outHard placement of all 
its OHn reinsurances. 
5: of each reinsurance 
treaty must be ceded to 
the African Re. 
The Societe Centrale de The 'SCR' nOH receives 
Reassurances was formed compulsory cessions of 
in 1961 as a semi-gover- 10% plus up to 50% of al 
ment owned company treaty reinsurance. Also 
which receives a compul- 5% of each reinsurance 
sory cession 5%. treaty must be ceded to 
the African Re. 
No history of government No government participa-
participation in in reinsurance under-
reinsurance underwriting writing. Foreign insur-
N .a. 
No history of government 
participatio'l in I 
reinsuran:e underH=itingl 
I 
ers must offer a share 
of 15% of all acceptance 
to Omani insurers. 
N.a. 
No government partici-
pation in r e i n s u r a n c ~ ~
undenvri ting. 
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Table 4.3 continued 
Country 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
United A.E. 
Historical Development Present Position 
Insurance under monopoly The State Insurance of 
control of the state, Somalia has full control 
the 'State Insurance of 
Somalia' . 
Insurance was 'Sudanised 
in 1975. The 'National 
Re' was formed in 1974 
with majority state 
ownership. 
Insurance was national-
ised in 1963. The 
General Insurance 
Organisation is the 
only company transacting 
insurance business in 
the country. 
The 'Societe Tunisienne 
d'Assurances et de Rea-
ssurances' was formed 
in 1960 and is a major-
ity state-owned company. 
The 'Tunis Re' was 
formed in 1981. 
over the outward place-
ment of all its own re-
insurance. 57:, of each I 
reinsurance treaty must 
be ceded to the African 
Re. 
There is no compulsory 
cession but companies 
cede 2 0 ~ ~ of non-life 
reinsurances to the 
'National Re' on a vol-
untary basis. 5 7 ~ ~ of 
each reinsurance treaty 
must be ceded to the 
African Re. 
The 'General' may 
write inwards reinsur-
ance business and also 
has full control over 
the outward placement of 
all its own reinsurances 
The Syrian government 
owns one-half of 'Arab 
Union Re' which receives 
a 10% compulsory cession 
of all Syrian business. 
The 'STAR'manages the 
'Fonds de Garantie' for 
the Government. This 
receives the 10% comp-
ulsory cession of all 
reinsurance business. 
Receives treaty cessions 
The country cedes 5 ~ ~
of each re insurance 
treaty to the African 
Re. 
No history of government No government participa-
participation in rein- tion in re insurance 
surance underwriting. undenvri ting. 
I 
I I 
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Table 4.3 continued 
! 
Country 
South Yemen 
North Yemen 
Dujibouti 
Historical Development 
Insurance was national-
ised in 1970. The 
'National Insurance and 
Reinsurance Company' is 
the only company. 
Present Position 
The NIRC may write in-
wards re insurance busi-
ness and also has full 
control over the outward 
placement of all its own 
reinsurances. 
No history of government No government participa-
participation in reins-
urance underwriting. 
tion in reinsurance 
underwriting. 
No history of government No government participa-
particpation in 
reinsurance underwriting 
tion in reinsurance 
underwriting. 
Source: (1) Neave (1977). 
(2) Crowe (1982). 
(3) Wood (1983). 
Private reinsurance is usually governed by laws 
applying to direct insurance, as in Morocco and Kuwait, on the 
grounds that there is no essential difference bet,oJeen reinsurance 
and direct insurance, so that it is logical to apply the same laws, 
regulations, and government supervision to both. HOIoJever, due to 
the i n t e r n a t ~ n a l l nature of reinsurance operations some of the provis-
ions applied to direct insurance cannot be applied in the same way 
to reinsurance. These include the rules relating to the establish-
ment of technical reserves and their investment. If the direct 
insurer is required to hold funds representing the technical reserves 
for his total commitments and make investments accordingly, reinsur-
ers in that case must be exempted from such obligations. 
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4.4 Prohibition to Take Out Insurance Abroad 
The purposes of insurance laws and regulations might be only 
partly achieved if insurance could be freely taken out abroad. 
For this reason, most Arab countriffiprohibit the insuring abroad 
of property situated within the country, persons resident there, 
or liability for risks there incurred. In Morocco, it even goes 
so far as to declare the insurance contract ~ u l l l and void, although 
this nullity may not be pleaded aQainst the insured. whether Dolicy-
holders or beneficiaries in good faith. Kuwait and Jordan have 
general prohibitions on insurance abroad. but exception is made 
for life assurance. Table 4.4 shows those Arab countries which 
forbid, and those which permit insurance with non-resident insurers. 
Table 4.4 
Insurance With Non-Resident Insurers 
Forbidden Permitted 
Algeria Morocco Bahrain 
Egypt Oman Qatar I Iraq Somalia Saudi Arabia I 
Jordan Sudan U.A.E. 
Kuwait (1) Syria 
Lebanon Tunisia 
Libya South Yemen 
Mauritania North Yemen 
(1) Except for marine policies. 
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Arab countries are not unique in imposing such restrictions, 
h h 1 d 1 d 
. (1) 
w ic are a so common amongst eve ope countrles. 
As far as domestic coverage of risks is concerned, it is clear 
that insurance transactions connected with international trade, 
especially insurance of carriage of goods, present the most difficult 
problems. Depending on whether the conditions of sale are stipula-
ted as f.o.b. or c.i.f., the transport risk is borne by importer 
or exporter, and the insurance is therefore taken out by the former 
or the lat ter. The terms of the commercial contract govern the 
matter and that is why the insurance legislation of a number of 
countries refers to the terms of the contract of sale ,vhich the 
seller and buyer are left to negotiate freely. 
In Iraq, the state indirectly plays a part through the credit 
institutions, by avoiding the placing of marine insurance abroad. The 
banks are instructed not to open letters of credit on other than 
a C. and F. basis. This means that whenever a letter of credit 
is involved for the importation of goods into Iraq, insurance must 
be effected in Iraq. The governments of many other Arab countries 
(1) For example, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain, 
and Turkey forbid the taking out of insurance abroad. Some 
countries tacitly allow insurance to be placed abroad (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom). Furthermore, some of these 
countries (Denmark,Iceland. Norway, Sweden), esnecially in 
the case of life assurance have restrictions for exchange 
cant rol reasons. In Denmark, Iceland, ~ o r w a y y and SHeden, 
transfers of life insurance premiums are subject to certain 
restrictions from the exchange control authorities (O.E.C.D. 
1963, p.32). Since the removal of exchange control on 13th 
December 1979, U.K. residents (including corporate bodies) 
have freedom to ~ u r e e their risks abroad, except for some 
classes of insurance subject to compulsory insurance regulation 
which must be placed with companies authorized by the govern-
ment to write such business in Britain. (Carter, 1974-78, 
7.4-02). 
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also require that all goods imported must be insured locally with 
domestic companies. This point will be discussed further in chapter 
eight. 
Such practices are common amongst developing countries, many 
of which now require local cover for imports, and in some cases 
for exports too. UNCTAD (1980, p.ll) has reported that by the end 
of 1979 some 30 developing countries employed this strategy, which 
has led to complaints in certain developed countries. For example, 
in the United States, the American Institute of Marine Undenvriters 
has complained to the government about the obstacles and restrictions 
to United States trade. Some developed countries pursue a different 
approach. In France, for example, it has been stated that: 
"insurance connected with the performance of contracts which 
involve preferential credits granted by France should be under-
written on the French market. The Department of Insurance 
and the Department of the Treasury have worked out a clause 
for insertion in financial protocols or financial implementing 
conventions concluded with countries which receive credits 
of this kind. The clause provides that contracts financed 
under the protocol in question are to be invoiced at the FOB 
price, but that if the insurance is handled by a French company 
it may be financed through Treasury loans or guaranteed private 
credits. This clause appears in the financial protocols 
concluded with nearly all the countries Hhich negotiated prefer-
ential credit agreements with France in 1975, including Bangla-
desh, Morocco, Brazil, Syria etc.". (L'Argus, 1976). 
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4.5 Regulation for Compulsory Insurance 
Most Arab countries have enacted compulsory insurance laws 
in respect of the following risks: 
(a) Motor Liability: 
The majority of the Arab countries have passed laws requiring 
the owners of motor vehicles to take out public liability 
insurance. This obligation is usually embodied in special 
laws, and regulations other than the general laws which are 
applicable to insurance companies and insurance t ransac tions. 
\-1hether by means of special law or general legislationgovern-
ing insurance, most countries have found it necessary to intro-
duce the principle whereby compensation for damage suffered 
by third parties as a result of a traffic accident is guaran-
teed. Regulations governing motor third party liability 
in the Arab countries are given in table 4.5. 
Cb) Employer's Liability: 
The second most common type of compulsory insurance is employ-
er's liability. Such business is carried on by a single 
state-owned company, or several companies, or may be by an 
authorized insti tut ion. Unfortunately, information abollt such 
insurance in the Arab World is unavailable. 
Some Arab countries have also extended compulsory insurance 
provisions to include: 
1 - Fire and life insurance on mortgaged real estate (e.g. 
Iraq) . 
2 - Fire for the productive sector, fire and hail for the 
Country 
Algeria 
t:r,ypl 
Ira,! 
Joro.ln 
rllW<l1t 
1,('h.1tV)1l 
1.1 hya 
t1nrncc () 
0111.'111 
~ - ; i 1 t ) ( l l l Arahla 
J.cgislat ion 
Ordinance 74·751 
30.1.74. b 75-58/ 
26.9.75. Deere!. 
80·14 to 80-37, 
16.2.80. 
--- - - - - ~ - - - -
Compu]sory motor 
third "arty liahlll 
ty Insurance law 
6 ~ 2 2 of 1955 
Law No. 52 of 1980 
as from 1.1.81, 
compulsory 1nsulanc 
against vehicle 
ace i dC'nt 5 
- - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~
Civil law l.8.76.111 
force as fronl 
1 . I . 79 . 
T I a f f I L La w (, 7 !7 b 
tlllilstelialOnler 
81/7f, I.aw of TOIL s 
tl/19fd ilmt>lIdpd hy 
!.aw. 42)61 . . &.?'! is' _ ~ _ _
Civil Code 
Penal (ode 
La" 28 of llJ. 3.71. 
\)('c rees 'l. 6 /8, 1/12. 
8.17. 2 ( ) . 8 . 6 ~ . .
Arretes 6.9.41. -
_ •. 1. "--lL1l!: . 
Lep,islalinn 
_ .. il! a f l . . , . i ! _ ~ _ . .
Taille 4. ~ ~
l(e&1I1at 1 ~ } _ I l . ~ ~ ~.. " - , , r n ~ n g g ]·hI!.I.!,,,ny !olabl]lly Insu.ance III the Arah Wntld. 
Compulsory 
II ahl 11 t y cover 
for nat iona]s 
f. f o r e l ~ n e r s s
Ye" 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Ye" 
Ypc. 
No 
Statulory minimllm sums inSlIH:d 
Private Cilrs Motor Cycles Ot her vehicle 
categories 
11111 i DIll crI 
Unlimited 
Unllmlled 
'Blood money1 dep-
end "1'''" trihal de 
(islon JllS(lOO per 
event 
Hnll ml t ed 
1111 Im. 
IInllmlted IInllmUed 
IInll ml t ed Un 11m1l ed 
IInllmited Unlimited 
Same as f/>r PI ivatp cars 
Unlimited, , , ~ c e l ' t t In la,;", of 
d('alh KJ) 10.000 
IInlimlted 
VcllicJe lip to 
horse POWt:1 
1 l I 1 . ~ I I O . O ( j O O "thels: 
DIIJ Ill: _. ___ ~ _ _
IInllml t ed 
DII. I m occupants 
1 n51lTance: 
nil. 100,000 per sect 
minimum Oll.lm. 
r.hnlce of 
insllrpr 
Monopoly of S.A.A. 
free choice from 
among admi tted 
compdnies 
Rolling 
Compulsory talirf 
IInlfoIm tariff for 
a I I co' s hu t d I f f -
erent tariffs accor 
dlng to Iype of 
vehicle 
- t - - · - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Monopoly of 
National Ins. Co. 
Free 
Free 
Free 
HOJlflpoly of LiI'ya 
Ins. Co. 
Free choire frl)m 
among co's admitted 
by Ihe Ministry of 
£'.! I l , i l ~ ~ ~ ~__ 
Frpf'> 
New uniform taliff 
to Le pill In force 
as from I. I.BJ. 
Tariff to be appr-
oved by Controller 
of Insurance 
IIniform tariff 
Flee 
C ( ) m p l J l ~ ; i l [ [ y tart t [ 
detenllinerl by f.lin-
_ L ~ t . . ! L L 0_ f . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ! y y
Hi nj -st [y (.f Fi UilIlC<-' 
mllst approve t.lf-
i (fs. 
!lallrain taliff 
Flt'(> 
,..... 
~ ~
o 
TAALr. 4.5 contInued. 
Count ry 
Somalja 
Sudan 
! ~ v r r 101 
Tunl si a 
North Yemen 
South YClHt>n 
Legislation 
Compulsory T.P.L. 
mutor insurance law 
The road traffic 
ordinance 15.4.19-
_ . ~ ~ L ! 2 ~ 2 1 l 9 ~ ~ ~__ 
De('ree-Law 71 of 
26.9.51, mol or 
vehicles law of 
1.10.74. 
Law 6(l-1l of 
10.11.60. Dpcle" 
61-80 of )0. I .6l. 
Sh'tria Ldw 
lIotnr Celr jnsuran(e 
l(ThJ rd P.nty RJ sks) 
JI.a\J 12/lQ76 
r.omflU 1 sory 
liahilily cover 
for IIallonals 
___ ~ - , - - o r e I 8 n e r s s
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Statutory minimum slims insured 
Private cars 
Sh.60,OOO per event 
Sit. 20,000 peT 
person Sh.10,OOf) 
1 l l ~ l l I i i ~ ~_____ _ 
Unl I mi led 
IInllmlterl 
TD. 50,000 
pe reI a i m a lid pe r 
vch1 t...: le 
Uotor cydes 
S.tmp as ()[ 
prtvafe cars 
Unlimited 
Unl Iml t ed 
Same as for 
prb'ate Lars 
Unlimited per e v e n ~ ~ Same as for 
YR.96.000 ver I prlvale cars 
person. YR.300.000 
m. ddmage 
Other vehicle 
catej\()!le!, __ _ 
Sh. 120,OO() per 
event SH. 20,000 
per person 
Ji'!, } ~ ~ ~ ~ ,"-.dam_ag 
linll miled 
UnUml led 
linllmlled 
Same as for 
private cars 
1I111Imit(,d Ilnlimited Unlimited 
(No CQVt,'l fot TUat er-i.tl dcllHi1ge) 
I _ ~ ~
Sou r ( L': Extracted tTom S\-;iss Re. Stgtna, Nu. 11/12,11)80.11111 No. 12. 19H-L 
Untfl: (1) O"ly in AIRetla and Ila(! n , , ~ f a l l l t t lialdllty is adopled. 
(2) Illfollna1ioll ahotlt n"jihouti anri tfillJl-jtania is uuavai1ab1c. 
(3) HOff,1 Ihird party lialdlity is ,ompIII""IY in Bahrain, (Ji,tar and 1l.A.E. - Ahll Illodbi only, (lJood, 1483). 
ChoicE' of 
insurer 
free 
free 
Not free 
Free 
Free 
HOllopoly of 
of National Insur-
ance and RRJ nSUI all 
ce L O ~ ~
Rat i IlR 
Accordln/l tu 
cuhi.c capitctly, 
weight, nn of 
__ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ r v f c e . .
Free 
lJlltf'lrm tariff 
Ta ri f f approved 
hy supervisory 
authorlly 
Free 
[Jnt f ortn l ill i f t 
...... 
.po 
...... 
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socialist agriculture sec tor, and fire and water damage 
for public and co-operative institutions entrusted wit!1 
real estate management, e.g. Algeria, (Crowe, 1982, 
p.ll) . 
3 - Third party liability for aircraft (e.g. Egypt and Jordag. 
4 - Architects' and contractors' liability (e.g. Algeria, 
Egypt, Iraq, Syria). 
5 - River craft (e.g. Iraq). 
6 - Hunters and work accidents (e.g. Morocco). 
7 - Personal liabilities for airports, transporters, doctors 
and medical officers (e.g. Algeria). 
All the countries of Western Europe have some types of insur-
ance which are compulsory. Such insurance has to be taken out 
either with private insurers established in the country or with 
state or semi-state institutions. The sectors in which compulsory 
insurance has most often been instituted are motor third party lia-
bility, workman's compensation and employer's liability. 
4.6 Nationalisation of the Insurance and Reinsurance Market 
As mentioned in chapter three, nationalisation of insurance 
in the Arab World wasa political act associated with nationalisation 
of wide sectors of the' economy. Nationalisation of the insurance 
industry has taken various forras. In a number of countries the 
practice has created a state-wide monopoly of the insurance business 
(e.g. Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Mauritania, Somalia, Syria, South Yemen); 
in other countries the market has been partly nationalised and 
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some local private companies have been allowed to continue to func-
tion (e.g. Sudan). 
In the countries where the whole insurance market is national-
ised it is usual to include in the legislative text the basic regula-
tions ~ . h i c h h give the nationalised company a monopoly. This \-las 
the case, for example, in the People's Republic of Southern Yemen; 
its Nationalisation Act provides that: 
"the Insurance Authority, Economic Agency for the Public Sector 
and National Planning, is responsible for insurance and reins-
urance business in the People's Republic of Southern Yemen 
including the formulation and execution of a national insurance 
and reinsurance policy. This policy should be based essen-
tially on the following principles: all insurance and rein-
surance business shall be carried on exclusively by the Public 
Sector, as of the date of nationalization; the private sector 
may not carry on business of this kind without the express 
authorisation of the national insurance and reinsurance company, 
nor may insurance policies covering risk and liabilities in 
the People's Republic of Southern Yemen be taken out abroad". 
(UNCTAD, 1972, p.79). 
The nationalisation of insurance and reinsurance in 
other countries was carried out on basically the same pri-
nciples. t'loreover, \-lhen direc t insurance has been fully 
nationalised, reinsurance is often nationalised as well. 
It has already been pointed out that Iraq and Egypt have rein-
surance companies \-lhich are answerable to the government, 
and whose main task is to co-operate with the direct insurance 
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companies in order to increase their capacity - in particular, their 
underwri ting capacity. Reinsurance in these countries has been 
modified to be operative within the framework of nationalisation; 
usually a decree is passed to establish a reinsurance company and 
to regulate business relations between this company and direct insur-
ers in areas such as co-insurance, reinsurance and retrocession. 
In countries where insurance is in the hands of a single nat-
ionalized company, administrative and technical supervision differs 
from the type of supervision exercised in countries where insurance 
is in private hands. This point has already been noted in the 
case of the People's Republic of South Yemen. In Syria authority 
to supervise the nationalised company, rests ,,,ith the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Foreign Trade. In Iraq and Egypt the situation 
is identical, but the fact that between the government and the insur-
ance companies there is a body which holds the shares of the compan-
ies and determines their policy introduces a new element into the 
supervision (UNCTAD, 1972, p. 83). Thus the Egyptian General Insur-
ance Organisation and the General Insurance Organisation of Iraq are 
the insurance supervisory authorities in these two countries. 
4.7 The Problems of Supervision. 
The advent of Arab insurance practices and the growth in insur-
ance business as a result of economic development, together with 
the increasing interdependence of the economies of the Arab count-
ries, has given rise to the need for legislation in order to control 
and supervise insurance and reinsurance companies. This legis la-
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tion to some extent, has promoted the development of Arab insurance 
markets, by providing for both guidance and supervision of the activ-
ities of insurance companies, thus protecting policyholders I inter-
ests and national wealth. On the other hand, the existing state 
of supervision may hinder the development of these insurance mark-
ets. .This is attributed to the fact that: 
(i) the state may not supervise the insurance industry in an effec-
tive manner, and 
(ii) there is still difficulty in formulating and operating insur-
ance regulations (which is common in countries at an early 
stage of development). This legislative and supervisory 
obstacle to the development of Arab insurance markets can 
be illustrated by a few examples: 
(a) Owing to the absence of active competition, insurance 
services rendered policyholders by the insurer(s) of 
(b) 
a nationalised insurance market are inadequate. Premium 
rates applied for some classes of insurance are high 
in order to realise huge profits. In other \vords, 
the premium rates offered to the insured are higher 
than those available from a competitive market. Clearly 
this conflicts with the reasonable premium rates objec-
tive sought by the nationalised insurance market. 
Sometimes the investment objectives, like sec uri ty, 
yield and liquidity, may collide with an insurer's 
management activities when the latter is demonstrably 
lacking in competence or reliability. Recent experience 
of the Iraqi insurance market provides a striking exam-
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ple of u n s o ~ n d d investment practice. 
(c) In most of the Arab countries there is excessive recourse 
to foreign reinsurance markets. The blame is not to 
be shouldered by insurance companies alone - insufficient 
insurance supervision carries the biggest share of the 
blame. 
(d) The insurance regulations in some Arab countries may 
increase the cost of insurance for policyholders (thus 
colliding with the objective of policyholder protection), 
since the compulsory reinsurance cessions to the national 
reinsurance companies have to be made on terms less 
advantageous than those available on the international 
markets. 
(e) The availability of some types of insurance, e.g. Work-
men's compensation, motor third party liability etc., 
has emerged as a fundamental objective of inurance regu-
lation. Although these classes possess considerable 
economic and social value, up to the end of 1983. they 
have not been enforced in some Arab countries. 
The above situation leads to the questionof \V'hether it might 
be possible for Arab insurance regulations to be improved. One 
possibility would be for an advisory committee to be formed within 
the General Arab Insurance Federation (GAIF). This committee should 
be directed to: 
1. Study the financial position of the insurance companies and 
suggest improvements in their free capital in order to streng-
then their financial base. 
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2. Examine and suggest measures to check the premium rates of 
various classes of insurance, to bring about more reliable 
rates. 
3. Study the demand for foreign reinsurance and encourage the 
supervisory authority to take steps to prevent under-reten-
tion. The purpose of this is to ensure that the companies 
retain a minimum written premium for their own account, and 
that foreign reinsurance is used only for risks exceeding 
the capacities of these companies. 
4. Examine the existing provisions regarding investment policy 
and find an adequate policy which would generate a good income 
as well as providing security, (co-ordination of the investment 
activities with the economic objectives of the government 
must be taken into consideration). 
5. Propose new la,.;s concerning those classes of insurance deemed 
to be social in nature, e.g. motor third party, workmen's 
compensation etc·, to ensure that coverages are available. 
If the GAIF is unable to establish such a committee it rrny he useful 
for Arab countries wishing to examine their insurance regulations 
to call upon the assistance of the United Nations Development Prog-
ramme (UNDP). Such a progranune includes insurance experts from 
developed countries available to advise developing countries on 
such matters. (International Insurance Advisory Council, 1972 p.18). 
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4.8 Conclusions 
The history of insurance legislation and supervision shows 
that in most countries its present form is the result of gradual 
growth and there are very significant differences in the legislation 
and supervision in different count ries. There are also still some 
countries where insurance companies and insurance contracts are 
free from any form of regulation and supervision, e.g. Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia and U .A.E. In these countries, insurance companies 
are governed by the normal practice that applies to commercial comp-
anies. 
One can look forward with some hope to an improvement in the 
existing regulations and that the issue of ne\.J ones will continue 
to expand, in part due to the absence of insurance legislation in 
some Arab countries. 
Government interference in the insurance industry is found 
in both developed and developing countries, but because the insurance 
markets of the developed countries are reinforced by a high standard 
of insurance legislation and supervision, their insurance industry 
is fairly strong and ,.;ell-developed. On the other hand, \.Jhere 
the insurance supervisory authority has insufficient experience, 
as in most Arab countries, one cannot expect that the insurance 
industry will grow properly and the aims it seeks to achieve \.;ill 
continue to remain unattainable objectives. 
Furthermore, it would seem to be that most Arab countries 
have no regulations with regard to fixing of retention limits or 
controlling the proportion ceded to foreign reinsurers. This situa-
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tion coupled with unskilled underwriters, has led to smaller individ-
ual retentions by the companies and underutilization of their actual 
retention capacity. Clearly, there is an urgent need to increa0e 
the experience of supervisory personnel by training facilities, 
so that Arab countries can promote the sound growth of their domestic 
insurance and reinsurance markets. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE EFFECT OF LARGE RISKS ON MARKET CAPACITY 
5.1 Introduction 
There is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes 
a 'large risk', though it is clear that the word large is used in 
a relative rather than in absolute sense so that vie,,,s of what is 
large varies both between insurers and over time. For example 
the UNCTAD Secretariat (1977, p.3), has said that: 
"in most cases, a judgement on ,,,hether or not a 
given risk is a large risk reflects an individual view 
of an insurance underwriter who has in mind his own 
undenvriting capacity". 
However, there are many risks that exceed an individual insurer's 
underwriting capacity but would not be regarded as 'large' 
a point implicit in the reference to the spreading of the risk inter-
nationally in the following definition: 
"Target risks are those that have to be spread bet,,,een 
underwriters: the loss expectancy involved being 
in many cases of such magnitude that a world-wide 
spread is required". (The Review, 1957, p. 1342). 
Yet the fact that a risk may be reinsured internaLionally 
is not a sufficient condition for it to be regarded as a 'large 
risk' . Insurers operating in countries where there are no restric-
tions on reinsuring with non-admitted reinsurers frequently place 
part of their treaties abroad. Before formulating a definitiun ,,,llich 
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deals with this point, one further attempt to define a 'large risk f 
will be considered. Tofield(l980,p.3) has said that a f 1 arge risk f exists: 
" an 
"When investments of very high value are heavily 
concentrated or various kinds of liabilities rep-
resent an unusually high exposure". 
A key to what is a f large risk' lies in the last four words-
unusually high exposure". I t is, judged from the standpoint 
of exposure to the loss of a single risk (as opposed to one of several 
collectively exposed to loss from one event, such as earthquake 
or storm), but of such a size that it exceeds the normal underwrit-
ing capacity of local insurers. Thus special insurance and reinsur-
ance arrangements are required to handle a "large risk". 
Therefore for the purpose of this chapter, a f large risk f 
will be defined as: 
"A special risk of such size and complexity that it 
cannot be handled in the normal manner. It not 
only calls for high technical underwriting skills 
in regards to determining the premium and other 
terms and conditions, but also the exposure to loss is so 
high that it is likely to exceed the underwriting 
capacity of the whole national insurance market 
after making recourse to its normal reinsurance 
facilities". 
This definition shows that a large risk may require under-
writing skills not available locally. 
Prior to the economic development programmes of the 1970s 
there were few large risks in Arab countries. Now the amount of 
insurance protection required for large risks is measured in millions 
of dollars, and in many cases in hundreds of millions. 
The problems of large risks today are basically the same for 
underwriters everywhere in the world. However. in the Arab insur-
ance markets, the problems of capacity and technical control may 
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be more acute than in the developed countries. Although co-insur-
ance and co-operation are growing between Arab insurance markets, 
no single market, and not even the whole region, can carry those 
large risks. Therefore it is necessary to have recourse to the 
international reinsurance markets. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show the potential demand 
for insurance that may strain market capaci ty, and to discuss the 
problems which arise from the underwriting of large risks. It 
is also intended to evaluate the necessary steps which must be taken 
to overcome placement difficulties. 
5.2 Nature of Large Risk and Branches Where They Usually Emerge 
5.2.1 Emergence of Large Risks in the Arab Countries 
In the Arab countries, rapid economic development relies heavi-
ly upon modern technology; industrial plants of high values are 
constructed and equipped with a great deal of costly machinery. 
As the Arab countries are importers of technology, they often have 
no choice but to utilise this technology in its original form, thus 
leading to the concentration of investment in limited areas, and 
creating what are known as large risks areas. In the transport 
industry the trend is towards the adoption of large uni ts, such 
as jumbo jets, super tankers, large vessels, etc. In mining and 
oil exploitation, the drilling rigs, off-shore rigs, pipelines, 
refineries and other installations represent a concentration of 
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high value equipment. Dams, silos, canals, steel mills, petrochem-
ical plants, nuclear plants, ports, roads, large hotel or residential 
compounds etc., represent not only high value investment risks but 
also enormous potential third party liabilities (UNCTAD, 1977, p.3). 
Therefore, one can classify the large risks in Arab countries into 
two basic types: 
(1) Large public works projects, and 
(2) Construction of factories related to the 
industrial sector. 
All this means that large risks are on the increase in the 
region, and the increase in their value is enhanced by two factors: 
the large amounts of investment, and inflation. However, within 
each country the numbers of large risks are still very few and they 
do vary considerably between countries. I n an Arab country, for 
example, one might find between one and five oil refineries, two petro-
chemical plants, a few units in marine hull, etc. 
Indeed, in the Arab countries large risks can involve a diff-
erent degree of hazard than in more industrialised countries. 
This hypothesis has been supported by Gobel (1981, p. 44) who has 
stated in this respect: 
"T,vo exactly similar industrial plants can represent two 
entirely different risks, depending on the environment 
in which they are set up, and the environment of most of 
the oil-exporting countries differs greatly from that of 
the highly industrialized countries in regard te climate, 
educational standard of the population, existing 
infrastructure. commerce and industry". 
Because of these factors, Arab insurers may find thc2Tilselves 
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in a market with a high degree of hazardous risks and high value 
business. 
An increase in the risk size \.;ill affect the loss severity 
. (l) 
assumed by an 1nsurer. For example, the risk for an insurer 
by insuring a high building containing a number of flats is greater 
than for an equivalent number of single houses. The same is equally 
true of other types of insurance, such as marine hull, engineering, 
etc. 
In this context, Tofield (1980, p.18) has pointed out that 
fire and fire loss of profit risks are heavier for modern industrial 
complexes, than for traditional industries. This is due to rapid 
technological development; larger industrial areas and a heavily 
concentrated, higher valued construction; use of sophisticated 
machines for process control; use of hazardous material (i.e. plas-
tic); etc. All these developments are reflected in the trend to-
wards larger losses and higher loss ratios. 
In conclusion, the trends to larger industrial risks lead 
both to unbalanced insurance portfolios and to larger fluctuations 
in loss experience. The influence of a small number of large losses 
on annual claims ratios of even a large national market is shown 
in the loss experience of the industrial fire and loss of profits 
business of the German market (see table 5.1). Therefore, the 
trend to larger risks leads to a greater demand for fire, marine, 
and other property reinsurances. 
Insurers in Germany and other industrial countries do have 
the advantage of being able to underwrite in addition to a relatively 
small number of large risks a substantial volume of business composed 
(1) It is for this reason that European and American insurers 
seek to increase the contingency loading of the premium for 
large risks. 
Year 
1970 
I 1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
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Table 5.1 
The Share of the 3,5 and 10 Largest Fire Losses 
in Total Annual Claims Expenditure 
Gross claims The three The five 
ratio in % largest largest 
of the prem- losses losses 
ium earned Of 01 10 10 
99.7 19.1 24.8 
98.9 23.0 26.8 
60.8 9.5 14.1 
55.9 7.7 11.1 
50.4 5.6 8.0 
The ten 
largest 
losses 
01 
10 
31.8 
33.8 
22 .0 
18.0 
11.6 
Source: Gerathewohl (1980, p.136). 
of many small risks independently exposed to loss which help to 
smooth out the impact of large random losses on the overall claims 
experience. However even in such markets tec hnological progress 
leading to the creation of large production units is tending to 
result in sums insured for large risks growing more rapidly than 
the total volume of insurance premiums and thus to less balanced 
insurance portfolios. The problem for Arab insurers is that in 
many countries they do not have a large base of small risks: most 
of their premiums for fire, engineering, aviation and marine insur-
ances are derived from medium to large risks. 
The degree of imbalance that exists in Arab insurance 
portfolios can be illustrated by two expmples: 
(i) In 1977 the total fire premium income 
of Qatar was just over U$7 million, Hhile the 
total loss of the petrochemical plant in Umm Said 
in the same year cost U$76 million. LikeHise, 
the total loss of even the smallest oil refining 
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plant, in any Arab country, could result in a claim 
larger than the country's fire premium income. 
(ii) In 1980 the EML exposure on the largest Iraqi 
fire policy was approximately ten times the country's 
total gross direct fire premium income. 
Generally speaking, as a market develops so the problems caused 
by large risks will tend to diminish, as not only will the size 
of such risks relative to total premium income decline, but also 
the increase in the number of large exposure units insured will 
help to reduce the degree of variability in its loss experience. 
5.2.2 Continous Move Towards Large Risks 
As mentioned in Chapter two, the slump in the demand for oil 
has decreased the rate of economic development in the Arab world. 
Nevertheless, the forecast is for continuing investment in economic 
development, especially in the oil producing countries of the Arab 
region, which can be expected to result in the construction of many 
more large risks of various types. The number of oi 1 processing 
projects which have reached the construction stage has increased 
rapidly, and the following examples show different production capaci-
ties in some Arab oil producers: 
(i) In Saudi Arabia, refinery capacity at present totals 
32 million tonnes a year from Jiddah, Riyadh and Ras 
Tonurah; it is expected to exceed 70 million tonnes a 
year by 1985-86. A new project refinery is to be cons-
tructed at a cost of U$2.6 billion and is designed to 
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produce 325,000 bid, (Financial Times, 1980). 
(ii) In Kuwait, over the five years 1981-85, the KUI-laiti 
petroleum corporation will be spending V$5 billion on 
investment in the oil sec tor. The main contract is 
for the V$500 million V$ 700 million Mina Al-Ahmadi 
refinery modernisation. The expansion of the other 
refinery at Mina Abdullah will cost V$1.5 billion 
(Financial Times, 1981). 
(iii) The cost of developing Qatar's North Dome gas field, 
and the building of associated plants, is expected to 
be about V$5 billion (Financial Times, 1981, p.3). 
(iv) In Algeria, the gas gathering and liquefication plants 
have cost hundreds of million V.S. dollars. 
Trends towards the expansion of productive capacity are also 
observable in other products related to the petroleum industry, 
such as ethylene, methanol, ammonia, urea, etc. The technology 
associated with the production of these products has become, <1nd 
is becoming, ever more complex. The OAPEC estimated produc tive 
capacity for some basic products in 1977 and 1985 is given in table 
5.2. One can see in such enormous productive capacity the key 
to tomorrow's larger risks. 
As has been stated in Chapter two, many Arab countries have 
invested heavily in the field of petroleum transportation. This 
has led to the acquisition of many large oil and gas tankers and 
extensive pipeline construction projects. 
Table 5.2 
OAPEC Estimated Productive Capacity for some Basic Products in 1977 and 1985 
Refining Ethylene Hethanol Ammonia Urea Iron-Steel Aluminium 
103 bid 3 3 3 3 3 Country 10 t/y 10 t/y 10 t/y 10 t/y 10 t/y 
1977 1985 1977 1985 1977 1985 1977 1985 1977 1985 1977 1985 1977 1985 
Algeria 115 442 - 120 100 100 990 1980 130 260 500 300 - 130 
Bahrain 250 250 - - - 330 - 330 - - - - 120 180 
Egypt 285 410 - - - 185 570 1400 900 1390 1740 2700 100 170 
Iraq 190 600 32 170 - - 330 1500 500 1600 - 1600 - -
Kuwait 609 725 - - - - 660 660 800 800 - - - -
Libya 78 358 - 350 - 330 330 1650 - 2300 - 1300 - 110 
Qatar 10 60 - 280 - - 330 660 330 660 400 400 - -
S. Arabia 703 2000 - 2060 - 1250 220 720 400 900 - 850 - -
Syria 100 220 - - - - - 330 - 350 - - - -
U.A.E. 15 135 - - - - - 330 - 500 - 1000 - 135 
Total 2355 5200 32 2980 100 2195 3430 9560 3060 8760 2640 9150 220 715 
'------ -
Source: ENI, "The International }lode 1" , Vol. 1, 1981. 
Cement 
1977 1985 
2500 9000 
- -
3800 9500 
3000 12000 
1400 1400 
2500 7000 
340 640 
1500 9800 
1500 6000. 
950 1950 
I 
11490 57290 
..... 
lJl 
(Xl 
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Furthermore, there are remarkable developments in industrial 
projects in several Arab countries. 
countries, such projects include: 
Amongst the oil producing 
the new industrial cities of Jubail and Yanbu in Saudi 
Arabia. It has been estimated that the infrastructure 
for both will cost US. $35 billion and table 5.3 shmvs 
the cost of some of the main heavy industrial projects. 
In south Iraq the largest petrochemical project to date 
is the US.$1.2 billion Basra petrochemical complex No.l. 
A fertilizer plant has cost more than US. $.580 million 
in the same area, and another at AI-Enbar cost 
US.$1 billion. Hork is expec ted to commence in 1985 
and last five years on a proposed new dam in the north 
of Iraq at a cost of about US. $ .1.5 bi llion. Iraq 
also aims to be involved in the domestic production 
of cars, lorries and tractors, possibly as early as 
1985; this project will cost more than US.$5 billion. 
(Financial Times, 1980 and 1981). 
Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA) is a major project which is 
insured for some US$850 million (UNCTAD, 1982, p.12). 
The Jebel Ali project and the dry dock in Dubai are 
other massive schemes. 
The non-oil producing countries 
demand for large projects, such as: 
also have a considerable 
the Kenana sugar project in Sudan which required an 
insurance cover of U3$1.2 billion. 
In Jordan (Financial Times, 1981, p.14), the 1981-85 
Table 5.3 
Some of the Main Hcavy Industrial Projects in Saudi Arabia 
Company Location Project Status 
Saudi Pecten (SABIC/Shell) Jubail Petrochemical -
SABIC/Mobi 1 Yanbu = Signed 1980 
SABIC/Dow Jubail = -
SABIC/Exxon Jubial = -
Saudi-Japanese Jubail = Signed Nov. 1979 
SABIC/Celanese Texas Jubail = -
SABIC/Mitsubishi Jubai1 = Signed 1980 
Petromin/She11 Jubai1 Refinery Signed 1980 
Petromin/Mobi1 Yanbu = Signed 1980 
Pctromin/Socal & Texaco Jubail = -
SABIC/Tahvan Jubail Fertiliser Signed, Dec. 1979 
SABIC/Korf-Stah1 Jubail ~ l e t a 1 1 u r g i c a 1 1 Signed, ~ l a r . . 1979 
Jubail Rolling Mill Jubail = -
Jeddah Rolling Mill Jeddah = Signed, Mid-1979 
Aluminium Smelter Jubail = Signed, May 1979 
SABIC: Saudi Basic Industries Corporation. 
Source: Financial Times (1980). 
Est. cost 
US.$2 bn. 
US.$1.6bn. 
I US.$1.6 bn 
US.$2 bn. 
US.$300m. 
US.$300m. 
US.$2 bn. 
US.$l bn. 
US.$2 bn. 
US.$3 bn. 
US.$360 m. 
USD.$600 m. 
-
US.$30 m. 
US.$300 m. 
I 
.... 
0\ 
o 
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plan includes the investment of USS 450 million in a 
potash plant on the Dead Sea, a US$ 350 mi llion chemical 
fertilizer complex at Aqaba, and a U3$ 230 million Port-
land cement plant at Rashidiyeh in South Jordan. 
In Egypt (Financial Times, 1980) there are also large 
industrial projects, like the USS 750 million sponge 
iron plant, and the US$l billion textile project. 
In other fields, such as p o r ~ ~ and airports, there are numerous 
requests for large projects in many Arab countries, which represent 
many billions of dollars of sums insured. 
Finally, the Arab world is witnessing a move towards the esta-
blishment of joint Arab projects. Examples of these are: 
the Arab Maritime Company for oil transportation, estab-
lished in Kuwait in 1972, costing US.$ 1 billion; 
The dry dock of the Arab ship-building and repair yard 
established in Bahrain in 1974 with investment of lB9 
340 million; 
The Arab Petroleum Investment Company (to invest in 
petroleum related projects and loan financing) establish-
ed in Saudi Arabia in 1975 at a cost of US 1 billion; 
The Arab Company for Petroleum Services (1975, Libya); 
The Arab Navigation Company; and 
The Arab Company for Drugs and ~ I e d i c i n e s . .
In addition, there are two joint Arab projects in Bahrain, 
the first taking a one-third equity between Bahrain, Saudi Arabia 
and Km.Jai t . A US.S400 million Petrochemical project will start 
production in 1984, and the second plant costing US.$ 300 million, 
to be owned by the Arab Iron and Steel Company, is due to start 
operating by the end of 1984 (Financial Times, 1980). All of these 
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joint projects and others have created large risks Hhich require 
joint insurance efforts. 
Clearly the development of such large risks is placing a consi-
derable demand on the local insurance markets whose ability to cope 
is affected by: 
(i) many of the risks being new and of types virtually unknown 
to Arab insurers; 
(ii) the limited local underwriting and financial capacity; 
(iii) insufficient technical know-how. 
Consequently it has only been possible to provide the insurance 
cover required by relying heavily on international insurers and 
reinsurers. For such companies the problems posed by the large, 
complex and costly innovations of modern t e c ~ n o l o g y , , such as power 
stations, nuclear power stations, super tankers, off-shore and on-
shore industrial projects, supersonic aircraft, etc. are not new. 
~ o r e o v e r , , as long as modern economies and modern technology continue 
to develop, they will continue to introduce risks of an unprecedented 
k ' d Cl) In . For example, Tofield (1980, p.14) has pointed out that 
a nuclear power station builtin the course of the 1960's had a capac-
ity of 300 MW a sum insured for approximately US$ 20 million), 
while since 1970 the capacity has ranged between 900 ~ I W W and 1300 
Ml..I. The sums insured for a nuclear pm"er station of 130mlW capacity 
are around VSS 1.5 bn. Now nuclear power stations with a capacity 
of up to 2000MW are being forecast. The number of nuclear power 
stations and their cumulative electrical capacity during the 
(1) An unprecedented risk is that of a hydro-electric power station 
recently completed at Itaipu on the border between Brazil 
and Paraguay. This project has already been called the largest 
civil engineering project in the world and will cost around 
US 10 billion. A.nother example of unprecedented risk is the 
construction of a gas pipeline in A.laska for the benefit of 
the U.S. and Canada. The cost of this project is twice that 
of the Itaipu dam and power station, i.e. U$ 20 billion (Gobel, 
1981, pp.4l-43). 
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period 1965-85 is illustrated in figure 5.1. The construction 
costs of a large offshore gravity platform are the same as that 
of a 1300 ( ~ ~ nuclear power station. 
5.2.3 The Classes of Insurance Affected by Large Risks 
Fire Risks and Allied Perils 
Besides infrastructure projects such as power stations and 
airports, large scale developments requiring insurance against fire 
and allied risks have occurred in a number of industries, such as 
the textile, paper, metal, foodstuff, chemical, iron and steel, motor 
vehicle and petrochemical industries, and oil refineries. 
Although they are no longer unique in terms of size, oil refin-
eries still pvsent fire insurers with particular difficulties. 
For example, in 1979 the Chouaibiya Refinery, belonging to the 
Kuwait National Petroleum Company had a total fire sum insured of US$890 
million, the Samir Refinery in Morocco was insured for US$ 461 
million, and the Libyan National Oil Corporation, insured for US 
$ 421 million (Aimarah, 1979, p.7). It is not only the magnitude 
of such risks, but also the degree of hazard associated with the 
nature of the product involved. In discussing such risks, Pat rick 
(1974, p.3) has pointed out that: 
"the number of fires and the cost of losses are 
increasing year by year. For the U.S.A. this is now in the 
region of over 1500 storage tank fires and nearly 6000 refinery 
fires per annum. There is no reason to believe that the 
number and kinds of such incidents are materially different 
in other parts of the world". 
Number 
400 
300 
200 
100 
o 
164 
Figure 5.1 
~ u m b e r r of Nuclear Power Stations and their Cumulative 
Electrical Capacity throughout the World 
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One can well understand the concern of the Arab insurers and reinsur-
ers, as their fire risks get bigger and more highly complicated. 
In October 1979, Ridah (p.4), stated that the number of large 
risks in the fire portfolio in an Arab insurance company had inc-
reased rapidly during the period 1974-78 as shown below, (see figure 
5.2) : 
Range of Risk Number of Large Risks 
1974 1978 
US$25 m - 50 m. 9 19 
US$50 m - 100 m. 1 7 
Over US$100 m. 3 10 
Engineering Risks 
Engineering insurance is extensively used to cover large rural, 
urban and industrial development projects. Engineering insurance 
generally furnishes three kinds of cover: 
(1) contractors' all risks, 
(2) erection all risks, 
(3) machinery breakdown. 
As the Arab countries have developed their economies, the operations 
of large-scale industrial contractors have encouraged the develop-
ment of contractors' all risk insurance for the large civil engineer-
ing projects. 
Fifteen years ago a contract valued in excess of USSSO million 
was exceptional. Today, contrac t values are among the Lngest 
in the ,wrld varying between US 500 million and several billion 
do llars. The Arab countries have witnessed many giant contracts, 
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Figure 5.2 
Fire Portfolio in an Arab Company 
Risks in Excess of US$.25m up to $ 50 m. Risks in Excess of US.$50m 
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the following being some examples: 
Gas gathering and liquefaction plants in Algeria, Iraq, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, etc. 
The construction of a causeway from the Saudi coast 
across the sea to Bahrain. 
The large number of ports and airports constructed in 
many Arab countries. 
The hundreds of miles of oil pipeline construction in 
some oil producing countries. 
Generally there are a number of features common to all large 
contracts, notably (Seddon, 1977, p.S): 
1. Multiplicity of contractors, often of varying nationalities. 
2. Joint venture, frequently involving a national government 
interest. 
3. Special contractual standards. 
4. Ferocious competition between contractors to secure the cont-
ract. 
5. Physical problems of communication at long distance and lack 
of professional skill in the evaluation and handling of large 
contracts by insurance companies. 
Besides his example of the fire portfolio of an Arab insurance 
company, Ridha also provided details of the numbers of large risks 
inc luded in the same company's engineering insuranc e port fo lio, as 
shown in figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 
Contractor' All Risks and Erection All Risks Portfolio in 
an Arab Company 
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Marine Hull and Aviation Risk 
Most Arab countries have their own marine and aviation fleets 
which are growing in size and sophistication as well as in 
value. All these fleets are insured locally in the 
domestic markets. 
Over the last decade the potential claims costs of large risks 
have increased substantially. Since 1970 aircraft hull and liabili-
ty limits have more than doubled. For example, in 1970 the hull 
sum insured for a Boeing 747 was between US.$20 million and US.$25 
million; by 1982 it had risen to US.$65 million with liability 
limits of more than US.$200 million. World wide the maximum hull 
and liability risks exceed even those figures. Jannott (1973, 
p.2) quotes a maximum for hull and liability of US$ 30 million in 
1960, US.$250 million in 1973 and up to US.$ 700 million in 1982. 
He also pointed out that in the same year 1982, the largest sura 
insured for product liability was US$l billion (1983, p.46). 
In marine hull, the size of individual risks is also becoming 
massive, the cost of the Algerian methane tankers, for instance, 
is more than US.$ 140 million each. 
Liability Risks 
In addition to marine and aviation, certain other types of 
industry and industrial activity have given rise to large liability 
risks in Western Europe and :-lorth America. Notable examples are 
liability risks associated with petrochemical plants, nuclear inst-
allations and large multi-storey hotels; products liaIJility for 
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pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, pest control and certain other types 
of toxic chemicals, asbestos, etc., and pollution risks. There is 
now some evidence of the emergence of large liability risks in Arab 
countries, particularly in connection with the oil and construction 
industries. However, in general public attitudes towards, and 
laws relating to, compensation for personal inj ury and damage to 
property, plus the lack of insurance consciousness, have limited 
the demand for liability insurance. 
5.2.4 Catastrophe Size Losses From Large Risks 
The losses involving large risks can reach catastrophic propor-
tions in the sense of the size of loss relative to the accumulated 
funds of the insurance markets of Arab countries. All the large 
risks are being designed and executed in accordance with the latest 
techological standards, yet losses still occur generally due to 
either machinery failure or human error. 
(1) 
The result can be 
the total or partial destruction of a very large industrial complex, 
the collapse of essential work, such as bridges, or dams, the loss 
of jumbo aircraft or supertankers and/or the pollution of the envir-
onment. 
Table 5.4 shows some examples of losses exceeding U.$lO million 
in the Arab countries. The losses fall into three categories; 
(a) fire and explosion; (b) aircraft; and (c) ships. There have 
been several major CAR/EAR losses in the region, but unfortunately 
information is unavailable. 
(1) Concerning the highly sophisticated 
the Arab countries, approximately 35 to 40 
ially operational losses, can be traced 
1982, p.26). 
projects transferred to 
per cent of losses, espec-
to human error (Negrier, 
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Table 5.4 
Some Losses with an Amount of Damage exceeding U$lOm. (1972-82). 
Date Place/Country 
19.12.72. Gulf of Oman 
18.4.76 Rumaila-Iraq 
31.1.77. Essaouira-Morocco 
3.4.77. Umm Said-Qatar 
11.5.77. Abqaiq-S. Arabia 
1.6.77. Jaddah-S. Arabia 
4.6.77. Abqaiq-S.Arabia 
16.4.78. Abqaiq-S.Arabia 
14.3.79. Doha-Qatar 
25.4.79. Nassiriyah-Iraq 
19.8.80. Riyadh-S.Arabia 
21.2.81. Dubai/UAE 
1.3.81. Thumrait/Oman 
20.5.81. Gulf of Oman/UAE 
20.8.81. 
Jan/Dec. 
1981 
Shuaiba/Kuwait 
Shatt al-Arab/Iraq 
11-17.6.82 Beirut/Lebanon 
3.4.83. I1esCani/Tunisia 
2.6.83. Rouiba/Algeria 
15.7.83. Oran/Algeria 
23.9.83. Abu Dhabi/U.A.E. 
Cause of Loss Anmmt of Damage 
Sinking of the 'Sea US.S 12m. MD 
Star' after collision 
Fire in oil well US.S 12 m.Fire 
'Exotic' runs aground US.S lSm. MD 
following explosion 
Bursting of liquid- US.S 76m. Fire 
gas tank 
Bursting in oil gath- US.S S4.Sm Fire 
ering centre 
Sea speed Dora capsize US.$ 15m. MD 
Explosion in oil US.S 10.6mFire 
gathering centre 
Explosion and fire 
following burst 
US.S S3.7mFire 
Crash.Alia Boeing 727 US.$ 12m. H&L 
Fire in telephone 
cable factory 
Crash and fire of 
Saudi Arabi airline 
L 1011-200 
Fire in aluminium 
works 
Crash of Jaguar 
combat aircraft 
US.S 22.5m. Fire 
US.$ 60m. H&L 
fl. 8m. Fire loss' 
& £10.2 m. LOP 
US.S 16m. Hull 
L 
Explosion and fire on US.$ 11.3m.Hull 
board tanker L 
Fire in oil refinery 
Damage to various 
ships, following act 
of war between Iraq/ 
Iran. 
US.S 50 m.Fire 
US.S 55 m.Hull 
(Greek insurers 
Yen 13 bn.Hull 
(Japanese 
insurers) 
Destruction of 5B-707 US.S 11 m.Hull 
/720 during act of L 
war. 
Running aground of 
freighter. 
US.S 12.5m.Hull 
L 
Fire in motor vehicle Alg.Din. 330 m. 
factory Fire loss 
Fire in warehouse 
Crash of Gulf Air B. 
-73 7 
Alg.Din. 90 m. 
Fire loss 
U
I 
S ~ 5 m . H u l l l &. 
.iaoilitv 
Source: Swiss Re, Sigma, different issues of January for 1973-1984. 
.. 
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Furthermore, given the increase in oil production in some 
countries, the potential exposure to large losses resulting from 
accidental pollution on sea or on land is high in the Arab region. 
Recently there have been large oil slicks in the Arabian Gulf largely 
as a result of war between Iraq and Iran. Although the cost of 
the damage is yet unknown it would seem that the potential severity 
of pollution risks, in terms of damage, is more than that of many 
other large risks. For example. it has been reported (Foresight, 
1981) that the total losses from the tanker • Amoco Cadiz I, which 
ran aground off the coast of Brittany, France, in March 1978, may 
be as much as US$175 million. 
5.3 Large Risks and Their Underwriting Problems 
Before discussing the main problems in underwriting large 
risks in the Arab World, it is reasonable to say that (a) the expul-
sion of foreign insurers has placed greater responsibilities on 
local insurers, and Cb) though other nations have encountered the 
same problems, they are more severe for the Arab countries. 
5.3.1 Assessment of Large Risks 
The first stage of underwriting any large risk is its assess-
ment. This usually requires the surveying of the risk by a special-
ist who later prepares a report giving a full descr.iption of the 
risk to be insured. His report must also contain an evaluation 
of the risk and recommendations of terms ami conditions which 
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be applicable to the cover. Because the report includes vital infor-
mation about the risk, and plays an essential part in its rating 
and placing, it is important that it should be acceptable to the 
insured, insurer and reinsurers. (UNCTAD, 1977, p.7). 
Furthermore the underwriter will rely heavily on the survey-
or I s assessment of the estimated maximum loss (EML) (1) in order 
to fix his company I s retention. Therefore it is essential that 
the surveyor should possess the technical skill required to assess 
risks accurately. 
The calculation of EMLs is a difficult task anywhere, and 
very prone to both under- and over-estimation. The explosion in 
June 1974 at the Flixborough plant which resulted in the destruction 
of the plant and losses amounting to US$ 60 m. is a case in point. 
Although the Effi.. was estimated at only approximately 20 per cent, 
the explosion actually destroyed about 80 per cent of the plant. 
Likewise the Effi.. Eor the Umm Said I s petrochemical plant tvas fixed 
at 25 per cent but the damage extended to more than 90 per cent 
of the plant. Three lessons can be drawn from these examples: 
(1) unless all possible hazards are recognised an E ~ L L can 
be a highly misleading figure; 
(1) The term E.M.L. was defined by the Reinsurance Officer Asso-
ciation (R.O.A.) in 1974 as follows: 
"An estimate of the monetary loss which could be sustained 
by insurers on a single risk as a result of Cl single fire 
or explosion considered by the underwriter to be within the 
realms of probability. The estimate ignores such remote coin-
cidences and catastrophes \vhich may be possibilities but still 
remain unlikely". 
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(2) even experienced underwriters and surveyors in the dev-
eloped countries can badly under-estimate possible losses; 
and 
(3) errors of such magnitude could lead to solvency problems 
on the part of the insurers. 
On the other hand, if EMLs are set too high, then the insurers 
will be inclined to retain too little for their own accounts and 
might encounter difficulties in obtaining all of the reinsurance 
they will then require. In the past reinsurers often accepted busin-
ess without checking the reliability of an EML. Today after having 
been badly affected by a number of cases of serious under-estimation, 
there is widespread recognition that they should ask for underwriting 
information to enable them to check the EMLs for large cases. 
(Oberschelp, 1977, pp. 2-3). 
5.3.2 Rating of Large Risks 
Local Arab market experience is not sufficient for the rating 
of large risks for two reasons. First, the advance of technology 
is rapid and its several applications continue to bring new hazards, 
which require risk evaluation by specialists. Second ly. nationally 
there are too few large risks to yield sufficient statistical data 
for a local market to calculate reliable premium rates. The larger 
the risk, the less statistical data there is available and the less 
certain can the insurer be about the rate of premium he charges. 
The original rating of large risks often tends to be Im.;er than 
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that of smaller risks of a similar type. The reason tor such prac-
tice is based on the argument that it may be possible to divide 
a large risk into several separate risks spread over a wide area, 
so that the probability of a total loss is less under such circum-
stances than for smaller risks (Patrick, 1974, p.10). However on 
occasions experience has shown that the bigger and more complex 
the risk, the more there is to go wrong with it. Also in the indus-
trial fire and fire LOP classes of insurance, for instance, large 
risks have often produced very large losses causing random fluc-
tuations in the insurers claims experience. Therefore it is arg-
uable that the larger is a risk the larger should oe the contingency 
(fluctuation) loading of the premium. This concept is explained 
by Berliner (1982, p. 61) who writes: 
"The larger the risk carrier's participation in 
the cover of a large risk, the more fluctuation 
loading must increase in relation to the pure risk 
premium" 
In addition, each large risk has its own special features 
which need specific inspection for the purpose of rating and other 
conditions. Highly qualified chemists, pht)ski<;ts , engineers. arch-
itects, and geophysicists can give useful assistance in this respect, 
but usually Arab insurers do not have ready access to such skills. 
Consequently in cases where risks have been rated locally some diff-
iculi ties have arisen ,.;hen ext ra cover has been sought from the 
international market, because the insurers and re insurers have con-
sidered rates insufficient. 
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5.3.3 Settlement of Claims Emanating from Large Risks 
As the size of large risk claims is usually very large, and 
because reinsurers have a heavy involvement, they tend to intervene 
in the handling of such claims. Recently, therefore most reinsurance 
treaties have incorporated a claims co-operation clause, which enti-
tles the reinsurers to play a role in the settlement of large claims. 
Large claims can present particular problems that inflate 
settlement costs as compared with the handling of the claims for 
smaller risks. There are few people in the Arab region capable 
of either assessing a large claim or effecting repairs to a large 
modern industrial plant or other construction, so resulting in delays 
in effecting repairs. aoreover many large ri sks have been si ted 
in remote areas, so making communications difficult for all concern-
ed, thereby adding to the delays. 
5.3.4 Determining Retentions for large Risks 
This point will be discussed in Section 5.4 
5.3.5 Insufficient Technical Expertise 
Recent developments have brought with them a battery of new 
risks, like nuclear power stations, jumbo jets and shi.ps, elec t ron-
ics, off-shore rigs etc., \vhich face insurers and re insurers today; 
this development in technology is not going to stop. HmJe\'er, 
it seems there is always a gap between the increasingly specialised 
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technology of industrial concerns and the insurer own kno\Vledge 
of these ma t ters (Gerathewohl, 1974, pp. 32-33), not only in the 
Arab insurance markets but amongst international insurers and reins-
urers too. 
Taking all the above problems into account, the Arab insurance 
markets are not (at present) in a position to provide a sufficient 
underwriting capacity for large risks. 
5.4 Retention Problems and Reinsurance of Large Risks 
Since Chapters 9, 10, 11 and 12 are devoted in their entirety 
to examining the determination of retention limits, only a brief disc-
ussion of retentions for large risks will be offered here. Because 
of the large size and high exposure of the large risks, substantial 
underwriting capacity is required to provide the required insurance 
cover 
(1) 
so that further capacity has to be found from insurance 
and reinsurance from abroad. 
(1)" Large risks are not normally insured at a purely national 
level even in the industrial countries. As insurance values 
grow, both industrial and developing countries become increas-
ingly dependent on the capacity, experience and smooth func-
tioning of the international reinsurance market which, in 
fulfilling its distributive function, is in a position to 
"break up" large risks into fragments small enough to be man-
eagable. An attempt to establish national autarky in this 
area would only create a false sense of security and a situa-
tion which would not be able to \Vithstand any serious strain 
over a period of time". (Tofield, 1980, p.6). 
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5.4.1 Large Risks and Underwriting Capacity 
The retention limits of Arab companies are low due to various 
factors; among these may be noted: 
generally low capital and free reserves; 
the small volume of their premium income; 
the lack of qualified personnel; and 
the imbalance of their portfolios. 
A limited retention level is quite natural for any new develop-
ing insurance market which previously had insured almost totally 
out side the region. However \vith the continuing development of 
the insurance market, the absolute level of premium being retained 
within a certain country should increase. Nevertheless because 
of the factors mentioned above, experience has shown that insurers 
in the Arab World still retain a very marginal share of these very 
large risks, as shown in the following examples (the monetary units 
are not shown to maintain confidentiality). 
One Arab insurance company cedes its CAR/EAR large risks into 
its engineering Quota Share and surplus treaties with, in 1980, 
a maximum retention of 375,000. It then purchases an excess of 
loss cover to protect its retention, so reducing its net liability 
to 75,000. The proportion of those retention limits to the total 
value of each large risk covered was as follows: 
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Selected Large Sums Amount Retention Amount of Net 
Risks covered Insured of as a % of retention retentio 
under engineer- Retention sum insured reduced by as a 0/ 0 /0 
ing Q/s and XL cover sum insu 
surplus treat- ed 
ies 
Dam 485 m. 375,000 0.077 % 75,000 0.015 ~ ~ ~
Petrochemical 
plant 425 m. 375,000 0.088 % 75,000 0.018 01 10 
Water purifi-
cation plant 350 m. 375,000 0.11 0/ 75,000 0.021 0; /0 /0 
Railway 
project 280 m. 375,000 0.13 % 75,000 0.027 0/ 10 
Power 
station 200 m. 375,000 0.19 0/ 75,000 0.038 0/ '0 10 
Cement 
factory 160 m. 375,000 0.23 % 75,000 0.047 0/ 10 
In 1978, another Arab insurance company was faced with the 
acceptance of three large fire risks with sums insured of 750 million 
800 m., and 850 m. These risks were ceded to its fire Quota Share 
and surplus treaties, with a retention limit of 0.5 million. Thus 
the company's retention share to the total sum insured of each risk 
was 0.067 per cent, 0.063 per cent, and 0.059 per cent respectively. 
Even if a share of each large risk is ceded to a local reinsur-
ance company, the total amount retained within the market still 
may not reach one per cent of the large risk's value. 
Many of the emerging insurance companies in the Arab countries 
still have relatively small portfolios, with most of the premium 
income coming from large risks related to their country's development 
n 
f 
r-
efforts resulting in an imbalance not only of their portfolios but of 
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their total national markets (UNCTAD, 1980, p.34). This is illu-
trated by table 5.5 which shows the small number of large risks 
insured in the United Arab Emirates. 
Table 5.5 
Aviation Portfolio in the U.A.E. Insurance Market, 1979 
Region Number of Total gross Eremium 
Eolicies income 
Abu Dhabi 15 DH. 8,885,000 
Dubai 8 DH. 1,622 ,000 
Sharjah 1 DH. 11,000 
Umm AI-Qiwain, 
Ras AI-Khaima, 3 DH. 134,000 
and Fujeira. 
Source: Ministry of Planning (1982). 
5.4.2 Capacity SUEEliers 
The suppliers of insurance capacity are to be found on three 
levels: 
First, there is the local insurance market which comprises 
the direct companies who issue the policy, and the local reinsurers 
who accept the reinsurance business. As noted above, individual 
Arab direct companies retain only a very small portion of large 
risks and even when several are interested by way of coinsurance 
generally the total retained remains a very marginal share of the 
total risk. Within the local market the local reinsurer(s) which 
receive compulsory or voluntary cessions and treaty acceptance from 
the direct insurers likewise maintain only small retentions. 
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Second, direc t insurance companies and reinsurance companies 
may supply further capacity on a regional level. Some direct comp-
anies participate in regional co-insurances particularly in the 
case of joint-venture projects between Arab countries, and there 
are also reinsurance business acceptances. Although the national 
and regional reinsurance companies, and the Arab regional pools, 
play a vital role in increasing the capacity of the region, they 
still cannot absorb the whole of a large risk. 
Third, on the international level, there is the London market 
which provides a massive capacity, especially in marine and aviation; 
this market can absorb any risk however large it is in these classes. 
Arab business is also placed in Zurich, Munich, ~ e w w York etc. 
The direct companies who partic ipate in reinsurance from abroad and 
the professional reinsurers, together represent a high capacity. 
It appears that in recent years the direct companies have gained 
in importance. 
5.4.3 Reinsurance of Large Risks 
In general, insurers use the same reinsurance methods for 
placing the large risks as for the ordinary risks; that is, propor-
tional treaties, non-proportional covers, and facultative reinsur-
ance. However, the underwriting limi ts of reinsurance t rea ties 
are usually limited, because the premium volume of a reinsurance 
treaty and its maximum limits must be balanced. Therefore as 
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the large risks require very high underwriting limits, the rcinsur-
ance treaty \.,1ill absorb only a very small port ion of those risks 
and leave the majority to be covered facultatively. Although facul-
tative reinsurance has gained greater significance during the past 
few decades, insurers will continue to cede the large risks to their 
automatic reinsurance treaties for the reasons mentioned in Section 
5.5.1. 
Finally, when referring to the large capacity needed for large 
risks, one is often faced with uninformed competition from the large 
capacity available in the international market. At the same time, 
large risks often attract reinsurers by their high volume of premium. 
Therefore, the large risks can be placed easily in a greedy market 
with the minimum of underwriting information. 
5.5 Measures for the Better Handling of Large Risks 
Various steps could be taken to improve the handling of the 
insurances of large risks in Arab countries, and the proportions 
of those risks retained locally. They need to be taken at four 
levels the individual Arab insurance companies; the domestic 
markets; the regional markets; and the international markets. 
5.5.1 The Individual Company Level 
The shortcomings experienced by individual companies in the 
underwriting of large risks could be mitigated in three ways: 
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(i) Strengthening company finances: generally compcmies need to 
increase both their capital and free reserves, and the volume 
of smaller conventional risks they underwrite. Larger, bet ter 
balanced portfolios would reduce the potential aggregate claims 
fluctuations, and larger reserves would enable them to with-
stand larger losses. 
There would be considerable merit in companies forming 
special reserves to cover the unexpected developments and 
catastrophes that may arise from large risks. Thus insurers 
should be encouraged to set aside out of pre-tax profits a 
reasonable part of their earnings for building up such reserves. 
(ii) Adequate technical facilities: although difficulties face 
the local insurance companies in the underwriting of large 
risks, many of them consider it a duty to provide cover loc-
ally for such risks as live evidence of their positive role 
of supporting the national economy. 
large risks is a task for experts: 
The inspection of the 
if such experts are not 
available locally, then their services must be obtained from 
elsewhere (Makar, 1978, p.65). Although internationally 
there are available individual consultants and specialist 
bodies (surveyors, engineers, etc.), mainly Arab companies 
rely on the international reinsurance brokers and professional 
reinsurers. The training of local people should be treated 
as a matter of priority. The more highly trained specialists 
an insurer has, the more efficiently will he use his capacity 
in each case. For example, suppose an insurer bases his 
retentions on E ~ l L s . . If due to lack of knowledge about a 
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particular type of risk the person responsible for e s t i m ~ l i n g g
the EML incorrectly fixed it at 40 percent instead of 20 per-
cent, all of the insurers involved would cut their acceptances 
by half thereby depriving the market of existing capacity. 
(Gerathewohl, 1980, p.181). 
As regards the rating of large risks, the inadequacy 
of local experience is such that Arab insurers of necessity 
must pay regard to foreign experience. However, the over-
rating of large risks is generally not in the interests of 
the economy of a country since this increases the cost of 
foreign reinsurance, particularly tvhen these risks are heavily 
reinsured abroad. Thus the Arab insurers need to r ~ t e e their 
large risks accurately which calls for considerable technical 
expertise. 
It is in the interest of insurers and the economy that 
insurers should have the technical abi li ty to ~ d \ ' i s e e on and 
enforce appropriate standards of loss prevention. 
(iii) Adequate reinsurance arrangements: improvements in the rein-
surance arrangements for large risks can be achieved by est-
ablishing proper retentions and optimum use of automatic rein-
surance facilities. 
To fix an insurance company's retention a proper measure-
ment of risk exposure is required. Such measurement requires 
a reliable classification of v ~ l u e s s among different risks 
and assessment of the estimated maximum loss. A company 
can safely increase its retention on a fire policy only if 
the insurance covers a number of independent risks, othen"ise 
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it might just as well base its retention on an EML. 
i ~ h e n n the insurer has exhausted the retention, the next 
step is to use all the reinsurance coverages. As regards 
large risks, the automatic reinsurance facilities are consider-
ed the best form of coverage for many reasons, viz, 
(1) they provide an automatic cover 
(2) they allow reasonable commission 
(3) they can bring profit commission 
(4) they may give the right to retain technical reser-
ves. 
Therefore as a general rule, attempts should be made to raise 
the limits of treaties to enable them to absorb a greater 
proportion of large risks. That, however, can only be achiev-
ed by increasing the volume of business (and so premium income) 
available to reinsurers,otherwise the rcinsurance treaty will 
become unbalanc ed . In exceptional cases it may be better 
to exclude a large risk from the treaty when the risk concerns 
an unusual class of hazard and if it is likely to produce 
high or repeated losses. In this case, the establishing 
of retentions and arranging special facultative reinsurance 
cover will depend on the nature of the risk. 
5.5.2 Steps at the Level of the Domestic Market 
Markets composed of more than one insurer should be considered 
in this section in order to illustrate the mobilization of market 
capacity and expertise. The use of full domestic underwriting 
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capacity increases the insurers' premium income; t his \.;i 11 , in 
turn, help those insurers to increase their retained premium income 
and improve their technical balance. The best methods of achieving 
this are the sharing of large risks amongst insurance companies 
on a coinsurance basis, and the creation of local committees for 
the handling of large risks. 
The increase in capacity could be provided by coinsurance, 
as is indeed prac tised in varying degrees in individual classes 
of business and national markets; when there is no coinsurance, 
the direct companies retain a small proportion of the risk. On 
the other hand, it may be useful to create a local technical comm-
ittee serving only the insurance of large risks. The main function 
of this committee would be to provide consultation in this field 
in order to safeguard all the parties concerned, e. g. the insured, 
the insurer and reinsurer. The creation of such a committee would 
be justified primarily by the necessity to advise direct insurers 
in stating insurance conditions (e. g. inclusions and exclusions), 
calculating premium rates, as well as of introducing special loss 
prevention measures, and determining the EML and retention limits. 
5.5.3 Subregional and Regional Co-operation among Arab Countries 
Due to the limited ability of any national market to cover 
large risks, co-operation with other insurance markets is needed. 
In order to overcome the particular capacity problems of Arab insur-
ance markets, it was thought appropriate to try to combine their 
activities at a regional level (Makar, 1978, p.69). The principle 
has been accepted by governments and insurance officials in many 
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Arab countries, and various forms of subregional and regional insur-
ance co-operation are being started, such as regional reinsurance 
institutions and pools, insuring major joint projects and joint 
placement of reinsurance abroad. 
5.5.3.1 National/RegionalReinsurance Institutions and Pools 
The establishment of national/regional reinsurance companies 
as well as reinsurance pools will be discussed in Chapter seven. 
5.5.3.2 Regional Co-operation on joint Venture Projects and 
Joint Placement Abroad 
Arab governments have participated in many large scale joint 
projects covering a number of different economic activities. The 
insurance of these projects is handled by one company and the covers 
split on a co-insurance basis between the markets concerned. Accord-
ing to the agreement between the governments who financed these 
projects, each insurance market must have a share equivalent to 
the contribution of its country to the share capital of the project. 
The surpluses, after exhausting the local capacity. are placed 
on a facultative basis abroad. 
An example of this procedure is the insural\c<Z.. of the Arab Ship 
Repair Yard (ASRY) dry dock which is carried by a consortium of 
the national companies in each of the seven shareho1ding countries 
led by the Bahrain Insurance Company. In 1980, the total premiums 
of this risk were over US.$ 1.3 million, and these were spread among 
23 companies according to their country's stake (Fi nanc ia 1 Times, 
1980). Some Arab countries in order to improve the terms avail-
able from foreign insurers, have also co-operaled through the 
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joint placement of some types of large insurances. 
such as marine and aviation fleets. As mentioned in Chapter three, 
several large risks are handled on a joint placement basis Por 
example, amongst the countries of the ~ I a g h r e b . . (Algeria, Tunis, 
~ l o r o c c o , , Libya and Mauritania), joint placement has been arranged 
for shipping and air line fleets with a priority sharing of business 
between the Maghrebin markets, so providing for Cl good distribution 
of premiums and risks among themselves. 
5.5.3.3 Regional Committee for the Assessment and Rating 
of Large Risks 
Although it was suggested earlier that committees be establish-
ed in local markets to assist in the handling of large risks, in many 
Arab countries there is a lack of knowledge and experience through-
out the market. Therefore, it may be more practical to establish 
a central committee for the whole Arab region. This committee could 
help to build up a technical staff and give assistance in underwrit-
ing large risks. It could also play a vital role in minimising the 
problem of assessment and rating and form the basis of central rec-
ords on all large risks in the area. 
An appropriate body for taking the initiative in setting up 
such a committee would be the General Arab Insurance Federation 
and it should, for this purpose, seek co-operation \.Jith national 
and international markets. In doing so the follo\.Jing points need 
to be borne in mind: 
1. The General Arab Insurance Federation would need to create 
technical staff, representing the committee, from the Arab 
insurance markets, i.e. technical experts from the industry 
concerned should be asked to join this committee. 
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2. The technical committee must collect detailed information 
on individual large risks from all the Arab COunt ries. and. 
if possible, from the whole world. 
3. It should ascertain what has already been achieved in the 
area of large risks in the region. 
4. The indexing of large risks into categories according to class 
and type of risk. 
5. An increase in co-operation with the international markets 
(some reinsurers have very useful information which would 
serve as a basis for the work of the technical committee). 
5.5.4 Co-operation between the Arab Insurance Markets 
and the International Market 
All the measures discussed so far are aimed at improving under-
writing locally and minimising the region'sreliance on the internat-
ional reinsurance market. Undoubtedly. the international market 
has contributed and will continue to contribute. to the growth of 
the Arab insurance industry. There has been good co-operation bet-
ween both markets in the handling of 'jumbo' risks in the Arab coun-
tries. The Arab markets always welcome assistance from the inter-
national market, particularly when this market is in a position 
to provide vital services to the Arab insurance markets in a number 
of ways. The international markets can increase the knowledge 
and experience of their clients. This can be achieved by: 
(i) giving advice on the underwriting and handling of large 
risks, 
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(ii) assisting insurers in training their staff including 
joint risk examination, jOint estirnati<.nof E.H.Ls, joint 
rating, joint claim settlement etc. All this assistance 
is the only practical way for them to obtain vital 
knowledge and experience. 
This practical and important aid to the Arab insurance industry 
from the international market is not inspired by purely altruistic 
motives. The complex and interdependent nature of international 
finance and insurance necessitates an essentially symbiotic relation-
ship between developed and developing nations. Aid and advice 
from the first world, in the form of training and education, leads 
to increased efficiency in the domestic Arab insurance industry, 
and hence to increased stability. In addition,there is 'goodwill 
and gratitude', although intangible, it has a habit of being trans-
lated into the concrete of business ceded to the international market 
from the Arab domestic insurance market. 
5.6 Conclusions. 
Arab insurance and reinsurance companies lag years behind 
the technological and economic development which have taken place 
in the region. However, historically, the insurance industry has 
always been faced with the problem of providing cover for new and 
more complex large risks; whenever these problems have arisen, 
eventually, solutions have always been found.Advances in modern tech-
nology will present the insurance industry with great choll enges 
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in the future, but, with co-operation between companies and markets, 
s o l u t i o ~ ~ to these new problems will also be found. 
The expansion in the numbers of na tional insurance companies 
in recent years has made increasingly evident the dramatic technical 
and capacity problems which they face. As sums insured and EML 
values of large risks increase considerably, insurers are unable 
to achieve a balance between risk exposure and the premiums generated 
from these risks. Limited capacity and unbalanced portfolios result 
in much of the large risks business being reinsured on the intern-
ational insurance markets. Experience shows that, with the help 
of these markets, it has generally been possible to find full cover 
for all types of large risks in the Arab region. 
However, coverage on the international market is not a complete 
solution to the problem of underwriting large risks. The remainder 
of the solution can only be provided by domestic insurance companies, 
and amongst the measures which they might consider are the following: 
(i) Premium rates, insurance conditions, loss prevention and 
loss settlement must be adequate in order to ensure the place-
ment of large risks. 
(ii) Insurers must plan to build up reserves and possess adequate 
free capital 
(iii) Coinsurance among companies within the market must be encour-
aged where it does not already exist. 
(iv) To achieve a large distribution and spread of large risks, 
regional and sub-regional co-operation must be considered 
and encouraged. 
(v) Insurance companies should also try to instil a 'risk conscious-
ness' amongst the insured and his staff, in order to reduce 
loss through incompetence, ignorance, carelessness, etc. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE EFFECT OF NATURAL HAZARDS ON THE ARAB INSURANCE MARKET 
6.1 Introduction 
Any definition of a natural catastrophe (1) must take into 
consideration the effect on people either through loss of life or 
ma terial damage. Disaster casualties are a function of the type, 
magnitude, duration and frequency of the catastrophic event. The 
greater the impact of a disaster, the higher the need for insurance 
coverage. This is particularly the case where the productive res-
ources of a country are badly affec ted. In Arab countries this 
may apply particularly to the petroleum sector \.;hich in many cases 
is the economic mainstay of that country. 
In general, insurers and reinsurers recognise the importance 
of both being able to provide cover for natural catastrophes and 
the problems involved in doing so. Consequently the insurance 
industry worldwide has increased its efforts to get better control 
of the risks of natural hazards. However, insurers suffer from 
a dearth of data for estimating the frequency, severi ty and cost 
of such risks. This problem clearly affects the Arab countries. 
(1) Thorne (1984, 167) defines the term 'natural catastrophe' 
as follows: 
'In simple terms the \,)"ords "any sudden, severe, unexpect-
ed and fortuitous happening of a natural origin c a u s i n ~ ~ great 
damage to property and/or loss of life" \.;i11 suffice for the 
present' . 
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe the degree to which 
the Arab countries are exposed to natural hazards, to show that 
these countries have been badly affected by them, and to indicate 
that insurers and reinsurers will have to face substantial problems 
due to the scarcity of information, including scientific information, 
about the hazards themselves. 
This theme will be illustrated by reference to four of the 
natural hazards COmmon to Arab countries, namely: 
Flooding 
Earthquake 
Salt Weathering 
Sand movement and dust storms. 
The last section of this chapter goes on to consider the awareness, 
and insurance coverage, of natural hazards, followed by a concluding 
discussion on the evaluation and accumulation of risk, which is has-
ed on a study of the type of evidence that can be drawn from earth 
sciences. The results of that study are summarised in the Appendix 
showing the exposure of Arab countries to the four lypes of hazard, 
and the centres of population and major development Ilrojects in 
relation to those hazards. 
6.2 Flooding 
In the Arab world, flooding has been a principal feature in 
a folklore which stretches over 3 millenniun. There are Sumerian 
legends from as early as 2000 BC, which contain the essentials 
of the later Babylonian stories of the flood. In C.lOOO B.C., 
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this legend was incorporated in the Gilgamesh epic, which was famil-
iar to Babylonian Assyrians, and Hittites U1unich Re, 1973, p.3). 
In Egypt the Nile floods have been recorded for more than 5000 
years and these records are the oldest for any scientific gauging 
of rivers. The most important date in the Egyptian ca lendar was 
the one on which the annual inundat ion took place, and records of 
flood levels can be traced back to 3000 - 3500 B.C., while remains 
of what is possibly the world I s oldest dam, built bet\"een 2950 and 
2750 B.C., are still in existence near Cairo (Ward, 1978, p.3). 
Floods result from a number of different basic causes, such 
as heavy rainfall snow melt and tidal surges. To these natural 
hazards must now be added man-induced floods such as those resulting 
from the failure of dams and other water control work (Figure 6.1). 
In order to assess the flood risk and hm" this is related 
to insurance and reinsurance, a brief discussion is required on 
flooding along river channels, across alluvial fans, coas tal flood-
ing and a brief mention of man-induced floods. 
6.2.1 River Channel Flooding 
Any river derives its flow either from surface runoff or from 
an underground source or both. A sudden rainstorm soon finds its 
\17ay to the river and a flood \17ill probably occur. However, there 
is a time lapse between a rainstorm and when water actually reaches 
the river. This time-lapse may be the same over the whole of the 
catchment area of a river and the tributaries may all discharge 
into the main river simultaneously. If this happens then a severe 
flood is quite likely to occur. But if the timing varies in different 
tributaries, then the main river may not actually flood, since the 
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excess water is spread over a period of several days (Gresswel1. 
1962, p.55-65). 
In addition to rainfall, the rapid melting of snow or ice 
can be responsible for severe flooding. Such a flood can normally 
only occur once each year, in the spring, resulting in a single 
flood, but when snow melt is slow it may not happen at all. The 
severi ty of snowmel t floods depend on two fac tors: first. the 
depth of snow accumulation and second the rate of melting. Ice melt 
is slower than snow meltand by itself is rarely responsible for 
severe flooding. (Ward, 1978, p.28). 
A river flood plain results from the storage of sediment within 
and adjacent to the river channel. 
two principal processes involved. 
of sediment within the river channel. 
In this connection there are 
The first is the accumulation 
This type of within-channel 
accumulation is mainly associated with below-bankfull discharge. 
Secondly, suspended sediment carried by overbank discharge across 
the valley floor may be deposited and supply a furt her inc rease 
of flood plain either generally over the flooded surface, or occas-
ionally, locally along the channel margins to form levees (Cooke 
and Doornkamp, 1974, p.107). 
There are several methods of measuring river flood. One 
of the commonest is based on the discharge rate which provides the 
basis for most methods of predicting flood magnitude. DIscharge 
is, by definition, the amount of water passing through the ch,:lDnel 
cross-section in unit time. Analysis of discharge frequency necess-
arily involves magnitude, since very high discharges are rare (great 
magnitude correlates with low frequency). Whereas Imll discharges 
are common (small magnitude correlates with high frequency) . 
197 
Because discharge is a product of mean depth, width and velo-
city of flow, and because its relations to characteristics such 
as area of inundation and sediment load have been described, curves 
can be drawn relating these variables to discharge (see figures 
6 . 2 and 6. 3 ) . The recurrence-interval of each flood is computed 
by the simple formula: 
RI 
N + 1 
M 
Where RI the recurrence interval, N total number of years 
of record, M the rank order of discharge. Calculations of 
flood frequency at gauging stations depend almost entirely upon 
the length and quality of the record. Table 6.1 shows the annual 
flood on the Tigris at Mosul and Baghdad, and the Euphrates at Hit 
and Hindiya. The table also shows that, in general, the Tigris 
is in maximum flood in April and the Euphrates in l"lay. Figure 
6.2 gives an indication of the extreme discharges of the Tigris 
and Euphrates that can occur. For example, a discharge of 7340 
3 
m/sec. at Mosul (on the Tigris) and 7366 
3 
m/sec. at Hit (on the 
Euphrates) occur with an interval of nine years (on average), whereas 
discharges of the same rivers of 
3 1700 m / sec. at Mosul and 1400 
m3 /sec. at Hindiya occur with recurrence intervals of 1.13 year 
for both. 
Table 6.2 shows that the maximum recorded discharge of the 
Tigris (10,900 2 m/sec. at Baghdad) has a recurrence interval of 
3 
once in one hundred years, whereas a discharge of 5230 m /sec. occurs 
on average once in every two years. Graphs, such as Figure 6.2 
can be drawn from short runs of data to allow an estimate to be 
made of the likelihood of high (flood-level) disc harges. This 
is illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
... 
:;l 
:J 
;>-< 
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1966 
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1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
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Table 6.1 
Annual Floods of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers at 
Mosul, Baghdad, Hit and Hindiya 
1965-1972 
Extreme Discharge Maximl.inl M3 / sec. 
~ ~ Tigris Euphrates ~ ~ ~ ~Cl 
~ ~ ~ Bagh- Hind-~ b s u l l Date rl;ll"l Date Hit Date ; "'" Date 
1 7340 3.4.69 3925 5.4.69 7366 13.5.69 3271 12.5.72 
2 6758 28.1.66 3922 16.4.71 6654 3.5.68 2894 19.5.69 
3 6316 2.5.72 3783 23.4.72 6092 23.5.67 2510 1. 5.68 
4 5180 20.4.68 3215 4.4.68 5214 10.5.72 2288 9.5.67 
5 4950 5.5.67 3660 19.5.67 4910 23.5.71 2098 14.5.68 
6 3740 19.4.71 3601 21.4.65 4484 5.2.66 1983 2.5.65 
7 3243 30.4.65 2521 25.4.66 3632 6.5.65 1775 22.5.71 
8 1700 9.4.70 2292 23.4.70 3254 14.5.70 1400 15.5.70 
Q ) ~ ~
u 
c ...... 
Q) <':l 
~ ~ ~ ~
::J Q) 
& ~ ~
9.0 
4.5 
3.0 
2.25 
1.8 
1.5 
1.29 
1.13 
Source: Compiled from the UNESCO, discharge of selected rivers of 
the World, Vol. 111 (part 11), 1974, pp.6Q, 62 and 
River 
Euphrates 
Tigris 
Tigris 
Great Zab 
Lesser Zab 
Diyalah 
Vol. I, 1969, pp. 32, 48. 
Table 6.2 
Euphrates, Tigris, and Tributaries 
Annual Flood Discharge Chances 
Percent change flood discharge 
Place 
50. 20. 5 . 
Hit 2840 3740 4650 
Mosul 3560 4900 6600 
Baghdad 5230 7000 8950 
Eski Kelek 1970 2860 3900 
Qara Beg 1440 2060 2780 
CAUun Kupri 
Jabal Harnrin 820 1120 1480 
3 ~ 1 1 / sec. 
1 . 
5500 
8400 
10900 
5000 
3500 
1820 
N.B. (1) The annual flood discharge is the discharge corresponding to 
the highest routine daily gauge reading observed during the 
flood season. (2) In the case of Tigris at Baghdad the extreme tloods 
must be regarded as potential only, since the embankments would not 
allow such discharges to pass through Baghdad itself. 
(Source: (IONIDES, 1937, p.254). 
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Figure 6.2 
Annual Floods, Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, 1965-1972 
A Tigris River at Mosul city. 
B Euphrates River at Hit city. 
C Tigris River at Baghdad city. 
D Euphrates River at Hindiya city. 
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From this it can be seen that there is a statistical. prolJabili-
discharge as high as 10,964 3 M/sec. at Baghdad once 
100 years. Such is the nature of statistical probabilities, how-
ever, that such a discharge could, of course, occur in two successive 
years. Whether or not this will cause flooding will depend on 
the capacity of the channel to contain the whole of this (10\"; 
if it cannot, then flooding will occur. Whether or not this will 
lead to damage, in an insurance sense, will depend on what insured 
property stands on the flooded lands. 
In many engineering situations, river works have to be carried 
out without a long record of river discharges being available. 
Since engineers frequently design up to the capacity of the 50 
year flood, their estimates of what this will be are crucial to 
the safety of the work they carry out. 
6.2.2 Alluvial Fans 
---
Alluvial fans are to be found in arid and semi-arid parts 
of the Arab world (e.g. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco 
etc.), and are the natural result of floods generated within mount-
ainous zones emerging on to the plains where they deposit their 
high sediment loads as fans. They are most highly d(Cvcloped in 
areas of sparse vegetation and torrential rainfall. (A general model 
of flooding danger on fans is shown in Figure 6.4). 
Flooding can be a serious problem on alluvial fans and can 
occur in two principal areas: 
(a) along the margins of the main supply channel and 
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Figure 6.4 
Relative Flooding Danger on a Typical Alluvial 
Fan in the Western United States. 
FLOOOING 
DANGER 
EEE.xtreme 
§ Modo:rate 
[]Sltght ----.- Cljer channels 
(after Kesseli and Beaty, from Cooke & Doornkamp, 1978). 
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(b) in the depositional zones beyond the ends of the supply 
channels. 
As the stream flow on fans is ephemeral, the probability of flooding 
is often ignored by man, but floods on fans can cause severe problems 
due to their high velocities, variable sediment concentrations, 
and their tendency to show swift alteration in flood location, so 
that channels can be abandoned and new ones created in relatively 
short periods of time (Cooke, et al, 1982). 
In addition, deposition on fans arises from changes in the 
hydraulic geometry of flows as they leave the major feeder channels 
from the mountains. Here the flow increases in \.Jidth, decreases 
in depth and velocity, and often loses water by infiltration into 
permeable alluvial deposits, thus causing deposition. Therefore. 
alluvial fan flooding is a menace to farmers working agricultural 
land on fans, to those concerned with building and maintaining lines 
of communication (e.g. roads) across them, and to residents in comm-
unities built on them (Cooke & Doornkamp, 1974, p.I08-l09, and Cooke 
et al, 1982, ch. VI). 
Cooke and Doornkamp (1974) provide a case study of alluvial 
fan flooding in southern Jordan. This flood occurred on IO-l1th 
March 1966 when torrential rain fell in the basin and precipitation 
of over SOmm was recorded in some places, with the highest rainfall 
occurring south W2st of Ma'an. The storm was possibly the second 
heaviest in the area for twenty years. Floods began in mountain 
tributaries and were fed into the main valley along alluvial fan 
channels. The flow accumulated an enormous amount of sediment 
which reached as far downstream as the southern Arava and the Gulf 
of Aqaba. t-Iost of the damage occurred in the tmm of rla I an where 
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some 70 people were killed and overe 250 were injured, ,:llld .] large 
number of houses were destroyed, when an artificial dam was hroken. 
Damage was estimated at between US.S 1.3 and S 3.7 millions 
Another case study is described (Doornkamp, et aI, 1978) for 
the flood hazard of the Suez City (Figure 6.5). Alluvial fan flood-
ing extends into the area of proposed urban development and places 
it at risk. 
6.2.3 Coastal Flooding 
The factors which must be taken into account in relation to 
coastal flooding are: the state of the tide, wind speed, wind direc-
tion, the shape of the coast line, its exposure, its off-shore chara-
cteristics, and the steepness of the inland ground. 
Coastlines are normally subjected to two high and t\olO low 
tides each day, with the tidal range reaching a maximum at spring 
tides and decreasing to minimum at neap tides. The normal range 
of tidal behaviour does not result in catastrophic flooding, either 
because the c0astal land surface is well above spring high tide 
level or because 10\'; lying coasts which are frequent ly covered by 
water are not inhabited by man (Ward, 1978, p.41). 
Severe meteorological conditions, however, can cause extensive 
coastal flooding, especially when a strong on-shore wind coincides 
with a high tide. This water can cause considerable damage. 
Some countries are well known for their frequent and violent winds, 
others are more fortunate, enjoying a much calmer atmosphere, but 
even these (including the shores of Arab lands) can experience drama-
tic storms. 
Figure 6.5 
Geomorphological Assessment of the Potential Flood 
Hazard of the Site of the Suez Development Plan 
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In 1978 the Commercial Union Assurance published a study of 
coastal storm risks, which was concerned with high winds associaterl 
either with frontal depressions or tropical cyclones. The averilge 
number of days per annum with gales varied from less than 5 in many 
of Arab areas (e.g. Basra, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jidda, Beirut. Suez 
etc.), between 10-20 in Casablanca, Bizerta and Socot ra. between 
30-45 in Tripoli, and to 45 or more in Berbera and Tunis (see natllral 
hazard data in the Appendix and Maps). For t he purpose 
of that study. gale force represented force 8 or more (on the Eeau-
fort Scale) as recorded at each location, and the velocity of these 
forces ranged from 39 to 46 miles per hour for force R to above 
75 miles per hour for force 12. Such high winds are particularly 
significant if they blow on-shore. 
Sudden storms with high waves may not be new in the Arabian 
Gulf, but the oil jetties and port installations are. These instal-
lations, built up along the Arabian coasts and particularly exposed 
to storms, have suffered much damage from sea waves. and one must 
expect serious losses from storms every year. Even fairly gentle 
winds can cause site-spills to drift towards the shore and cause 
damage, as has been shown in the Gulf during 1981. 
6.2.4 Man-induced Floods 
---
The catastrophic floods associated with the ~ I a c h l l l ctilm d i ~ ; a s t e r r
in Morvi - India in 1979 (killing 5000 people and destroying a whole 
settlement) has made the world a\,are of the potential risk helm" 
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any dam which bursts. In the Arab world this is especiallv Lmpnrt-
ant as an assessable risk in the earthquake zone. (see Sec t ion /).3). 
6.2.5 Flood and Insurance 
6.2.5.1 Flood Losses 
Flood causes considerable damage and in order to discuss the 
effect of flood on the insurance and reinsurance business, it. is 
important to classify the flood damage into tangihle and intangible 
damage, according to whether or not the damage can be expressed 
in monetary terms. 
Intangible damages include fear, anxiety, annoyance, distress, 
insecurity and ill-health. In general such damages are uninsurable. 
Tangible damages can be divided into direct and indirect categor-
ies. Direct damages include physical damage to buildings and their 
contents, bridges, roads, railways and to agricultural land. These 
losses result from the physical contact of vulnerable property wilh 
flood water. Indirect damages inc lude loss of produc t ion, Loss 
of income and business, delays in transportation of goods and pe()ple. 
These 
ities. 
losses result from the breakdown of specified economic activ-
Finally direct and indirect damages need to be subdivided 
into primary and secondary categories (Ward, 1978, pp .17.l-J), and 
Figure 6.6 illustrates the types of flood damage which may occur. 
Munich Re (1973, p.4) has pointed out that, in general, d a m a ~ e e
caused by flood and inundation is deemed to be included in lhe fr<lme-
work of some classes of business, such as cont rac tors alL r i s k ~ ) , ,
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erectionall risks, plate glass, livestock and motor. The i.nflllence 
of flood and inundation hazard in these classes of h u s i n e ~ ; s s does 
not constitute a great problem since it is in most cases onlya second-
ary element of the insurance protection granted and is not the decis-
ive factor in the demand for insurance. This means the water risk 
has an important influence on demand for CAR/EAR covers. This 
argument may be true of CAR/EAR, but in the case of other cl ass-
es of insurance, flood and inundation may cause a great prohlem 
to insurers. 
Figure 6.6 
Types of Flood Damages 
Flood damages 
I 
Tangible Intangible 
e.g. fear. 
anxiety 
I 
Direct e.g. Indirect 
physical damage e.g. loss of 
by floodwater production 
I 
primary secondary primary 
I __ l_l 
l secnndary __ I 
Source: (Ward, 1978, p.174) 
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In the insurance of construction projects, the risk of water 
damage varies to a degree during the insurance period. In the 
CAR/EAR insurance branches, experience regarding the water risk 
still induces the insurers and reinsurers to be rather reserved. 
In road construction, for instance, approximately 90 per cent, 
in fill-dam construction 75 per cent, and in bridge construction 
50 per centof all damage is caused by water. (Munich Re, 1973. p.5). 
Heavy rainfall in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya 
resulted in insured losses to CAR and EAR projects in excess of 
VS.$.15 million during the period of 1967-1969. The return period 
for heavy rains is less than once in la years in these areas (Swiss 
Re, 1976, p.36), but even this may be more frequent than is normally 
perceived. 
On two occasions in early 1982 heavy rain caused floods in 
the Gulf area which swept away huge stretches of road and caused 
great damage in Jubail industrial city (Financial Times, 1983). 
Furthermore, storms and torrential rain reported in ~ a y y 1981 in 
the V.A.E. and Oman resulted in one of the largest claims that insur-
ers in the V.A.E. have had to meet; initial estimates put the cost 
of damage at DH 1000 (V$ 234) million. Thirty-five people were 
killed. Some of the V.A.Els smaller and undercapitalised insurers 
faced possible ruin because many of them had an insufficient finan-
cial base and reinsurance backing (Lloyd I s List. 198 L) . Table 
6.3 shows the major floods in the Arab world during the period 1972-
1982. 
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Table 6.3 
Recent Major Floods and Storms in the Arab World 
Date P1ace/ Cause of Loss Victims/Damages Insured I 
Country Loss 
10 Feb.1972 Northern Yemen Flooding 35 dead n.a. 
March 1973 Tunisia and Flooding Over 100 dead n.a. 
Algeria 
Mar. 1974 Algeria Flooding n.a. n.a. 
Aug. 1975 Northern Yemen Flooding At least 80 n.a. 
dead 
Sept. 1975 Banks of the Flooding 75,000 homeless n.a. 
Nile/Sudan 
June 1977 Masirah/Oman Hurricane llO dead n. a. 
J1y. 1978 Gezirah/Sudan Flooding 500.000 homeless n.a. 
Oct. 1979 Egypt Flooding At least 30 dead n.a. 
May 1981 Oman-UAE. Storms 35 dead n.a. 
May 1981 Central of Flooding 600,000 homeless n. a. 
Somalia 
Sept. 1981 E1-Eu1ma/ Flooding 43 dead n. a. 
Algeria 
Oct. 1981 Arabia Gulf Storms 200 dead n. a. 
Jan. 1982 Arabian Heavy over 30 dead n.a. 
Peninsula storms 
Apr. 1982 Southern Yemen Flooding 500 dead, over n . .:1. 
10,000 homeless 
Nov. 1982 Tunisia Rainfall 100 dead n. a. 
flooding 
Source: Swiss Re, Sigma, various issues of January. 
6.2.5.2 Assessment of the Flood Risk and Losses 
5.2.5.2.1 Assessment of the Flood Risk 
Nany of the Arab countries are considered arid and semi-arid 
regions. Consequently when a construction project in an arid region 
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is to be insured, underwriters are mostlYadvised that the floud 
and inundation hazard is extremely low and that in this respect, 
the risk can be considered a good one. However, popular belief 
" h t "d t ff"" "I (1) and experlence over s or perlO s are no su lClenl evlC encl'. 
As far as river flooding is concerned it has been 
shown above (as well as by the Swiss Re, 1976), that even short 
records of river discharge can be used to estimate the risk properly. 
However, observations in data sets and at particular sites can 
occur. Other techniques for predicting flooding are available 
- e.g. based on drainage basin characteristics. (See Cooke et .11, 
1982) . 
If river records are available for a long period of time, 
then it is relatively easy to assess the flood risk to which a 
location is exposed periods of 50 years and 100 years 
may be considered as good and very good respectively. If no water-
level data taken near the site are available, assessment may also 
be effected on the strength of flow values determined at /<\auging 
points above the construction site (Munich Re, 1973, p.1.0), or by 
the geomorphology of the site itself (Cooke et al, 1982). 
Finally, in order to determine an adequate risk a s s e S ~ i m e n t , ,
the underwriter needs to know two factors: first, the !)l"ollability 
of a loss occurring, and secondly the extent of the damage result-
ing from such an event. When these factors have been ascertained, 
premium, deductible and limit of indemnity can be produced. 
(1) As an example, a contractor was told by villagers ne.Jr one 
isolated site that there had been no rainf.:ll1 over the prev-
ious four years. During the next eighteen months, flood and 
storm losses occurred at that site on seven occasions (Scalon, 
1977 p.2). 
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6.2.5.2.2 Assessment of Flood Losses 
To assess the extent of any loss, it is first essent ial to 
examine all the details of the project. There is no doubt that 
statistics on losses are very important for determining the l ( ) s ~ ; ;
potential, but in arid lands flood losses may not he adequa te ly 
documented, and in any event are irrelevant when construction is 
taking place on land that is subject to a greater flood risk than 
has historically been the case if the construction \vO r k itself 
changes the risk factors. 
The most indispensable items of information needed are (Swiss 
Re, 1976, p. 2 3 ) : 
(a) 
( b) 
(c) 
Relevant plans and drawings. It does not follow that 
the volume of plans and drawings decides the quality 
of the formation, and the underwriter may need to obtain 
advice on how effectively flooding can really be pred-
icted from the studies already carried out. Tn this 
respect, an evaluation using principles of genmorpho logy 
is valuable. 
Work progress schedule. A work progress schedule is 
essential to find out the severity of loss and is, there-
fore, the key to assessment and underwriting. 
Bill of quantities with detailed prices. The bi 11 
of quantity, with the unit prices, will supply the basis 
for calculating the expected damage. 
However, these only relate to the project. They are inadequate 
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for the purposes of assessing the actual physical risks i1t that 
site. What is more, the construction work that is being, or has 
been, undertaken may itself increase the risk of flooding (e.g. 
when a critical wadi has been inadvertently blocked). 
require very careful investigations. 
6.3 Earthquake 
6.3.1 Historical Evaluation 
This may 
The Arab world has a continous history of d.isastrolls 
earthquakes; in 551AD for example, Beirut was destroyed by an earth-
quake with an estimated magnitude of 7.5 Richter scale. The history 
of serious earthquakes includes the destruction of the city of 
Antioch in Syria, which claimed 250,000 human lives as early as 
859AD(Swiss Re, 1980, p.3). The earthquake extended to Ragga, 
Harran, Ras El Ain, Hims, Urfa, Damascus, Turtus, ~ l i s i s s and Adina. 
From such accounts one is tempted to assign a magnitude of :-'1.8 
to 8.5 to this event. (Swiss Re, 1978, p.32). 
In more recent years earthquakes include that of 10th October 
1980, which destroyed EI-Asnam in Algeria. Hore recently an earth-
quake occurred on 13th December 1982, when more than ]()O() People 
were killed and 400,000 left homeless in North Yemen, an area which 
does not normally suffer from earthquakes. Table 6.4 lists ~ . ; ( ) m c c
of the major earthquakes which have taken place in Arab count r i.es 
since 551 AD. 
Year (A.D) 
55i 
847 
847 
849 
859 
860 
881 
902 
977 
986 
103: 
1058 
1071 
ll18 
:'130 
1149 
1201 
1227 
1262 
1436 
:'503 
1550 
: 717 
1751 
1754 
1790 
1790 
1822 
1867 
1837 
1864 
1867 
1885 
1927 
1954 
1954 
:'955 
1956 
1956 
1959 
1960 
1969 
1974 
1979 
1980 
1982 
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Table 6.4 
The History of Major Earthquakes in the Arab ~ l a t . e s s
Place/Country 
Beirut - Lebanon 
Ant:'och - Syria 
~ ! o s u l l - Iraq 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Antioch - Syria 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Baghdad to Basrah - Iraq 
Baghdad to Basrah - Iraq 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Hosul - Iraq 
Hosul - Iraq 
Hosul - Iraq 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Coast of Syria 
Mosul - Iraq 
Hosul - Iraq 
Mosul - Iraq 
Hosul - Iraq 
Hosul - Iraq 
Algiers - Algeria 
Agadir - Morocco 
Cairo - Egypt 
Oran - Algeria 
Oran - Algeria 
Aleppo - Syria 
B1ida - Algeria 
Lebanon 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Bllda - Algeria 
Central Atlas - Algeria 
Jordan Valley 
Alexandria - Egypt 
EI-Asnam - Algeria 
Alexandria - Egypt 
Lebanon 
Dead Sea - Jordan 
Or an and Saint Cloud - A l g e r ~ a a
Agadir - ~ o r o c c 0 0
Cairo, Sinai, Asyut - Egypt 
North Libya 
Baghdad - Iraq 
El-Asnam - Algeria 
Northern Yemen 
~ ~ t l . . ll! ,'il' ~ ~ ms d . J m a w : e l ~ ~
Heavv c t a m a $ ( ~ . . ~ : . . ;.5 
20.000 dead and heavv d a m a ~ e e
50,000 dead and heavv d a m a ~ e e
Damaglng 
250,OOn dead ( ~ . 8 8 - 8.5) 
Dama!;ln. 
Soi: llque[,ctlun 
5011 liquefactlnn 
Damap ng 
Manv people dead. 
50 houses destrnved 
Many people de.d. 
Damaglng 
Damag1ng 
Very damag:ng 
A great e a r t ~ q u a K e e
Heavy a a m a ~ ~ n g g { ~ . 7 . S - ~ ! !
20,OUO dead 
Dama ~ l l ng 
D a m a ~ ~ n g g
Dama 81 ng 
Dest r,)ved 
20,000 aead 
D a m a ~ : n g g
C1.5.5 \ 
1200 dead. 2l',\)Or. iH)mejpss. D a m a ~ e s s
est:'r.l3tec .lt L'S: :51' tr .. 
22 dedd, (:-\. n.7,. 
:36 dl!dd, I ~ . b ) ) "'ltl', he,' 
( ~ . . 5. J) 
15.l)')(\ dead. darn .. ,g;e!... 3SSe!:sed at. 
~ a T ' ! ' l a g l n ~ ~ ( ~ ~ . ; ) )
(M. :. c' 
No aamag:.nll.. ( ~ . . 4. ~ ~ I 
2 ( l t ( ~ ' j ( I U U dead, :';SC,O\)t' h ~ ) m t _ · . ~ s ~ . .
D a m a ~ e c , , l ' s t l m a u ~ d d (1' :'S: Jli(il' fr.. 
Uver 3,OOll o8ad, '- )(),(IIl( :lnmelt!ss. 
Source:(l) S",iss Re, Atlas on Seismici"), and V o l c a n ~ s m , , 1<)78, pp.Jl-J2. 
(2) Swiss Re, S1gma, Nos. 1 of 1981 and 1983. 
:20m 
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6.4.2 Location and Types of Earthquake 
Most of the earthquakes in the world have happened at. t.he 
following locations (Swiss Re, 1977, p. 9): 
belts. 
(a) about 80 percent of all earthquakes are observed in 
the circum-Pacific belt which follows the West coast 
of South America, Central America, the arc of islands 
in the northern part of the Pacific, Japan, Taiwan, 
the Philippines and a section of Indonesia. 
(b) About 17 percent of earthquakes are observed in a belt 
which extends from the Azores in the At lantic to the 
southern part of Europe and part of North Africa, Turkey, 
the Near East including Iran, part of Arabia, Afghanis-
tan, Pakistan, India and Burma. A more detailed picture 
of the earthquake risk in the Middle East and ~ o r t h h
Africa is given in the Natural Hazards maps. (see Appendix). 
The probability of earthquakes varies great lv \.Jirhin these 
Although earthquakes are more common there than elsewhere, 
it does not mean that places outside the known earthquake zones 
are entirely without earthquakes. However, within those b e l t ~ ; . .
earthquakes may strike at almost any place and at any time. 
The coastal areas bordering the Red Sea and the Ar,1bi an (;ul f 
are considered to be in low exposure zones (see Natural Hazards 
Maps) although some earthquakes of a lesser magni t udc liave nee 11 rrcd 
in the past. However, the 1982 eart hquake in Nort h Yl'men ~ ; h O \ . J s s
that the degree of exposure in the area may be h.igher than pre'vinllS 1 v 
thought. 
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Furthermore, due to the high co ncentration of indu:;t r i it I c()mp 1-
exes in the coastal areas, it is here that the Arab world may ~ x p e c l l
the biggest ever single loss from earthquakes in t.he future (see 
towns and development projects maps). 
Earthquakes can also occur within geologically stable < 1 r e < l ~ ; , ,
for instance, one occurred at Meckering in Western Australia ill 
1968, and there have been other examples from time to time (Verney, 
1979, p.74). Stable regions might also be affected by a s t r ( J n ~ ~
earthquake in neighbouring areas. The consequences of such are 
difficult, if not impossible ,to predict. 
Earthquakes are caused by volcanic activity and by tectonic 
movements in the crust of the earth. Volcanic quakes do not norm-
ally release a large amount of energy and are not very important 
for the insurance world. (Munich Re, 1973, p. 7) . The relative 
movement of continental or submarine plates against each nther create 
much greater stresses. These stresses become obvinus nn the surface 
in the form of faults, and they can generate frequent l a r ~ e e earth-
quakes, such as along the famous San Andreas fault in South Califor-
nia, (Doerr, 1973, pp. 1 - 2). 
From the above, it can be seen that earthquakes <Ire possihle 
everywhere; however, it is possible to produce earthquake risk 
zones, in map form, as a basis for insurance /reinsurance assessment. 
The only real differences betwen the belts of higher c.Jrlhqu.Jke 
intensity and the areas beyond them is the return period nf eilrth-
quakes of high intensity. 
6.3.3 Return Period 
The average time which elapses between two unrelated cart!J-
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quakes of the same magnitude Ul) in the same local ion is cdlled 
the 'return period'. The study of return periods, or the [ r e ~ u e n c y y
of earthquakes, in a particular area is essential to insurers ()r 
reinsurers in assisting them to estimate the reL.It ive earthquake 
risk of various areas and the maximum possible losses. However, 
since there is only a short period of scientific experience available 
for calculating the return periods of earthquakes other than for 
China, prediction is difficult. The analysis of earthquakes shows 
that some places are more at risk than others (see Swiss Re, 1977), 
even though the precise timing of such events is imposssillle. 
To take the Morocco region for example, an earthquake Clccllrrecl 
at Agadir in 1751 but there was no recurrence until 1960 ((1.5.9). 
The interval between them was over 200 years. Huwever, it does 
not mean another 200 years must elapse before another earthquake 
occurs; such a prediction could be very wrong, and that the site 
remains vulnerable is beyond doubt. 
Wakuri and Yasukara in their paper, Earthquake [ n ~ ; u r a n c e e j n 
Japan, (The ASTIN Bulletin, Vol. IX, Part 3, 1977, pp. 334-5), say, 
concerning the return period: 
"Large earthquakes are always followed by aE t e r s l j ( ) t : k ~ ; . . For 
a period of several years after a large earthquake, ~ . ; a y y p ( ) ~ ; s i b b
ly 20 to 30 years, there occur a number of earthquakes .:llld 
these are considered to be aftershocks ...... It dppears t.hat 
no earthquakes, even small ones, occur during the 21) to 3() 
years preceding the next large earthquake". 
However, exceptions do occur. If the eart h q u a k e ~ > > n f El-
Asnam in 1954 (M.6.7) and in 1980 U!.7.'3) are taken inl" c()w;iciC'r-
ation, it can be seen that they do not conform to this hypothesis 
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in two important re spec ts. Firstly, the two major c a r t h q u a k e ~ i i
occurred with a short return period of 26 years, whereils for il major 
earthquake this is normally once in about 100 years (sLlch as at 
San Francisco) or even once in 200 years (as at Lisbon). Secondly, 
the earthquake of 1954 was followed by a larger one in 1980. 
Furthermore, although past losses and s e i s m o l o ~ i c a l l records 
show that, on average, an earthquake of magnitude 7 may he expected 
to occur once every fifty years (Perry, 1977, p.10), the ~ > t c l t i s t i c s s
also show that an earthquake of M.7 in one territory produces il 
different return period from one of the same magnitude in another 
territory. For example, a return period of 102 years was calculated 
for earthquakes in California with a magnitude of 8 on the open-
ended Richter Scale, while the figure was 16 years for carthquilkes 
of the same magnitude in the Philippines (Oberschelp, 1977, n.13). 
The r efore knowledge of the return periods of an earthquake in 
a particular territory is essential to rating the ciltastrophe excess 
of loss covers. 
6.3.4 Assessment of Earthquake Risk 
It is becoming of increasing importance that i . 1 l ~ ; l l r e r s s have 
accurate information about the location of earthquakes and their 
return periods because in recent years there has h e , ~ n n an i ne re;lse 
in both earthquake activity in the number and size of insur<lbl,-, 
structures placed in risk zones. 
Generally speaking, in evaluat ing earthquake r 1 ~ ; k : ; , , whet her 
for residential, administrative or other purposes or whetht:r formi ng 
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part of a factory or an industrial complex, the most l ' ~ ~ ~ . e n t t Lt! r ; j c t ~ ~
ors to be taken into account are (Swiss Re, 1977, pp. q ~ 2 7 ) : ~ ~
1. Position with respect to hazard exposure (i.e. geographical 
position with respect to the earthquake belts or ha7.ard zone:; ). 
2. Magnitude of the earthquake as measured on the Richter Scale. 
3. 
In contrast the intensity of an earthquake is a qu.]1 itat.ive 
measure of the effect at any particular point and is recorded 
on the modified Mercalli Scale. A greater magni t ude USlla lly 
means a higher degree of damage, deat h and des true t ion, bu t 
this is not always the case, as a shallow shock call be felt 
over a comparatively small area and cause much destruction, 
while a deeper shock may occasion only moderate shakin)o; nver 
a much greater area and do little damage. 
Subsoil conditions tn earthquake areas. The ground on which 
a building stands has a considerable effect upon its behaviour 
during an earthquake. It is certainly a sound l)raC t: ice to 
build on a rock foundation, and to avoid building clifferenr 
parts of the structure on ground of varying soil or rock c t e n s i . ~ ~
ties. Buildings standing part lyon rock and part 1 y Oll fill 
are particularly vulnerable (Eihy, 1967, p. 162). 
it is important to get information on the type of ~ ; u b s ( ) i i 1 
in the region of the risk, on depth of layers if the ~ ; u h s o i l l
is soft (e. g. alluvium) and on the ground \01.] te r 1 eve 1 . As 
a general rule, it can be taken that the harder .] m a t ' ~ r i a l . .
on which a building is founded, the smaller the d a m a , ~ e e I.ill 
be. Ground water raises the level of damage. Therefore. 
careful consideration of the subsoil conditinl1s is ut" great 
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importance to the stability of a structure. 
4. Building material. The quality of the material i ~ ; ; ill so impor-
tant in affecting the level of damage. If for instclnce. 
bricks or stones are set with mud or even lime mortar. the 
stone or burned brick will hold, but the mortar will fail. 
Cement mortar performs far better than lime mortar; this 
means that it is wrong to construct a perfectly designed build-
ing of second-class material (Huni c h Re, 1 q 7J • p. 13) . 
In Agadir the old stone masonry was held together \.Jith a murt-
ar of mud and sand, and roofed with anything from timber and 
corrugated iron to reinforced concrete slabs t his 1 cd to 
heavy damage (Eiby, 1967, p.176). 
5. Building design. If a building is irregular in its outer 
shape (such as L or U shaped building), or in its struct.ure. 
increased damage will occur, due to complicated and difficult 
to determine oscillation patterns. 
6. Quality of design. Obviously, great expertise I, " .> reqllired 
in the design of structures, to make them a ~ ; ; secure a g a i T \ ~ ; t t
earthquake forces as possible. There are agencies \.Jhich are 
highly experienced in this field (e.g. in Japan and the U.S.A.) 
and it is important to utilize such expertise. 
7. Sensitivity. In the case of machinery or industrial planl, 
a further factor should be considered, namely, ~ ; e n s i t i v i l Y . .
Machinery or similar items are not only exposed l() r i : ; k ~ ; ;
by falling debris, but by tilting or cracking [<)lInd,ltions 
too. A generally rather insensitive item could :;ustaill hez\vy 
damage if it were installed in a building where total ()J' part.-
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ial collapse might bury it under heavy debris, or i.[ it"; Coundilt ion:; 
were laid on bad subsoil. 
Finally, there is the possibility that fires resulting from 
earthquakes may cause more loss and damage than the original shock 
(as in the case of the earthquakes which hit San Francisco i.n 19()f) 
and Tokio in 1923). 
Even when the above factors have been taken into consideration 
in assessing the earthquake risk for individual builings, there 
still remains a major problem for insurers and reinsurers, i..e. 
that of assessing the probable total loss resulting fr()m an '_'<Irth-
quake catastrophe. Therefore, it is important to divide earthquake 
areas into zones of accumulation of earthquake risk. After the 
accumulation zones have been determined, it is essential that direct 
insurers have at their disposal a system which will enable them 
to ascertain at any time their commitments in terms of tot a 1 sums 
insured in various zones of accumulation. (Munich Re, 1973, p.13). 
It is also necessary for an insurer to determine his commit-
ments in terms of sums insured in the various zones of accumulation, 
but this matter is more complicated for a reinsurer, as the reinsurer 
has to work through several insurers in various countries, and is 
therefore dealing with accumulation commitments in a number of conn-
ec tions, and not only for the earthquake risk covered under fire 
and fire loss of profits. Thus both the insurer and reinsurer 
must expect an accumulation from CAR, EAR, marine cargo in:;lIrance, 
motor hull insurance as well as life insurance and person:!l accident 
insurance (rbid). In such cases portfolio risk c()n:3i:;t:; ()f tHO 
factors (Carter, 1979, p.33l):-
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1. The expected loss per structure. 
2. The probability of many losses resulting from the :;ame evcllt 
Friedman (1984, p.63) has pointed out that in the CdSL' of 
property insurance portfolios covering natural peri 1:;, past loss 
experience is unlikely to provide an adequate guide to an insurer':, 
future risk for the natural hazards because, 
(i) property characteristics do not remain constant; 
(ii) number, type, and geographical distribution chanMe 
rapidly with time; and 
(iii) their susceptibility to damage also changes, due to 
the changes over time in building design, material 
and construction, building codes, and insurance coverage. 
To provide a measure for evaluating the magnitude of the future 
natural hazard damage potential, Friedman suggest s two al ter na t i vc 
approaches: either quantatively or qualitatively estimated in 
an insurance operation. Both measures can be tested llsinM llat u[,:.ll 
l
. (l) hazard simu atl0n. 
6.3.5 Earthquake Protection 
It is still not possible, despite much scientific work, to 
predict both the place and time of an earthquake. T h e n ~ f ( ) r e , , prot:-
ection against earthquake damage is essential within the vulnerallle 
(1) For more information about the subject see Friedman 
(1972) and (1984). 
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seismic zones. The most obvious danger areas must be ..lv<li rled, 
and any building in earthquake-prone areas must be made as safe 
bl b d t . methods (1) as possi e y soun cons r u c t ~ o n n
Because earthquakes can bring about the comprehensive devasla-
tion of an area, government intervention is important and it mw;t 
focus on risk prevention and on determined effort to get het ter 
information, such as, detailed intensit)·, return period, maps of 
exposed cities, and exposure data by types of structures over the 
same urban areas. 
The action of government is principally along two lines: 
(i) legislation and administration, 
(ii) planning for loss reduction. 
Earthquake damages could be substantially diminished by enforcement 
of improved building codes to ensure better earthquake - resistant 
design. Most loss of life in earthquakes is due to a fall, or 
partial fall, of buildings. However, any co-operation between gcolo-
gists and engineering staffs can go toward prevent ing dangerous 
locations of structures. (Oakeshott, 1976, P.l12)(2) 
It is significant that evidence exists to show that d d m ~ ; ; over 
100 m. high and sited on weak lineaments in the eart h' s crllst can 
generate earthquake activity. Here the prediction of an ear-thquake 
depends on an adequate amount of information concernin).1; t hl' ddm 
and reservoir site. In general, the insurers and rei n:;urer:; mu:.;t 
turn to the professional earth-scientist for advice. 
(1) The traditional Japanese view says that earthquake resist-
ance construction substantially adds to building costs and 
even then cannot withstand the severest of shocks. Tlwrcforc 
why not build in a form that can easily and cheaply be replaced 
but which does not pose high risk to human life. 
(2) In some cases there are no safe sites, so it is i.mpossihle 
to avoid areas of risk. As an example, the land area of I ran 
and Turkey are within the earthquake prone zone, therefore 
the whole of each country is exposed to some measure of risk. 
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6.4 Salt Weathering 
The ambitious construction programmes in many A r ~ h h sI atcs 
in recent years have been accompanied by very grave sillt weathering 
problems. The use of concrete and natural stone for bui Idings, 
structures and roads in the presence of salts has resulted in much 
damage. The review in this section is based on the study by CoC)ke, 
et aI, 1982, 'Urban geomorphology in dry land'. 
6.4.1 Salt Weathering Processes 
Rock disintegration by salt may result from either physical 
or chemical changes (Figure 6.7). Physical weathering arises from 
stresses created by the expansion or growth of s<llt in confined 
spaces, particularly pores. 
main pressures: 
Such a process is probably due to three 
(a) the saline solution is exposed to evaporation in high 
air temperatures which results in the growth of salt 
crystals in confined spaces, 
(b) hydration can occur, whereby salt molecules combine 
with water molecules to form salt crystals, where the 
water may be derived from the atmosphere, and 
(c) thermal expansion of salt crystals takes place during 
the day time. 
When the salt crystals have a higher coefficient of l h ( ~ r m a l l expansion 
than the surrounding concrete they cause physicLll stress ledding 
to disintegration. 
Figure 6.7 
Effects of Salt Weathering Noted in Bahrain 
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Chemical processes of salt weathering may also rL!.';lllt ill volllme 
changes which cause disintegration particularly in a s ~ ; r I C C Lilt L()lI wi 1.11 
concrete. For instance, chemical exchange between ~ . ; u L p h a t t l' 
(SO -2) in solution and calcium aluminium hydrate in cement produce 
4 
reactive products of larger volume. ~ q u a l l y y cement and gypsum react. 
producing expansive Portlandite (calcium hydroxide). 
6.4.2 Damages due to Salt Weathering 
6.4.2.1 General Prospect 
Cracking, spalling and granular distintegration are the 1 I ~ , u a l l
signs of salt weathering attack, and some of these damages hilVC 
been reported in many Arab states. However. the most ser lOUS causes 
of damage due to the activity of salts include: 
1. The reduction in the strength and durability I)f the materiaL 
used in construction (e.g. concrete, steel) resulting from 
the alteration of their chemical composit ion. [11 the case 
of steel, chlorides in the conc .... ete can cause the corrosion 
of steel reinforcing bars, which in turn leads tu Lln incre,l,;e 
in its volume which then exerts pressure on the ~ ; l I r r ( ) u n d i i niS 
conCrete and results in its disintegration ( e . ~ . . as occurred 
in the nurses home attached to the hospital in :lana.,nah. llahrai n; 
this building had to be demolished. 
2. Salt and saline solutions (especially chlorides dlld :'illlphates) 
in buildings and other structures may cause weakening and 
disintegration due to volumetric changes caused by lilt! p r < l c . ~ , . ; : · ; ;
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es of salt weathering (e.g. as in selected government fLits 
in Bahrain). 
3. Serious damages may occur due to ground movement CClllseo by 
changes in the volume of salts existing in f () U nd at i () n f i 11 s . 
For example, gypsum may cause an inc rease in 1,;0 id space and 
subsequent surface subsidence, while hydration C3n lead to 
volumetric expansion and result in ground heave (e.g. also 
a problem at the same Nurses Home, Manamah, Bahrain). 
The existence of salts in buildings. structures and 
roads, may be derived from one or more of the followin)<; SOllrces:-
6.4.2.2 
salts contained in materials prior to their use in 
construction; 
the chemical alteration of the original material may 
result in formation of salts; 
salts can be produced from outside sources, :;ucll as, 
the environment (especially near the cnast.), ,md inun-
dation of buildings with saline water [r'lm piped water-
supplies. 
Buildings Made of Stone and Brick 
Sandstone and limestone blocks honded by ce!Tll'nl ')T mortar 
may be subjected to salt attack. A survey (bv Df)()rnk.1mp et ill) 
of the old town of Suez Egypt, revealed different examples of 
building deterioration through salt attack, the rTIo:;t ,'omm()!l kind:; 
of damage being: 
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a. Groundheave of tiles and floor blocks, both L l 1 ~ ; i d l ' ' ,111d 
outside buildings, to a height of 150 mm, due to sul-
phate attack from underlying gypsum-rich desert fill. 
b. Crumbling and disintegration of the surface of hricks, 
and sandstone or limestone blocks up to 1.0 m. above 
ground level, as a result of salt impregnLltion hv the 
evaporation of groundwater that had risen \Ilithin the 
building structure to the natural level nf its capLU_ 
ary fringe (see figure 6.8). 
c. Once cement and/or mortar has weathered out of plJce, 
the cavities left behind make possible the more lnt-en-
sive ,veathering of the exposed units of building ~ ; t ( ) l 1 e . .
6.4.2.3 Building and Structures made of Concrete. 
Concrete buildings and structures are the most vulnerable 
of all buildings to the effect of salt weathering, and serious damage 
occurs which either requires expensive repair, or seriollsly renuces 
the life of the building. Such damage is the resu 1 t of the Cdll!;eS 
identified in section (6.4.2.2) above. Seen on a ,drier scale the 
cracking of concrete in drylands is a consequence of il combinatioll 
of factors, which include; 
(i) climate (high temperatures, 
and low relative humidity), 
high evaporation rates, 
(ii) faulty construction methods and design, 
(iii) use of inappropriate aggregates,as well as 
Figure 6.8 
Definitions of Ground Water Terminology 
GROU!:!,D SURFACE 
Source: (Cooke. et al, 1982, p. 169) . 
CAPILLARY FRINGE LIMIT 
Potential limit of Capillarv Fringe 
• • • . • • • • • • . • . . . . • . . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • I N 
OBSERVATION WELLS 
N 
10 
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(iv) physical and chemical processes i 1 ~ S O c i i l t l , d d \.;i t h t hl' 
presence of salts. 
As indicated above, the most deleterious salts arc chloride:;, 
and sulphates. Chlorides (usually of sodium) are generally re:;poll-
sible for the corrosion of steel reinforcing hars. This process 
can increase their volume by up to six times and not on Ly I eacL; 
to the development of cracks and surface spalling,but can fundilmenl-
ally affect the structural stability of the whole building. Sulpha-
tes(usually of calcium) cause damage by producing ground heave (of 
150 mm or more) and disintegration of floors composed of bricks, 
stone blocks, paving stone, tiles and c o n c n z t ~ ~ , especially in build-
ings constructed on damp sulphate-laden 'desert fill'. 
6.4.2.4 Roads 
Surfaced roads often show signs of damage in terms of cracking, 
potholing, scabbing, stripping, crumbling and disintegrat ion. 
These phenomena are especially apparent in areas ,·:here sa 1 tne g rOllnd-
water is at or near the surface and where ample soluble salt:.; occur 
on the ground surface and in the soil. However, the existence 
of salts at or near, the ground surface is not necessarilv an engill-
eering risk if the salts are dry. Under moist conditiow;, ilc)\ll'ver, 
physical damage to the surface layer of the road results from t.he 
upward transport of salts by capillary movements induced by eViI!Jnrat-
ion through the surfacing. 
?-1ethods have been developed, especially bv genmnrpiln I (l)), i ~ ; t t s, 
which allow aggresive saline soils to be identi.fied, mapped ilnd 
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hazard zoning to be carried out. These are not descrihl'd IH're, 
but may be found, for example, in Cooke 1982. 
6.4.3. Insurance Application 
6.4.3.1 Present Situation 
From the previous discussion, it can be seen that salt weather-
ing may cause severe damage to builiings, structures and roads. and 
this is all the more serious in view of the enormous b u i l c t i n ~ ~ p r ( ) ~ ~
rammes adopted by the Arab countries, especially after the increase 
of oil prices in 1973. During that time serious c 1 a m i l ~ e e h d ~ ; ; nCCllrred 
to various projects, and some Arab governments (e.g. Algeria, lril'l, 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia) have reacted by r e q u i r i n ~ ~ c ( ) n t r ; t c l ( ) r ~ ; ; tl) 
be responsible for all damages up to ten years after c ( ) n ~ ; t r u c t i o n n
(decennial liability)(l) Therefore, all contrdctors must have 
a liability insurance policy to cover their liabilities aKainst 
any damage that might happen during that period. In A l t ~ ! ~ r i a a the 
contractors have no problem in obtaining suc h a po 1 icv; in I': ~ ~ ~ yp t , 
the law requires that contractors should have an i n ~ ; l I r < l n c l ' ' po 1 icy 
providing cover for such liability, which applies to all const l"lllti()I1 
operations with a value of E.£.10,OOO or more, and a L'onstrllcti()n 
licence will not be granted unless the insurance policy is ~ ; l I l J m i t . t e c l . .
(1) In France, decennial liability has long been an accepted part 
of their Civil code. Similar types of insuraIlce ,Ire met 
in Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembouri/; and Ho 11 and. Th i:; t '/pe 
of insurance also applies in the clel:elopinp, COllnt ril"; i n l ~ l l l d d
ing the Middle East (Piper, 1973-84, p.9.1-PL 
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In Iraq, although the contractors are also liable. bv I a\.;, f()r rlallldge 
to the structure for a period of ten years from compl Pt i()n. I hI' 
Iraqi insurance market is not yet in a position to pr()'Jide covers 
for these risks. It seems quite sensible that to service a contrac-
tors' requirements where this law applies it is necessary for the 
market to be in a position to furnish such covers. However. times 
are changing and the market must be prepared t () provide C()'Ier<lge 
of this nature. Finally, in Saudi Arabia it 1· < • . , bec <)m.i ng common 
for a clause to be incorporated into construction contracts. Cont-
ractors are free to seek insurance cover either from the local or 
foreign insurers. 
6.4.3.2 Minimizing the Salt Weathering Risk 
If the damage arising from salt weathering hazard is Liken 
into account, both the contractors and insurance c o m p a n i e ~ ; ; .1re p n t ( ~ n n
tially faced with large losses as the effects of thi.s p r ( ) c e ~ ; s s t ; ! l { ( ~ ~ ; ;
hold on buildings and other structures. 
made by the construction industry in: 
1. Avoiding hazardous ground. suc h as low-lyi ng, dc1mp, 
saline areas. 
2. Designing buildings, structures and r o a d ~ ~ If) \.;it h ~ ; t t ,lnd 
salt weathering attack. 
3. Insisting on greater quality control of matcriills wicd 
in construction (physically and chemically). 
However, many buildings were erected before this 11('\.; d \ " L 1 r , ' n c ~ ; ~ ; ;
had any effect; these are at risk. Some cont rac t ( ) r ~ ~ , , Q v ' ~ n n ~ ; ( ) r n ' - ' '
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design consultants, are still proceeding wi thout t dk j l l r ~ ~ IHflPf'1" L 1 ( ~ C C
aunt of this hazard, and some new buildings are theref()r"fJ ;11:;0 ill 
risk. In view of this, and where major structures <.Ire inv()lved, 
it would be prudent for insurers to have a site as:il'SSmel1t car-ried 
out by a competent authority. 
6.5 Sand ~ l o v e m e n t t and Dust Storms 
Large areas of most Arab countries are occupied hy c l e ~ j e r t , ,
some of it being sand desert, such as the Rub-AI-KhalL, l;reater 
Nafud, and Al Hasa, l"hilst North Africa includes the enflrmOlj!; Sahara 
desert. The movement of sand and dust by wind \.;il.hin and from 
these deserts is becoming an important probl em, espec ial l'I d:; cleve 1-
opment is leading to the spread of urban and industrial l J u i J d i n ~ s , ,
agricultural land, oil and gas pipelines, new roads, airport:;, IL'ie-
communication, and heavy industrial plants. Therefore, there l' ,-
" 
a need to understand this process and to assess it:; : ; L , I ~ l J i f i c a n c e e
for the insurance industry. This section is also l1a:;('<\ on I he w()rk 
by Cooke, et al., 1982. 
6.5.1 Damages of Sand and Dust Movement 
Damage from sand and dust movement a r i ~ , e s s fr()m ()llL' of Ilnl'c 
basic aeolian processes: 
1. Deflation damage. Deflation, the removal of SdlHi dlHi Ill';! 
by wind from desert surfaces, leads to the exhdl1:il j{)11 flf 
of the essential soil constituents. Other effect·; i l 1 c l l l d ( ~ ~
2. 
3. 
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scour and undermining of footing to telegraph p() le:;, :;(-()ur i ng 
beneath pipelines, railway sleepers and even r ( ) d d ~ ; , , d 1 I r) t 
these effects can lead to collapse of the slruc t u n ~ s . . Agric-
ultural land and construction in the urban ared!j are a lc;() 
exposed to damages. 
Damage from transported sand. The abrasion of structllrl':; 
and equipment is a direct result of sand storms in urban areas; 
sand abrasion causes great damage to building materials, tele-
graph poles and fences, glass loses its transparency, even 
car windscreens may suffer. For example, <.IS a re:3uLt ()f 
a storm (in the U.S.A.) on 27th December 1973, a single insur-
ance company in California had 1200 claims for wi.lld damaKc 
to windscreens and bodywork totalling US. S . 165. Oll(). 
Dust storms also cause different kinds of r 1 i 1 m , l ) ~ e . . but the 
problem that has received most attention is that 1)[ \'1:;i\)i lit:/ 
reduction, a problem of extreme importance to the transport 
industry (see Dust haze at Bahrain, Houseman. 1 <)n I ) . Fli)!,hrs 
into and out of airports affec ted by blowing dust 1IIi1 '/ be d f ~ ~ I av-
ed, in places there may be a danger of rurn.ay :,kidding as 
at Sharjah - U.A.E. 
Damage resulting from sand accumulation. 
with dust deposition within drylands include the burLt! and 
killing of young plants, the rendering of [()iHb i l : l ! J d : ; . " d b l f ~ , ,
and infiltration of dust into buildings c r l ' a t i n ) ~ ~ pr()blcm!; 
of sanitation and housekeeping. While the problems d:;:;<lcidted 
with sand deposition include their eEfect nn [(),Jcb, fdi I w a \ ' ~ ; . .
runways, pipelines, agricultural land and building:;; i. II In d ll'l 
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places the consequences of sand encroachment 1:; d"'pri'Hdt illn 
of communication, diminishing of land use, 1,lnd alJdnd'll1ml'l1t, 
large loss to the industries and depopu la t i Oil. 
factors have occurred, for example, in the town Ilr In ~ ~ d l d h h
in the Algerian Sahara. 
Industrial plants are vulnerable to sand movement LIno Cdn 
sustain considerable damage from heavy winds. I n p cl r Lie u 1 a 1, P 1.1Ilt 
may be at risk if sand or silt particles enter machinery or :;leri li;:-
ed buildings. Communication lines are al:;o sllsceptible to sand 
storms, and roads can be covered by the movement of dllnes. Some 
roads and railroads may be designed to be self-clearin.v" but ()th"rs, 
especially where they cross active sand fields, !TldY be conrinllollsiy 
in danger, as for instance, the road from K h a r , ~ a a t() ASYllit in Ev,ypt, 
and the new road from Al Ain to Abu Dhabi (U.A.E.) 
be buried by sand, especially in the areas of active d l l n ' ~ s , , making 
it difficult to carry out maintenance or inspect ion, dnd pns:,ihly 
causing frac ture. For example, Berz (lY84, p. Lllj), 11,,:,; point , ~ d d
out that in North Africa, throughout the constructi.on I)f d ) ~ a : ; ; pipe-
line, a large excavation was filled up by flyinp; sand ,Ind drift inp; 
excavated material as the result of a sandst llrm. 
re-excavation involved here were approximately USS3S(),I)(I(). (1) 
other instances of sandstorms in the Arab worl.d have ,I, i ven i n:;llrer:; 
problems in the past; for example, serious damap,e wa:. l.all:;ed t() 
various items of contractors'equipment due to the cnntrdct(,r:j having 
used the incorrect filters on the engines (P,()/)erL:;, 1'l77, pp. 2-
3) • 
(1) "As it turned out during the subsequent metenroiogiL·;ll ill\'I':;t-
gation, wind forces of 5 or more, causing sand drift:; (lL" :;,Illd 
storms, could be expected in this area on an average III 3')-
50 days a year" (Berz, 1984, p.139). 
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Sand and dust movement occurs in all of the Arab · ; L l t " ~ ; . . \1111 
the problems are most serious in areas of .:lC t i ve dUl1L'S, SI rlJllg \.Ji I l d ~ ; ;
and surface instability. The major source areas arc Lhn:;e of ~ J o r t t It 
Africa, Northeast Sudan and the Arabian Gulf (l) (scc Na t ura 1 HdZ;n-d:; 
Maps) . 
6.5.2 Insurance Cover and Control Measures 
If all the above risks are taken into account, Lt can he ~ > e e n n
that the impact of sand movement and dust storms on different econo-
mic activities in the Arab region is going to become more import dnt 
than it has been in the past. However, from the insurance point 
of view, the Arab insurance market has had litt le experience of 
this kind of insurance. Recent ly, however, there havc heen a few 
endorsements as extensions to original fire and C,\R,EAR p l ) l i c i e ~ ; ;
to cover damages derived from these perils. 
Effective control measures depend largely on adequate apprai:;-
al of the problem. However, a sound general rule in envi,l'!lllmCnl;l1 
management is to avoid hazard areas as far as P ( ) ~ ; S S i h 1 c. 
means of avoidance lies in reasonable site selection, \.Jh i c It )' ,-_. ,1 
specialist skill requiring knowledge of the terrai.n dnd the ph'l';iC:ll 
processes governing sand and dust movement. Where t hL' pr-oh I em ,:allllllt 
be completely avoided, the site may be desiRned so d ~ ; ; I () m in i mi :;e 
the impact of aeolian problems. Al Ain, in U.A.[·:., fIn' in:;tall((', 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - ~ , - - , - - - , - - -
(1) Saudi Arabia is in a known sandstorm .:uea. Accorrlin,ll, 10 1 1 j ( ~ ~
meteorologrcal reports, there is a possibilit.y !)f : ; d r l ! i . ; t ( I I ' I 1 l ~ ; ;
causing serious damage to property in many area:; (If S.tllcli 
Arabia, particularly those containing industrial c o m p l e x l . ' ~ ; . .
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had to be located for political and water supply r e a ~ ; ( ) n ' ; ; I l f ~ d r r ! () 
the old Oasis, but the new city plan attempts to lab· dl'Cllllnt Cl! 
the possibility of serious sand storm damage associated \"i t h the 
nearby, great and active sand dune fields. 
It should be pointed out that the effectiveness of :,t.abl 1 i-
sation methods depends on the nature of the hazard h.:lvinp; 1 ) I ~ e n n pr<Jp-
erly defined in the first place. The development of vegeL1L ion 
cover is usually a good solution in achieving the stabilizati.<ln 
of movable sand and dust, but in some circumstances, particulLlrlv 
in extremely arid areas, this cannot be done, so that :;and fi.xal ion 
must depend on special surface coverings or man-made ohst tile t ion. 
For example, stabilisation may be based on wetting the :;tlrfacc, 
providing a cover of gravel or stones and crushed rock greater t.h.rn 
2 mm in diameter, or applying oil or chemical ~ ; p r a y s s t () the :;dlld 
surface. Finally, many kinds of fences are also used tl) cont roJ 
sand and dust movement, but usually to no permanent J y good e f fec t ';. 
6.6 Awareness of and Insurance Coverage of Natural Hazards 
Attitudes regarding insurance protection against ndt drill ha;',--
ards vary from one country to another. 
to natural disasters governments have intervened to pro'.'ide i.n:;llr.IIHe 
cover, e.g. 
United States of America Federal Insurance pnlgr.rmm,: fill' 
Flood. 
New Zealand - Earthquake and War Damage Fund. 
Japan - Earthquake insurance under the 'Law c ( ) n c . ~ r n i l \ g g ":drth-
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quake Insurance'. 
And in other countries where government has not become i two 1 vI'd, 
the cover available may be limited, though pooling a r r a n g e m . ! n t ~ ; ; mdY 
help. 
Until recently, nowhere in the Arab world has t here been 
established a national pool against flood or earthquake r l ~ ; k ~ ; . .
Coverage can be written as an endorsement to a standard policy; 
for example, in Iraq flood or earthquake risk is given in the fl)rm 
of extended coverage endorsement to fire polic ies. 
be covered, by endorsement, in CAR/EAR policies. 
additional premiums are required. 
Flood can dlso 
And in ~ ! l l l cases 
It is impossible to analyse the insurance demand for natllral 
hazards without mentioning the awareness of natural ha::arc!!;, ~ ; i n c e e
people, even those living in highly natural hazard prone aredS, 
show a surprisingly low interest in insuring the i r prO{lf.'r I y agil in!; l 
these risks. Kunreuther (1984, p.208) has stated tW() main reil:,(1I1:; 
for this process:-
1. People may underestimate the damages and/or proiJaiJi 1 i t Y of 
a disaster so that the cost of the premium would be !;i.,.;ni ficitnl 
relative to the perceived benefits of insuLlnce pr()1 eel jl)n. 
In addition, people may overestimate the cost of I ilL' pl)l icy, 
which may discourage them from purchasing insurance. 
2. People assume the probability of a disaster is tOI) lUI" t.o 
constitute a threat, and even a considerati(\l1llf the pot.ent ial. 
loss is not merited by them. If this hypot hL'!;i:; i!; c () r r L' cl, 
insurance will not even be considered as a viable I)pl i(Jll. 
Figure 6.9 shows whether an individual is l i k c l ~ / / to 
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Figure 6.9 
Does the Individual 
know about the 
Natural Hazard? 
YES 
Does the Individual 
Expect a future 
Natural Hazard 
Loss? 
YES 
Does the Individual 
Expect to suffer a 
Loss? 
YES 
Does the Individual 
Expect to suffer a 
Serious Loss? 
YES 
Individual may 
Purchase Insurance 
cover 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
Individual Does Not 
Purchase Insurance 
cover 
240 
purchase natural hazards insurance after he or she collect:; i nfnnnat-' 
ion indicating that insurance is available. Surprisingly, in view 
of the very real risk in the natural hazard prone a r e J ~ ; , , most I l / ~ ( ) p l e e
completely abstain from buying any kind of disaster insurance (I)ver-
age for their property. For example, Themptanrler (l,)7'), p.lQ) 
has pointed out that in most Latin American (ountries le:;:; than 
10 percent of private dwellings and their contents are i nSllrerl. 
According to Ficker (1983, p.22), even in highly devel('rerl eali forn-
ia one finds similar low insurance interest; only h percent of 
the residents of the Los Angeles area have earthquake i n:;llt"ance, 
and in San Francisco the figure is 7 percent (1) 
A questionnaire survey of flood (in communtttes that \.;ere 
part of the regular National Flood Insurance Programme in the IJni Il'ci 
States) was carried out in 1974 (Kunreuther, fH aI, 1')78, p.6H). 
A total of 4231 people were sampled in 43 areas thl'OIl,>\h()llt the 
U.S.A. Of the 2055 respondents, 1103 were insured and 'lS2 ( 1 ~ 6 . \ \
percent) uninsured. Also an earthquake samp le was (ho:;en f rf)m d 
list of householders who had paid premiums during thL' peril)(j 1st 
August 1972 through 31st .July 1973 to eight of the l d r g l ' : ~ t t ",Irt hql1ake 
insurers in California. A total of 1975 were sampled, of whom ](WC; 
were respondents, 460 were insured and 545 (54.2 percent) unin:;lIred. 
Even though this survey was carried out in the flood ilnd ('drt h q \ l a k ( ~ " "
prone areas, among relatively affluent people, these t i g ' I [ ' I ~ : ; ; :;11,)\,; 
that the percentage of uninsured people is very high. 1ft hi:; i" 
(1) California earthquake premiums have increased from ITS SH.1J5 
million in 1972 to US$ 50.21 million in 1981, with illI ;I\'erage 
annual growth rate of 21.1 percent CFicker, 19H1, p.22). 
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the case with the U.S.A., how much worse the demand fllr Ln:;lIrdncf' 
is in the Arab countries. As mentioned ear 1 ier there hdve hl!.!n 
several examples of disasters affecting some Arab c()unt rie-s f()T-
which the impact of the insurance industry was negligil>le. 
Many catastrophes of recent years have shown that only il ~ ; m a l l l
share of the economic loss has been paid by insurers and rei n:;urer:;. 
The following examples are worth noting in this respect:-
1. Earthquake in Managua in 1972, which caused d a m a ~ e : ; ; amOIIIl!-
ing to US$lOOO million, of which US$ 100 million (10 per cC'nt) 
were insured losses. 
2. Hurricane Agnes in 1972 caused damage amount illg to lJ SS 3()(j 3 
million, approximately US $ 97 million (3.2 percent) t.hereof 
being insured. 
3. The power cut in New York in 1977 was produced by ! i.;ht l l i l l ~ , ,
and the overall damage was estimated at US$IOOO milli')1l 'lf 
which US$ 30 million (3 percent) were insured. 
4. Hurricane Allen in the Gulf of Mexico and the U.:';.A. ill 1')HO, 
producing damages totalling U S$ 1000 million, the ''''erall 
loss insured amounting to US$ 58 million (5.8 perc(!nt ). 
5. Earthquake in Italy in 1980 caused d a m a ~ e s s ()f dlJprllximdtelv 
US$ 10,000 million, insured losses of USS 40 millilln«(J.I. per-
cent) . Further examples of the amount of in:;url'd ddl1l.1ge 
relative to the total damages are given in table 6.5. Thi :; 
table is constructed, so as to give fundamental P l l - t l l r t ~ ~ of 
the magnitude losses in the twenty-one major Idt List rophe:; 
and gives the most important ones from the inslIrilncC' dnd rC'in-
surance point of view. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Date 
31 Hay 1970 
3 Aug. 1970 
Errl Sept. 1970 
9 Feb. 1971 
Errl Aug. 1971 
17/25 June 1972 
21 July 1972 
23 I«. 1972 
2/5 Apr. 1974 
18 Sept. 1974 
25 ~ . . 1974 
2/3 Jan. 1976 
4 Feb. 1976 
6 ~ 1 a y y 1976 
13/14 J1y. 1977 
Table 6.5 
The World's Largest Natural Catastrophes 1970-1980 
Place/country 
Peru 
C o ~ l S S Christi(Texas)US 
Gujarat - Irdia 
Los Angeles(California) 
US 
N. Irrlia,Bangladesh 
East coast U.S. 
Philippines 
Managua/Nicaragua 
14 federal states.U.S. 
Horduras 
Darwin - Australia 
Northwest Europe 
Guatemala 
Friuli - Italy 
tJew York - U.S. 
Cause of toss 
Earthquake 
Hurrlcane 'Celia' 
Flooding 
Earthquake 
Flooding 
Hurricane 'Agnes' 
Tidal wave 
Earthquake 
Tornados 
Hurricane 'Fifi' 
Cyclone 'Tracy' 
Cyclone 'Capel1a' 
Earthquake 
Earthquake 
Power breakdO\·JIl fo110\.I-
ing lightnj fig 
Victims 
60,000 
11 
45 
300 
121 
427 
10,000 
300 
10 ,cm 
100 
100 
22,000 
I,m) 
Total 
damage 
I (m; , 1 ; £"\1'"\ \ 
503 
457 
286 
532 
726 
3063 
600 
1000 
977 
500 
403 
960 
7':IJ 
2,400 
1,[0) 
8{() 
Insured 
Loss 
i 11 ; An \ 
320 
30 
97 
100 
430 
200 
480 
75 
30 
% 
70.0 
5.6 
3.2 
10.0 
44.0 
49.6 
50.0 
10.0 
3.0 
12 June lLJ78 Japan I r ~ r t h q u a k e e 21 
17 30 Sept. 1970 [)JflUnica, PR, U.S. lllun-lGllle '[und' 3,IY(1 7,10 1 250 12.5 
18 3 Sept. 197':1 le) Stdtl:o>, il.S. I Hurricane 'FrL.:lcric'll 2,)1.' 7 ~ } } 31.6 
I 11) 16 Feh. 19H{1 i CallfUmJZl ~ ; r i Z ( ) l k l , ~ . S . . Fluccling 1 ~ I . r l s l i ~ l t : s s .36 SiO ~ 8 , , 3.6 
iLl) 4 :\uy,. 1<J8(1 , l",lllf'JnlliJ ft:XLls,li.::l. J !lunlCd!lt: :,llen _ -'Si) l ' ( ~ j J ) )I 58: 5.8: I 21 : n :;')'.. l'Aj) 11tab Eillliypldke 3,114 10,10) 40 I 1).4 I 
I 1 I I I 
_____ _ ______ --------L ______________ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ +______ _ _____ ~ - - - ~ ~ . . . J J
::Cuurc.::: S\.;iss Re::. Si/:;r.Jd - differ.::nt iSSllcS. 
N 
.&:-
N 
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Furthermore, the tragic earthquakes in AlgerLl and NOr! h "{L'ml'n 
in recent years had no practical effect on the ins\lrance ( . : ( ) m p i l n i ( ~ ~ ; ;
of both countries or the international insurance and n ~ i n ~ ; u r i l n c e e
market. Hany people suffering damage obtained indemnlt y from thei r 
government, and many others remained without cumpensation. 
6.7 Evaluation and Accumulation of Risk 
6.7.1 Evaluation of risk 
When evaluating a risk, there are three kinds Ol informat ion 
available 
(i) previous damage experience, 
(ii) data about the subject matter including its d a m a ~ e e
susceptibility and 
(iii) knowledge of the natural sciences. 
Statistics of previous damage, if considered bv themsel VC';, are 
not a good measure of risk (Friedman, 1972, p.ll), h e C C l l 1 ~ ; e e C h d n ) l , ( ~ ~ i i
occur over the years in: 
1. Class of construction. 
2. Exposure of structures to damage, includinK for some 
risks changes in environmental conditions. 
3. Building codes. 
4. Type and amount of insurance. 
5. Costs of repair. 
6. Deductible size. 
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Many studies have been carried out in order to t. n' I <l d l ~ t t ('rmi m' 
the damages which would be caused today in various nilt lIra I hd;:dld 
prone areas, if a disaster similar to those in the p a ~ ; t t w"rl' tll 
strike. The following three examples given by Berz (1'184, p. J IH) 
show the cost of such probable disasters:-
1. A repetition of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, IH .1 maj()r 
earthquake in the Los Angeles area, would today C < ) ~ ; l l be! we(!n 
U$50 and US $100 billion. According to Swiss Re (l'lH2, p.H), 
the San Francisco earthquake caused insured l o s s e ~ ; ; of lJ:;:3 
350 million. At today's prices this would cost the i n ~ ; l I r i l n c e e
companies about US$ 4.6 billion. 
2. A repetition of the 1923 Tokyo earthquake would C():;! dpprOXltll.l-
tely U S$ 250 billion today, though beciluse the pe1"l:ent ilil,e 
of indemnity is limited under the policy c ( ) n d i t i o n ~ ; , , tlw In:;:; 
insured would be much less than the actual cost \)f the damdKe. 
3. Hurricane Betsy which in 1965, caused insured Ill:;:; III lIS:3 
715 million would cost (at the same price) about US$ :> hilli')ll 
today. The insured damage of a 100 year hllrri (<1nl' in the 
same area, for example, would be estimated at three <l1" t()llr 
times this amount. 
Despite the fact that the past loss experience mdV h., refill i 1"('<1 
in order to give an indication of future risk evalu.Jti"n, l ' r i . l ~ d r n d l \ \
(1972, pp.12-13) has pointed out that a pure extrap()!.lt illll i nt I) 
the future on the basis of past experience does not shed llIuch 1 i,v,ht 
on the character of future risks. He contends that \.Jhill i:; IWL,(kd 
is not actual damage that has resulted from past event s, hut d i l m i l i ~ ( ' '
relating to the present distribution of propert les from d r l ~ C l l r r . ' n c e e
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(1) 
of past events. • Hence, he recommends the c ( ) n ~ ; t t nil:! ion cll 1I.1111! 
al hazard simulations to provide a good means of as';e:;:; i n ) . ~ ~ 1 ht, I ():;'; 
potential. 
6.7.2 Accumulation of Risk 
The potential severity of natural hazard 10 S ~ ) ) e ~ . j j l' " ., r i:; i n)l; 
(both in terms of total damage/loss of life and L n : ~ u r e d d l()s:;e:;) 
because of: 
(a) increase in exposures, and 
(b) so far as insured losses are c{)ncerned, cl more than 
proportional increase in the numher of In';llrl'd C.::q)n:';llre:;. 
The information in this sectionis intended to explain this point. 
The accumulation of individual risks derived from !1dtllLll 
hazards is more important in recent years for the foll(jwing red:;O!1S: 
1. There are indications that the insurance world':; :;\JSCcpl ibi lity 
to catastrophe is increasing because of the grl)\.;th uf popllld-
tion, property values, etc., in disaster-prone .Ir.'.1:;, \.;hi le 
the frequency of natural hazards is not itself i n c r , . , . I ' ; i n ~ . .
Since insurance is bought to cover the new development:;, C:dt,I:;-
trophic losses have increased in both frequenc v dlHi ';('\'er it Y 
in recent years. According to the Swi ss Re (:; i )l;rn.l ~ l ( ) . . I (), 
1982) during the period 1970-1981, 1651 naturdl Clt .1:;1 rClphe:; 
----------------------- -------
(1) In order to evaluate the future risk uf A).;c1dir in <'l()l'<lllfl, 
for example, emphasis should not be placed Oil \.Jh.lt ! Ill' 1<)/11) 
earthquake cost, but on what it would Cllst i I .I comp.lrdhle 
earthquake occurred today and affected the pre:;l'nt dj:;t rUJ\11 jon 
and value of properties. 
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and major losses were registered world-wide. 
29.6 percent) out of 1651 were natural d i s a s t e r ~ . ( I ) ) DlIrill,; 
the observation period, 43.6 percent of the natural d i ~ ; d ~ ; I l ' l " : ; ;
were accounted for by flood, 41.5 percent hy \ " i n d ~ ; t t ) r m : ; ; ,111(1 
14.9 percent by earthquake. With regard to natural c.:tta:;tr()pll-
es, the annual average loss frequency \ " a ~ ; ; dPPt-";{ i :11(11 ,. 1 Y I1 L t.ll-
astrophes for the period 1970-81. Above average fi)l,lIl"e:; \vL':-e L'xperi-
enced at the beginning of the period, namely 1<J71 (46), and 
between 1975 and 1981, with the excepti()nof 1977 (38). Table 
6.6, figure 6.10, and figure 6.11 show the number and frequen-
cy of natural catastrophes during the 12 year period. 
Table 6.6 
World-Wide Number of Major Natural Catastrophes, l ? ~ Q ~ ~ ~ l l
Natural 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 HO 81 I TIlLlIT c a t a s t r n n h p ~ ~ 1---
Flood,(inc.land-
slide,tidal wave 18 '21 17 12 19 19 18 17 15 18 16 2] :13 Id .() 
lava,rock,mud, 
avalanche ). 
Windstorms(cyc1-
one,hurricane, 12 18 15 12 13 20 17 13 22 20 It} 22 203 41. S 
tornado,typhoon, I 
hail, snow)· 
Earthquake 6 7 4 3 4 3 10 8 5 9 7 7 n 
-----f--
Total 36 46 36 27 36 42 45 38 42 47 42 52 4Hl) 
Source: Sigrna, No .10, 1982. 
(1) In the early years of this century, there \vC'I-C "111'1 \ II\djtJl 
natural catastrophes per year, but this number 11:1:; i n t · r t · ; r ~ ; e d d
to 15 today (Munich Re, 1982, p.l.). 
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Figure 6.10 
Total Loss Frequency of Natural C a t a s t r o p p ~ _ ~ ~
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Figure 6.11 
Frequency of Natural C a t a s t r o p ~ s s
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2. The exposure to natural hazards througholll t Ilf' \v'orld i ,. 1',1/' 
idly increasing due to (Munich Re, 1982, p. 1 ) ( I ) 
(a) Growth of the world's population, 
(b) Concentration of the population and property in 
cities. 
(c) Improved standards of living. 
(d) Urbanization and industrialization of e s p . ~ c l a l l ? ?
exposed areas. 
(e) More hazardous technologies. 
World-wide there has been a drift of PO[1ulation from rural 
to urban areas (see table 6.8) but nowhere more so than in parts 
of the Arab world (tables 6.7 and 6.8). At the ';.:Jme t.! me m o ~ ; ! !
Arab countries have experienced a rapid increase in P(Jpu lat 11)n, 
the total rising from about 92 million in l <J60 t () I hH m i I I i ()fl L n 
1981. One result has been the increase in the number III ci! ip!; 
of over 500,000 people from 8 in 1960 to 22 in 1980, \..;lth .t!lntller 
61 of over 100,000 (see table 6.9), some in area!; highlv exp,,:;ecl 
to major natural disasters. This means that. not '>nly i!; tl1o're 
a higher concentration of people, but also ()f cdpil.ll d ' ; ' ; l ~ ! S S In 
urban areas which substantially raises the total dnd i n ~ ; u r . ' d d I(),;s 
potentials of natural hazards (see the Maps in the :\I'ilt'lld; x), 
(1) This trend is most marked in the developing Cllllntric!; w h ( ) , ; , ~ ~ IId!-
ional economies are particularly s\lscep! ihll' t" t h,' ,;('ri'"I!; eff-
ects of natural catastrophe, as has beell 1111I:;1 rdl l'd Indll'/ 1 i 1111"; 
during the past years (Berz, 1984, p. 135). 
Table 6.7 
The Urbanization of the Arab World Population 
Urban population Percentage of Number of cities 
as a percentage urban population of over 500,000 
Country of total of over 500,000 persons 
population persons 
1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 
Algeria 30 44 27 12 1 1 
Bahrain - - - - - -
Egypt 38 45 53 53 2 3 
Iraq 43 72 35 70 1 3 
Jordan 43 56 0 37 0 1 
KU\vait 72 88 0 0 0 0 
Lebanon 44 76 64 79 1 1 
Libya 23 52 0 64 0 1 
l-Iauritania 3 23 0 0 0 0 
~ I o r o c c o o 29 41 16 50 1 5 
Oman - - - - - -
Qatar - - - - - -
Saudi Arabia 30 67 0 33 u 3 
Snma1ia 1 7 3(J 0 0 0 () 
Sudan 10 11) 0 31) 0 1 
Syria I )7 511 35 55 1 2 Tu r.; siLt I Jo )! 4() 3U 1 1 
I 
r . ,\. r:. () u 
I :-;., It h Ycr.lt.:l1 ! llj 17! U I 
I '" \. I 1 1 I Lt ( j r t 11 ! t: i:ll: I l ! ..J .... 1 {j • ________ " ___ ~ ~__ _1 ___ ~ ~ ~_____ ---L-__ _ 
(J I 
I J ~ ~
() 
U 
u 
I) 
s () U l" et;: Ex t rete l ui f r Ij m l h \.: \.; u 1 1 J E d I d ~ ~ (1 'J 8 2, pp. 1 48- 9 ) . 
Increase in % of 
urban population 
1980 
1960 
1.47 
-
1.18 
1.67 
1. 30 
1. 22 
1.73 
2.26 
7.67 
1. 41 
-
-
2.23 
1. 76 
2.00 
1 . 35 
1. 44 
1.8u 
1. 32 
3. jJ 
I 
, 
N 
VI 
o 
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Table 6.8 
The Urbanization of the World's P o p u l a t i ( ) ~ ~
Urban population 
as 0, of total '0 
Country Group population 
1960 1980 
Low-income . (1) countrles 13 18 
Middle-income countries 
(2) 
33 4S 
High-income countries (3 ) 30 66 
Industrialized countries 68 78 
Non-market industrial e c o n o m i e ~ ~ 49 62 
Arab countries (umJeighted) 31 49 
Source: As for table 6.7. 
Note: Weighted Average 
(1) include two Arab countries. 
(2) include eleven Arab countries. 
(3) Four Arab countries only. 
------ ------
Percentage ( )f 
urban pp()pulat.i.nn 
in c i tie:; of nve t-
suo ,I)()!) person:; . 
III on I llHO 
31 4 1 
3 'i 48 
0 34 
I 
4H I 55 
23 I I 3:) 
3 () 47 
1 ____________ 
Rank 
11 
,2 
i3 
11 
!L 
III 12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
! 9 
20 
21 
22 
23 
I
' 24 
~ 5 5
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
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Table 6.9 
Arab Cities of 100,000 or more Inhabitants Ranked by Size of Populatl-,,-!, 
C:':y Country 
Cairo, E"vpt 
Baghdad. ! =aq 
Alexandria, Egypt 
Damascus, SyrJ..a 
Giza, Egypt 
Aleppo, Syria 
Tunis. Tunisia 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 
Amman. Jordan 
Jeddah, S a u d ~ ~ A=abia 
Marrakecb, Morocco 
Oran, Algeria 
Basra, Iraq 
Fez, Morocco 
:1eknes. Morocco 
Mecca, Saudi Arabia 
Mosul, Iraq 
Suez, Egypt 
OUJda, Morocco 
Tripoli. Libya 
Kuwalt City. Kuwait 
Shubra-E1 Khema, Egypt 
Pon Said. Egypt 
Tetouan. Morocco 
Aden. Yemen D.R. 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
El ~ ! a h a 1 ] ] a El Kubra. Egypt 
Omdurman, Sudan 
Tanta, Egypt 
Homs. Syria 
Kirkuk. Iraq 
Sfax • TUnJ.sia 
Mogadlscio. Somalia 
Zerka. Jordan 
Aswan, Egypt 
Sengazi. :'ibya 
Safi. Morocco 
T a ~ f , , Saudi Arabia 
Medina, Saudi Arabia 
Agadir, Morocco 
Asyut, Egypt 
Najaf. Iraq 
Zagazig, Egypt 
Ismal:'!.a, Egypt 
Dmanhur. Egypt 
HawaII:., Kuwalt 
Faiyum, Egypt 
Khouribga, MorocCO 
Hama, Syria 
H1:1a, Iraq 
Khartoum North. Sudan 
Dammam. Saudi Arabla 
Settat, MoroccO 
M1 nya. Egypt 
Nouakchott. ~ a u r i t a n l a a
Sana. Northern Yemen 
Port Sudan. Sudan 
DallUet ta, Egypt 
El Jadlda. Morocco 
Benl-suef. Egypt 
Hu1uf. Saudi Arabia 
Year and Source 
E-Estimate 
C - Census 
1974(E) 
1965(C) 
1974(E) 
1975 (E) /1970 (E) 
1974(E) 
1975(E) 
1966(C) 
1974(C) 
1975(E) 
1974(C) 
1971 (C) I: 9 73 ( E) 
1966(C) 
1965 (C) 
1971(C)/1973(E) 
1971 (C) 11973 (E) 
1974(C) 
1965(C) 
1974(E) 
1971(C) 11973(E) 
1964(C) 
1970(C) 
1974(E) 
1974(E) 
1971(C)/1973(E) 
1973(E) 
1971(E) 
1974(E) 
197UE) 
1974(E) 
1975(E) 
1965(C) 
1966(C) 
1972(E) 
1975(E) 
1974(E) 
1964 (C) 
1971(C)/197:!(E) 
1974(C) 
1974(C) 
1973(E) 
1974(E) 
1965(C) 
1974(E) 
1974(E) 
1974(E) 
1970(C) 
1974(E) 
1973(E) 
1975(E) 
1965(C) 
1971(E) 
1974(C) 
1974(E) 
1976(C) 
1970(E) 
1971(E) 
1974(E) 
1973(E) 
1974(E) 
1974(C) 
CHy 
?roper 
5,715,000 
l , 4 9 C . 7 5 ~ ~
2.259,000 
1 , 0 4 2 . 2 4 ~ ~ I 
853.700 
778.523 
468.997 
666,840 
634,000 
561,104 
330,400 
327,493 
310.950 
321.460 
244.520 
366.80l 
264.146 
368.000 I 
155.800 
213.500 
80,405 
346,OOC' 
342.00,) , 
137.080 I 
204.326 
261.84' 
287.8 1./ ; 
2 7 ~ . . 30( 
2 ~ 7 . ~ 3 2 2 I 
7 9 , ~ 9 5 5
230.00l' 
238,O()0 
232.400 
137.295 
129,10('1 
204.847 
198.186 
1 q .... :?CO 
~ J 4 . C J ~ 1 1
195.1C)o 
189.70·: 
1 7 5 , ~ ( ) 0 0
106.5e 
167.70(' 
1 6 ~ . J I C C
B ~ . . 704 I 
::7.672 
127.844 
131.200 I 
134.986 
120.ClOn 
lIC.C'9: 
110, ClOO 
102,00(,' 
107 . 1 0 ~ : :
101.271 , 
t'r t),] r. 
d g g ~ t ) m e ; a a
647,64(1 ' 
436.300 
328.257 
310.000 
~ 2 6 , C J [ ) 0 0
40:'.000 
:'04,14b 
';49.4l)( 
308. 70,' 
2 5 ~ . _ / 7 ) )
:83.98; 
215.83' 
~ 1 4 , 6 U I I
189. JOl, 
159, \ 'or, 
1 1 1 . : J ~ ~
E ~ T T ~ m a t e e
~ ~ l.JI"' U 
; : , ~ H 4 . : ~ 7 7
! . ~ ' l ; ; (I • ~ f ) - ; ;
'178. ~ ~ b b
Y 3 _\, bUi.4 
t' 7 R • J:) 7 
8 2 q , 2 ~ 7 7
752.9QJ 
b 0 7.770 
5 2 ~ . . 749 
4 7 ~ . b 5 1 1
5: , .451 
485.621 
45b. i 4 ~ ~
4 J ~ . i 6 b b
" 2 1 . 7 9 ~ ~
4 : 1 t ~ d 3 3
41': I j 7 tl 
40".9C) 
;Qb. S 7 ~ ~
37: • " ~ 9 9
~ 5 5 . : 7 : :
JJ2.7HlJ 
~ 2 b . ~ ~ " ~ ~
3: i; • ~ M : :
YeJ.795 
, J 'i .8: 5 
26 •• 6 ~ ' · ·
26o,J7-
2 t ~ . : H ~ ~
2 S ~ . o y ' '
.S •• 743 
2':'tl .45 '/ 
: ~ 7 . 7 ; ; ' 8 8
~ ~ 2 t' • ();: -;' 
22 _\ • q4 ; 
: ": • 596 
1 04.28-; 
1 8 1 . ~ " 5 5
:02.:'d 
.)h. 'Jb':' 
~ ~ S' • t.' 7 
1 ~ ~ • j 7 '1 
l 5(1 • ~ ~ hf1 
1.).43b 
:JQ."Z2 , 
12b .',)8C 
l : 2 . 9 ~ 1 1
::'; • 7 Sf 
~ ~ S . ~ ) 8 8
<1'.1'" r ..1 .. '(> 
;.: r. '\0," r: 
r.1: l' 
, ',,' .. '" 
,I. 
.. , 
'I, 
..:. :; 
),7 
2 . :-
, . 7 
-' . -; 
" , 
•• 0 
w. j 
1. ... 
4. ::. 
. " 
2. -; 
.:.. I 
:. h 
. , , 
: . J 
j • 7 
Source: United Nations. Statistical Office (1977): Demographlc Yearbook lQ7b. :;el.. ':'or", , C.:;. 
Adopted from Potter, R.B. and Potter. P. 11978. pp.3 uQ -7,,). EStllll4'e ,,: POPL: .. t:Or. lQIW 
and growth rates extracted by the author. 
~ o t e : :
(1) 
(2 ) 
There is an apparent contradiction between :aole 6.7 ~ \ . ; h l ~ - h h :':5t5 ':.2 l : t : e ~ ~ u:" 
over 500,000 persons) and Table 6.9 WhlCh lIsts In!. 13 such Cl:1es, 7he 
author is aware of this contradiction. and It car. be expi"lned n" ~ h e e ',]St' " ~ ~ :1.1' dl::e:' 
ent sources. Table 6.9 is taken frot: an estl!TI.a:ed pro 1ec:ion nf ~ } o p l ; : a t l o n n f : . . ~ u r e £ £
for 1980. U.S. Statistical Office in 1977. 7able 6.7 however. LS : a k e ~ ~ : r o ~ ~ a muc. 
more recent viz., World Bank Statistics, o! 1 ~ 8 2 . .
Secause of the populatlOn f i g u r ~ ~ not being updated.manv nf t h ~ ~ c l t l e ~ ~ population arl 
less t h a ~ ~ actual figures; for example, the popL1atlon ln C a ~ r n n 1S more : h a ~ ~ Q ~ : 1 1 : o ~ ~
and In Eaghdad more than 3 million. 
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The high extent of loss in the case of a catast rophic event 
will affect several insurance branches, though the total loss pClten-
tial is not the same as total insured loss potential, the difference 
being illustrated in figure 6.12 (Carter, 1981, p.ll). 
It is general practice, in property and fire insurance in 
particular, to grant an additional coverage for natural hazards. 
Loss accumulations in this type of insurance reSUlting from natural 
hazard are likely to be considerable. In view of this situation 
the insurer should seek to cover this accumulation risk for his 
retention. The most suitable type of reinsurance for protect tng 
the insurer against such accumulation is catastrophe cover under 
which he can reduce his liabilities to a certain limit. Ger.Jthe\.Johl 
(1982, pp.135-l41) has pointed out that if the insurer desires an 
effective protection from natural hazards, he must set up variOllS 
zones in which the risks he keeps in his portfolio may accumulate. 
He argues that an I accumulation control system I does provide a 
great amount of insight into the accumulation of risk. 
ing three steps are necessary to achieve this system: 
1. Earthquake exposure zones. 
The follow-
The insurer needs to subdivide a country or regiun into 
earthquake exposure zones. In so doing the insurer can \.;ork 
out the return period and probable intensity of an earthquake 
in a specific zone. The main practical value frum setting 
up such zones is the assistance this gives to the calculation 
of premium rates. 
2. Earthquake loss accumulation zones. 
Past experience and seismotectonics within a ~ ; p L ' c i f i c c
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Table 6.12 
Loss potential of Natural Hazards. 
Intensity and 
characteristics 
of loss producing 
event 
Total losses 
caused by event 
Total insured 
losses 
Source: (Carter. 1981, p .12) 
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area are very important factors in the setting up of 103s 
accumulation zones. Such zones thus represent regions which 
may have been affected by one single earthquake only. Estab-
lishing loss accumulation zones depends on the insurer's under-
writing policy, the structure of his portfolio, and his wi 11-
ingness to run a risk. 
3. Earthquake assessment zones. 
Having established the earthquake loss accumulation, 
the insurer must then split up these zones further into small 
earthquake accumulation assessment zones. When accumulation 
assessment zones have been determined, both direc t insurers 
and reinsurers can then fix their liabilities for each zone. 
The subdivision of a country or area into relatively small 
accumulation assessment zones provides a clearer picture of 
concentration and distribution of values within the loss accum-
ulation zones. 
However, many insurers may lack sufficient information 
about the accumulation of risks exposed to onc event. If 
the insurer does not know his overall liabilities derived 
from numerous individual losses caused by Olle loss event. 
there is little hope of the reinsurer getting it right. 
The reinsurer, who participates in a reinsurance treaty. 
has little idea of those hundreds of risks cov0r-ed by the 
treaty, which are exposed to loss by one event. Th is is 
compounded when the reinsurer participates in a number of 
pro-rata treaties from that market and the shares ill world-
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wide quota share, surplus treaties and excess of loss C ( ) \ · ( ~ t ~ , ,
which may have cessions from the same market. In this case 
the reinsurer will face substantial difficulties if he wants 
to ascertain the accumulation of risk. (Thorne, 1980, p.4). 
It is equally true of the direct insurers and is even more 
reason why reinsurers need to set up their own accumulation 
control systems. 
6.8 Conclusions 
The Arab world has a long record of natural hazards, t"hich 
have led to considerable losses throughout recorded history. With 
the development of the economy, the expansion of population through-
out the region and the settlement of hitherto sparsely inhahited 
areas, natural hazards pose an increasing threat to those exposed 
to them, and obviously are a major cause of concern to insurance 
companies. 
The figures below provide some indication of the types of 
natural hazards which may be encountered around the Arab t"orld. 
The full figures and information, of which the data below are merely 
the summary, are given in the Appendix and Maps, which show the 
potential for natural hazards, and the locationof tm"ns and develo[)-
ment projects in relation thereto. 
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Earthquake Flood ..., 
"8 <J.) 
~ ~ M OM 
~ ~ aI aI ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(.) 
"0 ..., ~ ~ .-i o ~ ~ OM Vl ~ ~ ;::l Vl ~ ~ OM 2:l .-i ~ ~ C/l ~ ~ +J ..., C/l C/l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ §i C/l 4-< ;j 8 ;:l ~ ~ "8 <J.) pa C/l ~ ~ .-..... j J 
Number of towns 
(exceeding 
100,000 popula- 129 33 1 11 35 24 47 61 12 I 9 
tion) exposed to 
natural hazards 
One must appreciate that the impact of a disaster wi 11 tend 
to be much greater in a developing, as opposed to a developed, c()unt-
ry, because although the amounts involved may be smaller, the relat-
ive impact on a developing country's economy and insurance industry 
is likely to be larger. ~ o r e o v e r r in developing countries governments 
are not in a position, in the event of natural disasters, to indemni-
fy their citizens sufficiently to provide them with living conditions 
equal to those they enjoyed before the event. This is exactly what 
has happened after earthquakes in Morocco (in 1960) Nicaragua (1972) 
Algeria(1981) and North Yemen(1982). But even the governments of snme 
developed countries may not feel able to provide the same insurance 
provisions as, say, the U.S. Federal Insurance Program, or disaster 
relief after the event. Therefore the private insurance industry 
should try to respond by providing as much cover as is safely possi-
ble within the limits set by its financial resources. 
In the past the losses incurred by Arab insurers as the reslllt 
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of natural disasters have been relatively small. Now the ~ i t u a t i o n n
is changing with the growth of demand for insurance in gener.:11 ilnd 
for cover against natural hazards in particular. Therefore i n ~ u r e r 3 3
and reinsurers are having to ·take an increasing interest in the 
proper evaluation of such hazards, in that such knowledge is required 
in order to: 
fix the premiums and o t ~ ~ terms for such insurances; 
determine the extent of possible accumulations of losses 
from any event; 
arrange catastrophe reinsurances. 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this study: 
First, if Arab insurers are to meet the growing demand for 
insurances that provide cover for losses arising from natura] hazards 
they will continue to be heavily reliant on the international rcins-
urance markets. Not only are many of the rapidly growing cit ies 
located in areas badly exposed to natural hazards but also some 
of the large risks discussed in Chapter five are being sited in 
such areas too. Thus, self-sufficiency in insurance for Arab COllnt-
ries is an impossible objective for these catastrophe risks, and 
the large risks too. 
Secondly, insurance and reinsurance underwri ters need to knO\v 
a lot more about the risks they are being asked to insllre. ,\1 t:lOllgh 
a lot of research has been undertaken by major internat iona 1 i 1l:;llrt!Li 
and reinsurers much more remains to be done, not least in providlng 
assessments in a form that would be instantly usefu 1 to .Ill:: llllder-
writer. The developments that are occurring in the earth scicnl.'c·; C<l1l 
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make major contributions to natural hazards assessments and insurance 
industries need to exploit more fully the information that is avail-
able. (l) 
Thirdly. Arab insurers have got to learn how to control their 
exposures to accumulations of losses from natural disasters. Such 
control is necessary not only for their own protection but also 
to enable them to obtain the catastrophe reinsurance they need from 
domestic, regional and international reinsurers. 
(1) See Doornkamp, J .C. et al (1982). 
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APPENDIX 6.1 
TOWNS AND 7YPE OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN THE ARAB \.l,)RLD 
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1 Arzew - Algeria x x 1 x I ;.: i 
2 Skikda - Algeria x I I 
3 Hassi Massoud - Algeria x x 
i 4 Algers - Algeria I 
I 
x X , X X x 
5 Bejel - Algeria x I I I I I X 
6 Awali - Eahrain x ! I 1 I 
7 Suez - Egypt x i x I ! I I X 
8 Alexandria - Egypt x 1 x 
:1 I 
x I x I 
9 Assut - Egypt i x , , 
10 Tanta - Egypt I ! I x 
11 Ras azzawr - Kuwait x x I ! I 
12 Khawr Mufattah - Kuwait x x t : 
13 Marsa Ma tr uch - Egypt x i 1 , 
14 Daura - Iraq x x I x 
15 Kirkuk - Iraq x i 
i 
16 Basra - Iraq x I 
, , 
x , x 
17 Balji - Iraq x I 
, I x I x 
18 Haditha - Iraq I I I 1 19 Samawa - Iraq I I X X 1 
20 Al1 .. and - Iraq x ! ! 
21 Qayarah - Iraq x I 
, 1 I 
; 
22 Zarqa - Jordan x 
23 Mina AI-Ahmadl - Kuwait x 
I x i ! I 
1 
24 Mina Abdallah - Kuwait x x ! I 
25 Shuaiba - Kuwait x x 
26 Tripoli - Lebanon x x 
27 Sidon - Lebanon x x 
28 Zawia - Libya x x 
29 .Berga - Libya x 
30 Ras Lanuf - Libya x 
31 Nouadhibou - Maritania i x 
32 Mohammedia - Morocco x x x 
33 AI-Jadlda - Morocco x x 
34 Nado - Morocco x x x 
35 Umm Said - Qatar x x 
36 Ras Tanura - Saudi Arabia x x x x 
37 Jedda - Saudi Arabia x x x 
38 Riyadh - Saudi Arabia 
39 Yanbu - Saudi Arabia x x 
40 Jubail - Saudi Arabia x x x x 
41 Rabegh - Saudi Arabla x x 
42 Abqai<: - Saudi Arabla x 
43 Port Sudan x x 
44 Banias - Syria x 
45 Homs - Syria x 
46 Bizerte - Tunisia x x x 
47 Gabes - Tunisia x 
48 Hodeidah - North Yemen x 
49 Aden - South Yemen x x x 
50 Al Amar - Bahrain x 
51 Khor AI-Zubair - Iraq x x 
52 Tobruk - Libya x 
53 Ou!."iyat - Oman x 
54 Gafsa - Tunisia x 
55 Ruwais - U .A.E. 
x x 
56 Urnm A l - ~ o r r - V.A.E. 
x 
57 Jebel Ali - U.A.E. 
x 
58 Zelten - Libya 
x 
59 Jebel - Libya 
x 
60 lo:aha - Libya 
x 
61 Defa - Libya x 
62 Beda - Libya )( 
63 Ora - Libv 
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No. CH y /Count ry 
126 ~ a n i f a a - Saudi Arabia 
127 Khafji - Saudi Arabia 
128 Umm Qasba - Saudi Arabia 
129 ~ a r j a n n - Saudi Arabia 
130 Zcluf - Saudi Arabia 
131 Shaybah - Saudi Arabia 
132 Burgan - Neutral Zone 
133 Bahrah - Kuwait 
134 Raudhatain - Kuwait 
135 ~ u t r i b a a - Kuwait 
136 Annaba - Algeria 
137 Oran - Algeria 
138 Bejaia - Algeria 
~ 3 9 , , Barni Saf - Algeria 
140 Chercehll - Algeria 
141 ~ a n a m a a - Bahrain 
142 Sitra - Bahrain 
143 Abu Zenima - Egypt 
144 Adabiya - Egypt 
145 Aln Sikhna - Egypt 
146 Port Said - Egypt 
147 Damiett - Egypt 
148 Ras Amir - Egypt 
149 Ras Shukheir - Egypt 
~ 5 0 0 Safaga - Egypt 
l ~ l l Wadi Peiran - Egypt 
152 KosseLr - Egypt 
153 Sudr - Egypt 
~ 5 4 4 W. Wardan - Egypt 
155 Ras Malarma - Egypt 
156 Fao - Iraq 
157 Umm Qasr - Iraq 
158 ~ ~ o r r Al-Amaya - Iraq 
159 Mina AI-Baker - Iraq 
160 Aqaba - Jordan 
161 Shuwaikh - Kuwait 
162 Umm GudaLr - Neutral Zone 
163 Wafra - Neutral Zone 
164 Mina Saud - Neutral Zone 
165 Abdali - Kuwait 
166 Beirut - Lebanon 
167 Tyre - Lebanon 
168 Jounieh - Lebanon 
169 Tripolo - Libya 
170 Misurata - Libya 
171 Benghazi - Libya 
172 Derna - Libya 
173 Nouakchott - Mauritania 
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174 Dellys - Algeria x Y. 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
175 Tenes - Algeria x " " 
x 
x 
x 
x 
)( 
176 Mestghanem - Algeria x Y. x 
177 Casablanca - Morocco x i x " I 
178 Tangier - Morocco x I x 
179 Safi - Morocco x x ! 
180 Agadir - Morocco x I x I 
181 Ceuta - Morocco x I x 
182 Essaouira - :1orocco I x x I 
183 :1elil1a - Morocco x x , 
184 Lyautey - MoroccO x I x 
185 Ghazawet - Morocco ~ ~ I I ii 
186 Tan Tan - Morocco I I I ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 ~ 7 ~ ~ ~__ J ~ ~ = ~ ; ~ ' ~ ~ : ~ 1 ~ ~ h ~ - ~ Q ~ m ~ ~ ~ m n ~ a _ n n______________ ~ ~__ ~ ; ~ ~ I I__________ ~ . .____________ ~ ~______________________ ~ ~
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Earthquake Flood ~ ~
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189 ~ ! i n a a Qaboos - Oman x 
190 Doha - Qatar x x x 
191 jazirat Abu Al1 -Saudi Arabia x x 
" 
192 .01.1 ,-hober - Saudi Arabl.a le x x 
193 Ras AI-Ghar - Saudi Arabia x x x 
194 Dub" - Saudi Arabia x 
195 AI-Wajh - Saudi Arabia x 
196 A1-Qadima - Saudi Arabia x x 
197 Berbera - Somalia x x x 
198 Suakir. - Sudan x 
199 :artous - Syna x 
200 :"atakia - Syria x 
201 Jeble - Syria le 
202 Sfax - Tunisia x 
203 Tunis - Tunisia x x x x 
20':' Sousse - Tunisl.a x 
205 La Sekhira - Tunisia x le 
206 Jebe1 Dhanna - U.A.E. x 
207 Shiek Rashid - U .A.E. x x 
208 Shar]ah - V.A.E. x x 
~ 0 9 9 Ajman - V.A.E. x x 
210 3ayed - U .A.E. x 
21l. Umm AI-Qawair. - t! .A.E. x le 
2' C FUJurah -~ . . U .A.E. x x 
213 Muka11a - South Yemen x 
214 :1okha - North Yemen x 
215 Sa:i.eef - North Yemen x 
216 Cairo - Egypt x x 
217 Damascus - Syria le 
218 Gl.za - Egypt x 
219 Aleppo - Syria x 
220 Amman - Jordan x 
22: !'tarakesh - !'toroceo x le 
222 Fez - Morocco x x 
223 :-1eknes - Morocco x x 
224 :-1ecca - Saudi Arabia 
2 ~ 5 5 !'tosul - Iraq x x 
226 Oujda - Morocco x x 
?'- Shuora EI-Khema -_.t. I Egypt x x x 
228 Tetouan - MoroccO x x 
229 Khacoum - Sudan 
230 El Mahal1.a EI-Kubra - Egypt x x 
231 Omdurman - Sudan 
232 o;c:nta - Egypt x x 
233 Aswan - EgY,.lt 
234 Taif - Saudi Arabia 
235 !'tedina - Saudl. Arabia x 
236 Najaf - Iraq x 
237 Zagazig - Egypt x x 
238 Ismail1a - Egypt x )( 
239 Damanhur - Egypt x x 
240 Hawalli - Kuwait x 
241 !'aiyum - Egypt x 
242 Hama - Syria x 
243 Hilla - Iraq y. 
244 Settat - MoroccO x 
245 Minya - Egypt 
246 Sana - North Yemen x 
247 Renl-Suer J::gypc 
248 : - l u f ~ f f - Saudl. A r a b ~ a a x 
249 Subaith - Kuwait 
250 A l - ~ a q w a a - Kuwait x 
251 :adaclyah - Ku",ait x 
252 f.2..-A.hmadi - K u w a ~ t t x 
129 33 2.1 35 24 47 61 12 19 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MEASURES TO INCREASE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL RETENTION CAPACITY 
7.1 Introduction 
Retention capacity in the Arab insurance market is limited 
by various factors, such as the unbalanced state of their insurance 
portfolios, a lack of adequate capital and free reserves, and insuff-
icient knowledge and technical experience in the insurance business 
in general. Consequently, Arab insurance markets are obliged to 
make heavy purchases of reinsurance from abroad. One resul t of 
this is that an increased outflow of insurance bllsiness resulting 
from foreign reinsurance may lead to an increased net outflow of 
foreign exchange, but this outflo\., differs from one country to another 
according to the features of each country's portfolios. 
Many Arab countries have concluded that the national retention 
capacity of their markets might be much better utilised throllgh 
the formation of national and regional reinsurance companies. Furth-
ermore at a time when many insurance and reinsurance conpanies felt 
that retention capacities at both the individual company and national 
market levels were too low to absorb the increasing values Clt r i ~ 3 k , ,
it was decided through the General Arab Insurance Federation to 
establish reinsurance pools in order to maximise the regional reten-
tion capacity and so reduce the reinsurance premiums ceded olltsi.de 
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the region. 
The main purpose of this chapter is: 
to appraise the Arab reinsurance companies and reinsurance 
pools as measures for increasing retention capacity, and 
to discover whether they have achieved their objectives. 
7.2 Formation of Insurance and Reinsurance Pools 
7.2.1 Reasons for Setting up a Pool 
Osler, et. al. (1972, p.120) define a pool as follows: 
'An organization of insurers or reinsurers through which part-
icular types of risks are underwritten with premiums, losses, 
and expenses shared in agreed amounts'. 
Another definition of a pool has been given by Cockerell (1980, 
p.145): 
'A pool is created when a number of insurers agree that all 
insurances of a defined charac ter shall be shared among them 
in specified proportions'. 
Here a pool will be defined as: 
"An arrangement by which a group of insurance and reinsurance 
companies, in a country or within a region, agree to cede 
risks of a certain class, or classes, to the pool, and to 
share the aggregate risks in accordance \"ith a predetermined 
distribution plan". 
From the above definitions it can be seen that a pool may 
be considered as reciprocity at its highest point of development, 
and U ~ C T A D D has encouraged developing countries to form pools as 
a means of increasing their local market capaci ties. Among the 
other reasons that have been given ,Gerathe\"ohl (1980, p.122) lists 
the follmving: 
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1. To cover I rare I risks by forming a portfolio to which the 
law of large numbers is applicable. 
2. To cover particularly large risks whose exposure cannot be 
assessed by the insurer. 
3. To provide cover for classes of insurance exposed to a risk 
of catastrophic accumulations of losses. 
Pools arranged for nuclear energy risks and offshore oil rig 
f acili ties are two examples of arrangements which enable companies 
to combine resources and attain sufficient collective capacity for 
underwriting such complicated risks. 
The concept of Arab reinsurance pools was evolved at the first 
conference of the General Arab Insurance Federation (GAIF) following 
the establishment of that Federation in September 1964. According 
to the GAIF. the reasons for setting up pools in the region were: 
1. To achieve closer collaboration between the insurance and 
reinsurance company members of the Federation. By redistribut-
ing reinsurance business. a pool may assist companies in ret-
aining part of the reinsurance premiums that usually leave 
the Arab region. 
2. To minimise the net outflow of foreign exchange resulting 
from foreign reinsurance. at both the national and regional 
LeveL. 
3. To facilitate the acceptance of reinsurance as well as retro-
cession business originating from within or outside the region, 
and providing additional underwriting capacity within the 
area. 
4. To create a better understanding among the Arab insurance 
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markets by increasing co-operation among companies in such 
fields as t ~ e e dissemination of knowledge about insurance theory, 
loss prevention, claim handling and the distribution of inform-
ation and ~ ; t a t i s t i c s s regarding the business transacted by 
the pools. 
It was felt that the members of the GAIF enjoyed four advant-
ages condt.cive to the success of the pools. Firstly, they had a 
common language and similar economic and social environments. Sec-
ondly, there were similarities in their insurance experience, prob-
lems and risk characteristics. Thirdly, the Arab geographic area 
is large enough to provide an adequate spread of risks and to make 
the pools economically worthwhile. Fourthly, there were no currency 
exchange difficulties between countries to overcome. Yet despite 
such advantages the pools have not achieved the degree of success 
that had been hoped for. 
7.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Setting up a Pool 
Besides enabling its members to achieve one or more of the 
objectives detailed above, a well-managed pool can confer other 
benefits. UNCTAD (1980, p.9) has argued that a pool may be: 
1. Highly r c s ~ o n s i v e e to the changing needs of its members; 
2. I n e x p e n ~ i ~ e e to operate because of its very nature and relative-
ly simple s ~ r u c t u r e . .
3. Able to secure, for common account, reinsurance protec tion 
on favourable terms. 
On the other hand, pools have their disadvantages too. As 
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Carter has pointed out (1979, p.46), disagreements are likely to 
arise between members if the results of the business they cede to 
the pool vary substantially: members that pool profitable business 
cannot be expected in the long run to continue to accept unprofitable 
business in return. Also, a pool may restrict competition between 
members and hinder the larger members in taking advantage of their 
superior knowledge and expertise, part icularly in the field of loss 
prevention. Likewise the knowledge that a substantial part of the 
business accepted will be passed on to the pool provides no encour-
agement for individual companies to undertake research and to improve 
their underwriting techniques. Finally, there is the danger of 
a pool being exposed to an accumulation of risk, if, unknown to 
the pool managers, several member companies have accepted shares 
of the same large risk, or risks exposed to losses from one event, 
which they then cede to the pool. 
7.2.3 Types of Pools 
There are two kinds of pool arrangement: 
ance pool, and the regional reinsurance pool. 
7.2.3.1 National Insurance Pool 
The national insur-
In many developed and developing countries with insurance 
markets consisting of a substantial number of insurers, national 
pools have been organised to handle classes of insurance that either 
require the mobilisation of exceptionally large amounts of under-
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,Hiting capacity (e.g. nuclear and aviation insurances), or where 
the underwriting results are so poor that individual insurers may 
be unwilling to write the business (e.g. the Philippines motor insur-
ance pool). Often such pools are organised on a net line basis, 
i.e., each member company accepts a share of the pool business which 
it will wholly retain for its own account, so that the pool operates 
as a form of coinsurance arrangement. Some examples of national 
pools are listed in Table 7.1 
Although national pools avoid the foreign currency problems 
associated with regional pools, they can suffer from a number of 
limitations, such as smaller underwriting capacity and more narrowly 
spread portfolios of business, ,vhich in some cases are exposed to 
a relatively higher accumulation risk. 
Country 
Finland 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Finland 
Finland 
South Korea 
Kenya 
France 
\.J.Germany 
Table 7.1 
Examples of National Pools in Developing and 
Developed Countries by the end of 1980. 
Name of Pool No. of rrember 
companies 
The Finnish Aviation Ins.pool 28 
The Danish Aviation Ins. pool 17 
The Norwegian Aviation Ins. 26 
pool 
The Swedish Aviation Ins.pool 22 
The Swiss pool for Aviation 
Ins. 35 
The Finnish Atomic Ins.pool 28 
The Finnish General Ins.pool 20 
Korean Atomic Energy Ins.pool 14 
Kenya Motor Ins. pool All co's writin 
motor insurance 
in Kenya. 
The French pollution pool. 70 
The German p h ~ r m a c e u t i c a l l lia n.a 
hilitv 0001 
Source: Extracted from UNCTAD 1980, Annexe Ill, pp.1-4. 
Establish-
rrent date 
1919 
1919 
1919 
1919 
1947 
1957 
1964 
1971 
1975 
1977 
I 1978 
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Excluding those countries with markets controlled by one or 
a small number of state insurance companies in which insurance bus-
iness is, in effect, already pooled, so far no national pools have 
been established in the Arab region. 
7.2.3.2 Regional Reinsurance Pool 
A number of regional pools have been established around the 
(1) 
world, including the following five Arab pools: 
Aviation pool (1968). 
Engineering pool (1968). 
Fire pool (1971). 
Marine Cargo pool (1972). 
Marine Hull pool (1974). 
7.2.3.2.1 Management of Regional PooLs 
The management of a regional pool is always entrusted to one 
of the pool's member companies. The members of the pool delegate 
(1) In other developing countries their are several reinsurance 
pools, such as (1) Asian Reinsurance Pool. It was established 
in 1969 and has one member from each of the following Asian 
countries: Hong Kong, IndoneSia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Thailand. (2) Fair Reinsur-
ance Pool, established in 1974 \.]ith 56 member companies of 
which 21 are from Africa and 35 from Asia. (3) PLAR Reinsur-
ance Pool, established in 1969 with 16 member companies from 
Latin America and 6 companies from outside the area (Indonesia, 
Iran, Italy, Republic of Korea, and Turkey. (4) ReD Reinsur-
ance Pool, which comprises three countries, Iran, Pakistan 
and Turkey (UNCTAD, 1980, Annex 11 pp.2-4). 
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certain underwriting and other func tions to the managing company 
acting collectively for them. All the business written by the 
managing company is accepted on behalf of the members, each of whom 
takes a share of that business onto his books, and any profits or 
loss, after payment of all incurred expenses, is distributed amongst 
the members. 
Since the managing company plays a vital role in the success 
of a pool, the following factors should be taken into account in 
its selection: 
1. The technical knowledge of the people who will handle the 
pool's business (normally a managing company will appoint 
a small group of its staff to run the pool); 
2. Its geographical location (which should possess good cor:ununi-
cations, banking facilities, etc.); 
3. Its marketing knowledge and reputation; and 
4. The adequacy of its financial base. 
The major functions of a managing company have been listed 
by UNCTAD (1980, p.4), as follows: 
1. To unden.]rite business from members, and non-member companies 
2. 
(if permitted). 
To request non-members to join the pool. The larger the mem-
bership, the larger will be the volume of business ceded to 
it. 
3. To advise and influence members regarding the overall quality 
of the business accepted by the pool. 
4. To fix the retrocessiun shares of the members, generally in 
proportion to the volume of business ceded (usually measured 
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in terms of premium income). 
5. To inform the members periodically of the status of their 
accounts, adjusting balances among them in the manner of a 
clearing house. 
6. To arrange, when necessary, an excess of loss cover for the 
common account against u n f o ~ e e n n excessive accumulation or 
catastrophes. 
7. To prepare an annual report in the form of statistical analysis 
of the pool's operations and its profitability during the 
previous year. 
In return for its services the managing company will be compen-
sated for expenses incurred, usually by the payment of an overriding 
commission of between 2.5 percent and 5 percent of the pool's premium 
volume. 
The five Arab pools are managed by the following companies: 
Pool 
Aviation 
Engineering 
Fire 
Narine Cargo 
i'larine Hull 
Managing Company 
Societe Centrale de Reassurance 
Morocco (formerly by the ~ i s r r Insur-
ance Company, until Egypt left the 
GAIF in December 1979). 
Iraq Reinsurance Company. 
Tunisienne Reassurance Company (prior 
to 1982 by the Societe Tunisienne 
Assurance et de Reassurance). 
Kuwait Reinsurance Company (prior 
to 1982 by the Gulf I n s u ~ a n c e e Company 
Kuwait) . 
Societe 
rlorocco. 
Centrale de Reassurance; 
The change in the management of the marine cargo pool was 
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the result of a decision by the GAIF in 1977 that the pools should 
be managed by reinsurance companies. 
Over the last 15 years many members of the pools have criticis-
ed their management, lack of growth and profit records. The issue 
was discussed at the 1982 Bahrain Conference but no decisions were 
taken; there is the fear that any change in management may create 
an unsettled situation which would adversely affect a pool's perform-
ance. Yet it is recognised that the decision to place all of the 
pools in the hands of reinsurance companies was not altogether wise: 
the Tunisienne Reinsurance Company, for example, which was only 
formed in 1981, lacked the experience to run the fire pool to its 
full potential. 
7.2.3.2.2 Business Cessioos to Regional Pools 
and Redistribution to its Members 
Every member of a pool must cede a share of its business which 
falls within the scope of the pooling arrangement. The pool's 
business depends on the geographical scope of the pool. Some pools 
comprise business emanating from a specific area, whilst others 
operate on a world-wide basis, excluding certain count ries. Thus 
business from non-member companies may be ceded to the pool in order 
to improve the balance of the pool's portfolio. 
All business ceded to the pool has to be distributed among 
the members. The usual practice is to share retrocessions among 
all members, depending on the amount of the premium or profitability 
ceded by the member. Consequently the members receive back through 
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retrocessions a part of the business they have themselves ceded 
to the pool. Any business written by the pool in excess of the 
total of the member's shares will have to be ceded to other reinsurers. 
Membership of the Arab regional pools is open only to insurance 
and reinsurance companies that are members of the CAlF. Although 
Arab reinsurance companies are allowed to accept business from the 
pools, in order to reduce the danger of accumulations they do not 
cede business to the pools. The geographical scope of the marine 
cargo, hull and fire pools is confined to business emanating from 
the Arab world and Arab interests located outside the Arab area. 
The aviation and engineering pools are on a world-wide basis. 
The capacity of each pool is limited to the combined retentioncapaci-
ty of the members, supplemented by excess of loss cover for the 
fire and aviation pools. 
Despite the fact that conditions were favourable for the est-
ablishment of the pools, their performance is open to question on 
a number of counts. 
First, as shown in Table 7.2, the number of member companies 
that have ceded business to the pools is small in comparison to 
the total membership of the CAlF, which in 1980 exceeded 100. Many 
companies have been reluctant to become pool members because of 
the firm ties they have with foreign brokers and reinsurers, and 
the favourable terms on which they are able to place their reinsuran-
ces. Other companies do not like to change their established pract-
ices, or they may not be familiar \vith many of the technicalities 
of reinsurance underwriting. 
Generally speaking, other reasons suggested by U ~ C T A D D (1980, 
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Table 7.2 
Development of Arab Reinsurance Pools Capacity and Members I 1) 
Aviation Engineering Fire ~ i l n n e e Cargo 
I ~ ~
~ ~ : 
- I 
Capac ~ ~ ty I! I 1.> J -,- '" Year I Capacity Capacity Capacity 
: ~ 6 e e : 
1969! 
1970, 
2..97l I 
' ~ 9 9 72 i 
1 9 7 ~ 1 1
: 974 
:975, 
1976 
,1977 ' 
: 978 
'1979: 
::980 
U5S I I 
150,oooln.a: 8 
250,000: roO a i 8 
300,000 n.a 117 
r,. a: 17 
n. a i 17 
330,000, r"a i 20 
" In. a ,20 
400,OOOin.a122 
750,000 n.a127 
n.a!20 
n.a!20 
n.a j 21 
1,000,000 n.a 35 
I 
i 
£ I I 137, 700 1 
i 
~ 8 8
81 1 ~ ~ 1 
81 11 i 
8 t :1 i 
91 111 
I 14 I 141 
10; 14: 
14! 17 i I 250,OOOi 
I 
500,000
1 IUSS1,700,cm 
I 
: :;5$2 , 500", (XX) I 
, I 
241 
26 I 
241 
23' 
21, 
11 ' 
-", 
27: 
18! 25 
USS 
I ~ : 3 3 ~ ~
I -
i -
, 
I 
250,000' 10 16 
10 17 
~ ~ , 18 ' 
30;,000 I ~ ; ; 191 
i 1: 24 
500,000 I 17 30 
600,000 1 18 33: 
18 21t 
650,000 I 18 I 22' 
I :5 19: 
USS 
I _ 
50,OOO! 
I 
I 
140,000: 
I 
- I 
7; la, 
:- le: 
~ ~ 3 " 
145,OOC' i 14: - 1 
:'2 : 
lO 
S o u r c ~ : : Annual reports of the managing companies 
~ o t e : : The maximum capacity ~ ~ the eng1neer1ng pool 15 in the CAR and EAR r ~ s k s . .
(1) The numbers of the Pools members 1n 1981 and :982 were: 
(198: ) (Ha:) 
Pool Ceding Accept1ng Ceding AcCept1ng 
, Aviation 10 34 10 35 
, Engineering 13 23 12 25 
Fire 12 18 n.a n . ~ ~
~ a r i n e e Cargo 9 17 17 
Marine Hull 6 20 8 21 
Source: Figures presented by che GAIF. 
:1anne Hull 
~ a p a c : : y y
L'S:; 
::,000 r .. a 
5 ~ , C O C C roOd 
2 ~ . 0 0 C C n.a 
:2,000 n.a 
5e,OOe 1:.3: ! 1:. a 
'r .. a 
, " ~ - ! !
:5: 
276 
pp. 12-13) include: 
(a) a reluctance to be involved in the redistribution of 
business with companies of whom they have little know-
ledge; 
(b) Lack of confidence in the management of the pools concer-
ning the acceptance of risks to be redistributed; 
(c) Lack of confidence in the solvency and ability of other 
companies to adjust balances promptly; 
Cd) Fear of accumulation of heavy losses which has limited 
the pools acceptances. 
Secondly, the pools have not grown as fast in terms of premium 
income as may have been expected, given the rate of growth of direct 
insurance business in the region since the early 1970s. In the 
case of marine business, the formation of the separate cargo and 
hull pools may have deterred companies with combined cargo and hull 
treaties from ceding business to the pools. 
Thirdly, the geographical limitation of the fire, marine cargo 
and hull pools to the Arab world, which accounts for only a small 
proportion of the total world business, restricts their growth poten-
tial. There is no reason why these pools should not be extended 
to include international business. 
Finally, the pools, except the engineering pool, have failed 
to increase substantially the region's underwriting and retention 
capacities relative to the size of risks that require insurance 
in the Arab countries. For example, the fire pool's capacity in 
1980 was still only US $650,000, which was less than 0.2 per cent 
of the value (of between $400 - 600 million) of a single oil refinery 
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with a tank farm and terminal in the Gulf area, and a mere 0.65 
per centof one refinery process unit costing $100 million upwards. 
7.2.3.2.3 The Experience of the Arab Reinsurance Pools 
Buol (1981, p. 9) has argued that insurance, and particularly 
reinsurance, are services which can only be provided on a fairly 
large scale, below which neither the technique nor the economics 
of insurance and reinsurance can operate to the satisfaction of the 
users. He adds that regional pools are no exception to this rule. 
i 
-,; 
Having already criticised the Arab pools for their small capacities, 
it is now proposed to examine their size in terms of premium income 
and their results, bearing in mind Buol's remarks. 
The Engineering Pool 
The pool accepts all kinds of engineering risks and as from 
1st January 1980, it has included computer insurances within the 
scope of its treaty. It is the largest pool in terms of underwriting 
capacity, which has been increased from £137,700 in 1968 to US$2.5 
million in 1980. This capacity is 2.5 times that of the aviation 
pool, about 4 times of fire, 10 times of marine hull, and 17 times 
of marine cargo. 
The importance of the pool is the direct result of the const-
ruction boom including many large projects, that has occurred as 
part of the development plans of Arab c o u n t r ~ , , , and which suddenly 
made engireering insurance one of the most important classes of 
i n s u r a n c . ~ ~ . The managing company has increased the capacity of the 
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pool due to; (a) response to the demand for engineering insurance. 
including the rise in sums insured due to inflation and the increas-
ing size of investment projects. and (b) the entry of new companies 
to the pool, and the willingness of member companies to increase 
their acceptance limits, partly following increases in the capacity 
of their own treaties. Nevertheless individual member companies' 
retention limits, and thus the capacity of the pool, remain very 
small relative to the sums insured required for many construction 
projects. 
The underwriting results of t he pool. since its inception, 
broken down into underwriting years, are shown in Table 7.3 and 
Figure 7.1. During the period 1969-1973 the annual premium income 
was very modest, although the pool extended its acceptances to inc-
lude risks on a worldwide basis as from 1st January 1971. Since 
1974 there has been a noticeable increase in the premium income, 
but it still remains relatively small, due to the reasons mentioned 
earlier, plus the fact that the participation share of business 
accepted by the pool from its members' reinsurance treaties was 
small, which left part of the pool's underwriting capacity unabsorbed. 
Table 7.3 also shows that in 1980 most of the pool's members 
accounts were not received by the managing company. The later the 
year the more provisional is the underwriting result shown: in 
particular all of the figures for 1980 will be subject to substantial 
adjustment as more premiums and claims are reported by the ceding 
companies, and outstanding claims are settled. However, if the 
last two years are excluded, the overall technical profit for the 
years 1968-78 was very high at 24.6 percent of total premiums. 
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If the provisional figures for 1979 and 1980 are included, the techn-
cal profit is even higher at 29.6 percent. 
Table 7.3 
Results of Engineering Reinsurance Pool 
- Underwriting Years (1968-1980). 
Currency·US$ 
Under Underwrit- Result 
writ- Premium Conmission OIR Paid Outstand- ing result as ~ ~ ~
IncOIlP Conmission Claims ing Claims profit premium ing 
year (loss) incorre 
1968 50708 16164 1268 22450 117 10709 21.1 
1969 37550 10901 940 17980 2384 5345 14.2 
1970 41894 12172 1045 11921 - 16756 40.0 
1971 122611 37027 3065 23168 - 59351 48.4 
1972 147969 43190 3707 42622 - 58450 39.5 
1973 176539 50079 4414 40236 770 81040 45.9 
1974 380792 111592 9519 91052 50793 117836 30.9 
1975 868645 278092 21716 173495 175185 220157 25.3 
1976 768908 252367 19220 194998 237481 64852 8.4 
1977 795791 268759 19901 127511 153033 226587 28.5 
1978 763192 249858 19081 65926 155457 272870 35.8 
1979 944147 326931 23605 47529 233191 312891 33.1 
1980 333226 117694 8330 3359 42558 161285 48.4 
5431972 1774826 135811 862247 1050969 1608119 29.6 
Source: The Iraq Reinsurance Co., the Report of October 1981. 
~ o t e : : (1) Figures converted from I.D to US dollars on exchange 
rates - period average. Rates extracted from I.M.F. 
supplement on exchange rates, supplements Series 
No. 1, 1981. 
(2) Each underwriting years figures are as at 31st 
December 1980. 
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The Aviation Pool 
The aviation pool is probably more unbalanced than any of 
the other pools. due to the limited number of large exposure units. 
Table 7.4 and Figure 7.2 provide ample evidence of the fluctuations 
experienced in this class of business; premium income has dropped 
since 1974 in comparison with the previous years. It then reached 
Under- Premium 
writing incorre 
year 
1968 104084 
1969 103551 
1970 1020245 
1971 1137103 
1972 1139786 
1973 1055540 
1974 762523 
1975 662132 
1976 751321 
1977 1226692 
1978 953554 
1979 855896 
1980 714064 
10486491 
Table 7.4 
Results of Aviation Pool 
Underwriting Years (1968-80). 
Conrnission Paid and Underwctt -
o/s claims ing result 
profit (loss) 
15155 108838 (19909 ) 
15788 41801 45962 
196092 801918 22235 
239994 707406 189703 
205042 1078872 (144128) 
153522 774755 12763 
114887 427383 220253 
100319 233193 328620 
113525 260270 377526 
189868 671999 364825 
196129 572268 185157 
125967 534342 195587 
109010 401153 203901 
1775298 6614198 2096995 
Currency: US $ 
Result as ~ ~ ~
premium 
incorre 
(19.1) 
44.4 
2.2 
16.7 
(12.6) 
12.1 
28.9 
49.6 
50.2 
29.7 
19.4 
22.9 
28.6 
20.0 
Source: (1) Misr Insurance Co. 1979 Annual Report. 
Note: 
(2) Societe Central de Reassurance. Morocco, 1980 Annual 
Report. 
(1) Each underwriting year's figures are as at 31st 
December 1980. 
(2) The figures are net of excess of loss cover. 
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its highest level in 1977, follmved by a further drop over the 
period 1978-1980. This was due to the positionof the international 
aviation market during the past seven years, when aviation rates 
fell dramatically. These reductions can be partly explained by 
the improvements in aircraft manufacturing and safety techniques, 
but the foremost factor is the intense competition due to over-
capacity in the market. The obvious facts are that only twice (in 
1968 and 1972) in the last 13 underwriting years has the pool suffer-
ed underwriting losses. Like the engineering pool, a substantial 
technical profit amounting to 19.6 percent of premiums was achieved 
for the period 1968-78. 
for t he period 1968-80. 
The figure rose slightly to 20.0 percent 
However, especially in the case of the 
later underwriting years ,changes can be expected to the final profit 
ratios as the outstanding claims are run off. 
The Fire Pool 
During the period reviewed, it can be seen that despite premium 
income increasing rapidly, the size of the pool's business, compared 
with the total fire business of the members of the GAIF, was relativ-
ely small. This can be attributed to the fact that the average 
shares ceded to the pool were far below the pool's underwriting 
capacity, and to the pool's limited membership and capacity. 
Table 7.5 and Figure 7.3 show that during the 1971-73 period, 
the pool achieved substantial profit. Since 1974 results have deter-
iorated, producing considerable losses, though in 1977 and 1978 
the pool was involved in the three largest Arab fire losses. as 
follows: 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1st hal 
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April 1977 Umm Said-Qatar US$ 76 million 
Nay 1977 Abqaiq-S. Arabia USS 54.5 million 
April 1978 Abqaiq-S. Arabia USS 53 million 
Table 7.5 
Results of Fire Pool 
Underwriting Years (1971-80) 
Currency: US S 
Under- Result as ~ 6 6
Premilllll Corrmission Paid Outstanding writing premilllll 
incotlE claims claims result, incotlE 
profit(1oss) 
171904 68616 9165 3829 90294 52.5 
229721 101734 38404 4680 84903 37.0 
269620 129747 49447 37495 52931 19.6 
284762 134483 125349 103574 (78644) (27.6) 
295088 130413 130365 111733 (77423) (26.2) 
444535 213 711 141573 94403 (5152) (1. 2) 
560677 265037 282144 275668 (262172) (46.8) 
730631 336842 262886 355760 ( 224857) (30.8) 
760875 325849 271148 171606 (7728) (1. 0) 
443892 197533 94693 179883 ( 28217) (6.4) 
4191705 1903965 1405174 1338631 (456065) (l0. 9) 
I 
Source: Societe Tunisienne cl Assurance et de Reassurance. 1980. 
Note: 
Annual Report. 
(1) Each underwriting year's figures are as at 30th June 
1980. 
(2) The figures are net of excess of loss cover. 
The Marine Cargo Pool 
The pool's problems, which are similar to those 
in the other Arab reinsurance pools, are its limited capacity, 
the small size of shares ceded to the pool, and an inadequate number 
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Figure 7.3 
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of members. Although the development programmes call for a variety 
of insurance covers, marine cargo insurance was the first beneficiary 
of the recent economic boom which has made it by far the largest 
branch of insurance in many Arab countries. This is why marine 
cargo business added weight to the importance of the establishment 
of the Arab marine cargo pool. 
Although the premium income has risen dramatically during 
the period 1972-1979 (see Table 7.6 and Figure 7.4), with an average 
annual growth rate of 33.6 percent, the pool's position is not enc-
ouraging, because its business is still small and constitutes an 
insignificant share of the total marine premiums of the GAIF members. 
It would seem, therefore, that this pool has been even less success-
ful than the other Arab pools in attaining its objectives of retain-
ing as much as possible of the regiorls marine business. 
During the period 1972-78 the pool achieved an overall 
loss of only US $58,325 (i.e. a somewhat modest 1.05 percent of 
premium income). Given the size of the outstanding claims, the 
international competition in marine business, and the substantial 
losses which have occurred since 1980 due to the war between Iran 
and Iraq, a progressive deterioration in the pool's results may 
be expected. 
The Marine Hull Pool 
The premium income of this pool has remained small (see Table 
7.7) mainly because of the low retention limits of the member compan-
ies. They face two difficulties. First, only a small number of 
Table 7.6 
Results of Marine Cargo Pool - Underwriting Years (1972-79). 
Currency: U.S.S 
! 
Under- Premium Received Commission paid Out stand- Under- Result I I 
writing income iilterest a"nd other claims ing writing as % I 
year on charges claims result premium 
reserves profit/ income I loss 
1972 184,502 1,950 82,189 112,899 2,837 (11,473) (6.2) I 
1973 369,103 5,518 166,105 199,606 12,574 (3,664) (1. 0) 
1974 837,410 10,085 381,423 447,721 49,615 (31.264) (3.7) 
1975 1,170,757 16,314 527,028 655,149 79,163 (74;2.69) (6.3) i 
1976 940,548 14,762 444,232 434,111 115,350 (38,383 (4.1) 
1977 999,043 9,677 506,478 368,348 124,450 9,444 0.9 I 
1978 1,063,636 6,280 512,821 294,430 171,381 91,284 8.6 I 
1979 1,399,912 - 689,269 92,701 339,892 'D8,050 19.9 
I 
6,964,911 64,586 3,309,545 2,604,965 895,262 219,725 3.2 
-- ----- -
_L 
-- - - -- ----- -- -- -
Source: Km.Jai t Insurance Co. The 1981 Annual Report. 
Note: (1) Figures converted from K.D. to US dollars on exchange rates 
period average. Rates extract from I.M.F. supplement on exchange rates, 
supplements series No. 1. 
(2) Each underwriticg yearh figures are as at 31st December 1979. 
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Figure 7.4 
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ships are insured in the Arab world, so that the companies' marine 
hull portfolios have remained unbalanced. Secondly, new vessels 
are larger and more sophisticated; consequently the companies have 
tended to err on the side of caution in fixing their retention limits. 
Year Premium 
income 
1974 24,825 
1975 71,174 
1976 81,862 
1977 143,108 
1978 121,210 
1979 157,893 
600,072 
Table 7.7 
Results of Marine Hull Pool -
Underwriting Years (1974-79) 
Commission paid Out-
& other claims standing 
charges claims 
9,635 263 11,354 
22,231 12,606 5,238 
23,717 37,09l 23,514 
41,766 44,231 1,614 
40,201 43,329 50,478 
42,078 115,468 39,457 
253,088 131,659 179,628 
Currency: US.S 
Results Profit 
/Loss 
Ob) 
3,573 14.4 
31,099 43.7 
(2,460) (3.0) 
55,493 38.8 
(12,R98) (10.6) 
(39,110) (24.8) 
35,697 5.9 
Source: Societe Central de Reassurance, Morocco. The 1980 Annual 
Report. 
Note: (1) Figures converted from Moroccan Derham to US dollars 
on exchange rates period average. Rates extract from 
I.M.F. supplement on exchange rates, Supplement 
Series No. 1, 1981. 
(2) Each underwriting year's figures are as at 31st 
December 1979. 
By reason of the size of the overall portfolio underwritten, 
fluctuations in underwriting results may be expected, but the outcome 
of results for the last fe\oJ years is not particularly encouraging, 
due to the considerable losses which have occurred in the Arab world. 
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Figure 7.5 
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7.2.4 Conclusions 
One final comment on the Arab pools' experience is related 
to the main problems facing the pools' managing companies. Although 
the submission of accounts by member companies to the pools' manag-
ers are a matter agreed bet'veen both parties. the managers have 
always been (and still are) faced with undue delay in receiving 
ceding companies accounts. Inevitably, therefore, the pools' res-
ults and annual reports are published very late. Settling balances 
due to the pools by some companies is another problem. Clearly 
any delay by the member companies in settling their accounts causes 
a shortage of liquidityand a loss of investment income. For exam-
ple. the managing company of the fire pool has reported that some 
balances due to the pool since 1971 are still unsettled. 
The performance of the pools as measured by the growth of 
their premium income has been disappointing, having failed to reflect 
the increasing premium income emanating from the region. The pools' 
aggregate premium income of US$4.ll9 million in 1979 represented 
only 2 per mille of the total premium income of 2037.4 m. for all 
Arab countries apart from Saudi Arabia, or 1.3 per mille, if Saudi 
Arabia's premium income is included. Thus the pools' contribution 
to increasing the premiums retained within the region has been mini-
mal. Since the pools were first formed they have failed to adopt 
the right policies for increasing the retention capacity of the 
region, and now is the time for them to consider a radical solution 
by merging the five pools into one. 
The creation of a single pool could provide a number of bene-
fits, notably: 
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1. the new pool's administrative costs should be much lower than 
the combined costs of the present five pools; 
2. it would be able to pick up the bouquet business from which 
the five pools, up to this time, have had to abstain; 
3. it would provide a better basis for the acceptance of reciproc-
al business from abroad; and 
4. provided it also adopted the policies listed below, the pool ought 
to be able to retain a larger volume of local premium income with-
in the Arab region, and achieve more stable underwriting results. 
In order to achieve the largest possible increase in the new 
combined pool's retained premium income a number of other measures 
would be necessary; notably: 
1. The pool should accept all classes of non-life business. 
2. It should have higher underwriting limits than the existing 
pools. In order to safeguard the interests of the pool's 
members and to reduce their liabilities from accumulation 
risks, the pool's managing company would need to arrange excess 
of loss cover for common account. 
3. The pool's geographical scope should be worldwide. 
4. Each member should be required to cede to the pool a minimum 
amount of premium as a condition of membership. 
S. All the members (except reinsurers) who accept business from 
the pool should be required also to cede business to it. 
If the present members of the Arab pools and other Arab insurers 
are not prepared to take such steps to improve their effectiveness, 
then it would be better to abolish the pools which currently seem 
to create more problems than they solve. 
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7.3 The Formation of Arab Reinsurance Companies 
The last twenty years have w i t n e s s ~ b o t h h an unprecedented rate 
of formation of professional reinsurance companies worldwide, and 
an increase in the importance of reinsurance, as will be shown in 
this chapter and Chapter eight. 
In the Arab world government intervention in insurance business 
has extended to reinsurance and, as described in Chapter three, 
this has led to the formation of a growing number of professional 
reinsurance companies. These companies are of two types: 
1. National reinsurance companies: 
(a) Egyptian Reinsurance Company, Egypt. (State owned). 
(b) Iraq Reinsurance, Iraq. (State owned). 
(c) SocieteCentral de Reassurance, Morocco. (Majority state 
owned) . 
(d) Kuwait Reinsurance Company, Kuwait. (Privately owned). 
(e) National Reinsurance Company , Sudan. (State and privately 
owned) . 
(f) Compagnie Central de Reassurance, Algeria. (State owned). 
(g) Societe Tunisienne de Reassurance, Tunisia. (State and 
privately owned). 
2. Regional insurance companies: 
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(a) Arab Reinsurance Company, Beirut (State and privately 
owned) . 
(b) Arab Union Reinsurance Company, Damascus (State owned). 
(c) Mediterranean Insurance and Reinsurance Company, London 
(State owned). 
(d) Arab Insurance Group (ARIG), Bahrain (State owned). 
The establishment of these reinsurance companies marked a 
considerable change in the reinsurance arrangements of the markets 
concerned. Prior to their formation. most reinsurance business 
was placed with foreign reinsurers. The main reasons for set ting 
up the Arab reinsurance companies were: 
(i) to increase the premium retained and consequently partly 
reduce the amount of business leaving the country/region; 
(ii) to reduce the dependence upon foreign reinsurers; 
(iii) to reduce the outflow of foreign currency at country 
and regional levels; and 
(iv) to write international reinsurance business to provide 
a two-way flow of business with the rest of the world. 
The national Arab reinsurance companies are given the right 
to receive compulsory (i.e. quota shares of all business written 
as in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia) 
reinsurance cessions from the direct insurance companies on advantag-
eous terms. The percentages of compulsory cessions vary from 10 
per cent in Morocco to 30 per cent in Egypt. Carter (1980, pp.65-
66) has discussed the compulsory cessions placed with the Egyptian 
Re and pointed out that 'arguably' the taking of compulsory cessions 
on less generous terms to its ceding companies than are available 
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on the foreign reinsurance market is the only way that the new rein-
surance company could withstand competition from foreign reinsurers, 
acquire a widespread portfolio of business and thereby: 
"( a) retain for its own account a significant proportion 
of its total gross premium income, so reducing the 
country's imports of reinsurancej 
(b) offer the balance in exchange for overseas reinsurance 
so as to obtain a geographically diversified portfolio 
of business; and 
(c) rapidly b u ~ d - u p p its free reserves to finance larger 
retentions and so further increase its business". 
Such benefits to the reinsurer are, however, obtained at the 
expense of its ceding companies or their policyholders, who are 
obliged to pay higher premiums to cover the higher reinsurance costs 
incurred by their insurers. 
Besides receiving compulsory quota share ceSSions, national 
reinsurance companies have also participated in the direct writing 
companies' reinsurance treaties. For example, Moroccan insurers 
have been called upon by the supervisory authority to let the Societe 
Central de Reassurance particpate in up to 50 percent of their rein-
surance treaties. Iraq Reinsurance Company receives the following 
shares of the National Insurance Company's reinsurance treaties: 
Reinsurance Treaties 
Accident Q.Share& XL treaties 
Marine Q.Share & surplus treaties 
Hull Q. share & surplus treaties 
Fire Q. share & surplus treaties 
Range of Share 
Accepted 
3 0 ~ ~ ~ - 5U 
30% - 48% 
30% - 48% 
4 0 ~ ; ; - 4 8 ~ ; ;
Source: The Iraq Reinsurance Company. 
Period 
Considered 
1970-1980 
1971-1980 
1971-1980 
1975-1980 
Other Arab national reinsurance companies are also offered 
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a share of the ceding companies I reinsurance treaties. This share 
varies from class to class, and from country to country. Thus the 
Arab national reinsurers through their participation in both compul-
sory and voluntary reinsurance t ~ t i e s s obtain a considerable percen-
tage of their markets I total volume of reinsurance, but then they 
retrocede a part of it abroad. 
Regional developments have also led to the increase of retention 
within the Arab region of some reinsurance business that otherwise 
would have been ceded to international markets. Arrangements have 
been made for regional reinsurance companies (except ARIG) to 
receive compulsory shares in reinsurance business arranged by Arab 
insurers and reinsurers. Under the terms of the agreement establish-
ing a regional reinsurer, each shareholder has to cede a certain 
share of its business to the reinsurer. An overall picture of the 
compulsory reinsurance cessions to the Arab regional reinsurers 
is given below: 
1. Arab Reinsurance Company shareholders cede 5 per cent o ~ ~
their reinsurance treatiesto the company on original treaty 
2. 
terms. 
Arab Union Reinsurance Company: the company receives compul-
sory cessions of 10 per cent from all the direct insurance 
offices transacting business within the Libyan and Syrian 
insurance markets. 
3. Mediterranean Insurance and Reinsurance Company: t ~ ~ company 
is equally mmed by the Libya Insurance Company of Libya and 
the Compagnie Central de Reassurance of Algeria. 
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and each cedes 25 per cent of their domestic reinsurance 
treaties. Establishing Mediterranean Re in the London 
market represents a completely new idea, particularly 
as the company is drawn from countries with such diff-
erent backgrourdsto the traditional London market. 
African States belonging to the OrganislJtiorl for African Unity 
have established the African Reinsurance Corporation with the same 
aim of increasing the amount of business retained in Africa. The 
Corporation commenced its operations in January 1978 with headquart-
ers at Lagos, Nigeria. Under the terms of the agreement establish-
ing the corporation, each member government requires every insurer 
to cede a minimum of 5 per cent of all reinsurance treaties placed 
outside the country. The corporation's eight Arab members are: 
Algeria, 
Tunisia. 
Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and 
The formation in Bahrain of the Arab Insurance Group in 1980 
by the governments of Kuwait, Libya and U .A.E. marked a further 
significant step towards increasing the proportion of total domestic 
premiums retained within the region. The size of its capitalisation 
(US$3 billion authorised capital with US $150 million paid-up) made 
it the strongest ne,v entrant to the internaticnal insurance market, 
and it was reported by UNCTAD (1982, p. 29) that it I.;rote US S 80 
million of premium income in its first eight months of operation 
to December 1980. In 1982 68 percent of its premium income Ivas 
received from non-Arab countries (Financial Times, 1983). The comp-
any is recruiting experienced London underwriters and in due course 
expects to be in a position to take the lead on major risks. 
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Besides participating in direct insurers treaty reinsurances, 
the national and regionalreinsurers also accept shares of facultative 
reinsurances Wo. However the problem remains that the underwriting 
capacities of the Arab reinsurers is still very small in relation 
to the size of risks requiring insurance. Consequently not only 
are the direct insurers obliged to place substantial reinsurances 
abroad but the nationaland regional reinsurers also find it necessary 
to retrocede to foreign reinsurers a significant proportion of the 
reinsurances they have accepted. Obviously those retrocession arran-
gements vary both by class of insurance and between companies. 
Figure 7.6 presents a simple chart of the reinsurance flmv within 
the Arab region and its links with the international market. 
Reinsurance Premiums Accepted from, and Ceded Abroad by,Arab 
Reinsurers. 
It has proved impossible to establish precisely what contri-
bution the formation of Arab reinsurers has made to increasing the 
retention capacity of the countries concerned. However, Table 7.8 
does record the increase in the gross written and retained premium 
income of some of the Arab reinsurers during the period 1967-1979. 
In 1979 the comiJanies I retained premiums varied between about 20 
percent and 63 per centof their gross written premiums with an over-
all average of 56.2 per cent. The drop in the percentages of retained 
premiums in the later years \"as caused mainly by the increase in 
the number of large risks and the low retentions of the newly establ-
ished reinsurers. 
Unfortunately the lack of adequate statistics for all of the 
Arab reinsurers prevent a complete evaluation of the role of Arab 
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Table 7.8 
Development of Written and Retained Premium 
by Arab Reinsurers 
(U $ million) 
1967 1977 1978 1979 
Gross premium 24.975 271.654 317.838 377.895 
Net Retained premium 16.717 167.518 191.111 212.276 
Retention % 66.9 61. 7 60.1 56.2 
Source: Ridha (1981, p.2). 
Note: Figures for 1967 include only three reinsurance 
companies, while figures for 1977- 79 inc lude nine 
companies. 
reinsurers in increasing the retention capacity of individual 
countries and of the region as a whole. Therefore, two compan-
ies the Egypt Re and Iraq Re, are selected as case studies 
not only because they are the oldest reinsurers in the Arab 
world, but also because there is relatively full data avail-
able on them, allowing for a detailed study of their develop-
ment. 
Egypt Reinsurance Company 
The Egypt Reinsurance company began its reinsurance 
dealings with a very small portfolio acquired from the local 
market, mainly through compulsory cessions. In its first 
year of operation (1958) the company's total premium receiv-
ed '.,ras £E 1.057 million, of which £E 739 thousand (i.e. 69.9 
301 
per cent was retained by the company. By 1981/82 gross premium 
income amounted to £E87.033 million, of which £E53.531 million (i.e. 
61.5 per cent)was retained. Over the period 1958-1981/82 the growth 
rate of gross premium income was 20.2 per centp.a., while premiums 
retained grew at an average rate of 19.5 per cent. Table 7.9 shows 
the growth of non-life reinsurance premium received by the company 
from home and abroad for the period 1970/71 - 1981/82. 
One of the most important objectives of any reinsurance company 
in the Third World is to offset the outflow of reinsurance premiums 
abroad. Unfortunately, although the company publishes breakdowns 
of its premiums both between domestic and foreign business and bet-
ween gross and retained premiums, it does not separate premiums 
retroceded between the Egyptian direct insurers and foreign reinsur-
ers. Therefore it is not possible to obtain a precise measure 
of the balance between premiums retroceded to and received from 
foreign insurers and reinsurers. Nevertheless it is possible to 
obtain some measures of its success in achieving that objective. 
First, the proportion of inwards foreign premiums to total 
gross premiums increased from 25.4 percent in 1970/71 to 32.4 percent 
in 1981/82 (see Table 7.9). Whereas over that period domestic 
gross premiums increased at an average annual rate of 22.2 percent, 
foreign business grew at a rate of 26.0 percent. 
Secondly, over the period 1975 to 1981/82 the company received 
from abroad premiums totalling £EI07.664 million compared with total 
premiums retroceded to domestic and foreign insurers of £El14. 715 
million (see Table 7.10 ). 
During the same period there was little change in the propor-
Table 7.9 
Development of Non-Life Premium Income of the Egyptian Reinsurance Co. 
(£E million) 
1970/71 1976 1981/82 
Source of Gross % of Gross % of Gross % of 
--- --
business premiums total eremiums total eremiums total 
gross gross gross 
premiums premiums ~ r e m i u m s s
I 
I 
Compulsory 5.746 66.5 11.777 58.8 46.771 54.2 
cessions 
I 
Non-compulsory 0.695 8.0 1. 534 7.7 11. 562 13.4 I 
domestic 
I 
Inwards foreign 2.196 25.4 6.733 33.6 27.974 32.4 I 
business I 
~ ~
Total 8.637 100.0 20.044 100.0 86.307 100.0 
~ . - - - - -
Source: extracted from the Egyptian Re's annual reports and the E.G.I.O. 
Note: prior to 1973 and from 1980 onwards the company's financial year 
commenced on 1st July: during the period 1973 to 1980 its financial 
year commenced on 1st January. 
-
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Year 
1970/71 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980/1981 
1981/1982 
Table 7.10 
Life and Non-Life Reinsurance Premiums Handled 
by Egypt Reinsurance Co. 
(£E mi Hion) 
Domestic Business Foreign Business 
Premiums Retention % Premiums Retention % 
-
-
- - - -
12.204 6.909 56.6 5.071 3.808 75.1 
13.447 7.667 57.0 6.733 5.072 75.3 
15.399 8.954 58.1 8.049 5.888 73.2 
19.983 11. 867 59.4 11.048 8.257 74.7 
30.761 16.927 55.0 22.578 16.6]3 73.7 
49.467 27.991 56.6 26.203 19.757 75.4 
59.051 32.153 54.4 27.982 21.378 76.4 
200.312 112.468 56.1 107.664 80.793 75.0 
Total Business 
Premiums Retention 
8.694 4.841 
17.275 10.717 
20.180 12.739 
23.448 14.842 
31. 031 20.124 
53.339 33.560 
75.670 47.748 
87.033 53.531 
3]6.670 198.102 
Source: Extracted from the Egyptian Re's annual reports and the E.G.I.O. 
Note: Due to the change in the financial year, figures for the period from 1st January to 
30th June 1980 have been omitted. 
% 
55.7 
62.0 
63.1 
63.3 
64.9 
62.9 
63.1 
61. 5 
62.6 
VJ 
o 
VJ 
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tions of domestic and foreign premiums retained by the company. 
~ o o doubt the increase in the amount of domestic business written 
by the company has resulted in an increase in the absolute values 
of domestic premiums ceded abroad. However, those retrocessions 
could have served two main objectives: 
(i) to relieve the company from what may exceed its retention 
capacity, and 
(ii) to provide it with more inwards reinsurance business 
through reciprocity. 
The balance of inwards compared with outwards premiums is, 
however, only a partial measure of success. More important is the 
balance of the operating results (i.e. underwriting result plus 
investment income) of the inwards and outwards business. 
Carter pointed out in his study of the Egyptian market, that 
it is not possible to obtain information about the quality of the 
inwards foreign reinsurance business obtained by the Egyptian Re, 
and the profitability of that business, compared with domestic reins-
urances it ceded abroad. The only information available relates 
to the gross underwriting losses of domestic and foreign reinsurance 
business received by the company in 1980/81 and 1981/82 as shown 
in Table 7.11. This table shows that overall the company (like 
many other reinsurers during the same period) has incurred serious 
underwriting losses, with a loss in 1981/82 of 8 per cent of total 
rt.!insurance premiums written compared \.;ith a 15.4 per cent of total 
premiums in 1980/81. (1) According to Egypt Re, much of the local 
(1) Information about what were the results of the company's 
retrocession treaties is not available. 
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Table 7.11 
Underwriting Results of the Egyptian Reinsurance Co. 
Year Gross Underwriting Losses I -- Local % of Foreign %of Total Losses 
--- -- --(£E m) local 
---
(£E m) foreign Total premiums 
premium premium 
1980/81 8.951 
I 
18.1 2.687 10.3 15.4 
/1981/82 5.598 9.5 1. 399 5.0 8.0 
Source: Extracted from the Egyptian Re's annual reports. 
underwriting loss is attributed to the very poor marine cargo and 
motor T.P.L. results, while the aviation and marine hull played 
their parts in the foreign underwriting loss. Its foreign business 
results were better than for domestic business,though no meaningful 
conclusions can be drawn from just two years. 
The profitability of the Egyptian Re's total business 
during the period 1975-1981/82 is shown in Table 7.12 and Figure 
7.7. The company's underwriting loss has increased dramatically 
in recent years, advancing from 4.37 percent on net premium income 
in 1975 to 7.72 percent by 1981/82. While investment income contin-
ues to grow (10.55 percent on net premium in 1981/82 compared with 
8.25 percent in 1975), the net profit left appears to be uncomfort-
ably narrow. A possible explanation lies partly in the bad under-
writing results of foreign and domestic business, partly in the 
effect of economic fluctuations, and partly in the rapid expansion 
of worldwide over-capacity in the last few years. 
The Egyptian Re is not unusual in producing underwriting 
losses, these are common for most professional reinsurers throughout 
Table 7.12 
Profitability of the Egyptian Reinsurance Company 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
£EOOO's HOOD's £EOOO's rEOOO's £EOOO's 
(a) Net premium income 10.717 12.739 14.842 20.124 33.560 
(b) Underwriting loss (468) (489) (624) (1.362 ) (2.108 ) 
(c) Net investment profit 884 994 1.190 1.994 2.823 
(d) Net profit (c -b) 416 505 566 632 715 
Profit ratios: 
b x 100 - 4.37% - 3.84% - 4.2% - 6.77% - 6.28% 
a-
c x 100 8.25% 7.80% 8.0% 9.91% 8.41% 
a-
d x 100 3.88% 3.96% 3.81% 3.14% 2.12% 
a-
--
- --- ... _-- ----
Source: compiled from the Egyptian Re's annual reports and the E.G.I.O. 
1980/81 
£EOOO's 
47.748 
(3.385) 
4.189 
804 
- 7.09% 
8.77% 
1.68% 
1981/82 
fEOOO's 
53.531 
(4.134) 
5.647 
1.513 
- 7.72% 
10. 5 5 ~ ~ ~
2.83% 
I 
I 
, 
w 
o 
C\ 
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Figure 7.7 
Profitability of the Egyptian Reinsurance Company 
% of net premium 
incom 
10.0 
8.0 
6.0 
4.0 
2.0 
o 
75 
-2.0 
-4.0 
-6.0 
-8.0 
76 77 
(1) Net investment profit 
(2) 
(3) 
Net premium income 
Net profit 
Net premium income 
Underwriting Loss 
Net premium income 
78 79 80/81 
x 100 
x 100 
x 100 
(l) 
(2) 
81/82 
Year 
(3) 
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the world. In the U .S., 30 professional reinsurers (or 75 percent) 
out of 40 have achieved underwriting losses for a 5-year average 
from 1976-1980 (Lambert, 1982). This number rose to 42 reinsurers 
(out of 50) in 1981 and 46 in 1982 (Stockes, 1983). The U.K. 
non-life reinsurance companies also suffered badly from underwrit-
ing losses. The underwriting loss increased dramatically in 1982, 
except for the Victory which ended the year with a lower underwriting 
loss than in 1981 (as shown in Table 7.13). Other major profess-
ional re insurers like Munich Re, Swiss Re etc., have also achieved 
underwriting losses in the last few years. 
Table 7.13 
Underwriting Results of the U.K. Non-Life Reinsurance Business 
(1980-1982) 
Premium Hritten Underwriting Result 
1980 1981 1982 1980 1981 1982 
£m £m £m £m fm fm 
Commercial Union n.a 34.3 41. 3 n.a - 3.5 - 3.8 
(London market) 
Royal Re 43.1 48.1 59.9 0.2 - 1.6 - 4.4 
Sun Alliance 39.7 33.9 45.7 - 2.9 - 4.9 -14.2 
& London 
Prudential(M&G) 153.4 174.4 203.7 -12.4 -23.8 -31. 9 
Eagle Star n.a n.a n.a 0.2 - 0.5 - 5. 7 
(London market) 
Phoenix (London 15.7 20.8 22.7 - 0.8 - 1.6 - 3.7 
Guarantee) 
Legal & General 34.7 50.4 53.9 - 3.1 - 8.9 - 7.7 
(Vict()rv) 
Source: Carter and Godden (1983/84, p. 72). 
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Iraq Reinsurance Company 
Like the Egyptian Re, Iraq Reinsurance Company has played 
a significant role in enhancing local retention capacity and hence 
in reducing the reinsurance ceded abroad. The company's gross 
premium income has risen from ID 307,000 in its first year of opera-
tion (1961), to ID. 4.022 million in 1970, and to ID 53.315 million 
in 1980 with an average annual growth rate of 31.2 per cent during 
the period 1961-1980. 
A newly established reinsurance company in any developing 
country cannot hope to build up immediately a sizeable foreign port-
folio, and during its first few years the company's business and 
particularly its foreign business was very small. However, in the 
late 1960' s the company resolved to expand its foreign business; 
growth was so rapid that during the period 1970-1973 inwards foreign 
business exceeded its total domestic business (see Table 7.14). 
Despite the fact that the company's overseas reinsurance prem-
ium income was considerably increased during the period 1971-80, 
after 1973 it failed to keep pace with the growth of domestic busin-
ess. Over the period 1971-80, compulsory cessions grew at an aver-
age annual rate of 36.1 per cent while the growth rate of non-compul-
sory cessions was 35.7 per cent. The inwards foreign premiums incr-
eased at an average rate of 16.4 per cent. 
Table 7.15 shows the geographical distribution of the company's 
inwards foreign reinsurance premiums. During the period 1971-1980 
there was a significant increase in the shares of both Afro-Asian 
and Arab countries' business in the total portfolio, with the share 
of other countries falling from around 50 per centat the beginning 
-Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Table 7.14 
Development of Total Premium Income of Iraq Reinsurance Company 
(ID.million) 
Compulsory Non-compulsory Inwards Foreign 
cessions Domestic Business 
Gross % of Gross % of Gross % of 
premiums total premiums total premiums total 
gross gross gross 
premiums premiums premiums 
1.890 33.4 0.700 12.4 3.069 54.2 
2.020 31.8 0.750 11.8 3.583 56.4 
2.610 34.1 1.079 14.1 3.964 51.8 
5.864 45.3 2.453 19.0 4.62l 35.7 
9.153 43.1 5.180 24.4 6.893 32.5 
10.910 45.2 4.962 20.6 8.244 34.2 
11. 487 40.5 6.263 22 .1 10.640 37.4 
13.171 44.3 5.052 17 .0 11.512 38.7 
22.926 46.0 14.801 29.7 12.111 24.3 
30.303 56.8 10.948 20.6 12.064 22.6 
Source: Extracted from the Iraq Re's Annual Reports. 
Total 
premiums 
5.659 
6.353 
7.653 
12.938 
21.226 
24.116 
28.390 
29.735 
49.838 
53.315 
Note: In 1970 total premium income received by the company was ID 4.022 millon, 
of which ID. 1.947 million from the home market and ID.2.075 million 
from the foreign market. 
w 
'-' 
o 
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of the period to under 40 per cent by the end. The rise in the 
pro portion of total business received fro m other Arab countries 
during the 1970s is attributable to: 
(i) the company's efforts to develop its business relations ~ v i t h h
these markets, and 
ell) the general trend of direct premium income expansion in 
Arab countries as a result of their economic development. 
Table 7.15 
The GeograEhical Distribution of Reinsurance Premiums received 
~ y y the Iraq Reinsurance Company f r o . ! ! ! _ ~ b r o a ~ ~
~ 6 6 of 
total 
% of total premium premium 
Year Arab other Afro Total Asia Otner Grand 
countries -Asian & Africa regions total 
1971 31. 3 18.1 49.4 50.6 100.0 
1972 31.1 19.6 50.7 49.3 100.0 
1973 24.0 29.5 53.5 46.5 100.0 
1974 33.5 26.7 60.2 39.8 100.0 
1975 35.5 23.3 58.8 41.2 100.0 
1976 35.9 23.7 59.6 40.4 100.0 
1977 36.9 23.5 60.4 39.6 100.0 
1978 38.4 23.6 62.0 38.0 100.0 
1979 39.5 23.1 62.6 37.4 100.0 
1980 38.7 23.0 61. 7 38.3 100.0 
Source: Extracted from the Iraq Re's Annual Reports. 
Besides the growth of domestic and foreign reinsurance prem-
ium income, the ability of the company to increase the country's 
retention capacity can be regarded as another measure of its success. 
Table 7.16 shows reinsurance premium retained by the Iraq Re for 
the period 1971-1980. In a span of nine years, the premium income 
retained by the company has increased almost nine-fold. The propor-
Table 7.16 
Total Reinsurance Premiums handled by Iraq Reinsurance Company 
(ID million) 
Domestic Business Foreign Business Total Business 
Year Premiums Retention % Premiums Retention % Premiums Retention 
1971 - - - - - - 5.659 {1.073 
1972 - - - - - - 6.353 4·575 
1973 3.689 2.205 59.8 3.964 3.083 77.8 7.653 5.288 
1974 8.317 5.551 66.7 4.621 3.626 78.5 12.938 9.177 
1975 14.333 9.875 68.9 6.893 5.397 78.3 21.226 15.272 
1976 15.872 11.006 69.3 8.244 6.420 77.9 24.116 17.426 
1977 17.750 12.180 68.6 10.640 8.122 76.3 28.390 20.302 
1978 18.223 12.548 68.9 11.512 8.533 74.1 29.735 21.081 
1979 37.727 22 .014 58.4 12.111 8.309 68.6 49.838 30.323 
1980 41 251 26.317 63.8 12.064 8.813 73.0 53.315 35.130 
Total 157.162 101.696 64.7 70.049 52.303 74.7 239.223 162.647 
- - - - - - ~ ~ --
-
- ~ ~ '------------- ~ - - . - - - - - ----- ------
Source: Extracted from the Iraq Re's Annual Reports. 
% I 
72.0 
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tion of total business retained was consistently around 70 percent 
until 1979, when it dropped ten percentage points due to its domestic 
premium income having doubled in the one year. As a result of that 
increase the proportion of domestic premiums it was able to retain 
fell from 68.9 to 58.4 per cent. 
Throughout the period the company has retained a higher propor-
tion of its inwards foreign business than domestic business. This 
has been possible because of the better risk distribution and so 
more balanced portfolio of business it obtains from abroad than 
from its domestic market At home it is required by law to take a 25 
per centquota share of every insurance written by the National Insur-
ance Company, plus various shares of non-compulsory treaties. There-
fore its domestic business is more heavily exposed to both industrial 
large losses and accumulations of losses from natural hazards and 
other events. 
Regarding the company's profit performance, as can be seen 
from Table 7.17 and Figure 7.8 it earned an underwriting profit 
on its total retained business each year from 1971-80 with the sole 
exception of 1977. Although the rate of underwriting profit has 
declined, it is still a far better performance than most professional 
reinsurance companies world-wide. On the other hand, for the reasons 
discussed in Chapter four, its investment income is relatively low 
compared with that of international reinsurers. 
Table 7.18 shows that the favourable underwriting performance 
of the company over the last six years is entirely due to its domest-
ic business. Each year since 1976 it has incurred undenvriting 
losses on its foreign business, the deterioration in results follow-
Table 7.11 
-----_. - -_.-
P t ~ ( ( i . ~ - " " i i l1.'.:L '!!. t,h-,,- I." '!'l 1>-e t l l § _ , ! ! ' , ! ~ " " Cn!""".n}, 
--------- ~ ~ ~ - - - - - . --- ---- ---
-- .. _---- ---
------- - --
1971 1972 1913 1914 1975 1976 1977 1978 
"" ~ I ' ' "'" 1 nooo' s I[lOOO's IDOOO's 1 DODO's I ()OOO's I DOOO' s 1 11000' s 1 IJOOO , s lIX100 ' s I rooo ' s ---- -- - -- -- -- ----- - - - - -- ------ - -- ~ - - ----- ------ --- ---------- - -- - --- - - - - ~ - - -- --(a) Net JlI"('minm income 4,071 4,575 5,288 9,177 15,272 17,426 20. )02 21,081 30, 3]3 35, 1 30 
(11) lilldpnnilillg profll 68 97 JlO 111 355 357 (570 ) 2RO 76 277 
(c) Nel tll\!!..-'stment lll"ofit I () I 130 200 226 39/, 58B 842 866 1.336 1.685 
(d) Net profit (h'e) 169 221 310 198 749 945 272 1.146 1.412 1.912 
Profit ratios: 
b )( lOO 1.1% 2. It 2.It 1. 9% 2.3t 2.0% -2.8% 1.3% O. n 0.6% a 
c x lOO 2.5% 
a 
2.8% 3.B% 2.4% 2.6% 3.4% 4.1% 4.It 4.4% 4.S% 
d )( lOO 4.2% 4.9% 5.9% 4.1% 
a 
4.9% 5.4% 1. n: 5.4% 4.7% 5.4% 
. -- ----- --- - ~ . - . .
________ J_. _________ .. ~ ~___________________ ~ ~ ________ .4_ ________ ~ ~.... __ ~ ~____ .. _________ & _________ 
Sourc,,: E)(lracled from the lr,,'1 Re's Anllual Repolls. 
Table 7.1S 
lill<!erwri t InJl. R-"'H!I t" . ~ ~ ~ . ! 1 ~ ! ! ' H l _ H e l . " : < ; u ! ! a n c ~ ~ _C'''"l'anl' 
Year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
IQ78 
1979 
I 'lAD 
-
DfJlUe!""'>1 ie Bust I l " ' S ~ ~
RC'ta1ned lfnderwI it i ng 
prf>mi tlrns profit/los!=> 
- ~ ~ - ---
1 1 ~ ) f I O ' ' s IIXIOO' " 
9,875 214 
Il,OOn 695 
I?, HIO ( 1 97) 
12,5 /dl ns 
27,01 /, 7111 
2(,,117 111J 
fo'orelgn HlIsiness 
% Ret{1jnerl IInderwrltlng 
premllllRs (lIofllfloss 
---",------ ----
IIXlflO's IDOn!)'" 
2.2 ~ , , 191 141 
6.3 6,470 ( l1S) 
I. (, 1l,In ( 17 I ) 
5.B 1\,5lJ (445) 
3.2 8, 1119 (615 ) 
5. I 8,Il1 I (1,102) 
: ' ; o l l r c ( ~ : : Ext racted frnm ttH_' (roq R e ' ~ ~ AnuHal Reporl <:;. 
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Figure 7.8 
Profitability of the Iraq Reinsurance Company 
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ing the general pattern of international markets. Although it 
would be dangerous to draw any firm conclusions from just six years 
figures, if unprofitable foreign business is obtained in exchange 
for profitable local business retroceded abroad, it would have a 
double negative effect on the Iraq's balance of payments. On the 
other hand information is not available regarding the terms on which 
the Iraq Re has been able to place its retrocessions (e.g. commission 
and profit commission, etc.). Also to some extent annual underwrit-
ing profits/losses are the direct consequence of a company's manage-
ment decisions. For example, changes in claims reserving policy 
can result in the rolling forwards or backwards of underwriting 
profits or losses. In Iraq Re's case during the period 1975-80 
while retained premium little more than doubled (see Table 7.16), 
its technical reserves were increased from ID 14.576 million to 
ID 40.215 million. It is not known whether that was the result 
of any change in reserving policy or a deterioratinB claims position, 
or ,vhether there was any differential treatment of domestic versus 
foreign business. 
Other Aspects of the Companies' Performance. 
Although the Arab reinsurance companies have helped to reduce 
the amount of premium income ceded abroad two further questions 
must be answered before firm conclusions can be drawn regarding 
their contributions to their countries' economies. First, have 
they improved their countries' net foreign cash flow on reinsurance 
Secondly, are these companies nationally and internationally 
acceptable as reinsurance carriers? 
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An attempt will be made to answer the first question in the 
following chapter dealing with the balance of payments effects of 
insurance and reinsurance trade with other countries. 
As regards 'the second question, there would appear to be no 
reason why an Arab reinsurance company should not be acceptable 
to both local and foreign ceding companies provided it can fulfil 
the following conditions: 
1. It must have sufficient capital resources to provide adequate 
security for its ceding companies. So far as is known, none 
of the Arab reinsurance companies have defaulted on their 
commitments or become party to a financial dispute with any 
insurer. 
2. It must be free from exchange control restrictions. From 
the outset all of the Arab reinsurance companies have enjoyed 
such freedom. 
3. It must establish a good communications network. Some Arab 
reinsurers, as a part of their strategy, have a considerable 
number of people touring the world, developing contac ts with 
the ceding companies. In addition, seven out of ten national 
and regional reinsurance companies, (1) have established a 
'contact office' in London to maintain easier and more regular 
contact with insurers, reinsurers and reinsurance brokers. 
The first contact office was set up in 1967 by Iraq Re. 
4. It must be organised to provide a rapid service. Several comp-
anies are building up impressive reputations for settling 
(1) The Mediterranean Re is not included because its headquarters 
were in London from the outset. 
318 
cash loss requirement and other business responses. 
5. It must be able to offer technical advice to ceding companies 
at home and abroad. It is on this point that the limited 
experience and technical expertise possessed by the Arab rein-
surance companies places them at a severe competitive disad-
vantage compared with the major international reinsurers. 
7.4 Conclusions 
In so far as both the Arab reinsurance companies and the mem-
bers of the Arab reinsurance pools retain for their own accounts 
local business written by the two types of organisation, then both 
may be deemed to have achieved the objectives of increasing the 
amount of premiums retained within the region and raising retention 
capacity. However, the failure of the pools' members to agree on 
measures to deal with various conditions that have impeded their 
development have prevented the pools from growing as fast as may 
have been desired. 
Generally the performance of the reinsurance companies in 
retaining local premiums, obtaining inwards foreign reinsurance 
business and helping to raise local and r e g i o n ~ ~ reinsurance capacity 
has been far better than that of the pools. How successful they 
have been in improving their countries', and the region's, net over-
seas trading balance in insurance and reinsurance business will 
be examined in the next chapter. One criticism that can be made 
regarding their method of operation is that the system of compulsory 
or quasi compulsory reinsurance cessions creates a major obstacle 
319 
for the development of direct writing companies, since reinsurance 
companies take these cessions on terms less advantageous than those 
available on the international reinsurance markets. The less f av-
ourable are those terms, the higher the cost of insurance for policy-
holders. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE TRANSACTIONS 
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD 
8.1 Introduction 
The international balance of payments for any country may 
be defined thus: 
'a statement of all claims and obligations which have 
arisen over a certain period of time between a given country 
and the rest of the world'. (Lengyel, 1953, p.3). 
International insurance and reinsurance transactions have 
received the attention of very few researchers; these include, 
S.J. Lengyel, H.O. Nelli, J.J. Launei, G.M. Dickinson, and F.G.Gahin. 
The seminal - and for many years only - published work on the subj-
ect was Lengyel's book 'International Insurance Transactions - Insur-
ance in the Balance of Payments' (1953). It was not until 1977 
that Dr. Dickinson in his paper 'International Insurance Transactions 
and the Balance of Payments' attempted to give more significant 
meanings and measurements to the various items in insurance transac-
tions. 
~ o s t t of the developed, and all the developing countries, have 
a net outflow of funds on their international insurance and reinsur-
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ance transactions. 
(1) 
In recent years, however, the developing 
countries have become more concerned about the insurance and reinsur-
ance cost in their balance of payments, though a deficiency of comp-
rehensive, comparable and dependable statistics gravely hinders 
any assessment of the extent of these costs in most countries, parti-
cularly the developing countries. As regards the Arab states, it 
seems that no real attempt has been made at an official, or non-
official, level to assess the effect of insurance and reinsurance 
transactions on the balance of payments. So, in this study efforts 
have been made to obtain some data from a variety of Arab countries, 
but it has only been possible to obtain satisfactory information 
about the Iraqi insurance industry. 
The purpose of this chapter is: 
to analyse the nature of international insurance and 
reinsurance transactions and their relation to the bal-
ance of payments; and 
to measure, as a case study, the place of such services 
in the Iraqi balance of payments. 
(1) It should be noted that in many of the insurance importing 
nations, there are highly developed domestic insurance mark-
ets. This is certainly true of the United States and Japan. 
Both of these nations have some restrictions on foreign insur-
ers designed to protect their domestic markets, yet neither 
of them is able to balance its international insurance tran-
sactions accounts. (Launie, 1973, p.16). 
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8.2 National and Foreign Insurers' Direct Activities 
in the Arab Insurance Market 
Before the establishment of the local insurance companies, 
foreign insurers had dominated the Arab markets, but at that time, 
their business was mainly with the foreign merchants in the region. 
As shown in Chapter three, even after the creation of the local 
markets, for many years the aggregate premium incomes of foreign 
insurers were higher than those of domestic insurers. With the 
steady improvement and stabilization of the local insurance compan-
ies, the premium volume of foreign insurers gradually declined in 
some Arab countries and disappeared in others. Hmvever, in Saudi 
Arabia foreign insurers control the entire market. Their tendency 
to maintain, and often increase, their share of non-life business 
is of particular importance to a country like Saudi Arabia. Clearly, 
this process might have serious effects on the balance of internat-
ional insurance indebtedness. 
Although most Arab governments have sought to curtail the 
activities of foreign insurers and reinsurers, generally the statist-
ical evidence is insufficient to show exactly \vhat has been the 
net impact on the balance of payments, not least because of the 
complexity of measuring such effects. 
Insurance operations in the Arab countries are carried on 
in three ways: 
Ca tegory 1. Arab national companies whose shareholders are 
exclusively nationals of the country cor.cerned, 
whether private or government. 
Category 2. Arab nation.Jl comp.Jnies with a minority foreign 
shareholding. 
Category 3. Foreign companies operating in an Arab country 
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in the form of agencies, branch offices, or 
locally incorporated subsidiaries possibly with 
a minority local shareholding. 
In the context of the above three categories, one finds, brief-
ly. that insurance transactions might affect the country I s balance 
of payments as shown in Table 8.1. Moreover. besides current 
account transactions there may also be capital movements with cate-
gories 2 and 3 as will be shown in Section 8.3 and Appendices 1 and 2. 
Table 8.1 
Type of Insurer and its Balance of Payments Effects 
Type of Insurer 
Category 1 (i) 
(H) 
Balance of Payments Effects 
Net reinsurance payments and ob-
ligations abroad from reinsuran-
ces ceded and accepted. 
Net insurance costs (premiums less 
claims) for merchandise insurances 
for goods imported on c.i.f. basis 
jcategory 2 (i) and (ii) as above. 
(iii ) 
Category 3 
(a) Agencies and (iv) 
branches. 
Dividends remitted or owed to 
foreign shareholders. 
Aflounts remitted or owed to parent 
companies being the difference 
between 
(a) gross premiums less reinsur-
ances ceded locally. and 
(b) gross claims paid plus comm-
issions and expenses incurr-
ed locally less reinsurance 
claims recoveries, ~ ~
technical reserves retained 
locally. 
I(b) Subsidiaries As in (i) and (iii) above. 
I 
I 
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8.3 Balance of Payments Classification 
The following brief discussjon will attempt to disclose how 
insurance services relate to the current and capital accounts found 
in the Appendix at the end of this Chapter. 
8.3.1. Current Account Transactions 
The main categories of current account items are merchandise 
insurance and non-merchandise insurance. '1erchandise insurance includes 
the supplying of cover, net of reinsurance, on the international 
shipment of goods, ,,,hile non-merchandise insurance comprises all 
other kinds of insurance, including reinsurance operations. However, 
the transactions of life insurance across national frontiers repres-
ents a capital flow as well as a payment for a service. These trans-
ac tions are considered as a part of 'non - merchandise' insurance 
in most countries. (Dickinson, 1977, p.6). 
18) : 
Also included in the current account are (Gahin, 1979, pp.16-
(i) The service of agents, brokers and loss adjusters. 
In fact, the international brokers' services constitute 
an important item of insurance in the current account. 
(ii) The mutual exchange of managerial services between bran-
ches and subsidiaries and their parent insurers. 
(iii) Dividends,interests and other earnings on 'foreign 
portfolio investment' and 'foreign direct investment' 
in overseas subsidiaries less taxes payable. 
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An indication of the relative importance of the various items 
is provided by the UK's overseas insurance earnings shown in Table 
8.4, which conversely represent balance of payment costs for import-
ers of insurance services. 
8.3.2 Capital Account Transactions 
Since the invisible trade of the insurance sector is recorded 
in the current account on a 'receivable' and 'payable' basis, the 
corresponding net financial flows connected with these transactions 
appear in the monetary sector of the capital account. When payments 
for insurance and reinsurance coverage do occur between residents 
and non-residents, this changes the net foreign assets and liabilit-
ies of a given country (Gahin, 1979, p.18). Thus, the capital acco-
unt of the balance of payments reflects all capital flows corres-
ponding to changes in foreign assets and liabilities of a certain 
country and includes non-monetary and monetary sec tors. The non-
monetary sector covers long-term and short-term capital flows from 
investment and the lending of the private sector and that of govern-
ment not direc t ly related to monetary management; the monetary 
sector relates to official financing and changes in gold and currency 
holdings, and other financing (Dickinson, 1977, p.26). 
As Dickinson asserts, financial flows from insurance and rein-
surance arise in various ways and are recorded in different parts 
of the capital account. For instance, payments for imports of ins-
urance and reinsurance coverages could be in foreign exchange or 
in increased foreign liabilities. Thus, since a double entry system 
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of book-keeping is used, an offsetting credit entry occurs in the 
capital account. Additionally, the values of insurance and reinsur-
ance cover ages which are recorded in the balance of payments as 
'receivable' or 'payable' differ from the actual premiums received 
and claims paid, and this difference needs to be adjusted for inclus-
ion in the capital account. Nevertheless, the element of life insur-
ance constituting important saving' is classified directly in 
the capital account as a private flow, whilst that part of the life 
insurance transaction deemed to be an insurance service is included 
as a part of non-merchandise insurance. 
~ o r e o v e r , , portfolio and direct investments represent major 
items in the capital account. These investments arise from a variety 
of transactions. For example, if an insurer decides to invest over-
seas a part of his domestic insurance funds (that is, it engages 
in overseas portfolio investment), that will result in an increase 
in the foreign assets of that insurer's country of residence. 
According to Dickinson, investment decisions to establish 
or expand overseas branches or subsidiaries constitute fundamental 
capital flows, and represent increases in foreign direct investment. 
The nature of financing such investment arises from a variety of 
transactions. If such investment is financed through foreign exch-
ange markets, this will result in a decrease in net foreign currency 
holdings. If payment is made by overseas loans arranged by the 
parent company then the corresponding flow ,viII be an inward port-
folio investment. Sometimes expansion of overseas subsidiaries 
is financed by loans procured locally by the subsidiaries; in 
such cases neither the investment nor the financing enters the capit-
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al account. 
8.4 Impact of International Insurance and Reinsurance 
Transactions upon Balance of Payments 
International insurance transactions are carried out in the 
following ways: 
(1) direct business between the residents of one country 
and insurers of another; 
(2) insurance purchases from branches, agencies and sub-
sidiaries of foreign companies; 
(3) insurance attached to international trade; 
(4) international reinsurance transactions. 
In addition to these activities others may be added, such as that 
of insurance and reinsurance brokers, loss adjusters, and similar 
businesses, whose services result from these international activities. 
8.4.1 Direct Insurance Transactions 
Legislation in most Arab states prohibits residents from purch-
asing insurance coverage directly from foreign insurers not estab-
lished in the country. In fact some operations of this nature do 
take place in a few Arab countries, but it is unlikely that they 
are on a large scale. When such operations do occur they result 
in the export of the total amount of premium from the resident's 
country to the insurer's country. Losses and commissions paid to 
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local agents on these transactions will result in a return of part 
of the exported funds to the resident's country. The balance of 
payments accounts of the purchaser's country will depend on the 
outflow and inflow of the funds. If the losses and commissions 
exceed the origwal premiums outflow the country importing the insura-
nce would show a gain in its balance of payments, and vice versa. 
But this would not continue in the long-run, as it is essentially 
a short-term fluctuation. 
8.4.2 Insurance Operations through Branches, 
Agencies and Subsidiaries. 
Generally speaking, overseas branches and agencies are consid-
ered as if they were run by residents of the country in which they 
are located, and insurance services purchased by the local policy-
holders do not enter into the balance of payments. Bu t t ransac tions 
between these overseas institutions and their parent companies, 
and with insureds not within the country in which they are located, 
are considered to be international (Dickinson, 1977, p.26). However, 
the outflow of funds is larger with this type of transaction conduct-
ed by branches and agencies than it is with subsidiaries, but much 
less than it is in direct transactions (Nelli, 1964, p.3). 
The size of international insurance transactions through bran-
ches and agencies in the world insurance markets is still relatively 
large. However, in many countries foreign insurers have been required 
to convert branches into locally incorporated companies and the trend 
is for their share in direct business to decrease. Generally that 
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has been the position in the Arab world where many countries have 
totally excluded foreign direct insurers (see Chapter three). 
It is only in Saudi Arabia that the entire insurance business remains 
in the hands of foreign insurers. 
The incorporation by foreign insurance companies of subsidiary 
companies in the Arab countries marked a more significant stage 
in the establishment of foreign controlled insurance operations. 
In those Arab countries that allow foreign subsidiaries to operate, 
mainly the companies are controlled by those states which already 
operate on broad international lines, i.e. W. Germany, Great Britain, 
Switzerland, France and America, as measured by both numbers of 
companies and size of business. Subsidiaries which are not wholly 
owned by foreign interests pose a real problem when analysing balance 
of payments effects. The participation of Arab local capital obv-
iously affects the distribution of profits. 
In general, the insurance operations of foreign subsidiaries 
have the least impact on the balance of payments. This is because 
all losses paid, plus most of the administrative costs and other 
expenses, remain in the country of origin and, in effect, only the 
profits are exported (1) (Nelli, 1964, p.3). 
8.4.3 Insurance Attached to International Trade 
Due to the importance and magnitude of insurance transactions 
attached to foreign trade this kind of insurance has received consid-
(1) In practice, reinsurance ceded abroad by subsidiaries is mostly 
to their parent companies. 
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erable attention from all the countries involved, especially the 
developing states. Even so it is still difficult to find relevant 
statistics. In order to assess the international insurance of merch-
andise and its effect on the balance of payments in the Arab count-
ries, two points need to be discussed: 
8.4.3.1 
o ~ ~
Problems Arising from the E v a l u a t i o n ~ I n s u r a n c e e
Transactions of Merchandise. 
Merchandise insurance is recorded by many countries as a separ-
ate item in the balance of payments. It consists of 
(i) insurances on goods in transit to and from the country 
in question, and 
(ii) insurances on goods in transit between third countries. 
From a valuation point of view the insurance on goods between third 
countries is similar to other forms of non-life insurance registered 
as non-merchandise (Dickinson, 1977, p.25). The v a l ~ i o n n of insur-
ance on imports and exports of the country in question is a task 
which poses a significant problem. The crucial point is that when 
goods are exported on c.i.f. conditions of sale the goods are usually 
insured by the exporter with his local insurers, and this adds the 
cost of insurance to the cost of the goods. This results in the 
premium for the insurance being paid by the importer, and constitutes 
an export of funds from the importer's country, but no international 
insurance operation seems to occur. 
Nevertheless, in most Arab countries this problem is less 
frequent because it is now compulsory for insurance on goods imported 
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into the countries to be placed with domestic insurers. Thus, the 
international insurance transactions of merchandise have only a 
minor effect on the balance of payments of these countries, (exclud-
ing reinsurance on the international shipments of goods). Although 
the import of goods on a c. i. f. basis is prohibited in most Arab 
states, the I.N.F. balance of payments yearbook, vol. 31, 1980, 
nevertheless, shows that some goods were imported in this way into 
some states, such as Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and Northern Yemen. 
The reason for 1his is that these imports have been financed by 
foreign loans and grants, and no doubt they have mostly been insured 
by the foreign exporters with insurers of their own countries. 
In this case, however, the insurance transactions are submerged 
in the international merchandise trade. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia no estimates are available of 
the exact proportions of imports purchased on c.i.f. conditions 
and no reliable basis can be found for attempts to estimate the 
actual insurance costs involved. However if all imports were 
insured outside Saudi Arabia, and the average insurance cost 
was 1 per cent of the c.i.f. value of imports, the cost of insurance 
in total imports in 1980 would have been US. $ 314 million, minus 
any corresponding claims payments. (1) This would have given Saudi 
Arabia a tremendous deficit on marine cargo insurance costs, but 
from the figure of US$3l4 million it is necessary to deduct claims 
payments to arrive at the net cost. If that cost is unacceptably 
high then the only solution is for Saudi Arabia also to require 
the local insurance of imports. The following 
(1) Total values of import goods in Saudi Arabia in 1980 ,,,as US$ 
31.355 billion. I.M.F. Yearbook, 1980. 
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section outlines some of the arguments in support of. and some of 
those against. the domestic supply of marine cargo insurance cover. 
8.4.3.2 Merchandise Insurance Within the Local Market 
All the Arab countries in the past insured their imports and 
exports with the insurance institutions located in developed count-
ries, but following encouragement by the UNCTAD. most of the Arab 
countries have begun to conduct insurance of their imports within 
their own countries. 
The placing of merchandise insurance within the local market 
may be directed in two ways (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 
1972, p.31): 
1. By requiring imports to be insured in the country of 
importation (and in some cases exports in the country 
of exportation). 
2. By imposing high taxes on merchandise insurance placed 
with foreign companies, or by restrictive import lie en-
sing and exchange control r e g u l a t ~ s . .
The following Arab countries do not permit residents to insure 
(1) imports of goods abroad: 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Libya Sudan 
Mauritania Syria 
Morocco Tunisia 
Somalia S. Yemen 
(1) :lany non-Arab countries also require imports of goods to be 
insured in the local market. Among these countries are: Argen-
tina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Rep .• Ecuador. 
Laos. Iran. Pakistan, Venezuela and Zambia. 
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livO arguments may be advanced in support of marine insurances 
being insured locally: 
1. By insuring its imports with domestic insurers, a country 
will reduce its outflow of foreign exchange and cut the cost 
to its balance of payments of goods that othenvise may have 
been imported on c.i.f. conditions. 
2. Protection of the insurance market will encourage the develop-
ment of marine business. 
Consequent upon such regulations in many Arab states, the 
number of marine risks which are now insured locally has inc-
reased substantially, and the markets are in a better position 
to develop their marine insurance port folios. The increase 
in the number of insured risks should, moreover, reduce the 
variability of aggregate losses (provided that those risks 
are independently exposed to loss), so reducing the size of 
the contingency loading required in premiums and the proportion 
of t he business re insured . Premium rates have been cut 
in some Arab states where there is competition between insur-
ance companies, but unfortunately in other states where one 
direct state insurance company. for instance, is operating 
in the market, not only do the rates remain high (1) but also 
there has been no improvement in the insurance services, even 
though marine business in those countries has achieved good 
profits in the past years. 
(1) If the rates of marine insurance become unduly high, due to 
the absence of competition,the result for the national economy 
will clearly be negative. 
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In some countries where imports must be insured locally, marine 
insurance ranks first or second in terms of volume of premium income 
compared \vith all other classes of insurance business transacted, 
(see Table 3.22). Conversely, in countries where local marine ins-
urance for imports is not compulsory, marine premiums tend to comp-
rise a lower proportion of total non-life premium income (see Table 
8.2) . 
Nevertheless, there are a number of arguments against compuls-
ory marine insurance, including: 
1. The making of marine insurance for imports compulsory could 
lead to double insurance. 
Regardless of whether their customers arrange their own insur-
ances, many manufacturing companies in developed countries 
prefer to purchase marine insurance cover locally from insurers 
known to them and from whom they may expect to receive speedy 
claims settlements. Thus two insurances may be effected on 
the same goods and the purchaser pays for both if the exporter 
includes the cost of his insurance in the prices charged. 
However, this problem is declining because Western trading 
and insurance communities are starting to accept the practice 
of compulsory insurance for imports. The posi t ion becomes 
confused, however, where both the importe::- and the exporter 
are required to effect the marine insurance. According to 
UNCTAD (1978, pp.67-8), not all imports, for example. are 
negotiated under normal contracts of sale and aid programmes 
are an obvious example of this. In this context, India entered 
i 
I 
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Table 8.2 
Comparison of Marine Premium with Cl:her 
Insurance Branches in Certain Developing Countries 
where Insurance of Imports with Local Marine Insurers is not 
Compulsory. (US$OOO's) 
Country Year Marine Fire Accident 
Of of total 01 of total ~ ~ ~ of total 10 10 
Congo 1975 13.9 21. 2 64.9 
1976 10.3 12.8 76.9 
1977 6.6 14.3 79.1 
Turkey 1975 22 .2 35.6 42.1 
1976 20.2 35.8 44.0 
1977 21.8 34.6 43.6 
:1alaysia 1973 8.9 21.6 69.5 
1974 9.7 23.3 67.0 
1975 9.0 24.9 66.1 
Philippines 1975 24.4 44.0 31. 6 
1976 21.4 43.1 35.5 
1977 21. 4 43.0 35.6 
Thailand 1975 13.4 49.2 37.4 
1976 13.6 48.3 38.1 
1977 13.4 43.1 43.5 
Source: Compiled from Table 1 (Aktas, 1979, p.45). 
into an agreement \.Jith the U.S.A. for a 50 per cent sharing 
of marine risks. A similar agreement made between the People's 
Republic of China and Algeria concerning all goods exchange 
between them. 
2. Much of the earned premiums from the operation of marine insur-
ance of imports "'ithin a country may still flo\.; to the inter-
national market through reinsurance due to the limiled retention 
capacity of local insurers. 
3. 
336 
It is clear that the development of retention capacity in 
Arab countries has not grown at the same rate as premiums, 
but many insurers and reinsurers in the region have now imp-
roved their retention capacity over what it was ten years ago. 
Also they have entered into business exchanges with each other 
and developed their underwriting capacity, which should enable 
them to keep more premiums within the local markets. 
Marine business requires high technical expertise which is 
ei ther scarce or even non-existent in Arab countries. This 
is a problem which has been considered in earlier chapters 
not only in connection with marine business but for other 
classes of insurance too. If local insurers are inefficient, 
incompetent, or exploit their monopoly positions it means 
that industrial and other firms will have to pay more for 
insurance, thus adversely affecting their competitiveness 
on world markets. 
8.4.4 International Reinsurance Transactions 
8.4.4.1 Local Insurance Markets and the International Market 
As mentioned in Chapter three, the developing countries, if 
considered together, represent a vast insurance market, with problems 
to be sure, but also with a growth potential exceeding that of the 
rest of the world. Some of the developing countries are themselves 
of a size sufficient to develop efficient national insurance markets, 
but considered as one group the size (by area) of the market becomes 
even more conducive to the creation of large insurance operations. 
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(Launie, 1973, p.21). However at present all insurance companies 
must resort to foreign reinsurance to maintain an adequate spread 
and diversification of the risks insured. No insurance company 
expects to retain the whole of its insurance acceptances on its 
own account, and therefore a large portion of the insurance business 
of developing countries is reinsured internationally, though the 
need for using the world-wide reinsurance capacity varies from one 
country to another. Local insurance companies, for instance, with 
only a small insurance business, limited amounts of capital to devote 
to insurance, low retention capacity, lack of expertise, etc., have 
a correspondingly great need for foreign reinsurance. In addition, 
no one developing country has sufficient resources to cover locally 
all the risks associated with one jumbo jet or large petrochemical 
plant. Thus, international reinsurance facilities form an important 
link in the process of establishing a local insurance industry. 
Regarding the balance of payments effects of international 
reinsurance transactions, the insurance obligations between ceding 
companies and their foreign reinsurers may result in currency flows 
in either direction. If the total premiums ceded to the re insurers 
exceed the commissions and losses to be paid and the reinsurance 
deposits to be constituted, then a balance will be due to the reins-
urers. In contrast, as the result of poor claims experience the 
balance will be payable to the ceding companies. 
Whatever may be the short-term flows, international reinsurance 
transactions between direct insurers in a certain country and rein-
surers in the international markets undoubtedly have important impli-
cations for the balance of payments of both sides. Among the most 
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important countries in this context are the United States and United 
Kingdom. The former, a great industrial country with tremendous 
risk absorption capacity, remains the world's largest net importer 
of insurance and reinsurance services, w h ~ a s s Britain remains the 
greatest insurance and reinsurance exporting country in the world. 
A study recently completed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
of the U.S.A. Department of Commerce shows that the U.S. net balance 
of payments deficit on reinsurance transactions is very small relat-
ive to its vast total market premiums. Yet despite the size of 
its market it still imports reinsurance, though in recent years 
it has been expanding its own reinsurance acceptance relative to 
reinsurance ceded abroad (See Table 8.3). 
In Britain, the contribution of insurance in the City's foreign 
earnings increased considerably during the period 1971-1982 as shown 
in Table 8.4. Over that period the insurance industry contributed 
£8.658 billion to the net overseas earnings of the U.K's economy 
(figures include direct insurance). That represented 37.9 per cent 
of the total overseas earnings of all U.K. financial institutions 
over the same period. 
However, since the absolute size of insurance business in 
most of the developing countries is quite small, with a greater 
likelihood of unbalanced portfolios, one major catastrophe may bring 
an inflow of funds in a year on a scale far greater than several 
years premium outflow. A few examples will emphasize this point 
more clearly. In 1980, the net inflO\I1 of reinsurance payments to 
South Korea amounted to US $46.296 million, as shown in Table 8.5. 
Year 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979p 
Total 
Table 8.3 
Effect of Reinsurance Transactions on the U.S. Balance of Payments (1957-79) 
(Million of dollars) 
-. 
Reinsurance Imports Reinsurance Exports Net Balance 
Net Claims Net Net Claims Net of payments 
premium paid received paym::nts !Premium recei vc;Q .mid receints effect 
234.2 179.5 54.7 48.0 32.1 15.9 - 38.8 
241.8 168.1 73.7 54.5 40.0 14.5 - 59.2 
254.5 183.1 71.4 56.2 47.3 8.9 - 62.5 
257.1 185.3 81.8 56.8 44.7 12.1 - 69.7 
266.4 189.7 76.7 62.0 48.8 13.2 - 63.5 
308.1 224.1 84.0 96.9 76.3 20.6 - 63.4 
302.4 227.6 74.8 97.0 70.7 26.3 - 48.5 
299.5 226.8 72.7 103.5 80.2 23.3 - 49.4 
305.8 288.8 17 .0 107.0 98.0 9.0 - 8.0 
353.9 310.2 43.7 125.3 118.7 6.6 - 37.1 
381. 9 302.6 79.3 143.2 126.9 16.3 - 63.0 
408.1 291. 2 116.9 170.7 151.7 19.0 - 97.9 
416.7 269.3 147.4 205.7 163.2 42.5 - 104.9 
447.7 287 .8 159.9 251.4 174.2 77.2 - 82.7 
473.6 263.7 209.9 311.1 207.6 103.5 - 106.4 
512.9 295.2 217.7 402.0 244.1 157.9 - 59.8 
574.6 373 .1 201. 5 475.9 321.0 154.9 - 46.6 
679.1 506.4 172.7 559.6 393.6 166.0 - 6.7 
899.5 597.9 301. 6 683.3 479.5 203.8 - 97.8 
1118.0 619.0 499.0 729.3 536.7 192.6 - 306.4 
1271. 7 674.7 597.0 783.7 601.2 182.5 - 414.5 
1567.0 812.7 754.3 803.3 581.3 222.0 - 532.3 
1672.7 899.0 773.7 837.0 670.7 166.3 - 607.4 
13257.2 8375.8 4881. 4 7163.4 5308.5 1854.9 -3026.5 
p = preliminary. 
Sourc e: Der i vErl from statistics on internatbnal reinsurance transactions published by the Bureau of &onomic Analysis. 
the U.S. Department of Commerce 1957-1979. 
Note: (1) Reinsurance transactions of resident branches or subsidiaries of foreign reinsurers in the U.S. or those 
of American reinsurers abroad are not included. 
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~ l u c h h of this figure resulted from the severe aviation (the Korean 
Air Lines crash in 1980) and marine losses. The disastrous Mal1e:gua 
earthquake of 1972 (property damage: US$lOOO million) and the Guatem-
ala earthquake of 1976 (property damage: US$750 million) likewise 
resulted in the two countries receiving large inflows of reinsurance 
claims payments. 
8.4.4.2 Size of Reinsurance Transactions and its Effect 
on the Balance of Payments 
Owing to the lack of concrete data on comparable reinsurance, 
it is still not possible to state reliably to what extent the bal-
ance of payments of individual developing countries are affected 
by reinsurance transactions crossing natiortal borders (UNC TAn, 1969, 
p.96). Also, it is clear that the serious deficiencies in the avail-
able statistics prevent any degree of accuracy in the assessment 
of the size and nature of funds available for remittance and of 
the net actual flows involved. In fact this is one of the reasons 
behind the concern felt by these countries about the cost of reinsur-
ance sold to them by foreign insurers and reinsurers. 
Even in many developed countries, the shortcomings of national 
accounts, from the insurance point of view, make it difficult to 
assess the value of international insurance and reinsurance transac-
tions and the balance of payments. In this respect, Dickinson (1977, 
p.5) has pointed out that: 
'Indeed the International Monetary Fund has been making 
great efforts to increase the quality of balance of 
payments statistics, and also efforts have been made 
by the United Nations to help countries to improve 
the quality of their national income accounts.Neverthe-
less, individual countries, especially the more developed 
ones have evolved their own national income and balance 
of payments accounting systems, and there is some 
reluctance to change to standards on which there is not 
full agreement.' 
13 Direct 
companies 
Korean Re 
Total 
Table 8.5 
Effect of Reinsurance Transactions on the 
Korean Balance of Payments (1980) 
(US$OOO's) 
Reinsurance Imports Reinsurance Exports 
Net Claims Net Net Claims Net 
premium received payments premium paid receipts 
paid received 
36297 68260 -31963 38103 42380 -4277 
50148 54026 - 3878 45716 30984 14732 
86445 122286 -35841 83819 73364 10455 
Source: Falush (1981, p.29). 
Net balance 
of payments 
surplus 
27686 
18610 
46296 
I 
w 
~ ~
I'-J 
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However, even if one assumes that the information is complete 
and accurate, it would still be difficult to assess the actual impact 
of these transactions on the balance of payments due to the follow-
ing factors: 
1. The nature of insurance business; in contrast to many other 
industries, it operates on a long-term basis. 
2. The time lags between underwriting the risks and the payments 
of premiums and the occurrence of losses are great, particular-
ly in liability insurance. 
(1) 
3. Transportation insurances recorded in the balance of payments 
provide an unrealistic measure of merchandise insurance. 
As mentioned earlier, if goods are exported on a c.i.f. basis, 
and all insurance for them is arranged by the resident expor-
ter with resident insurance companies, no international insur-
ance transactions appear to take place. 
As far as the Arab world is concerned, it has been possible 
to obtain sufficient data to make even a tentative assessment of 
the effect of international reinsurance transactions on the balance 
of paymentsonly for Iraq. In the early stages, Iraqi insurers trans-
acted reinsurance business with a few companies only. Now reinsur-
ance is conducted on a wider scale with different countries, espec-
ially the United Kingdom, Switzerland and W. Germany. 
As to the flow of reinsurance premiums by the Iraqi insurance 
market, it is evident that the increase in the total written premiums 
was reflected in the proportionally larger transfers abroad. Table 
(1) The time lags can also be considerable for reinsurance trans-
actions. 
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8.6 and Figure 8.1 show that the total premiums written in the Iraqi 
market (domestic written premiums plus premiums accepted from abroad) 
have increased from ID.ll.476 million in 1971 to ID 141.965 million 
in 1980, with an annual average growth rate of 32.2 per cent while 
the growth rate of the premiums ceded abroad was 33.5 per cent. 
The aggregate written premium during the period 1971-80 \vere 
ID.550.000 million, of which ID.222.2l2 million, that is 40.4 per cent, 
were ceded abroad. The contribution of the National Insurance Com-
pany towards the total premiums ceded abroad was 64.5 per cent of 
Iraq Re 34.5 percent, and Iraqi Life Insurance Company, 1.0 per cent. 
The total premiums accepted from abroad by the Iraq Re were slightly 
higher than the total premiums ceded abroad by the company during 
the period 1971-80 (see Table 8.6). 
Table 8.7 shows the percentage increase during the period 
1971-80 of total premiums written in Iraq, the reinsurance exported 
to foreign countries, and the net premium balance. The total premium 
volume has grown very rapidly during this period. In 1980 it had 
risen to 1237 per centabove the 1971 volume. The net premiums ceded 
abroad have shown a much higher percentage increase than that of 
the net premiums accepted from abroad, and even higher in many 
years( e.g. 1974, 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1980) than the percentage 
increase of the total written premiums in the market. The net diff-
erence in absolute amounts is very much in favour of foreign markets. 
Clearly the figures in Table 8.6 do not give an accurate indic-
ation of the effects of reinsurance transactions on the balance 
of payments, which requires commissions and losses to be deduc ted 
from the premiums paid to, or received from abroad. It is proposed 
Table 8.6 
Total Written Premiums by the Iraqi Companies and Premiums Ceded Abroad 
Million of ID 
PremitmlS accepted Total I 
Direct written premiums from abroad Total Reinsurance ceded abroad premitmlS 
Year National Iraqi Life Iraq Re National written National Iraqi Life Iraq Re ceded 
Ins. Co. Ins. Co. Ins. Co. premiums Ins. Co. Ins.Co. abroad 
1971 7.502 0.905 3.069 na 11.476 2.813 0.045 1.586 4.444 
1972 8.132 0.976 3.583 na 12.691 2.741 0.036 1.778 4.555 
1973 10.440 1.125 3.964 na 15.529 3.602 0.038 2.365 6.005 
1974 23.060 1.707 4.621 na 29.388 8.993 0.141 3.761 12.895 
1975 35.947 2.598 6.893 94 45.532 11.611 0.309 5.954 17.874 
1976 43.462 3.176 8.244 0.123 55.005 14.343 0.230 6.690 21.263 
1977 48.675 3.298 10.640 0.146 62.759 16.988 0.167 8.088 25.243 
1978 53.171 4.832 11.512 0.224 69.739 18.131 0.248 8.654 27.033 
1979 87.031 6.583 12.111 0.191 105.916 23.150 0.386 19.515 43.051 
1980 120.492 9.152 12.064 0.257 141.965 40.967 0.697 18.185 59.849 
Total 437.912 34.352 76.701 1.035 550.000 143.339 2.297 76.576 222.212 
_ _ __ _ _ _ _ L-___ _ _ ____________________ _ 
Source: Compiled from the Annual Reports of two direct insurers and the Iraq Re. 
Note: The National Insurnce Company does not normally underwrite reinsurance business. 
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Figure 8.1 
Relative Changes in Written Premium in Iraq 
and Reinsurance Ceded Abroad 
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Table 8.7 
Index of Written Premiums in the Iraqi Market, Reinsurance 
Premium Ceded to and Accepted from Abroad and 
Net Premium Balance (1971-80) 
(1971=100) 
Year Total written Net premiums Net premiums Net premium 
premiums ceded abroad accepted from balance in 
abroad favour of 
foreign rein-
surers 
1971 100 100 100 100 
1972 111 102 117 71 
1973 135 133 129 148 
1974 256 278 150 602 
1975 397 383 232 792 
1976 479 509 274 938 
1977 547 609 354 1051 
1978 608 652 385 1123 
1979 923 902 404 2236 
1980 1237 1459 402 3457 
Source: Table 8.6 
to measure the balance of payments effect as follows: 
Net balance of payments effect(l) Net funds payments 
- Net funds receipts 
Where 
Net Funds Payments Reinsurance premiums paid abroad 
- Reinsurance commissions received from 
abroad 
- Reinsurance losses recovered from 
abroad. 
Net Funds Receipts Reinsurance premiums received from 
abroad - reinsurance commissions 
(1) We are measuring only amounts falling due for payment, though 
not necessarily cash flows because of premium and loss 
deposits. This leaves the problem of outstanding claims 
which in balance of payments terms are credits from the 
standpoint of the ceding company I s country. So the total 
balance of payments debit for the whole period shown in 
Table 8.8 would be less than ID. 68.108 million. 
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p a ~ d d abroad reinsurance losses 
paid abroad. 
Table 8.8 shows the reinsurance imports and exports in the 
Iraqi insurance market, during the 10 year period 1971-80. The data 
show that the net premiums paid (premiums less commissions) have 
increased from ID 2.966 million in 1971 to ID 43.262 million in 
1980, an increase of 1459 percent, while the net premiums received 
increased from ID 2.118 million to ID 8.516 million, a rise of 1./02 
percent. 0) The smaller growth of exports may be attributed to 
the fact that the Iraq Re represents the Iraq reinsurance market 
as a sole exporter of reinsurance business. Its foreign portfolio 
has remained far below its home portfolio due to the company's selec-
tive and very restrictive underwriting policy. This table also 
shows that the result of reinsurance transactions was a net balance 
of payments deficit of ID 68.108 million, or 12.4 percent of the 
total written premiums of the market. 
One of the questions raised in Chapter 7 was whether the esta-
blishment of a national reinsurance company might lead to an improve-
ment in a country's balance of payments. There are two points of 
evidence which bear on that question: 
1. 
(1) 
(2 ) 
During the period 1971-80(2), the Iraq Re's net payments on 
The success in acquiring inwards foreign reinsurances has 
reduced the net premium deficit relative to both Iraqi premiums, 
total written premiums and premiums ceded abroad. 
Information was provided by the three Iraqi companies subject 
to the non-disclosure of their figures in detail. However, 
the deficit (i.e. ID 58.793 million) made by the National 
Insurance Co. and the Iraqi Life Insurance Co. is the differ-
ence between the Iraq Re's deficit of ID 9.315 million and 
the total deficits ID 68.108 million. 
Table 8.8 
Effect of Reinsurance Transactions on the I r a ~ B a 1 a n c e e _ o f _ ! ' . ~ y m e n t s s (1971-80) 
(ID .000' s) 
Reinsurance Imports(-) Reinsurance Exports 
Year Net Claims Net Net Claims Net Net balance 
premium received payments premium paid receipts of pay ments 
paid received effects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 (3-6) 
1971 2,966 890 2,076 2,118 1,482 636 - 1,440 
1972 3,033 1,150 1,883 2,473 1,714 759 - 1,124 
1973 3,939 1,719 2,220 2,735 2,025 710 - 1,510 
1974 8,233 2,342 5,891 3,175 2,191 984 - 4,907 
1975 11,351 4,307 7,044 4,903 2,850 2,053 - 4,991 
1976 15,092 5,908 9,184 5,795 3,735 2,060 - 7,124 
1977 18,058 9.190 8.868 7,488 5,998 1,490 - 7,378 
1978 19,336 8,121 11,215 8,164 6,991 1,173 - 10,042 
1979 26,753 10,866 15,887 8.563 7,350 1,213 - 14,674 
1980 43,262 28,312 14,950 8,516 8,484 32 - 14,918 
152,023 72,805 79,218 53,930 42,820 11,110 - 68,108 
--
~ ~ ----
--
Source: Compiled from the Annual Reports and Accounts of the two direct companies and the 
Iraq Re. 
! 
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its reinsurance retrocessions abroad ~ o t a l l ~ ~ I D D 76.576 milliun) 
amounted to ID 19.388 million or 25.3 percent of premium ceded 
abroad. However, over the same period it was able to reduce 
the drain on the country I s balance of payments by securing 
net payments on reinsurance exports amounting to ID 10.073 
million or 13.1 percent of premium accepted from abroad, thus 
reducing the net payments deficit to ID 9.315 million. 
2. As noted in Chapter 7, the profits on Iraqi business are too 
high, so that Iraqis are paying too much for insurance. Al-
though the profits on the net retained accounts may have been 
boosted through the receipt of over-riding reinsurance commiss-
ions and profit commissions, it nevertheless seems that the 
business accepted from abroad has been less profitable than 
that ceded abroad. However, the Iraq Re did retain over the 
eight years 1973-80 total domestic premiums amounting to 
ID 101.696 million: if instead those premiums had been placed 
abroad by the two direct insurance companies, the net deficit 
on reinsurance transactions would have increased by ID 41.056 
million. 
A possible flaw in these arguments is that the Iraq government 
insteadof forming a separate reinsurance company could have increased 
the capitalisation of the direct insurance companies, thereby enabl-
ing them to have increased their retention limits and avoiding double 
handling costs. Such an argument would be less applicable to a 
country with a direct market composed of several competing companies, 
and by forming a specialist reinsurance company it might be able 
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to develop reinsurance expertise more rapidly than otherwise. (1) 
Regardless of what might be the net effect of the Iraq Re, 
the total balance of payments deficit made by the three Iraqi compan-
ies is still so large that it is significant in relation to the 
total written premiums in the market. The factors leading to this 
situation are several, but amongst the most important may be listed 
the following: 
1. The lack of sufficient capacity and experience in the Iraqi 
insurance industry can be considered as the main reasons for 
the large volume and cost of reinsurance imported by the coun-
try, particularly in earlier years. During the las t decade, 
the position has considerably improved. 
2. The high profits on Iraqi business have increased the net 
balance of payments deficit. 
3. The number of large risks has increased rapidly, and a situation 
has been created whereby a very high proportion of these risks 
inevitably are reinsured abroad. 
4. The complicated reinsurance programme arrangements and lack 
of expertise are creating some obstacles in determining ade-
quate retention limits, which might increase the amount of 
premium retained. This subject will be discussed in the foll-
owing four chapters. 
(1) Since the I.D. 145.636 million reinsurance premiums ceded abroad 
by the National Insurance Co. and the Iraqi Life Insurance 
Co. have produced a net payment of ID 58.793 million, it axio-
matically follows that if the ID 101.696 million had been 
ceded abroad, it would have resulted in a net payment of ID 
41.056 million. 
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If the economy continued growing at the same rate as in the 
past and no changes were made to existing reinsurance arrangements, 
then the balance of payments deficit would continue to deteriorate. 
However, circumstances cannot be expected to continue unchanged. 
The main factors which will affect the reinsurance transactions 
in Iraq are: 
1. The growing retention capacity and experience of the Iraqi 
insurance market should reduce the size of the need for foreign 
reinsurance. For example, since 1982 the National Insurance 
Company has changed its marine cargo quota share and surplus 
treaty to a surplus treaty only. The same has occurred in 
the case of the fire quota share and surplus treaty. Retention 
capacity rose substantially in 1982 over the 1981 figures 
as shown below: 
Reinsurance 
treaty 
Fire and allied perils 
Marine cargo 
Retention Limits (1) 
1981 1982 
ID 375,000 10.1,200,000 
ID 375,000 10.1,500.000 
2. The economic development plan is considerably affected by 
the Iran-Iraq War and it might be scaled dmvn in the near 
future. This may cause a reduction in the size of internation-
al trade and thenumber of new projects, and may resulL in lower 
insurance and reinsurance activities. 
3. So far the trend of insurance losses in the Iraqi market has 
been satisfactory (as shown in Chapter three), but it is diffi-
cult to predict what may occur in the future particularly 
as the number of large risks has been growing very rapidly 
(1) Excess of loss covers are arranged for both treaties in order 
to reduce the company's retention limits. 
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during the last decade. 
8.4.4.3 Balance of Payments Effects on the Basis of Cash System 
The balance of payments, as defined in Section 8.3 above, 
is a statistical statement for a given period shOlving the exchange 
of funds and transfer frqn, and to, the country in question. It is 
a form of double entry accounting which can be described as follows: 
"The basic convention applied in constructing a balance of 
payments statement is that every transaction that is recorded 
is to be represented by two entries that have exactly equal 
values. One entry of each of these pairs is designated as 
a credit and conceived as having a positive arithmetic sign, 
while the other entry is called a debit and given a negative 
sign. Thus, in principle, the sum of all the positive entries 
is identical to the sum of all the negative entries, and the 
net balance of all the entries in the statement is zero." 
(I.M.F. 1977,p.8). 
The measurement of the balance of payments on the cash system 
is deficient in a number of ways. In particular it ignores the 
time lags which may occur in concluding international transactions 
(Youssef, 1971, p.323): Such lags are of considerable importance 
in relation to insurance transactions, where earnings and remittances 
in insurance rarely go together for a number of reasons. Lengyel 
(1953, p.3) explains the phenomena thus: 
"(i) earnings from the business may be reinvested in the 
country of origin, 
(ii) losses may be covered by funds at the disposal of the 
foreign insurer in the country in question, while no 
transfer takes place. On the other hand 
(iii) a change in investment policy will result in remittances, 
and 
(iv) exchange control regulations and/or statutory requirements 
will also play an im portant part in remit tances." 
One could add that considerable delays often occur between 
the inception of an insurance!reinsurance contract and the settlement 
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of claims occurring on that contract. Consequently the actual 
transfers of funds are not an appropriate measure of the balance 
of payment effects in international insurance transactions. 
Table 8.9 and Figure 8.2 show the reinsurance transactions 
in Iraq on the cash basis system, and its effect on the balance 
of payments. The balance of payments deficit is calculated on the 
basis of remittances. Actual remittances give a very different 
picture from the real indebtedness, shown in Table 8.8 arising from 
international reinsurance transactions, and they are obviously very 
much below the real indebtedness. The National Insurance Company's 
share of the total foreign exchange paid abroad during the period 
1971-80 was 58 per cent; that of Iraq Re 41.5 per cent and the 
Iraqi Life Insurance Copany just 0.5 per cent. On the other hand, 
the share of each company of the total foreign exchange received 
from abroad was 20.4 per cent, 79.6 per cent and zero per cent resp-
ectively. 
The aggregate balance was a deficit of ID 29.065 million for 
the same period. The National Insurance Company's share of the 
defici t was quite significant, amounting to ID 26.578 mi llion, 91. 4 
per cent of the total deficit during 1971-80. The Iraq Re's share 
of deficit was ID 2.264 million representing 7.8 per cent of the 
total deficit. 
Furthermore, although the Iraqi Life Insurance Company's share 
of the balance of payments deficit was very small (i.e. ID 224 thous-
and, which accounted for only 0.8 per cent of the total deficit), 
we believe that, from the practical point of view, the company does 
not need to purchase reinsurance from abroad except for very large 
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cases and sub-standard lives, e.g. diabetics heart conditions etc., 
in which the foreign reinsurers may specialise. There are two reas-
ons for this belief. Firstly, the sums insured in most life poli-
cies are still small, except group policies. Secondly, after the 
company's retention (which ranged between 80 percent and 93 percent 
during the period 1971-80) the Iraq Re can absorb all the surpluses 
of the company without resorting to foreign markets. Therefore 
the question may be asked as to why the company cedeS" its surpluses 
to the international reinsurance markets. Possibly the company 
may have wanted to continue its relationship with its overseas rein-
surers in order to obtain their assistance in technical matters 
such as the underwriting of sub-standard lives. 
Finally, mention should be made of the foreign exchange control 
in the Iraqi insurance market. The three Iraqi companies are not 
hindered by foreign exchange control in correctly transferring abroad 
their reinsurance debit balances on a quarterly or half yearly basis. 
Table 8.9 
Total Amounts Paid to and Received from Abroad and their 
Effect on the Iraqi Balance of Payments on Cash Basis 
for 1971-80. (in Thousand I.D.) 
Year Total Actual Amounts Total Actual Amounts Deficit 
Paid Received 
1971 1,377 636 741 
1972 1,698 803 895 
1973 1,794 1,127 665 
1974 2,501 881 1,620 
1975 4,952 1,427 3,525 
1976 5,605 2,369 3,236 
1977 5,853 3,021 2,832 
1978 9,301 2,678 6,623 
1979 10,338 3,264 7,074 
1980 11,407 9,555 1,852 
Total 54,826 25,761 29,065 
Source: Extracted from the flnanclal departments accounts of the 
two direct insurance companies and the Iraq Re. 
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Figure 8.2 
Total Amounts paid to and Received from Abroad and its 
Effect on the Balance of Payments (on Cash Basis) 
Amounts 
paid 
Defici t 
Amounts 
o J - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - _ T T
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
Source: Table 8.9 
Year 
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8.5 Some Policy Considerations 
Business ceded from the Arab countries to foreign insurers 
and reinsurers is increasing considerably from one year to the next, 
and this business, in general, has been profitable. However, a 
very common argument asserts that the Arab countries purchase too 
much reinsurance, and therefore there is an unnecessary outflow 
of foreign exchange, which in turn has an undesirable effect on 
the countries' balance of payments. Indeed, the Arab countries are 
still heavily reliant on foreign reinsurance, but whatever the size 
of the reinsurance purchased, it seems quite natural that the main 
problem is inherent in the insurance markets of these countries. 
Given their lack of capital, managerial expert ise, reserves and 
retention capacity, the Arab countries cannot easily avoid buying 
too much foreign reinsurance. 
Nevertheless, some steps can be taken which, to some extent, 
could reduce the deficits in the Arab countries' balance of pay-
ments 
(1) 
First there are those measures that have already been examined in 
earlier chapters, which can be summarised as follows: 
(l) Undoubtedly the importance a government ,,,ill place on improving 
its balance of payments position will depend on its overall 
balance of payments situation. There will be less need for 
a government like Kuwait or Saudi Arabia with a large current 
account credit balance to reduce any insurance deficit than 
for a government like Egypt with an overall deficit. Despite 
this fact, in principle whether a country is rich or poor, 
in order to reduce foreign exchange outflow, it should find 
ways and means for improving its balance of payments position 
as far as the insurance and reinsurance transactions are conc-
erned. 
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Improving the experience and skills of the companies' 
personnel. 
Building up and strengthening the companies' financial 
bases. 
Encouraging co-insurance where several companies operate 
in a market. 
Advising policyholders on loss prevention matters. 
Improving the standard of insurance legislation and 
supervision. 
Establishing 
and pools. 
national/regional reinsurance companies 
Increasing co-operation between Arab insurance markets 
above all in the case of large risks and natural hazard 
risks. 
Secondly it may be possible to raise companies' standards 
of reinsurance planning, including the forms of reinsurance employed 
and the fixing of retention limits in relation to the nature of 
risk and type of re insurance selected, and thereby reduce the amount 
of business ceded abroad. The fixing of retention limits will be 
examined in the following four chapters. 
8.6 Conclusions 
Self-sufficiency in insurance is neither sought by any country, 
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nor possible. Thus, the purchase of foreign reinsurance by domestic 
companies is necessary, and, of course if the domestic reinsurance 
cessions abroad are profitable, then they will result in an outflow 
of foreign exchange abroad. 
Governments of Arab, and indeed all other developing countries, 
are concerned about the outflow of reinsurances and thus foreign 
exchange. The absence of reliable statistics prevents any degree 
of accuracy in the assessment of the actual funds outflow, but 
the volume of reinsurance transactions leads them to believe that 
the net foreign exchange outflow is substantial. 
As a result of that concern, several changes have occurred 
in Arab markets, such as legislation on insurance and reinsurance 
imports restrictions, sometimes the setting up of a national reinsur-
ance company receiving compulsory or voluntary cessions. However, 
the available statistics about the Iraqi insurance market show that 
the rapid growth of domestic premium income during the 1970' s has 
been more than equalled by the growth of foreign reinsurance imports. 
However, the establishment of the Iraq Re appears to have reduced 
expenditures of foreign exchange considerably thereby improving 
the country's balance of payments, though international reinsurance 
transactions still constantly resulted in unfavourable balances 
to Iraq in all the years 1971-1980. The net balance of payments 
deficit was equal to 12.4 per cent of the total written premiums 
in the Iraqi market for that period. 
In the long run foreign insurers and reinsurers expect to 
make a profit and that means that business placed with them will 
involve a balance of payments cost, but that is the price that has 
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to be paid by policyholders and ceding companies for protection 
against short-term fluctuatins in claims experience. Sometimes 
it can result in a net inflow of foreign exchange at a time a country 
needs it (e.g. following a natural disaster). Therefore the failure 
of a country to secure a balance on its trade in insurance with 
the rest of the world need not per se be disadvantageous to its 
economy, but it certainly merits examination by the authorities. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE DETERMINATION OF RETENTION LIMITS 
9.1 Introduction 
One of the themes running through previous chapters has been 
that for most classes of insurance business insurers in the Arab 
insurance markets still retain only a small proportion of the risks 
which they underwrite, thereby limiting their own growth in terms 
of retained premium income and imposing costs on their countries I 
balance of payments. Chapter 7 was concerned with examining the 
efforts that have been made to increase the proportion of business 
retained within the Arab region. Now in this and the following 
three chapters attention will be focused on an examination of how 
insurance companies should seek to achieve optimum retention levels 
and the actual record of two Arab companies in relation thereto. 
In one sense, an insurance company's retention may be defined 
as the maximum sum it may be called upon to pay in respect of any 
one claim, or a series of claims, net of any recoveries it may obtain 
from its reinsurers. So, for example, Reinarz (1969, p.103) refers 
to a retention as: 
"The uninsured liability or loss according to the 
kind of reinsurance contract concerned". 
So defined, an insurer's retention would include such sums as it 
may unexpectedly be called upon to pay itself because of any def-
iciencies in its reinsurance arrangements. ;-lore usefully from the 
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standpoint of the efficient management of an insurance company, 
a retention may be thought of as the maximum sum which it would 
wish to bear itself, as in the following two definitions: 
"The maximum amount that the company is prepared to pay on 
any loss affecting a policy, risk or group of risks". 
(Swiss Re, 1980, p.47). 
"The amount of liability which a ceding company retains for 
its own net account on a particular risk or in the event of 
a catastrophic event affecting several risks at the same 
time" . ( Ra ng a raj an. 1979, p. 50 ) . 
Both of these definitions also emphasise that an insurance 
company in fixing its retention limits needs to pay regard to both 
potential claims in respect of individual risks and accumulations 
of claims arising from the occurrence of one event. One could add 
that it should consider too the potential accumulations of all claims 
arising during anyone planning period. The fixing of such reten-
tions is of paramount importance to the performance and solvency 
of an insurance company. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter 
is: 
to examine the factors that should be considered in 
fixing retention limits and their relationship thereto; 
to provide a framework for the analysis of retention 
limits and guidelines which will be undertaken in the 
following three chapters. 
9.2 Objectives in Fixing Retention 
The main objective of an insurance company in fixing its 
retention limits is to control fluctuations in either (i) its annual 
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loss ratio; or (ii) its annual business results; or (iii) its c.:1sh 
flow C Buhlmann, 1964, p. 42) . Any insurance company is faced with 
two apparently mutually exclusive options: Ca) to underwrite as 
much as possible for its own account, or Cb) attempt to stabilize 
the inherent fluctuations within each class of business. In fact 
there is an inverse relationship between the two options which is 
so close that any attempt at maximising one will result in minimising 
the other. Therefore, and under given circumstances, the company's 
management will determine which of the two objectives is more impor-
tant, and make a compromise between them. 
In order to reduce loss ratio fluctuations and stabilize busi-
ness results, the insurance company must fix its retention at a 
level sufficient that the premium retained for its own account, 
together with the funds available, will at least be sufficient to 
cover the loss payments for which it might become liable CGerathewohl, 
1980, p.129). This is a major problem for all direct insurers world-
wide, and it is particularly acute in the developing countries. 
The real problem of insurers in the latter countries is to fix 
their retentions at levels commensurate with their desired financial 
security without unnecessarily ceding abroad too much reinsurance. 
Some of the factors which ought to influence an insurer in 
making such decisions are examined below (see figure 9.1). 
9.3 Factors to be Considered iJhen Fixing Retentions 
There are a number of key factors which, if taken into account, 
will help a company to fix its retention limits correctly. 
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Figure 9.1 
Factors to Consider When Fixing the Level of Retention 
Retained 
Premium Income 
Retention Limits 
Income 
Volume 
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9.3.1 The Attitude of Management 
~ a n a g e m e n t t attitudes to risk play a large part in determining 
'h . 1·· (1) a company s c osen retentlon lmlts. They decide the nature 
and the range of liability exposures which are acceptable, \IThich 
in turn, affects the size of premium retained and consequently the 
volume of reinsurance ceded. 
Gerathewohl (1980, p.129) in stressing that management atti-
tudes have an important bearing on decisions regarding retention 
limits has said: 
"Fixing the retention is always a genuine management 
decision, where a selection must be made from several 
possibilities, and management priorities must be 
determined. These priorities may differ completely from 
one company to another. The correct retention does not 
therefore, exist, and one must realize that each retention 
has to be seen within the specific situation involved". 
Hence the size of a company's chosen retention limits depends 
mainly on the philosophy of management and its knowledge. 
9.3.2 The Size of the Company 
Company size plays an essential role in determining the size 
of any loss it can absorb on anyone risk or anyone event. ~ o r e e
Cl) "A discussion has been held with several managers and under-
writers in London on this most important question and the 
answers which have been given were invariably the same. They 
fix their retentions first of all as a management decision 
and then vary them up or down according to the availability 
and price of excess of loss protec tion". (Kingsbury, 1980, 
p.ll) . 
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specifically, there is a direct relationship bet\.;een the size of 
a company and its retention limits. Whether the size of a company 
is measured in terms of its premium volume or its capital and free 
reserves, most diff:i:.ult in the Arab states, and in other developing 
countries are relatively small, so that they are forced to operate 
with relatively low retention limits. 
9.3.3 Premium Income Volume 
The premium income volume of any class of insurance has a 
direct relationship to the size of the retention limits. Generally, 
the larger the premium income, the higher may be the retention. 
However, the size of premium income alone is not a sufficient 
guide; equally important is the risk profile of the account, e.g. 
is it composed of a large number of relatively small independent 
risks, or a few large risks, or a mixture. Theoretically, depending 
on the nature of an insurance portfolio, one loss may range in size 
from less than 1 per cent to more than 100 per cent of a company's 
premium income; such large variations in the size of insured losses 
make it extremely difficult to plan a company's operations. Thus, 
an insurance company should decide when fixing its retention that 
even if a major loss should occur, its retained loss should not 
exceed a specified proportion of the premium retained for its own 
account (Rangarajan, 1979, p.5l). Consequently, as a guide for 
fixing retention limits, the Swiss Reinsurance Company (1965, p. 5 
and 1978, p.49) suggests the use of the follm.;ing formula which 
would stabilise the undenvriting result, though it does not take 
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into account the company s capital and free assets: 
H X% x p 
where M Maximum limit of retention per risk or per event. 
p Retained Premium income. 
Swiss Re then recommend that the percentage X should be within the 
following limits: 
Per risk generally around 1% for a large company and up 
to 10% for smaller companies 
Per event generally between 1% and 3% for fire and accident 
business and as high as 5% for marine business. 
Following this approach the impact on a company's claims ratio 
of anyone loss or an accumulation of losses from one event will 
be limited to a predetermined percentage. Although in order to 
control their reinsurance costs smaller companies generally are 
forced to fix high retention limits per risk in relation to their 
retained premiums, the limits in actual currency amounts are not 
large. 
9.3.4 The Financial Strength of the Company 
The financial position of an insurance company is of key impor-
tanee to the fixing of any retention limits. Carter (1979, p.325) 
for example says: 
" ... there is a direct relationship between the 
size of a company's reserves relative to the volume 
of business written and the amount it can retain 
for its own account". 
Likewise Gerathewohl (1980, p. 133) argues that: 
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11 the more funds the direct insurer is willing 
and able to utilize, should the premium be 
inadequate, the higher the retention may be". 
Conversely it follows that the smaller is a company's retention 
limit, the smaller will be its reserve requirements (Marcuard, 
1966, p.53). It would be unwise, however, to pay regard only to 
the size of a company's reserves in fixing its retention limits, 
consideration also must be given to the potential variation in its 
claims experience which will be influenced by the size distribution 
of its insured risks. Marcuard illustrates this point by the follow-
ing example produced by Sergowsky. 
A portfolio of 300,000 fire risks, the largest being 
5,000,000 and the smallest 1,000 (the composition of 
the portfolio being arbitrarily chosen, with relatively 
few large and small amounts) shows the following reserve 
to be necessary (mathematically expected deviation): 
Required reserves 
No reinsurance 144% of thE risk premium 
With retention limited to 500,000 55% of the risk premium 
With retention limited to 200,000 3 5 ~ ~ ~ of the risk premium 
With retention limited to 100,000 21% of the risk premium 
The calculation is based on the principle that the maximum retention 
depends firstly on the amount of the available reserve fund and 
secondly on the absolute deviation of the fire losses. 1ft hi s 
assumption is made for the maximum retention, the necessary reserve 
can be expressed quantitatively by the following formula: 
n 
L 
i=l 
C. R. 
1. 1. 
Necessary Reserve 
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where n number of groups of similar risks which together make 
up the portfolio. 
C most probable annual loss cost (risk premium). 
R relative deviation in the loss ratio. 
The simplest approach to fixing retention limits to an insur-
ers financial strength is again the use of rules-of-thumb, such 
as the following given by the Swiss Reinsurance Company (1965, p.6 
and 1 9 78, p. 4 9 ) : 
M Y% x (C + S) 
where C + S capital plus free reserves (policyholders' funds) 
and with the recommended values for Y% being: 
Per risk: generally not more than 1 0/ '0 for a large company 
and up to 5% for smaller companies 
Per event: generally between o. 5 ~ ~ ~ to 1. 5 ? ~ , , representing the 
number of maximum claims which if not payable 
from premium income, would consume all the capital 
and free reseves. 
This approach ensures that no loss event may reduce capital 
and free reserves by more than Y%. 
Another formula suggested by Swiss Re relates the retention 
limit per risk to the company's liquid assets as follows: 
where 
M Z% x A 
A 
2 01 10 
Liquid assets which should be around 5 times the 
maximum retention per loss in the company's most 
important branch. 
An estimate of how many times per year large 
372 
claims will require immediate payment. If a 
company's estimate is N (e.g. 10) times, then 
z 100 N (e.g. 10%) . 
This rule aims at ensuring that funds are available for the 
immediate payment of claims. 
The main weakness of such simple rules-of-thumb as those cited 
by the Swiss Re is that the growth of an insurer's premium income 
is not necessarily matched by a proportionate growth of its capital 
and free reserves. For example, premium expansion may be at the 
expense of profits, and even if profits keep pace with premium income 
a sufficient amount of profit may not be retained to maintain the 
company's solvency margin (Gilmore, 1980, p.383). In many private 
companies in the Arab states shareholders prefer to receive dividends 
rather than finance premium growth. A large number of companies 
in the region distribute a very high share of their annual profits. 
On the other hand, in monopoly markets, the company's management 
may be obliged to show the government that it has achieved a good 
profitability, and consequently such a company could not build up 
a strong financial position. 
Baker (1965, p.886) attempted to overcome the problem by devis-
ing a set of formulae which take into account both premium income 
and the insurer's financial strength. 
According to Kenny (1957, p.20) the financial situation of 
an insurer can best be measured by comparing the insurer's policy-
holders' surplus with his potential claims costs on business in 
(1) 
force. 
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Obviously the larger is the policyholders' surplus, 
the larger will be the proportion of any loss which the insurer 
can afford to retain for his own account. In the case of a property 
insurer it is appropriate to relate the policyholders' surplus to 
his unearned premium reserve, but for a casualty insurer Kenny argued 
that generally it is preferable to make the comparison against written 
premiums for two reasons. Firstly, many policies are written on 
a deposit premium basis, being earned at the time of collection. 
Therefore different insurers can have substantially different un-
earned premium reserves while having similar outstanding liabilities, 
depending entirely on how each writes and books his business. Sec-
ondly, the unearned premium reserve can be affected by the existence 
of short-term business of less than one year (e.g. motor insurance). 
Employing these two standards, and if unearned premiums are cal-
culated without any deduction for pre-paid expenses, the target 
ratios of policyholders' surplus to the unearned premium reserve 
of a property insurer should be 1: 1 according to widely accepted 
American market conventions, and against the ,vritten premium income 
of a casualty insurer the ratio becomes 1:2. 
On the basis of such measures of financial strength Baker 
devised the following formulae for calculating retention limits 
(1) Policyholders' surplus is defined as "That part of the assets 
of an insurance company that is available for the benefit 
of policyholders". Whilst unearned premium reserves is defined 
as !lA fund kept by a non-life insurer to provide for claims 
that may arise in the future under insurances that are still 
in force. It was formerly common to reserve 4 0 ~ : ' ' of premium 
income but in direct insurance more exact methods now prevail, 
e.g., the reserving for each insurance in force of 1/365 of 
the premium for every day that the insurance has sti 11 to 
run". (Cockerell, 1980, pp. 145 and 196). 
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for an insurer writing only one class of insurance: 
Property Insurer Model: 
Net Retention X%(S) (EP) (UPR) 
Casualty Insurer Model: 
Where EP 
UPR 
S 
WP 
Net Retention 
Earned premium income 
2 X% (S) (EP) 
(WP) 
Unearned premium reserve 
Policyholder's surplus 
Written premium income 
The factor of 2X% (instead of X%) is used for the casualty insurer 
because of the desired 2: 1 relationship between written premiums 
and surplus. 
Baker further pointed out that the insurer's loss ratio and 
expense ratio should be taken into consideration when fixing its 
retention limits because a company that is earning underwriting 
profits, as signified by a combined (claims plus expense) ratio 
to written premiums of less than 100 should be capable of financing 
larger losses than one operating at a loss with a combined ratio 
exceeding 100. Therefore if an underwriting capability factor of 
100, dd d h t' th t d I b (L+E)s a e to t e equa lons e wo mo e s ecome: 
X%(S) (EP) (100) 
Property Insurer Retention = (UPR) (L+E) 
Casualty Insurer Retention = X% (S) (EF) (100) (WP) (L+E) 
Where L Insurer's loss ratio for period under consideration. 
E Insurer's expense ratio for period under consideration. 
In the case of insurers writing more than one class of insur-
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ance business Baker recommended that a total retention limit should 
be fixed for all of the classes that may in the ordinary course 
of events be involved in one loss producing event. Therefore he further 
developed the model by assuming that each separate class of insurance 
has a claim on the surplus protection proportionate to its relative 
size in the portfolio. Under this assumption the individual class 
retention limits derived above would be multiplied by the factor 
EL 
of EP' as follows: 
Property Insurer Retention 
Casualty Insurer Retention 
Where EL Class earned premium 
X% (S) (EL) (100) 
(UPR) (L+E) 
2X% (S) (EL) (100) 
nIP) (L+E) 
The following examples will illustrate how the above formulae 
operate: 
+ 
Assume two insurers with the following premium incomes: 
Written premiums (WP) 
Unearned premium reserve (UPR) 
at beginning of year 
Unearned premium reserve (UPR) 
at end of year 
Earned premium (EP) 
Loss and expense ratios (L + E) 
Property 
insurer 
£ 
1,000,000 
450,000 
1,450,000 
500,000 
950,000 
(a) 
Cb) 103 ~ ~ ~
Casualty 
insurer 
£ 
1,000,000 
360,000 
1,360,000 
400,000 
960,000 
If we assume that each insurer holds policyholdecs I surplus 
amounting to £450,000, and the value of X ~ ~ is 5 per cent, the insur-
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er's respective retention limits will be: 
Property insurer model 
Situation (i) premium income, etc. as above: 
0.05 x450,000 x 950,000 = £42,750 Retention = -500,000 
Situation (ii) if the insurer increases premium income without 
increasing policyholders' reserves, the retention will be reduced 
as follows: 
Property (Year 2): W.P. £1,200,000 
+ U.P.R. at beginning of year 500,000 
1,700,000 
- U.P.R. at end of year 600,000 
E.P. 1,100,000 
. 0.05 x 450,000 x 1,100,000 
Retentlon = £41,250 600,000 
Taking the loss and expense ratios into consideration the retention 
limit in situation (i) becomes: 
. 0.05 x 450,000 x 950,000 xlOO Retentlon (a) = 500,000x 99 £43,182 
Retention (b) 
Casualty insurer model 
0.05 x 450,000 x 950,000 x 100 
500,000 x 103 £41,505 
2 x 0.05 x 450,000 x 960,000 Retention = 1,0000,000 £43,200 
Retention (a) 
Retention (b) 
2x 0.05 x 450,000 x 960,000 xlOO 
1,000,000 x 98 
2 xO.05 x 450,000 x 960,000 x 100 
1,000,000 x 104 
Property and casualty insurer model 
£44.082 
£41,538 
By merging the two insurers the combined policyholders' surplus 
S becomes £900,000 and the total EP is £1,910,000; thus the insurer's 
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retention will become: 
Property insurer retention 
0.05 x 900,000 x 950,000 x 100 
500,000 x 99 
Casualty insurer retention = 
£86,364 
2 x 0.05 x 900,000 x960,000 x 100 
1,000,000 x 98 £87,273 
The retentions of the above two formulae would be multiplied by 
their respective class EP/Total EP and added together to produce 
the combined retention limit as follows: 
£86,364 x 
£87,273 x 
950,000 
1,910,000 
960,000 
1,910,000 
£42,956 
£43,865 
£86,821 
There are various criticisms one could make of the formulae 
but they do attempt to improve on the simple rule of thumb that 
expresses the retention limit simply as X % of premium income. It 
divides the result of X% (S) (E.P.) by: 
(i) a measure of financial strength UPR, which shows by 
what factor potential claims on business in force (UPR) 
exceeds surplus. 
(ii) the underwriting performance of the company as measured 
by its combined ratio L + E. 
So the lower the company's financial strength and the poorer 
its performance, the more the RL is reduced. One major failing 
of Baker's work is that he gives no recommended value for X%. Also 
although it does improve on the simpler rules of thumb there are 
many factors not accounted for (e.g. the potential f l u c t u a t i o ~ s s
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in the insurers' claims costs, the quality of the insurers' invest-
ments, inflation, etc.) but the models required to handle such addit-
ional variables inevitably become far more complex and require far 
more data. 
9.3.5 Premium Rates and Premium Loading 
It is widely accepted practice for insurers to grade retention 
limi ts according to degree of risk as measured by premium rates, 
with the retention limit being inversely related to the premium 
rate, so that the lowest rated risks carry the highest retentions. 
Obviously a high risk premium may be required either on account 
of a high loss frequency or a high average claims severity, or due 
to a combination of both. Although there are exceptions to this 
practice, there is a case for retentions being governed by premium 
rates but not in such a simple manner: this point will be discussed 
in Chapter eleven so here it is proposed to consider only the loading 
of risk premiums to cover: 
(i) expenses (including commission); 
(ii) profit; and 
(iii) the contingency of claims fluctuations. 
The profit and contingency loadings are to provide for an expected 
profit and some protection against fluctuations in claims costs. 
In his discussion of reinsurance theory, Benjamin (1977, 
p.224) derives the following 'very approximate but practical rule' 
for determining an insurer's retention limit M: 
u = 2 v P . ~ 1 1 - A P 
t t t 
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,,,here 
U the amount of the insurer's free resources (i.e. capital 
t 
and free reserves) which can be called upon at time t; 
P the (risk) premiums required to time t to cover the 
t 
expected claims cost; 
A the premium loading required to service the insurer's 
capital. 
From t".1e equation he draws two conclusions. First, as already 
observed from the Baker formula, "if premiums increase without any 
increase in the free reserves, then the retention limit must fall", 
and secondly "if the reserves and premiums are correspondingly inc-
reased (in the same ratio) the retention limit can rise". 
The influence of the premium loading A on the retention limit 
M becomes clear by re-arranging the equation as : 
U + A = 2 0p . M 
t t 
An increase in A would add to available resources and thus would 
enable the insurer to increase ~ . .
Carter (1979 ,p326) has pointed out that competition has a 
real effect on the loading of premium rates \"hich a company can 
charge, the more competition for the same business, the narrO\"er 
the loading is likely to be. Thus the size of the loading varies 
between companies and classes of insurance, and consequently a comp-
any will determine different retentions for different classes of 
business. It would be sensible to consider that the same approach 
applies for different kinds of risk within a certain class. This 
situation, in fact, is not confined to a competitive market; even 
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in a monopoly a company cannot ignore the effectof the size of prem-
ium loading on the demand for different classes of insurance. 
9.3.6 The Cost of Reinsurance 
Reinsurance is an important input for an insurance company 
enabling it to control its portfolio risk, i.e. the potential adverse 
f luc t ua t ions in aggregate claims. However its purchase does involve 
a cost which has to be balanced against the reduction in risk. 
Therefore in fixing retentions the price of reinsurance is an import-
ant factor. 
Every company purchasing reinsurance knows that its claims 
experience will affect both its retention limits and the price of 
reinsurance. For example, following adverse loss experience on 
an excess of loss treaty the reinsurer will usually increase the 
required premium. The only alternative then available to the ceding 
company will be to agree to a higher retention limit than it other-
wise might have considered desirable. For example, one Arab insur-
ance company three years after the inception of its motor excess 
of loss treaty, found that it had produced considerable losses to 
the reinsurers. Consequently at rene\val the leading reinsurer re-
quired ei ther an increase in the premium rate from 3.5 per cent 
to 8.0 percent, or a more than twofold increase in the treaty deduct-
ible. The company decided to accept the higher retention limit 
rather than an increase in the rate. 
From the reinsurer I s point of vie\v, it is never acceptable 
to provide coverage at a price sufficient only to cover the actuarial 
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value of the anticipated claims transferred by the direct insurer. 
He will require a loading of the reinsurance premium to cover the 
cost of general expenses, fluctuation in loss experience, and profit. 
It is even possible that the loading may exceed the risk premium 
when the coefficient of variation of the expected claims cost of 
the reinsured portfolio is high (Carter, 1979, p.326). 
9.3.7 The Claims Experience 
Past claims experience is likely to influence an . , lnsurer s 
decisions regarding the size of his retention limits, and thus the 
proportion of his gross premium income which he will be able to 
retain for his own account, in a number of ways. As noted above it 
will affect the price and/or amount of reinsurance which reinsurers 
are prepared to offer. Also the more limited is an insurer's claims 
experience the more conservative he should be in his retention policy, 
because the degree of accuracy that can be achieved in estimating 
future claims costs is directly related to the amount of data avail-
able regarding claims frequencies and severities. 
The simplest measure of claims experience, which even the 
smallest insurer can employ, is the claims ratio; that is, the 
ratio of the aggregate cost of claims incurred in a given period 
to the premium income for the same . d (1) perlO . The ratio may be 
measured either for the gross account or net of reinsurance premiums 
(1) In practice the calculation of claims ratios is severely 
complicated by delays in the reporting and settlement of claims, 
the need to estimate outstanding claims, etc., so that less 
than perfect data often has to be used. See G.B. Hey (1970 ) 
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and claims recoveries. By calculating its gross 
or net (of reinsurance) claims ratios the managers of an insurance 
company can observe both the degree of fluctuationover time in agg-
regate claims costs relative to premium income, and how effec tive 
are its reinsurance arrangements in reducing the size of those fluc-
tuations on its retained account compared \vith the gross account. 
The relative size of the fluctuations in gross claims ratios 
over time will tend to vary with the size of the account as measured 
by premium income. Therefore in order to keep the fluctuations 
on the retained account \vithin acceptable limits, as shown earlier 
in section 9.3.3, the smaller is the gross premium income the lower 
must be the retention limit and so the proportion of the gross premium 
income which the company retains for its own account. An examination 
of the claims experience of the Iraqi market supports the results 
of Baker I s retention limi t equation and Carter I s hypothesis (1979, 
pp. 30-31) that if a company writing more than one class of insurance 
fixed one retention limit applicable to all classes of business 
written instead of fixing separate limits for each class, it would 
be able to carry a higher limit and thereby retain more of its gross 
premium income. 
Table 9.1 shows the gross claims ratio of the total non-life 
business of the Iraqi market written by the ~ a t i o n a l l Insurance Comp-
any during 1971 to 1977, and Table 9.2 shows the breakdmVil for the 
individual main classs of business plus the proportions of the gross 
premiums which the company retains for its own account. As can 
be seen from Table 9.3, the relative fluctuations in the claims 
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ratios for the individual classes, as measured by the co-efficient 
of variation, are in every case higher than for the total non-life 
business. 
Table 9.1 
Gross Claims Ratios for Total Non-Life 
Business in the IraqiMarket 
Year Gross Claims Ratios 
" '0 
1971 66.0 
1972 88.3 
1973 67.5 
1974 43.9 
1975 66.8 
1976 82.0 
1977 101. 6 
Average ratio 73.7% 
Standard deviat on 18. 7 ? ~ ~
Co-efficient of 25.4 
variation 
Source: Compiled from the Annual Reports 
of the National Insurance Company 
- Iraq. 
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Class of Insurance 
Marine cargo 
Hull 
Aviation 
Fire 
Motor (compulsory) 
Hotor (Comprehensive) 
Engineering 
~ l i s c e l l a n e o u s s
Table 9.3 
Summary of Table 9.2 
Gross claims ratio for class 
Average 
ratio 
78.1 
87.9 
105.7 
40.3 
130.9 
58.8 
102.7 
43.5 
Standard 
deviation 
26.9 
25.1 
68.1 
22.0 
57.8 
39.9 
26.3 
23.9 
Co-efficient 
of variation 
34.4 
28.6 
64.4 
54.6 
44.2 
67.9 
25.6 
54.9 
Aggregate 
underwriting 
result for 
period 
Profit 
Profit 
Profit 
Profit 
Loss 
Profit 
Profit 
Profit 
Ratio of 
retained to 
gross written 
premiums 
compared \vi th 
overall 
average 
Below 
Below 
Below 
Be 10\-1 
Above 
Above 
Below 
Above 
Note: Underwriting results have been taken from the annual reports of General Insurance 
Organisation of Iraq. 
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Figure 9.2 
Gross Claims Ratios for Overall and Individual Class(es) 
of Insurance 
National Insurance Company 
71 72 73 
Source: Tables 9.1 and 9.2. 
(1) 
(2) 
( 3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
Overall Claims Ratio. 
Motor Compulsory. 
Aviaton. 
Motor Comprehensive. 
Marine Cargo. 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
74 75 
Engineering. 
Fire. 
Marine Hull. 
Miscellaneous. 
76 77 
Year 
(2 ) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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Apart from engineering business, the marine cargo and hull 
classes have both shown lm.;er co- efficients of variation in their 
claims ratios than other classes, and profitable underwriting results 
(see figure 9.2 and Table 9.3). Marine cargo business represents 
more than 50 per cent of the whole premiums written in the market, 
yet it has a net retained premium income lying below the average 
h 1 b · (1) for t e tota USlness. The retained premium income for marine 
hull business is very small due to first, the number of insured 
vessels being limited and, secondly, the size of risks being relati-
vely large. 
Aviation business has the second highest co-efficient of varia-
tion ( 6 4 . 4 ~ ~ ) , , and like the hull business, it has a net retained 
premium income far be 1 m.; the average, 'though during the period it 
produced an aggregate underwriting profit. 
Fire had the lowest average claims ratio, and during 1971-
77 its overall business result was profitable, yet its retained 
premium income proportion was below the overall average. 
The retained premium income for both classes of motor business 
was far above the overall average partly because both accounts were 
protected by excess of loss covers which leave the ceding company 
with ahigherproportion of the gross premium income than do proport-
ional reinsurances. However, there were other factors involved. 
In the case of motor comprehensive business, which yiQlded an under-
writing profit taken over the whole period, the company could afford 
(1) "In this context the level of retention in a class of busines 
should decrease as the share of that class in a company s 
overall premium volume increases." (Gerathewohl, 1980, p.167, 
footnote 81). 
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to retain for its own account the bulk of the accidental dar.lage 
claims which account for a high proportion of the total claims costs. 
The company's retention limit on motor compulsory business would 
have been forced up by the adverse claims experience which was due 
to premium rates having been increased insufficiently to compensate 
for the increases in: 
(i) the number of claims, which for all motor business 
rose from 4366 in 1971 to 18142 in 1979; and 
(ii) the size of third party claims due to inflation and 
increased claims consciousness. 
The Engineering business, which includes CAR, EAR and a few 
boiler and machinery breakdown covers, has the third lowest net 
retained premium income over the whole period. The reason is because 
the class of business is still new and the portfolio includes a 
number of large risks. Engineering business also shows the lowest 
co-efficient of variation and a profitable result. 
The miscellaneous insurance class retained premium income 
is far above the average for overall business. Although the claims 
ratio fluctuations were relatively high, ranging between 14.0 per 
cent in 1977 and 87.8 per cent in 1972, its average claims ratio 
was the second lowest. 
To determine the proper level of retention, the insurer must 
examine the size and frequency of loss for each class. ~ 1 e e thods 
of calculating these factors will be shown in Chapter eleven. HOiv-
ever. on the basis of the ~ a t i o n a l l Insurance Company's claims exper-
ience for the individual classes, a strong case could be made for 
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it considering fixing one retention limit for all classes of business. 
\oJith the possible exception of motor insurance due to the nature 
of that business and the substantial underwriting losses incurred 
on the compulsory motor account. 
9.J.8 Investment Policy 
A company in deciding on its investment policy should pay 
regard to the likelihood of having to pay claims which it may not 
be able to meet from its normal cash flow, so that it \oJill need 
to maintain a certain level of liquidity. The higher its retention 
limits and so potential retained claims costs, the more liquid funds 
it will require. Therefore investment policy and retention limits 
are interrelated, as implied by the Swiss Reinsurance Company in 
their rules of thumb for fixing retentions (see Section 9.3.4). 
Whether insurance companies do consider investment policy 
in fixing their retention limits is a moot question. However as 
both are matters decided by top management, it is likely that the 
investment factor is taken into consideration when fixing the level 
of retention. 
9.3.9 Experience of the Company's Staff 
Reference was made in Chapter five to the shortage of experien-
ced trained staff in the Arab insurance and reinsurance companies. 
Such lack of skill adversely affects their ability to correctly 
determine retention limits. and requires management to adopt a more 
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conservative retention policy. When experienced and qualified staff 
have the ability to underwrite risks and fix premium rates reasonably 
accurately, a company is in a position to retain a higher proportion 
of the risks which it underwrites in that it can have greater confid-
er,ce in available funds being adequate to meet claims, which also 
should be subject to smaller fluctuations in their total cost. 
9.4 Characteristics of Class of Business in Relation 
to RetentiOIlS Per Risk 
There are certain characteristics in the nature of marine 
cargo, marine hull, aviation, fire, motor, and engineering insurances 
\oJhich are worth a brief comment. 
9.4.1 Marine Cargo Insurance 
In marine cargo insurance there is a basic choice between 
fixing a retention per policy or per vessel (this point will be 
discussed in Chapter 11). 
The structure of the portfolio plays an essential role :n 
determining the retention limit. The concentration of cargo values 
is, indeed, constantly increasing with the development of new and 
larger ships. To an increasing extent, for instance, large indust-
rial projects are nowadays shipped to Arab countries, and are usually 
insured only with one, or perhaps a few, national insurers, thus 
resulting in a less balanced portfolio, and, consequently, more 
exposure to large losses. 
One must also take into account, when fixing the retention 
1 i mi t s , po s sib lea c c u mu 1 a t ion s 0 f va 1 u e sat r i s k 0 non eve s s e 1 0 r 
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at the docks, the means of transport, the type of vessel, the quality 
of merchandise and its packaging, and the type of cover. 
9.4.2 Hull and Aviation Insurance 
In marine hull insurance the original premium rates may encour-
age companies to maintain a higher retention limit if they believe 
that the pattern of results obtained in their own markets are better 
than the world average CKingsbury, 1980, p.7). The retention varies 
according to factors such as size and value of the insured vessels, 
classification, flag, age, owner, and fleet (large or small). The 
main reason, however, for fixing a small level of retention, parti-
cularly in Arab countries, is that the hull portfolio contains few 
individual units coupled with a high value per unit: port accumu-
lation risk is another factor. Therefore the portfolio tends to 
be less stable than most non-life insurance business. 
The aviation portfolios of Arab companies comprise mainly 
relatively few airliners operated by the national airlines. Conse-
quently their retention limits are low given the very high combined 
hull and liability limits required for such aircraft compared \Jith 
the companies' total aviation premiums. 
9.4.3 Fire Insurance 
There are a number of factors \v'hich affect retention limits 
for individual fire risks, such as the location of the risk, its 
construction, occupation, contents, etc. The additional covers. 
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such as earthquake, flood, hurricane, etc., also affect the deter-
mination of retention limits. 
Unlike large insurers in developed countries, the fire port-
folios of Arab insurers do not contain large numbers of small to 
medium sized independent risks. Instead a large proportion of their 
premium income is derived from large risks, so making their port-
folios badly unbalanced, and thereby, limiting their retention capac-
ity relative to gross premium income. 
Instead of basing retention limits on sums insured, fire ins-
urers frequently operate on estimated maximum losses ( E ~ l L L 's). As 
noted in Chapter 5, the danger then lies in the under-estimation 
of the ErlL. 
9.4.4 Motor Insurance 
Motor business is characterised by relatively uniform sums 
insured for own damage covers, and the limits of third party lia-
bility covers are also uniform within one market. Al t hough motor 
portfolios in Arab countries include a large number of homogenous 
risks, the main problem in this class of business is the level of 
the original premiums relative to the claims costs and general ex-
penses. 
Throughout the world, but especially in the developing count-
ries, motor business is one of the branches of insurance most sub-
ject to political interference in that governments are cnnscious 
that it affects a large part of the general public (Kingsbury, 1980, 
p.4) . In many Arab countries government intervention makes it 
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difficult for insurers to raise motor premiums, especially for com-
pulsory motor insurances, to levels sufficient to offset increases 
in their claims costs during periods of inflation. Given the 
unwillingness of reinsurers to subsidise national motor portfolios 
by sharing in the resulting underwriting losses, many Arab insurers 
are forced to carry higher retention limits than they would prefer. 
9.4.5 Engineering Insurance 
In Engineering insurance, the level of retention has to be 
determined, in a large number of cases, on an individual basis, 
taking into consideration the special characteristics of each risk. 
Mare common factors are the type of cover (Le. EAR, CAR, (1B), 
the location of the risk and the sum insured. The latter factor 
forms the main problem in this branch of insurance, because of the 
disproportion which exists between the sums insured in the different 
engineering risks (Swiss Re, 1980, pp.52,and 198). 
Retention limits are usually based on sums insured for engineer-
ing insurances. Although with the aid of highly qualified technical 
staff an insurer in principle ought to be able to work on the basis 
of Er1Ls, such a practice is not considered desirable by some lead-
ing insurers in that it involves arbitrary decisions ,,'hich could 
leave both the insurer and his reinsurers badly exposed to loss 
(Gerathewohl,1980, p.161). 
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9.5 Accumulation Risks and Retention Limits per Event 
Insurance portfolios can be exposed to accumulations of 
losses as the result of one loss producing event affecting two 
or more risks either within one class of insurance or involving 
perhaps several classes of insurance. As discussed in Chapter 
six, major loss accumulations may arise from the operation of natural 
hazards, but there can be other causes. 
9.5.1 Accumulation within one Class of Insurance 
There are two factors involved in the consideration of reten-
tions: (i) the retention per risk; and (ii) where there is any 
interdependence between individual risks, the retention per loss 
event. If the individual retentions are determined according to 
the company's financial strength and the anticipated fluctuation 
of its business results, and if the maximum retention per risk 
represents a high proportion of the net retained premium income. 
then the total amount of money to be paid as a consequence of one 
loss event may severely affect t he company (Gerathewohl, 1980, 
p.154). 
As explained below, the main classes differ in their degrees 
of exposure to accumulations of losses from one event, which is 
one reason \.,hy insurers vary their retention limits by class of 
insurance. 
Fire Business 
Fire portfolios can be exposed to accumulations of losses 
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affecting: 
(i) two or more material damage risks; e.g. due to 
conflagrations or explosions in inner city areas; 
(ii) material damage and ensuing loss of profits for the same 
policyholder(s) ; 
(iii) loss of profits for two or more policyholders: e.g. custom-
ers and suppliers. 
The second type of accumulation is common and can be handled 
by scaling down the per risk retentions. For example. where an 
insurer insures both risks for the same policyholder, it is common 
practice to reduce the loss of profits retention to 50 per cent 
of the corresponding material damage retention limit. 
If a portfolio is exposed to possible accumulations of losses 
arising from conflagrations or natural hazards, besides fixing 
per risk retentions the insurer will also need to arrange a retention 
limi t per event. The balance of any accumulation of losses can 
then be covered by catastrophe excess of loss reinsurance. 
Marine Cargo Business 
Possible causes of accumulations of losses may be classified 
as follows: 
(i) Several cargoes on one vessel. 
(ii) Several cargoes in one dock and/or warehouse. 
(iii) Cargoes on two or more vessels. 
The first type of accumulation is common and is the reason 
for cargo insurers often preferring to fix their retention limits 
on the basis of "per bottom" rather th,:m per policy I. Apart from 
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the remote risk of collisions at sea the other main accumulation 
risks occur at ports of departure and destination. Due to the 
increasing demand for consumer and investment goods in the Arab 
World in recent years, particularly by the oil producing countries, 
cargo amounting to a total value of many hundreds of millions of 
USS is stored in the warehouses and storage yards of the countries' 
ports. Since most of these ports, coupled with the poor quality 
of roads and transport systems, do not have sufficient capacity 
to cope with such huge amounts of goods and are not capable of 
shipping them without delay, the accumulation risk has rapidly 
increased in recent years. Therefore cargo insurers need to fix 
retention limits per event for the purpose of effecting catastrophe 
excess of loss covers. 
Marine Hull Business 
The accumulation of several hulls due to a collision or a 
seizure (in the case of hostile events) is quite possible. A 
well-known example in this context is the war between Iran and 
Iraq, which, as a consequence. has trapped many ships in the Iraqi 
port of Basra. The main accumulation risk for a hull undf'nvriter 
is in connection with war risks, though the port risk can also 
be important for an insurer covering national fleets operating 
from congested ports. 
The other major accumulation risk for the marine insurer is 
that of being involved in a loss affecting both hull and cargo 
whether insured for the same or different interests. 
Aviation Business 397 
In aviation, following a crash involving one plane, accumulation 
may arise through loss of hull, passenger legal liability, cargo 
legal liability, third party legal liability, and accident policies. 
Under such circumstances the accumulation risk may result in losses 
of many million of US$. It may also be possible that a major 
accumulation could arise when several aircraft are on the ground, 
at one place, and damage occurs to more than one aircraft insured 
by an insurer; e. g. the Tenerife disaster \"hich involved tiVO jumbo 
jets. 
:Iotor Business 
Apart from vehicle damage claims arising from natural hazards. 
e.g. windstorm, flood and hail, and fleets of vehicles being garaged 
together, the risk of an insurer incurring claims for two or more 
vehicles being involved in the same incident is directly related 
to the size of its market share. In other words, a monopoly insurer 
will have an accumulation of claims from every collision or other 
incident involving two or more vehicles. 
risks are, however: 
The main accumulation 
9.5.2 
(i) vehicle damage plus liability claims arising from the 
same event; and 
(ii) multiple liability claims, especially in connection with 
buses and coaches. 
Accumulations Between Various Classes 
Simultaneous accumulations of losses from several classes 
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of business are very infrequent, but are possible. A hurricane, 
for instance may affect fire, business interruption, personal accid-
ent, EAR, CAR, motor own damage, marine, life and conceivably even 
credit insurance 1· . po ... 1.c1.es. In such cases, the losses which derive 
from different types of insurances may have a major effect on a 
company s annual results and will no doubt, be much greater than 
in case of loss accumulation in one class only (Gerathewohl, 1980, 
p.155). 
In the above example, it is impossible for an insurer to knmv 
in advance the impact of such catastrophic events on various reten-
tions in respect of numerous risks in different classes covered 
by him. The insurer must always check, when fixing r-etentions, 
whether several, independent classes of insurance may be affected 
by one event, thus creating a loss accumulation. Therefore the 
insurer may need to compile a classification list of classes in 
which accumulations are likely to occur, and then adjust the reten-
tions according to this list. From an empirical point of view, 
it is difficult to reach an accurate calculation in this respect. 
Carter (1981, p.1/7) argues that to a large extent the problem 
of identifying and measuring accumulations from a single occurrence 
has not yet been solved. Qualified companies will do their utmost 
to quantify such accumulations, while unqualified companies will 
disregard this potential with possibly ruinous consequences either 
for themselves, or for their reinsurers, or for both. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that companies may prefer to 
arrange a catastrophe excess of loss cover that operates when losses 
resulting from one event affect more than one class of insurance: 
i.e. an umbrella reinsurance. If arranged in addition to separate 
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catastrophe excess of loss covers for the individual classes of 
insurance, the purchase of an umbrella reinsurance will enable 
the insurer to limit to a pre-determined sum its aggregate net 
retained losses arising from one event which affects two or more 
classes of insurance. Thus, as Carter has pointed out (1981, p.2/4), 
the insurer then will be able safely to fix the retention limits 
for the underlying separate catastrophe covers at levels which 
are as high as is appropriate to the needs of the individual classes 
of insurance. The difficulty is to establish the correct retention 
and upper treaty limit for the umbrella insurance. 
9.6 Conclusions 
The fixing of retention limits is one of the most difficult 
problems facing the management of an insurance compar.y because 
of the number of factors that need to be taken into consideration, 
including the differing characteristics of the various classes 
of insurance business and the distinction between loss events affe:t-
ing one or more individual risks. As shown in this chapter, the 
relationships between the various factors and the appropriate reten-
tion limits differ, in some cases being direct and in others inverse, 
so that to date there has been developed no widely accepted mathema-
tical model which insurers can use to solve the problem. An approach 
gaining in popularity is the use of computer simulation models, 
such as the model outlined in the Baleslaw Manic Fund prize-winning 
papers Net Retentions (1981) but many insurers still lack all of 
the data required to make use of them, and managem.ent must still 
choose between alternative policies with differing reinsurance 
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costs and probabilities of rUin. Thus whatever system may be 
employed to fix retention limits, management attitudes are of para-
mount importance. 
A second point is that the retention limits chosen will have 
an important influence on the attainment of an insurer I s corporate 
objectives. That issue will be explored more fully in the following 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CORPORATE OBJECTIVES AND THE DETERNINATION 
OF RETENTION LIMITS - GENERAL THEORY OF RETENTION 
10.1 Introduction 
The main role of top management is to decide on their companies' 
objectives and to pursue the policies necessary for their attainment. 
Exactly what those objectives may be can differ from one company 
to another depending on the company's type (e.g. state or private-
ly owned, proprietary or mutual), its size and the nature of the 
market in which it is operating. Any discussion involving the corp-
orate objectives of companies encounters three difficulties: 
(i) \vhether a company's controllers and managers have clearly 
defined their objectives; 
(ii) the potential conflicts between possible objectives, 
Hhich leads to the distinction between primary and 
secondary objectives; and 
(iii) the differences between companies in their chosen objec-
tives. 
In all of these respects, of course, insurance companies are no 
different from companies operating in other industries. 
Increasingly insurance and reinsurance companies, especially 
if operating in competitive markets, are beginning to realise that 
the definition of clear, realistic objectives is of paramount import-
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ance. 
(1) 
One of the primary duties of top management is to deter-
mine the company's objectives and select the appropriate strategies 
by which to achieve them. This is not only necessary for the growth 
and profitability of the company but may even be vital for its survi-
val. 
When companies have defined their objectives, the next step 
is to decide on the prime objective. Does it, for example, wish 
to achieve maximum profits, or to maximise the growth of gross prem-
ium income, or to maximise the growth of retained premium income, 
or to increase its market share? Many questions like these need 
to be answered before a comprehensive corporate strategy can be 
formulated. The underlying principle is that all objectives are 
interdependent and none can be set in isolativn. But one should 
realise that objectives may change in emphasis over a period of 
time. For example, the management of a new company may seek to 
maximise profits in order to build up reserves, later it may merely 
attempt to maintain a satisfactory profit. 
How management can achieve a continuous growth in the amount 
of business written is one matter: how much of that business it 
reinsures is another. The latter problem is often complicated bv 
the limited information available for selecting the best reinsurance 
programme. Equally, the company may not understand the advantages 
and disadvantages of each type of reinsurance and the cost implica-
tions of selecting one type over another. Unless the programme and 
(1) "Since 1863, the inception date, until 1970 Swiss Re did not 
have formal volume objective, no formal objectives and no 
budgeting existed." (Odermatt, 1978, p.ll). 
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cost of reinsurance are clearly understood in the decision making 
process, the company may decide on the wrong plan, which might prove 
an extremely costly mistake. 
The most difficult problem in reinsurance programming is the 
determination of retention limits. Obviously, if the retention 
limits are too low, unnecessary reinsurance will be taken out, while 
if these limits are too high, unexpected fluctuations in claims 
costs and therefore in earnings may occur. 
provide a comprehensive discussion of: Ca) 
This chapter seeks to 
the utility theory of 
retentions, (b) an examination of the findings of a questionnaire 
designed to discover what insurance and reinsurance companies in 
the Arab World see as their prime objectives, Cc) some possible 
objectives, namely: profit target, production target, market share 
and solvency margin, and how insurance companies seek to achieve 
them, and Cd) the implication of these objectives for retention 
limi ts. 
10.2 A General Review of Corporate Objectives and Retention Limits 
10.2.1 Key Corporate Objectives and Retention Limits 
Among the objectives which insurance companies mey pursue 
four are of major importance, ~ a m e l y : :
Profit Target 
Economic theory indicates that the point of maximum profits 
is ,.;here marginal revenue equals marginal cost. :!any economists, 
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however, warn that profit maximising is not an operational concept 
since it cannot be defined. Thus, in recent years, there have been 
several alternative theories of the firm, including the theory that 
confronted by many uncertainties, firms tend to be 'satisficers' 
that is they seek to attain not maximum but satisfactory profits 
( S i mo n , 1 9 5 5 ) . That could well be true of insurance and reinsurance 
companies that have to operate in an environment where lack of cert-
ainty about the future makes it questionable whether profit maximis-
ing is ever the main objective and, indeed, whether it is an achiev-
able objective. 
Growth of Sales 
Instead of trying to maximise profits a firm may try to maxim-
ise its revenue. An insurance company's revenue may be measured as 
either gross or retained premium income, though the two are related 
because unless an insurance company can achieve the growth of gross 
premium income it will not be possible to increase retained premium 
income unless it raises its retention limits. The latter is a very 
risky strategy because, as demonstrated in Chapter 9, it exposes the 
company to larger fluctuations in aggregate retained claims costs. 
Market Share 
A market share objective is closely related to the growth 
of sales: t he higher are an 
. , l.nsurer s sales as measured by gross 
premium income, t he larger \-/i 11 be his market share. Therefore 
the same considerations apply to the fixing of retention limi ts, 
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particularly if the market share objective is expressed in terms 
of retained premium income. 
One additional complication with pursuing an objective of 
increasing (or even just retaining an existing) market share is 
the difficulty of obtaining up-to-date information regarding the 
performance of the rest of the market. If the objective is based 
on retained premium income, competitors may quickly change their 
market positions by changes in their retention policies \.;hich may 
not become public knowledge for some time. 
Solvency Margin 
As the provision of security for policyholders is the function 
of an insurance company, so maintaining its own solvency ought to 
rank high amongst an insurer's corporate objectives. Changes in 
underwriting or reinsurance policy can directly affect the attainment 
of that objective. For example, a rapid increase in retained premium 
income at a time when underwriting plus investment earnings are 
falling or even static will result in the company's solvency margin 
also falling unless it is able to boost its free reserves by raising 
additional capital. So when underwriting results are deteriorating, 
or the value of free reserves are falling due to a decline in the 
market values of asset s, an insurer may choose to rei nsure a high-
er proportion of his potential claims liabilities. For example 
in 1983 when the Commercial Union was concerned about the substantial 
losses being incurred on its American business it opted t<) purchase 
a special stop loss reinsurance. 
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Competition and Corporate Objectives 
Obviously, the objectives which have already been mentioned 
above are substantially affected by competitive forces which in 
insurance markets can take the following forms (Diacon, 1981, p.6/7). 
1. Price competition. 
2. Extent of cover. 
3. In life assurance, type 
rates. 
4. Quality of service. 
of profit bonuses and bonus 
5. Rapidity of claims settlement. 
6. Quality of underwriting. 
7. Xarketing policy. 
8. Rates of commission paid to agents. 
Item 1 and arguably item 8 are examples of price competition, 
whereas the remainder are forms of non-price competition. The 
latter may be divided into product and service competition. It 
is impossible within the scope of this study to offer more than 
a brief explanation of price and non-price competition and their 
relationship to corporate objectives. 
10.2.2.1 Price Competition and Corporate Objectives 
In many Arab countries, competition within the insurance 
industry continues to be intense, sometimes due to companies seeking 
to obta':n premium income without proper assessment of the risks 
involved. This si t ua tion has been encouraged by reinsurers i.Jho 
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have behaved in a similar manner. Indeed , given such availability 
of reinsurance there are clear signs of an over-capacity almost 
everywhere, and this has increased at an even more rapid rate than 
the business available. Over-capacity, together with the economic 
recession and the availability of high interest rates, has resulted 
in vigorous competition for business. This has encouraged relent-
less price cutting and adversely affected profit margins. The more 
intense the competition and uncertainty in an insurance market, 
the worse tend to be the underwriting results. 
If the cutting of premium rates to increase the volume of 
business wri t ten is taken to the point that an insurer's marginal 
revenue (i. e. premium income plus inves tment income) falls belo,,, 
its marginal costs, then both its operating profits, and ultimately 
its financial strength, will suffer. Today many Arab insurers and 
other insurers worldwide are in such a position, even though in 
many countries governments have the power to control the price compe-
tition in direct insurance. 
Clearly insurers, like firms in other industries, cannot afford 
to pursue premium growth or market share regardless of the effec t 
on profit and, ultimately, on financial stability. 
10.2.2.2 Non-Price Competition and Corporate Objectives 
Non-price competition in insurance takes two forms: 
(i) product innovation, by providing improvements to th2 
cover under standard types of insurance contracts avail-
able on the market, and by introducing new forms of 
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insurance; and 
(ii) quality of pre- and post-sales service provided; that 
is, the efficient handling of proposals and claims, 
the provision of loss prevention services for policy-
holders, etc. 
Both forms can be highly effective in attracting business 
but they also add to costs, e.g. (a) generous claims settlements 
add to claims costs, and consequently affect underwriting results, 
and (b) loss prevention surveys add to expenses. Indeed there is 
much discussion nowadays about the need for insurers to unscramble 
the services they offer from the insurance produc t, and to charge 
for them separately. 
Moreover, given the complex and subjective nature of insurance, 
together with a highly technical and unattractive commodity, the 
quality of the service and product provided by an insurance company 
may be more important than the price when choosing insurance. This 
argument, in fact, is to a large extent an empirical one, and not 
a theoretical question. 
The above discussion may suggest that non-price competition 
in the quality of the product and service, as \Vell as the price 
competition, may be the only really effective elements in achieving 
a company's prime objectives. 
10.2.3 Corporate Objectives in Insurance Business 
2\Ving (1968, pp. 26-28) summarised the c h a r a c t e ~ i s t i c s s of 
good strategic objectives as follo\Vs: 
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1. Objectives must be specific; 
2. Objectives should have a time scale; 
3. Objectives must be consistent with one another; 
4. Objectives must be based on facts, values and feelings 
about the facts; and 
5. Objectives are hierarchical. 
The above characteristics provide sufficient elements for 
conceptualising the determination of objectives. However, one further 
factor should be considered, that of the extent of the objectives. 
It may be better to determine comprehensive objectives for the 
whole company's activities than try to establish objectives for 
only a few activities. Robarts (1969, p.624), Chief General i'lanager 
of the (.lorwich Union Group, an organisation owned by a mutual life 
office, supports this general view and expresses that group's object-
objectives as: 
"To offer as widely as possible to the public at home and 
abroad the benefits of competitive insurance terms for all 
classes of business at rates profitable to the group, to earn 
the highest possible bonus for participating life policyholders, 
to hand on to succeeding generations of policyholders an effic-
ient and live organisation, with increased funds and surpluses, 
and to sustain an enthusiastic and effective staff at all 
levels by ensuring the best possible Harking conditions and 
remuneration, and full opportunities for promotion to the 
maximum of individual capability". 
T\11O points can be made regarding such a set of objectives. 
First, as already argued, if a company adopts a number of objectives 
it cannot maximise them all, there :nust be trade-offs both between 
objectives and overtime. So, for example, the distribution of 
the highest possible rates of bonus to life policyholders in the 
short-run may reduce the returns over the longer-term. Secondly, 
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an organisation contains differing interest groups the owners, 
employees and customers. Their objectives may conflict too; for 
example, large pay awards to insurance employees may raise a comp-
any's expense ratio so adversely affecting its policyholders'and/or 
shareholders' interests. 
The latter point also raises the question as to whose inter-
ests management seeks to serve in setting the corporate objectives. 
Over the long-term there must be some degree of common interest 
between each of the interestgroups, but in addition to the possible 
objectives of an insurance company which have already been discussed 
one could add: 
(a) dividend and asset growth objectives for shareholders; 
and 
(b) price and service objectives for policyholders. 
Not only may direct insurers differ in their corporate object-
ives, partly reflecting differences in the type of ownership, but 
also it is arguable that the objectives of reinsurance companies 
may differ to some degree from those of direct insurers. 
In the case of a reinsurance company with shareholders, Frank 
(1982, p.129) has argued that its t,.JO main objectives should be 
(i) concern with the return on investment and (ii) solvency. Becke 
(1981, p.770) argues that the ultimate targets of a reinsurance 
company in most cases will combine profit expectation, volume of 
business, proper security, cash flow consideration, and solvency. 
The same could be sairi of a direct insurer, but the necessity to 
achieve a particular objective in a reinsurance company may not 
be the same as in an insurance company. For example, since a proress-
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ional reinsurer is involved in reinsuring the higher layers of risk 
accepted by insurers, and because his reputation in the international 
reinsurance market, and thus his success, is directly related to 
his financial strength, the reinsurer requires a somewhat relatively 
larger solvency margin than insurance companies of similar size 
in terms of premium income. Today ceding companies and their advis-
ers are certainly placing more emphasis on the security of potential 
reinsurers. 
Some insurance experts refer to insurance company objectives 
as static, theoretical and unachievable. Their objectives are also 
subject to the criticism that they are not precise. For instance 
Borch (1967, pp. 581-591) has said that: 
"It is difficult to specify the general problems of an insur-
ance company simply because the company as a general rule 
will be unable to make a precise statement as to what it really 
wants to achieve. We can search the whole literature of insur-
ance, without finding an operational formulation of the aims 
or objectives of an insurance company". 
That may have been true of the position in the 1960s, but it 
is less so today. An ever increasing number of insurance companies 
in both developed and developing countries are, for example, engaging 
in corporate planning when the formulation of corporate objectives 
is an essential part of the planning process. There remains the 
problem, however, of choosing between objectives and coping with 
the uncertainty of outcomes: that is where utililty analysis can 
help. 
10.2.4 Utility Theory 
~ l o t t only are the outcomes of any course of 2ction uncertain, 
but also the managers and OImers of a company may not necessarily 
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judge the satisfaction gained from differing outcomes as varying 
in proportion to their monetary values. For example, according 
to the hypothesis of diminishing marginal utility, a profit of, 
say, $2 million would yield less than twice the total utility (i.e. 
satisfaction) than that of $1 million. Also attitudes to risk 
differ, some people being far more risk averse than others, so that 
the management of an insurance company may prefer to pursue a policy 
which guarantees its financial security, even if it means sacrificing 
a chance of earning high profits by not adopting another course 
of action which also carried the risk of incurring large losses. 
These are problems which can be handled by the use of utililty 
analysis. A suitable utility function is formulated to encapsulate 
the attitudes of the decision-makers, and then it is possible to 
determine mathematically the necessary conditions for maximising 
their total utility. Such analysis is largely of theoretical rather 
than practical use because of the difficulty in measuring an ind-
ividual's utility values, though there are devices for doing so. 
However, it does provide more insight into the necessary conditions 
for attaining differing objectives as will be illustrated briefly 
below. 
Three major decisions which the management of insurance compan-
ies have to take are: 
(i) 
(ii) 
the size of the loading which can be built into its 
premium rates and how much money it should spend 
on its marketing activities if it wishes to increase 
its sales volume; 
the reinsurance arrangements it should make in order 
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to reach an acceptable balance between expected 
profit and its financial security (e.g. as measured 
by its probability of ruin); and 
(iii) the investment policy it should pursue in order to 
achieve the best possible return on its funds while 
still being able to fulfil its other objectives. 
As far as the first point is concerned, clearly the size of 
premium loading affects the number of insurance policies which the 
company could sell. The larger the premium loading, the higher 
the insurance price, and the lower are likely to be its sales, 
and thus premium income. Borch (1974, p. 213) has pointed out that 
the choice of specific techniques can probably best be made in each 
particular case, depending upon the nature of the three functions 
namely: the claims distribution, the number of policies the company 
may be able to sell, the utility functions. The first function 
is far from fully known to any actuary, and the second is usually 
estimated by the sales manager or a market research department of 
the company. But the problem remains with the general shape of 
the utility functions about which little is known. He interprets 
this as follows: 
"the main reason for this lack of knowledge is that few compan-
ies are very specific when they make public statements about 
their policy. This may mean that companies simply do not have 
a ~ v e l l - d e f i n e d d policy. It may, hotvever, also mean that com-
panies consider their policy a business secret". 
The second substantial point regarding an insurance company 
is that of the reinsurance arrangements. In this context, however, 
one might ask what objectives the insurance company ought to have 
414 
in its ~ e i n s u r a n c e e policy. The purchase of reinsurance will enable 
an insurer to reduce the probability of incurring retained under-
writing losses which may imperil its solvency but at the cost of 
a reduction in: 
(i) its retained premium income; and 
(ii) its expected total operating profit, because the 
reinsurer will require a premium greater than the 
loss expectancy reinsured. 
Therefore in deciding upon its reinsurance arrangements an 
important consideration is its probability of ruin. When this 
probability is high, this will lead the company to consider re-
insurance arrangements to bring the probability of ruin down to 
the required level. Each type of reinsurance arrangement has a 
different effect on the company's portfolio. Assume that a company 
\olants to reinsure a quota K of its portfolio. It is cl ear t ha t 
the company's utility is affected by the value of K, because for 
each value of K there will be a different value of expected profit 
and probability of ruin. Therefore, that value of K should be chosen 
which enables the highest expected profit to be achieved with the 
acceptable probability of ruin. This point can be illustrated by 
the following example taken from Borch (1974, pp 93-94) using table 
10.1 below. 
Assume that a company in the risk situation (S,F(x» decides to 
reinsure a quota K of its portfolio. For this reinsurance cover 
the company has to pay the net premium KP of the ceded quota, plus 
a loading AKP, thus the optimal quota will then evidently be the 
value of K which maximises the expected utility of wealth: 
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co 
JV(S-(l-A)KP-(l-K)X)dF(x) (1) 
o 
where F(x) the probability that the total amount of claims being 
made under the contracts in the portfolio shall not 
exceed x. 
S the funds which the company holds and which it can 
draw upon to pay claims. 
P the risk premium of the whole portfolio, i.e., 
co 
P JxdF(x) 
o 
Assume that 
F(x) 
and the utility function is given 
vex) 2 -ax +x+b 
It seems that the above utility gives acceptable results when Vex) 
is increasing over the range of x values up to x=S; the constant 
a should be 1 . 
< 2S 
By substituting F(x) and Vex) in (1) and setting 
the derivative (with respect to K)=O, we obtain the optimal value 
of K that maximises the expected utility, and given by 
K 2a(1-A)-A(1-2aS) 
2a(1+\2) 
416 
If for example a 1/3, b 0.135, S l.2, and A 0.1 
t.Je obtain 
K 0.86 
The third column of the table 10.1 gives different values 
of K in (1). Taking now an example using K = 0.8 and 
co 
p JxdF(x) 
o 
Then 
U(S-(l-A)KP-(l-K)x) U(0.32-0.2x) 
i. e. U 0.421-0.1573x-0.0133x2 
Substituting in (1), we obtain 
U = 0.2368 the value of utility which corresponds to using K 0.8. 
As mentioned earlier, different values of K result in different 
values of expected profit and probability of ruin. Thus, for the 
same value of K = 0.8, the expected profit and probability of ruin 
are computed as follows: 
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00 
Expected profit f[S-(l+A)KP-(l-K)x]dF(x) 
o 
from before we have P 1, and the quantity in the brackets is 
O.32-0.2x 
00 
Therefore expected profit f(O.32-0.2x)e- xdx 
o 
0.12 
To obtain the probability of ruin, we solve 
We obtain 
S-(l-A)KP-(l-K)X=O 
x = S-(l-A)KP 
1-K 
1.6 
00 
Therefore probability of ruin fdF(x) 
1 • 6 
00 
-x f e dx 
1 • 6 
0.2019 
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From the above one can conclude that the utility, expected 
profit and probability of ruin are all affected by the value of 
K. If we assume the company accepts a ruin probability of ~ 0 . 2 7 , ,
then it will only consider the arrangements number 7-12, from which 
the company chooses the one with the highest utility, namely the 
arrangement number 10 which gives utility equal to 0.240, at 
K = 0.86. 
Table 10.1 
Quota Share Reinsurance Arrangement 
~ o . . K Utili ty Expected profit Probability of Ruin 
1 0 0 0.20 0.3012 
2 0.1 0.056 0.19 0.2982 
3 0.2 0.101 0.18 0.2923 
4 0.3 0.142 0.17 0.2865 
5 0.4 0.174 0.16 0.2808 
6 0.5 0.195 0.15 0.2725 
7 0.6 0.216 0.14 0.2645 
8 0.7 0.230 0.13 0.2393 
9 0.8 0.237 0.12 0.2019 
10 0.86 0.240 0.115 0.1791 
11 0.9 0.238 
I 
0.11 0.1225 
12 1.0 0.231 0.10 I 
0 
Source: Borch, 1974, p 94. 
The final point in the activity of an insurance company is 
concerned with investment decisions. Investment funds are of two 
kinds: (i) technical reserves funds, and (ii) shareholders funds. 
Practice shows that the first is more significant than the second 
in terms of its volume. The objective of the company's management, 
from the investment point of view, is to discover the actions which 
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provide the best attainable return. This means that the m a n a g e ~ e n t t
should have the ability to differentiate between various alternatives 
over its investment policy, and then choose the most favourable 
alternative with which to obtain the highest return. 
One of the most difficult financial decisions facing the insurance 
company is the determination of the liquidity of its funds since, 
normally, (i) interest rates are inversely related to liquidity, 
and (ii) expected rates of return on different types of investment 
are directly related to their riskiness. The optimal investment, 
however, relies on two factors: firstly, the claims distribution. 
Since the reinsurance arrangement has its effect on the claim 
distribution, the investment and reinsurance decisions should be 
analysed together. Secondly the available investment opportunities, 
and the decision which has to be taken by the company, have a sub-
stantial effect on the rate of return on the company's invested 
funds. 
One can conclude from the above, that there is a close rel-
ationship between the three activities of production, reinsurance, 
and investment. Taking into account that the correlation exists 
between these activities, a company's ultimate objective should 
be to find decisions which are jointly optimal. 
10.3 The Corporate Objectives of Arab Insurance Companies 
Having discussed corporate objectives and retention limits 
in general terms, attention will now be focussed on the practices 
of Arab insurance companies. 
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A questionnaire was sent to 143 insurance and reinsurance co-
mpanies in the Arab World (see Appendix) and replies were received 
from 46, i.e. almost one-third. The replies represented 15 of the 
21 countries to which the questionnaires were sent, and covered 
the types of companies shown in Table 10.2. 
Table 10.2 
Types of Ownership and Number of Respondents 
Type of Ownership Number of 01 
I I 
'0 
Respondents I 
I 
State 9 20 
Private 14 30 
~ l i x e d d 6 13 
Co-operatives 2 5 
Foreign Subsidiary 1 2 
Owned by local interest and 
foreign company 14 30 
Total 46 100 
In response to the question as to how long had they been 
established, only one-third said they were more thiln 20 years old 
and almost a half had been formed within the last ten years (see 
Table 10.3). 
Companies were also asked whether they have formal/explicit 
corporate objectives. 8 3 ~ ~ ~ of the respondents replied in the af-
firmative (see Table 10.4). 
Question four asked the respondents to specify from a list of 
nine commonly cited corporate objectives and any other \.;hich they 
wished to add, their primary objectives, ranking them in order of 
importance. Some respondents cited only one, others ranked sev-
eral. Table 10.5 and figure 10.1 which were constructed from 
Table 10.3 
C o m p a n i e s ~ ~ Dates of Establishment 
'-._--
Type of 0-5 yrs. 6-10 yrs. 10-20 yrs. 20-30 yrs. 
OHnership No. % No. % No. % No. % 
State - - 1 11 3 33.5 2 22 
Private 2 14 6 43 3 22 2 14 
Hixed 2 33.3 2 33.3 - - 2 33.3 
Co-operative - - - - 1 50 - -
Foreign 
Subsidiary - - - - - - - -
Owned by 
local int-
erests & 
foreign co. 1 7 7 50 3 21.5 3 21. 5 
Total 5 11 16 35 10 22 9 19 
Over 30 yrs 
No. % 
3 33.5 
1 7 
- -
1 50 
1 100 
- -
6 13 
Total 
No. 
9 
14 
6 
2 
1 
14 
46 
% 
20 
30 
13 
5 
2 
30 
100 
I 
i 
.p. 
N 
.... 
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the replies, show that, with the exception of the subsidiaries 
of foreign companies, the three most important objectives (ranked 
in order of importance) were: 
1. to provide a service for insured clients at a fair price; 
2. to maintain the financial strength of the company; 
3. to achieve a satisfactory level of profit. 
It can thus be observed that companies in the Arab World tend 
to be orientated towards social objectives, i.e. providing a service 
for insured clients at a fair price, rather than profit objectives. 
This is to be expected because firstly, from the outset, for State 
insurance companies that has been a principal objective laid down 
for them by their governments. Secondly, for other companies (except 
foreign subsidiaries), it may be because it is essential for their 
business future to show that they are more concerned with furnishing 
a good service for their policyholders than to achieve profit. 
Table 10.4 
The Position Regarding Corporate Objectives 
I Type of Ownership I 
Yes No 
\ I 
I I No. 0, No. 0; I 
" 
0 
State 8 89 1 11 
IPrivate 11 79 3 21 
r.-1ixed 4 67 2 33 
to-operative 2 100 - -
Foreign Subsidiary 1 100 - -
Owned by local interests 
& foreign company 12 86 2 14 
Total 38 83 8 1 7 I 
The average rankings given to the two profit objectives included 
in the list (i.e. 'to maximise profits for the coming year, and 
___ ~ ~___ -0_--
Objective s 
-----
(a) Service 
(b) Fillimci 
(c) t-todmis 
(d) ~ 1 a x i m i s s
( e) ill viderxi 
(f) Satisfa 
(g) Premium 
(h) Relained 
(i) ~ 1 a r k e t t
1 Strength 
profit 1 yr 
profit 5 yr 
s gro.oJth 
tory profit 
gro.oJth 
premilUn 
hare 
Table 10.5 
~ r i m e _ i > ~ j e c t i v ! : ! s s ~ _ L l ! s u r a n c e e and Reinsurance tn ~ h e _ A ! " ~ ~ ~ ~ _ l d d (1) 
----_._----------- - - . ~ - - - - ---- ------
State Privdle t-Ii xed 
total degree total degree total degree 
IXlints of inllxlr- IXlints of impor- IXli nts of irnIX)r-
tance tance tance 
-------
71 1 123 1 53 1 
53 2 101 2 50 2 
'12 5 70 8 20 9 
26 6 75 6 21 8 
1 8 72 7 26 7 
53 2 92 3 42 3 
45 4 86 4 31 4 
50 3 84 5 28 6 
32 5 72 7 29 5 
--------
Co-operatives 
total degree 
rx>ints of iIn}x: 
tance 
18 1 
17 2 
14 3 
14 3 
11 4 
14 3 
4 6 
11 4 
9 5 
- -
,r-
Foreign 
tota 1 
Ix>ints 
7 
9 
8 
6 
1 
5 
4 
3 
2 
sub. 
degree 
of in1iXlr-
tance 
3 
1 
2 
4 
9 
5 
6 
7 
El 
Local 
total 
points 
103 
96 
59 
54 
52 
66 
56 
66 
62 
------
& Foreigni Total 
degree I total degree 
of ilIljx>r- IXlinls of imp.)r-
tance tance 
1 375 1 
2 326 2 
5 203 7 
7 195 8 
8 163 9 
3 272 3 
6 226 5 
3 242 4 
4 206 6 
(I)The method of calculating the total points for the iJurpose of determining the importance of the factors was as follows: 
First poinU; \.,rere aHarded to each factor according to the rallking given by the respondent, i.e. 
fjrst 9 points 
second 8 points 
J 1 
ninth point 
Then the points d\,/arded on the basis of each respondents ranking were added to produce the total points. 
41313 
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3513 
300 
250 
(j) 
f-
z 
0 
il. 
2130 
-1 
< 
I-
0 
I-
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to, maximise profits over five years ') differ by type of company. 
State companies considered them to be of the fifth and sixth degree 
of importance respectively, private companies of the eighth and 
~ i 5 t h , , and mixed companies of the ninth and eighth. Co-operatives 
ranked both of the objectives in third place, foreign subsidiaries 
in the second and fourth, and companies owned by local and foreign 
interests in the fifth and seventh. 
These findings are in marked contrast to the results of a survey 
conducted by an Advanced Study Group of the Insurance Institute 
of London (1982) which indicated that profit \vas the primary motive 
of the majority of U.K. insurance companies, apart from specialist 
life offices (see Table 10.6). According to Sharp (1983, p 85), 
Australian companies are even more profit-orientated (see Table 10.7). 
Table 10.6 
The Prime Objectives of the United Kingdom Companies 
Insurance Canpanies 
Objectives Life General Canposite Brokers Total 
No. ~ ~ ~ No. ? ~ ~ No. 0' No. 0, No • o ~ ~0 '0 
To achieve a profit target 20 43 26 90 14 61 7 78 67 63 
To achieve a production target 23 50 12 41 11 48 3 33 49 46 
To determine probable future profits 21 46 18 62 13 57 5 56 57 53 
To determine future production p a t t e ~ ~ 15 33 14 48 11 48 3 33 43 40 
Other 11 24 6 21 5 22 3 33 25 23 
Source: I.I.L., (1982 p ifS). 
In addition to the objectives listed in the questionnaire, 
25 companies said that they had other objectives which may be 
classified as follows: 
1. To promote private inter-Arab investment. 
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2. To maximise profits as well as protect the environment in which 
the company operates. 
3. To achieve better co-operation bet\veen local insurers in order 
that they should share risks rather than compete to accept high 
liabilities at low premiums. 
4. To achieve a production target. 
5. To find a way to develop real co-operation bet\veen our sister 
countries and increase our market S h n ~ e . .
6. To satisfy our clients while maintaining, or even increasing, 
our rate of growth. 
The answers to the last three questions of the questionnaire, 
which sought information about how the companies fix their retention 
limits, will be considered in Chapter 12. Meanwhile the remainder 
of this chapter will be devoted to a more detailed examination 
of the inter-relationships between retention limits and some of 
the corporate objectives of insurance companies, commencing ,vith 
profit. 
Table 10.7 
The Prime Objectives of the U.K. and Australia Companies 
Objectives Australia ! U.K. 
To achieve a profit target 93 ? ~ ~ 63% 
To determine future profits 60 53 
To achieve production target 49 46 
To determine future production patterns 34 40 
Source: Sharp (1983 p. 85). 
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10.4 Profit Target 
Although Arab companies, unlike their British and Australian 
counterparts, may not place profit high on their lists of corporate 
objectives, it does appear amongst them. The questionnaire referred 
to the maximisation of profits, the realism of which has been 
questioned earlier in this chapter, so now the mat ter will be ex-
amined in more detail, together with the relationship between profit 
objectives and retention limits. 
profits will be explained. 
First the sources of an insurer's 
10.4.1. Sources of Profit in Insurance and Reinsurance Business 
The net earnings of insurance and reinsurance companies are 
obtained from: 
(i) 
(ii) 
the difference between the premiums they receive and 
the claims and expenses incurred (the underwriting result); 
plus 
the earnings they receive from the investment of their 
funds, which consist of their capital and free reserves 
plus funds they accrue from their underwriting activities 
representing liabilities to policyholders (the technical 
reserves ). 
Figure lO.2 shows the two sources of profit in diagrammatic form. 
Traditionally non-life insurers and reinsurers have treated under-
writing profit as the appropriate measure of the profitability 
of t heir business. Today there is far greater acceptance of the 
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Figure 10.2 
Sources of Profits in the Insurance Industry 
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concept that one should also bring into account the investment 
earnings on the technical funds. For example, Meinertzhagen (1983, 
P 4) chairman of the Royal Insurance Co., writes: 
"Insurance Companies, however, hold-out of premiums received 
funds to provide for unearned premiums and outstanding claims, 
which are invested and on which investment income is earned. 
The investment of these funds and the earnings on them are 
an integral part of the insurance operation. We felt it right 
to give shareholders a clearer understanding of the return 
derived from our insurance operations by changing the format 
of the Revenue Account to include an item for the investment 
income earned on these funds". 
An insurer's profit performance is closely tied up with both 
!:he general economic cycles and market conditions. Accordingly. 
underwriting profit in many classes of insurance tends to be cyclical. 
Table 10.8 and Figure 10.3 show the underwriting results of total 
non-life business for nine developed countries for the period 
1973-1980. Underwriting losses predominated in the majority of 
countries and years. Compared with those countries, the underwriting 
results of Arab insurance markets (which are recorded in Chapter 
Three) have been relatively good. However, even in profitable 
markets some insurance companies may incur losses due to poor 
underwriting and/or claims control and/or general management. 
An insurer's investment earnings are also to some degree beyond 
its control being dependent on market interest rates, etc. But 
they also depend on the size of the funds at its disposal, the 
length of time for which the funds are available for investment, 
Table 10.8 
Underwriting Results of Total Non-Life Business as 
Percentage of Premiums for the Period 1973-1980 
Country 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
% % % % % % % 
Australia (1) -2.3 -13.0 -7.8 +1.0 d.6 -1.4 -3.1 
Canada (1) -6.1 -10.6 -4.9 -2.0 -0.7 -0.2 -5.2 
W.Germany (1) (4) +3.1 +3.9 +1.8 +0.2 +1.1 +0.4 +1.0 
G. Britain: domestic B(l) +1.8 + 1.0 -1.9 -1.2 -0.7 -2.8 
(3) +0.6 
foreign B(l) -6.6 -7.5 -3.2 -0.6 -0.4 -3.4 
(3 ) 
Japan (1) -1.7 -4.7 -5.7 -3.4 -2.5 -0.6 -0.7 
Netherlands (1) +5.1 -0.4 -3.2 -4.9 -5.0 -2.5 -0.6 
Spain (2) -9.7 -7.9 -5.7 -9.8 -13.8 -15.9 -17.2 
Switzerland (1) -1.8 +2.8 -6.0 -6.6 -6.8 -6.6 -6.4 
United States (1) +0.8 -5.6 -8.4 -3.4 +1.6 +2.4 -0.4 
----
- ~ - -
------
1980 Average 
% 
-9.4 -3.1 
-11. 0 -5.1 
+0.3 +1.4 
-1.7 -0.6 
-6.9 -4.1 
+0.6 -2.3 
+1.4 -1.3 
-14.9 -11. 9 
-7.7 -4.9 
-3.0 -2.2 
-----
Source: Extracted for Sigma-Swiss Re, No. 9/1979 for the year 1973, No. 9/1980 for the 
year 1974, No. 9/1981 for the years 1975-1979, and No. 9/1982 for the year 
1980. 
(1) Total business for own account. 
(2) Gross direct business. 
(3) Excl. marine and aviation. 
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Figure 10.3 
Underwriting Results as Percentage of Premiums 
in Total Non-Life Business 
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Figure 10.3 
continued 
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and the investment policy pursued. Although a company's investment 
income invariably will be positive and usually sufficiently large 
to cover any underwriting loss, in volatile capital markets realised 
and unrealised capital losses due to falling stock market prices 
may easily exceed the investment income. 
10.4.2 Constraints on Insurance Profitabiity 
An insurer's profitability and consequently its retention limits 
may be constrained in various ways, namely: 
1. The actual profit may vary from expected profit, not least because 
of random fluctuation in claims experience. The higher are the 
potential fluctuations from year to year in the number and/or size 
of losses, the more may actual profit vary from the expected profit. 
2. Government regulation may adversely affect both actual and expec-
ted profit. Mehr and Hedges (1974, pp 174-5) indicate three kinds 
of regulations that may curtail an insurer's profitability, that 
is regulations on: (i) premium rates, (ii) capital requirements, 
and (iii) types of investment. For example, in many countries 
investment regulations prevent insurers from investing their funds 
in certain types of assets, or stipulate how funds shall be invested, 
or place limits on the amount that can be invested in any security 
or type of security. 
3. Inflation has adversely affected profits and made the estimation 
of outstanding claims more difficult, so that apparently good under-
writing result may badly deteriorate as outstanding claims are settled 
for amounts in excess of the figure originally reserved. The longer 
434 
a claim remains outstanding the greater it is exposed to the effect 
of inflation. Table 10. 9 illustrates how the settlement cost of 
a claim valued at $3000 at the date of occurrence would increase 
as the time to settlement lengthens, assuming constant annual rates 
of inflation as shown in column 1. 
4. Technological progress, which affects the nature of insurable 
risks, adds a further element of uncertainty to rating and conse-
quently to profit. Whatever the underwriters I skills are, they 
can never be adequate enough to keep pace with the technological 
change, especially in the field of microtechnology. 
5. Finally there is the impact of competition on premium rating 
levels. One of the greatest problems of the insurance industry 
is increasing competition which forces down prices to uneconomic 
levels leading to substantial underwriting losses. In many countries 
pricing competition has caused the failure of many insurance com-
panies. 
Consequently instead of seeking to maximise profits, insurers 
may be content to set profit targets in terms of satisfactory profits. 
In either case, given the unavoidable fluctuations in gross claims 
costs and investment yields from year to year, any form of profit 
target is more likely to be framed in terms of expected rather than 
actual profits, subject to a tolerable degree of variation in the 
actual from the expected profit. 
10.4.3 Profitability and Retention Limits 
A relatively large retention usually indicates that an 
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is convinced of good expected profit for the business he has written, 
and vice versa. In such cases, the insurers frequently wish to 
carry no more than a minimum retention. This would have a direct 
effect on the insurer's retained premium income. 
Table 10. 9 
Effect of Inflation on Claims Settlement 
Annual rate Estimated Cost of Claims Settlement 
of claim claims After 4 After 8 I After 12 
inflation cost at years years 
I 
years 
date of occurrence 
S $ S s 
I 
6 0; 3000 3787 4782 6037 ,0 
9% 3000 4235 5978 8438 I In 3000 4721 7428 I 11688 
15% 3000 5247 9177 16051 
18% 3000 5816 11277 21863 
However, in making any decision on the determination of reten-
tion limits, one must take into consideration: (a) absolute expected 
profits and probable expected profits relative to retained premium 
income, and (b) the variability of retained claims costs, and th-
ere fore of profits, relative to retained premium income. Assume, 
for example, that an Arab insurer would like to fix a higher reten-
tion limit for his reinsurance treaties in order to achieve a larger 
retained premium income and thereby increase his absolute under-
wri ting profits. Though a higher retention limit would increase 
retained premium income, it would also expose the insurer to the 
risk of greater variability in results. An adverse claims fluc-
tuation may result in an increase in retained claims costs larger 
than the additional retained premium income, thereby reducing 
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absolute profits and diminishing the amount which otherwise could 
have been available for strengthening the insurer's financial pos-
ition. 
A reduction in the insurer's current retention limit(s) would 
have the opposite effects. Although it would have the benefit 
of reducing the variability of retained claims costs it would be 
at the expense of a fall in both the company's retained premium 
and, as noted in section 10.2.4, its expected profit. Such pot-
entially positive and negative effects of changing retention limits 
are illustrated in figure 10.4. 
Thus, if a company's management feels unsure about its ability 
to fix retention limits correctly in order to achieve the desired 
balance between the various corporate objectives, it may prefer 
to err on the side of caution, and accept a lower absolute expected 
profit. As demonstrated already, an insurer's retention limits, 
retained premium income, financial base and expected profi tare 
all inter-related. 
A final complication in estimating the impact of changing ret-
ention limits on expected profit is the effect of an insurance 
company's reinsurance arrangements on its investment earnings. 
Not only, as explained in Chapter 9, do the latter affect the level 
of liquidity which an insurer needs to maintain, it also affects 
its cash flow and the size of the funds available for investment. 
And in the case of proportional reinsurance treaties, if the ceding 
company is allmved to retain premium and loss reserves, allowance 
must be made for the differences between the rate of interest 
payable to the reinsurer on those reserves, and the yield T,,,hich 
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Figure 10.4 
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the ceding company can obtain on its invested funds. 
So it is that there is a trade-off between risk (i.e. retained 
claims variability) and profit, and the insurer will need to select 
that reinsurance programme which yields him greatest utility. 
In considering various al terna ti ve programmes it seems that the 
retention limits have to be projected back on the profit objective. 
The shorter the time period taken for the measurement of profit 
(e.g. one year as against, say, five years) the relatively larger 
will be potential variation in the outcome. 
10.5 Production Target 
Ansoff (1968, p 98) has pointed out that there are only three 
methods in which any business can grow, namely market expansion, 
product expansion and diversification. So an insurance company 
can increase its gross premium income through: 
1. Expansion of existing product lines (e. g. selling its present 
products to new customers). 
2. Expansion into new products (e.g. selling nel'; products to 
its existing customers). 
3. Diversification into other customers and types of business 
(e.g. selling new products to new customers). 
illustrated in Table 10.10. 
These I,ays can be 
In the insurance industry, market penetration is typified by 
providing an ongoing service to the existing insureds, reviewing 
their cover and revising their sums insured according to rises 
in the subject matter value. This strategy has long been practised 
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Table 10.10 
Methods of Business Growth 
~ ~ Present New Market 
Present Market Product 
Penetration Expansion 
New Market Diversification 
Expansion 
Source: Ansoff (1965-8, p 99). 
by many insurance companies world-wide and it is one of the most 
reliable sources of new premium income (Churchill, 1972 p 147). 
~ e w w products and markets are important for three reasons: (i) 
to increase gross premium income and the overall profitability 
of the company; (ii) to assure sustained growth; and (iii) to diver-
sify portfolio business and reduce the variability of claims costs 
(and so profits). The expansion of existing products is also an 
important strategy for increasing gross premium income. This 
strategy may be achieved by a company selling its existing pro-
duct(s) to new customers. Business expansion through the develop-
ment of new products may derive from two kinds of pressure; that 
is: 
(i) the pressure to supply new products in response to the 
demands of policyholders and/or agents. For example, 
a policyholder may ask for business interruption insurance 
in addition to his existing fire policy, or for a liability 
insurance to be extended to cover pollution liability. 
(ii) the pressure to react to such developments by competitors. 
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Regardless of the manner in which business expansion occurs. 
it will both lead to the growth of gross premium income and directly 
affect the company's retained premium income too. 
Having established the methods for increasing the volume of 
business transacted, a company needs to decide upon its marketing 
strategy. The focus may be on present or new customers, or both. 
How can they be influenced? What is the company's selling strategy? 
Can the company increase its sales volume? etc. The answers to 
these questions lead to an understanding of the effectiveness of 
the company's marketing policy. Figure 10.5 shows the process 
of premium income growth discussed above. 
Obviously there is a direct relationship between the growth 
of sales and a company's market share. Therefore the relationships 
between business growth or market share objectives and insurers' 
retention limits will be examined together. 
10.6 Determination of Market Share 
Market share can be defined as the ratio of an insurer's gross 
premium income to the total written premiums of the industry. 
The simplest mathematical formula of market share is: 
where ?1 
GP r 
Market share of the firm, expressed as a percentage 
Gross written premiums of the firm 
Gross written premiums of the entire insurance industry 
i 
, : ~ ~
Marketing 
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Figure 10.5 
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There are various reasons why an insurance company may seek to 
increase its market share, such as managerial prestige, to improve 
its position relative to other companies to increase its retained 
premium income and/or profit, or to achieve and maintain a leader-
ship position in a chosen field. On the other hand, a company 
may sometimes prefer to reduce its market share if the market as 
a whole is experiencing substantial losses. 
An insurance company should be interested in measuring its 
market share in order at least to provide a comparison of its sales 
performance with the average performance of other companies in 
the market (Kotler, 1976, p 452). Harket share, however, reacts 
substantially to competitive forces which may cancel out any attempt 
by a company to increase the market share. 
Business Growth/Market Share and Retention Limits 
All other things being equal, any rise in an insurance company's 
gross premium income normally will produce: 
(i) increases (though not necessarily proportionate increases) 
in both its retained premium income, and the premiums 
ceded to its reinsurers; and 
(ii ) a decrease in its solvency margin. 
It may also be associated Hith a deterioration in the profitability 
of its business due to an increase in: 
either its variable costs relative to premium income, perhaps 
because of the payment of higher commission rates to attract 
more business from agents and brokers. or other additional 
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marketing expenditure; 
or its claims and expense ratios due to it competitively cutting 
premium rates; 
or its claims ratio due to a lowering of its underwriting standards. 
A worsening of its claims experience eventually would lead 
to a deterioration in the terms which it could obtain from its 
reinsurers. 
Therefore, before adopting any particular business growth/ 
market share objective the management of a company must consider 
the implications for its reinsurance programme, including its re-
tention limits. How the growth of gross premium income may affect 
the lat ter depends on a number of factors which were discussed 
in Chapter 9. 
The response of a company's management to any reduction in 
the contingency and profit loadings of premium rates should be 
to examine the need to reduce its retention limits. At the same 
time, however, consideration must be given to a possible increase 
in the cost of reinsurance attributable to any deterioration in 
the company's claims experience. 
The effect of business growth on the company's capital resources 
relative to its potential claims liabilities, and on the variability 
of claims costs are other factors to be considered. If a company's 
solvency margin is well above the statutory minimum, or it can 
raise additional capital, so that its solvency margin does not 
act as a constraint on the growth of retained premium income, it could 
enable the company to increase its retention limits. Moreover, 
if the growth of a company's business reduces the relative fluctations 
in its aggregate claims costs, and does not lead to a rise in its 
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claims ratios, it may have other beneficial effects. I t could 
improve the balance between the premium income and potential claims 
liabilities of its reinsurance treaties, which may enable it to 
negotia te bet ter terms with its reinsurers. Also it may enable 
the company to switch from proportional to non-proportional rein-
surances, thereby further increasing its retained premium income. 
10.7 Strengthening the Solvency Margin 
Benjamin (1977, p 268) defines solvency as follows: 
"A company is sol vent if its assets exceed its liabilities 
with a certain probability". 
In other words, the company is in a position not only to meet its 
liabilities, including expected claims, but has a margin of assets 
to cover possible adverse fluctuations in aggregate claims costs. 
It would be unrealistic for a company to maintain a margin of assets 
over liabilities to meet any conceivable eventuality, (1) bu t the 
margin should be such as to reduce the probability of ruin to an 
acceptable level in order to provide policyholders with the security 
they expect when buying insurance. 
Pentikainen (1967), p 4) has listed four means of protecting 
solvency: 
1. Sufficient premium rates. 
2. Reinsurance. 
(1 )"It cannot define solvency in a way that gives any certainty 
that an insurer can meet his obligations. Catastrophes are conceivable 
that could exhaust the assets of even the soundest insurer, even 
in the absence of a catastophe, an insurer can sustain a long run 
of bad experiences that can eventually cause insolvency." 
(Kimball, 1969, p 147). 
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3. Adequate solvency margin. 
4. The continuous internal and external inspection of a company's 
accounts and operations. 
As already explained, 1 to 3 are inter-related, and the regular 
monitoring of a company's operations should be standard practice. 
Ideas both as to what constitutes an acceptable probability 
of ruin,and how to measure solvency,differ. Therefore, solvency 
regulations and minimum solvency margins also vary between countries. 
The U. K., for example, has adopted the common European Community 
regulations and the Insurance Companies Act, 1982, requires companies 
transacting general insurance business to maintain a minimum solvency 
margin equal to the largest of the amounts produced by two formulas, 
knm,;n as: (1) the premium basis, and (2) the claims basis. By 
using the first method, the solvency margins are calculated on 
the gross premium income receivable by the company in the preceding 
year. The minimum solvency margin is 18 per cent on the first 
10 m. ECUs, (1) and 16 per cent on the balance. As regards the 
claims basis method, the solvency margins are calculated on one 
third of the aggregate gross claims paid during the last three 
preceding years. According to this method companies must maintain 
a minimum solvency margin equal to 26 per cent on the first 7m. 
ECUs, and 23 per cent on the remaining excess, (see tables 10.11 
and 10.1 2) . The figures (1) and (2), mentioned in these tables, 
are modified by the total claims recoverable on reinsurances ceded, 
subject to a maximum adjustment of 50 per cent. 
(1) ECU means the European Currency Unit which the companies should 
convert their accounts into. 
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Table 10. 11 
Determination of Solvency Margin on the Premium Basis 
Gross premium income 
(1) The first 10 million ECUs 
(2) Over 10 million ECUs 
Source: Insurance Companies Act 1982. 
Solvency margin 
18 per cent 
16 per cent 
Note: The above percentages are reduced to 6% and 5 ~ ~ ~ respectively 
in case of health insurance based on actuarial principles. 
Table 10.12 
Determination of Solvency Margin on the Claims Basis 
Gross claims paid 
(1) The first 7 million ECUs 
(2) Over 7 million ECUs 
Source: As for Table 10.13. 
Solvency margin 
26 per cent 
23 per cent 
Note: For the same class of business in the above note (Table 
10.11) the above percentages are reduced to 8 2/ 3 ~ ~ ~ and 
In the United States there is no statutory solvency margin 
per se. According to Pentikainen (1982, p 1.5-7), in the USA, 
the premium/surplus ratio is used as a general measur2 of companies' 
solvency. If this indicator is less than 2, the financial position 
of the company is good, if it exceeds 3, the situation is deemed 
alarming. 
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In Egypt, companies transacting non-life business are required 
to maintain a minimum 10 per cent solvency margin (Crmlle, 1982, 
p 196) and minimum capital requirements are imposed in most of 
the other Arab countries. Supervisory authorities in other dev-
eloped and developing countries follow the same pattern. They 
either require companies to maintain a prescribed minimum solvency 
margin and/or stipulate other capi tal requirements, such as the 
minimum paid-up share capital and possibly the deposit of assets. 
Most companies endeavour to maintain solvency margins well above 
the statutory minimum, and so actual solvency margins both tend 
to vary over time (as shown by figure 10.6) and between companies 
(see also Table 10.13). Dickinson and Roberts concluded from their 
study that firstly, the major UK companies aim to maintain solvency 
margins well above the minimum required by the law, and secondly, 
that those margins have been subject to large fluctuations, mainly 
due to: 
1. changes in the market values of assets; 
2. fluctuations in retained profits; 
3. movements in foreign exchange rates; and 
4. high growth rates of premium income. 
Table 10.13 provides a comparison of the solvency margins of 
British, Egyptian and Iraqi insurance companies. The average sol-
vency margins of the two Iraqi companies (National Inc. Co. and 
Iraq Re.) were, generally, a little above those of the leading 
British insurers. However, the solvency margin of the Na tional 
Insurance Company of Iraq did fall substantially from 117.5 per 
cent to 42.2 per cent in 1980, its retained premium income having 
80 
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Table 10.13 
Solvency Margins of British, Egyptian and Iraqi Insurance Companies at Year End 
--------_.-
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
% % % % % % % % % 0' m 
- ----
Average of ten leading British 
Companies 40.5 43.2 38.2 30.9 34.9 30. 7 36.8 40.0 41 . 7 43.0 
Royal Insurance Company na 37.8 35.8 30.5 34.9 27.3 28.7 33.8 45.3 36.8 
Norwich Union na 20.2 20.6 40.4 43.5 57.9 90.6 103.2 79.5 87.2 
Average of four Egyptian Companies na na na na 33.8 32.4 29.8 18.4 15. 1 17.4 N 
(including Egypt Re) 
Egypt Reinsurance Company 16.0 12.4 18.3 14.5 11. 4 10.6 10.2 8.3 5.6 4.4 
Average of two Iraqi Companies 
(National Ins. Co and Iraq Re) 62.8 57.8 54.2 43.1 29.7 32.0 35.7 42.1 34.4 32.7 
National Insurance Company 117.5 104.1 98.9 63.7 45.3 49.4 58.5 61.2 51.1 42.2 
Source: (1) Carter 1972-1981 for British Companies 
(2) The Egyptian Re., Annual Report for 1981/82, p 30. Its solvency margin has been measured 
as the ratio of paid-up capital plus free reserves to net premium income. 
(3) EGIO (1975-1980) 
(4) National Insurance Co., Annual Reports for 1971-1980. 
(5) Iraq Re., Annual Reports for 1971-1980. 
N ~ ~ figure for 1980/81. 
+>-
+>-
10 
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grown at a faster rate than its capital and free reserves. Figure 
10.7 graphs the change in the solvency margins of the Iraqicompanies 
over the ten years 1971-1980. 
The average solvency margins of the Egyptian companies, which 
are shown in figure 10.8, fell well below those of the British 
companies after 1976.( 1) The position of the Egyptian Reinsurance 
Company looks very unheal thy. On the basis of the information 
given in its published accounts, by 1978 its solvency margin (as 
defined in footnote 2 of Table 10.13) had fallen below the statutory 
minimum. Possibly the company had hidden reserves and it does 
have the ultimate financial backing of the government, so that 
perhaps the size of its solvency margin is not as critical as for 
a private company. Nevertheless, even if the position is acceptable 
to the supervisory authority, it must adversely affect its standing 
in international reinsurance markets. 
The level of a company's solvency margin not only has an important 
bearing on its financial security but also on the profitability 
of its operation, as measured by the rate of return on capital 
employed. As illustrated in the hypothetical examples in Tables 
10.14 and 10.15, which assume a constant insurance profit (i.e. 
underwriting profit plus investment income on technical funds) 
and an annual rate of interest on shareholders' funds of 5 per cent, 
the rate of return on capital employed varies inversely to the 
size of the solvency margin. 
(1) Although the three Egyptian direct insurers are roughly equal 
in size of premium income and scope of operations, the Natiunal 
specialises in handling the Egyptian marine hull and the Misr deals 
with aviation hull, while the three compete for all other insurance 
business. 
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Figure 10.7 
Solvency Margins of Two I r a ~ C o m p a n i e s . .
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Figure 10.8 
Solvency Margins of Four Egyptian Companies including 
the Egyptian Reinsurance Co. 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Year 
Average of 
three Egyptian 
Companies and 
the Egypt Re. 
Egypt 
Re 
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Table 10.14 
Underwriting and Investment Profits as % of Shareholders' Funds 
Premium Income (net of reinsurance) 
Underwriting profit 
Technical Funds 
Investment Income on Technical 
Funds (at 5%) 
Underwriting Profit and Income on 
Technical Funds 
Shareholders' Funds (40% solvency 
margin) 
Investment Income on Shareholders' 
Funds (at 5%) 
Total profit 
Total profi t as ?:; of shareholders' funds: 
$50,000 
$20,000 
Underwriting profit and Income on Technical 
Funds 
Shareholders' Income 
Total pre-tax return on capital employed 
Total profit as % of net premium income 
Table 10.15 
$50,000 
0 
2,500 
2,500 
1,000 
---
3,500 
1 2 . 5 ~ ~ ~
5.0% 
17. 5 ? ~ ~
7.0% 
Insurance Profit as a Percentage of Shareholders' Funds 
Assuming Total Profit Equals 7% of Premium Income 
Level of Solvency 
1 5 ~ : , ,
35% 
5 5 ~ 6 6
~ i l l
01 
/0 
'M . .., 
20.0 
I ~ · l l
Rate of Tax 
2 m ~ ~ 400s 
0/ 01 
,0 10 
37·4 l3.o 
I 6.0 \1.6 
lo.;{ g.S 
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Solvency Margins and Retention Limits 
During the last decade, the solvency margins of many insurers 
world-wide have come under pressure because of the large increases 
that have occurred in their premium incomes due in considerable 
measure to inflation. Apart from those periods in some countries 
where rises in the market values of invested assets have counter-
balanced the rise in premium income, for companies unable to raise 
addi tional capital the need to maintain solvency margins above a 
statutory minimum level has acted as a constraint on the growth 
of retained premium income. 
One of the simplest means that an insurer can use to control 
retained premium income is quota share reinsurance. For example, 
if an insurer with capital and free reserves of $20 million writes 
a gross premium income of $400 million, by reinsuring its business 
under a quota share treaty it can adjust its solvency margin simply 
by varying its quota share retention, as shown in Table 10.16. 
If it had to maintain a minimum solvency margin of 10 per cent of 
retained premium income, the company could not afford to retain 
more than 50 per cent of its business for its own account. 
If the objective is to ensure that a company at all times has 
sufficient free resources to maintain a target probability of ruin, 
then in determining the solvency margin as a percentage of retained 
premium income an insurer (or supervisory authority) should recognise 
that the size of the fluctuations in aggregate claims costs relative 
to the expected costs tends to vary i niversely to the size of the 
insurance portfolio. Therefore Pentikainen (1982, p 4.2-1) has 
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Table 10.16 
Solvency Margin and Quota Share Reinsurance 
(Figures in million) 
10% Retention 2 0 ~ ~ ~ Retention 40% Retention 70% Retention 
Gross premium income $4OOn $400n $400n $400n 
Retained premium income $ 4Qn $8Qn $16Qn $28On 
Capital and free reserves $ 2Qn $ 2Qn $ 2Qn $ 2Qn 
Solvency margin 50% 25?s 12. 5 ~ ~ ~ 7. 1 ~ ~ ~
demonstrated that if a company maintains a constant retention limit, 
the minimum solvency margin required to maintain a given probability 
of ruin will fall as retained premium income increases. However, 
if the level of retention is determined according to the company's 
Size, the minimum solvency ratio depends only very slightly on comp-
any size because some of the basic variables which affect solvency 
(e.g. market underwriting cycles, asset values, etc) are not affect-
ed by company size. 
An insurance company' s solvency margin is affec ted, however, 
not only by the amount of business it writes and the proportion 
which it cedes to reinsurers, but also by the price it pays for 
reinsurance. The larger is the reinsurer' s loading of the risk 
premium for the expected claims costs transferred, the smaller will 
be the net income, and therefore assets, retained by the ceding 
company to meet retained claims. Therefore the higher the premium 
loading required by reinsurers, the greater is the incentive for 
an insurer to increase its retention limits. However, the closer 
is its solvency margin to the statutory minimum the less can it 
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afford to increase its retained premium income. 
The cost of reinsurance also directly affects a company's prof-
itability. The expected net income (excluding investment earnings) 
that will be obtained from writing additional business will be: 
additional gross income less additional expected net costs 
where: gross income 
expected net costs 
gross premium income 
expected claims costs 
plus original expenses and commission 
plus reinsurance premiums (net of 
commissions) 
less expected reinsurance claims 
recoveries 
If the size of the reinsurance premium loading is so high that by 
writing more business and in turn ceding more to reinsurers, a com-
pany may suffer a reduction in its expected net income, the way 
both to protect its solvency margin and increase profits would be 
to reduce gross premium income and reinsurances ceded. Preferably 
such cuts would be achieved by reducing the company's acceptance 
limits rather than by curtailing the number of risks insured. 
To summarise, the need to maintain a prescribed minimum solvency 
margin expressed as a percentage of retained premium income acts 
as a constraint on the growth of retained premium income. If a 
company is unable to achieve an increase in its solvency margin 
(i.e. the excess of assets over liabilities) by: 
(a) raising additional capital from its owners (and in a free enter-
prise company, as opposed to a state corporation, that \Vill 
require the company to offer a return equal to that obtainable 
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from other investments); or 
Cb) increasing free reserves out of retained profits; or 
Cc) enjoying an increase in asset values due to a rise in market 
values (though valuation regulations are applicable here); 
then it must reduce (or at least limit) the growth of retained 
premium income by either: 
(a) restricting growth of gross premiums; or 
(b) reducing retention limits, so that a higher proportion of its 
gross premiums are ceded to reinsurers but as noted above, acc-
ount must be taken of the price required by reinsurers. 
10.8 Conclusions 
Uncertainty as to future conditions and events should be a reason 
for t he management of an insurance or reinsurance company trying 
to formulate its corporate objectives, and not an excuse for not 
doing so. The overall performance of an organisation is dependent 
upon its parts. Therefore all of the top functional managers 
underwriters, actuaries, investment, financial, etc. - should part-
icipate in the exercise, and in formulating policies designed to 
achieve the chosen objecti ve( s) , consideration mus t be given to 
the company's reinsurance arrangements, including its retention 
limits. 
One of the difficulties is that amongst allY list of corporate 
objectives some may conflict, so that policies usually need to be 
designed so as to achieve a balance between desired objectives rather 
than seeking to maximise any single objective. 
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The questionnaire sent to 143 Arab insurance companies listed 
nine possible corporate objectives. The number of replies (46 
indicated that many Arab insurers do set themselves objectives, 
Vlith "providing a service to clients at a fair price" emerging as 
overwhelmingly the main primary obj ective. That finding differed 
from the results of two surveys in the UK and Australian insurance 
markets, which indicated that profit was the prime aim of their 
insurers. 
As shown in Chapter 9, a number of variables should enter into 
the determination of retention limits. It follows that the obje-
ctive(s) which a company seeks to pursue must influence its decisi-
ons regarding appropriate forms of reinsurance and the size of its 
retention limits. This chapter has shO\.Jn how different corporate 
objectives, notably profit, growth and financial security, may re-
quire a company to modify its retention limits, and how one objec-
tive may act as a constraint on the levels of retention limits and 
retained premium income which othenvise may be desirable for the 
attainment of some other objective. 
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Appendix 10.1 
THE UN I V E R SIT Y OF NO TT IN G H A M 
Head 01 Department 
PR.OFESSOR. D. S. LEES 
a.Sc.(Econ.), P ~ . D . .
:ate as Post:-;1ark 
Dear S"r 
M ~ ~~ ~
DEPAR.TMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY PARK 
NOTTINGHAM NG72RD 
UNITE:] KINGDOM 
Telephone 56101 
: ~ m m a ?hD s ~ u d e n t t at the University of Nottingham stucying with P ~ o f s s s o r r
R L C a r ~ e ~ ~ and engaged in research entitled "International Insur:nce and 
Reinsurance Transacticns in the Arab World". Enclosed is a questionnaire 
On c 8 r ~ o r a t e e cbjectives of insurers and reinsurers. It is part of the 
:hesis on the subject ana I woula be very grateful if you could complete and 
return it as soon as possible in the addressed envelope provided. The 
answers to tne questions will be treated as strictly confidential and no 
firm will be identified. The questionnaire aims to be as straightforward as 
~ o s s i b l e e and mcst of the answers are completed by ticking the box opposite 
the appropriate answer. 
Your urgent reply would =e very much appreciated. 
YOurs faithfully 
Abdul Zahra A Ali 
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: : ~ ~ a ~ ; ; last ~ ! X 2 : : i:s : ~ e a t y y ~ e t e n t i o n n l i ~ i t s ? ?
i ~ : : r : a ~ : e e as in : ~ ~ a t i ~ n n 4 above. 
Please r a ~ K K tnem in craer 07 
--:a!:-:aining :he financial strength of the : : ~ ; : ; a r : y y .......•............. 
I ~ ~ cermi: expansion of the grcss premium inccme 
~ ~ ~ :ncraase retained premium income 
~ o o limit retained premiwm inccme 
e. -:-::; minimise reinsurance costs .....•..•................................ 
= t ~ e r s s (please list) 
~ : w w :f:en are the re:ention limits of your reinsurance treaties revised? 
( ~ l e a s e e tick approcriate cox): 
Every t'I'IO years D EJsry three jears D 
D than four years D 
5 ~ c u l s s any ef Jour answers require alaooration, please aed :elow. 
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The geographical distribution of the questionnaires and the 
number of returns are shown below: 
Country Number of I Number of I No. I 
questionnaires sent I Respondents I 
1 Algeria 4 -
2 Bahrain 12 3 
3 Dujibotti I 1 -
4 Egypt 7 3 
5 Iraq 2 2 
6 Jordan 11 .., I 
..., Kuwait 9 4 I 
g L e ~ a n o n n 16 5 
9 Libya 2 2 
10 Morocco 9 -
11 ~ I a u r i i tania 1 -
12 Oman 4 2 
13 Qa:ar 5 -
14 Saudi Arabia 13 4 
15 Somalia 1 1 
16 Sudan 10 3 
17 Syria 2 -
13 Tunisia 4 3 
19 U.A.E. i3 4 
20 I N. Yemen 6 2 
2i S. Yemen i 1 
Tota 1 143 46 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
RETENTION LIMITS ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT FORMS OF R E I ~ S U R A N C E E
11.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters have examined various factors, such 
as an insurer's size, financial condition and corporate obj ec tives; 
the cost of reinsurance; the risk characteristics of different 
classes of insurance; etc., \."hich in principle ought to influence 
insurers in fixing the general levels of their retention limits. 
Only brief references have been made to retentions being varied 
according to the type of reinsurance selected. 
An insurer's operational results, and indeed its solvency, 
can greatly depend upon the type of reinsurance programme it arranges. 
That involves both selecting the forms of reinsurance to be employed 
for the various classes of insurances written, and deciding on 
the appropriate ret ention limi t s. 
chapter is threefold: 
Therefore, the purpose of this 
Ca) to discuss the variations in retention limits appropriate 
to the main forms of reinsurance (i.e. quota share rein-
surance, stop loss, surplus, per risk excess of loss 
and catastrophe excess of loss); 
(b) to demonstrate how retained premium income is affected 
by the type of reinsurance involved and to show the suit a-
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bility of a particular form of reinsurance for a 
particular class of business; and 
(c) to compare empirically some reinsurance programmes to 
see how they play a decisive role in determining the size 
of retained premium income. 
11.2 Retention for the Entire Portfolio 
Both quota share and stop loss reinsurances may be said 
to provide total portfolio protection in the sense that: 
(i) both provide cover against the aggregate losses incurred 
over the year on all policies included within the scope 
of the reinsurance treaty; and 
(ii) both thereby afford protection against increases in claims 
frequency and/ or claims size, though unlike a stop loss 
reinsurance, a quota share treaty provides no protection 
against aggregate claims costs in anyone year exceeding 
some predetermined sum. 
11. 2 .1 Retention Under Quota Share Reinsurance 
The correct level of retention depends on a combination 
of many factors, i.e. a company's financial base, premium volume, 
claims experience etc., all of which have been discussed already 
in Chapter nine. However, under a quota share treaty, the size 
of the retention \.Jill often be determined primarily according to 
the desired retained premium income rather than the size of the 
individual risk exposure, \.Jhich is a feature of surplus and per 
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risk excess of loss reinsurances. Often past claims experience 
of a certain class of business provides a fairly reliable indicator 
of both future expected aggregate claims costs and potential fluctua-
tions therein, so that an insurer, when fixing the retention limits 
of his quota share treaty, will tend to depend on such past claims 
data. However, sometimes past claims experience may mislead the 
insurer, as shown by the following example taken from Iraqi motor 
comprehensive insurance. The claims as a percentage of gross premium 
income of this class of business during the period 1971-1976, ranged 
from 41.2 in 1971 to 56.1 in 1976; this might be called a normal 
fluctuation, but in 1977 the claims ratio sharply increased to 
134.4. 
Table 11.1 
Gross Claims as % of Premium Income for 
Motor Comprehensive Insurance 
Year Gross Claims Ratio 
1971 41.2 
1972 46.0 
1973 45.4 
1974 42.1 
1975 46.5 
1976 56.1 
1977 134.4 
Source: Annual Reports of the 
National Insurance Co., Iraq. 
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Clearly past experience alone is not sufficient for a dec-
ision to be taken on what size of retention an insurer should fix 
for a quota share treaty. 
taken into account, notably: 
Other important factors need to be 
(i) what is the absolute aggregate amount of a loss he can 
afford to retain in a certain class of business? 
(ii) what claims ratio should be anticipated in the class 
of business involved for the term of reinsurance envisaged? 
(Gerathewohl, 1980, p.146). There are two factors related 
to the first question. Firstly, the amount of capital and free 
reserves available if claims incurred in any year exceed earned 
premiums (net of commissions and expenses) plus the investment 
earnings attributable thereto. Secondly, how many years in success-
ion the company can afford to sustain such losses, which depends 
on the size of its solvency margin relative to any minimum figure 
prescribed by the insurance supervisory regulations of the country 
(or countries) in which it operates. The closer is the solvency 
margin to the statutory minimum the less risk can a company afford 
to take, and so the lower must be its retention limit in order 
to keep the potential fluctuations in its aggregate claims costs 
within a tolerable upper limit. A succession of bad years may, 
therefore, force a company to reduce its quota share retention. 
Regarding the claims ratio to be anticipated for any class 
of insurance, the more uncertain is an insurer as to possible claims 
cost outcomes, the more conservative it needs to be in fixing its 
retention limits. Allowance needs to be made not only for the 
possibility of the aggregate claims costs for one class of insurance 
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substantially exceeding the expected cost, but also for the same 
happening with other classes, thereby seriously depleting the solven-
cy margin. 
The nature of the reinsurance programme arranged by an insurer 
will affect not only its potential solvency but also the volume 
of its retained premium income. For example, if a quota share 
reinsurance treaty is arranged to protect a marine cargo account 
the proportion of the gross premium income retained by the ceding 
company will depend, ceteris paribus, on whether the treaty operates 
on a retention "anyone bot tom" or "anyone policy" basis, as shown 
by the following example: 
Example 
Assume: (i) an 80 per cent quota share 'vith a treaty 
limit of $2 million 
(ii) the account includes 40 policies each 'vi t h 
a sum insured of S300,OOO, the cargo in respect 
thereof being loaded on six vessels as follmvs: 
Aggregate insured sums 
Vessel U (15 policies x S300.000 each) S 4.500.000 
Vessel V 9 " " " ) S 2.700.000 
Vessel W 7 " " " ) S 2.100.000 
Vessel X 5 " " " S 1. 500.000 
Vessel Y 2 " " " ) S 600.000 
Vessel Z 2 " 11 " ) S 600.000 
S12,OOO,OOO 
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The amounts retained and ceded to reinsurers would be: 
(a) 'anyone bottom basis': 
Cb) 
on an 
Vessel U 
Vessel V 
Vessel i.J 
Vessel X 
Vessel Y 
Vessel Z 
Aggregate Retained by 
insured sums ceding company 
(20%) 
$4.500.000 $ 400.000 
$2.700.000 $ 400.000 
$2.100.000 $ 400.000 
$1. 500 .000 $ 300.000 
$ 600.00 $ 120.000 
$ 600.000 $ 120.000 
$1.740.000 
any one policy basis': 
Each policy of $300.000 $ 60.000 
Total of 40 policies $2.400.000 
Ceded to reinsurers 
Q..iota Share Facultative 
(80%) 
$1.600.000 $2.500.000 
$1.600.000 700.000 
$1.600.000 100.000 
$1.200.000 
$ 480.000 
$ 480.000 
1$6.960.000 $3.300.000 
$ 240.000 
$9.600.000 
From the above example it can be seen that retentions based 
anyone policy' would provide the insurer with a higher 
retained premium income than on an anyone bottom' basis. However 
given the likelihood of cargoes insured under more than one policy 
being loaded on the same vessel, a retention limi t based on "any 
one policy" would leave the ceding company with the risk of incurring 
higher retained losses as the result of the loss of one ship. 
To compensate for that risk the company \vould need to accept a 
Im.;er retention limit if it chose to reinsure on that basis. 
iJhen a quota share reinsurance treaty is arranged to cover 
both marine cargo and hull risks. the treaty will often separate 
retentions for each type of insurance. In fixing his retentions, 
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the insurer then must consider the possibility of hull and cargo 
losses accumulating. 
11.2.2 Retention Under Stop Loss Reinsurance 
The retention (priority), as well as the limits, in a stop 
loss cover are expressed as a percentage of an insurer's net premium 
income for the portfolio protected; they may also be shown as ab-
solute amounts. The minimum retent ion applicable under a stop 
loss cover in a certain class of insurance is the insurer's actual 
administration expenses for the class in question, plus the expected 
(i. e. annual average) aggregate retained annual claims cost. At 
such a retention level the stop loss reinsurer will become liable 
when the acquisition and administration costs, plus losses retained, 
exceed the premiums retained by the insurer after allowing for the 
contingency and profit loadings in the original and reinsurance 
premiums ceded. If the ceding company's retention under a stop 
loss cover was below that level it would guarantee the insurer a 
profit . 
Moreover, the reinsurer may require the insurer to retain 
usually between 5 and 10 per cent of any loss above the deductible 
for his own account. Thus by also requiring the retention to be 
fixed at a level which ensures that the ceding company incurs an 
underwriting loss before the stop loss reinsurance protection oper-
ates, the reinsurer ensures that the company will remain interested 
in properly underwriting the risks it accepts. 
Gerathewohl (1980, p.l00) has pointed out that premium 
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growth may have a considerable influence on the level of retention. 
For example, a significant increase in premium rates due to inc-
reased claims expenditure may reduce the expense ratio if expenses 
increase at a lower rate than claims. Therefore a retention which 
was technically correct in one year may be too low in a subsequent 
year in that the reinsurer could be liable to contribute before 
the insurer loses money. Also when the treaty limits are expressed 
as percentages of the ceding company's premium income, an increase 
in the premium income will raise the absolute values of both the 
ceding company's retention and the reinsurer's maximum liability. 
The average claims ratio experienced, and the claim fluctua-
tions an insurer has to expect on the basis of a number of years' 
past results, are of great importance in calculating the level 
of the retention. However, as with other forms of reinsurance, 
many other variables including the special factors outlined above 
should also be taken into account. 
When considering how important stop loss covers are for 
an insurer two perspectives need examination. Firstly, Borch (1974, 
p.9) like Verbeck a few years earlier (1966, pp. 26-38) has indicated 
that stop loss cover is better than other forms of reinsurance 
for protecting a whole portfolio of risks and may even be the cheap-
est form of reinsurance. He argues that: 
" \ ~ e e can say that this is the 'most efficient I form of rein-
surance since it gives the greatest reduction in the vari-
ance of the portfolio for a given net premium. \ ~ h e t h e r r
it also is the cheapest form will depend on the loading. If 
the loading for all kinds of reinsurance is a fixed propor-
tion of the net premium, stop loss will also be the cheap-
est form of reinsurance.Should the loading be some function 
of the variance, for instance, proportional to the standard 
deviation, it will be a matter of subjective judgment, 
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~ . ; h e t h e r r stop loss is bet ter than other forms of reinsurance." 
In practice, however, there are contrasting opinions to 
those expressed by Verbeck and Borch. ;lany insurance and reinsurance 
experts have stressed that stop loss covers are very difficult 
to handle; they also give a warning on the unpleasant consequences 
of underwriting such covers. Kiln (1981, p.268), for example, 
has said: 
"It is 
used to 
my firmly held belief that stop loss programmes 
cover a whole account on a long term basis. often 
turn out to be disadvantageous to the reassured and reinsur-
ers alike, and that such contracts, to replace the more 
normal me$ods of pro rata and/or excess of loss reinsurance, 
are very dangerous animals which can only be undertaken 
successfully by highly trained people with phlegmatic temper-
aments and considerable cash resources". 
Lavers (1979, p.9) has also stressed that stop loss covers 
are the most dangerous form of reinsurance to underwrite. Therefore, 
he argued that stop loss covers should be avoided by reinsurers 
unless the following conditions are met; 
1. The maximum priority should be 100 per cent of the 
insurer's net premium income. 
2. The insurer should incur an underwriting loss of 
at least equal to 5 per cent of premium income before 
the stop loss cover pays. 
3. No one loss or event should take a ~ v a y y more than 
10 per cent of the premium income. 
Of course, the buyer of a stop loss cover or any other 
form of reinsurance, is unlikely to share a reinsurer' s \·ieHs as 
to what constitutes the ideal terms and conditions. The reinsl.lrer 
al\.;ays intends to obtain some profit from the risks he reinsures 
whereas the ceding company will aim to reduce its reinsurance costs 
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and improve its net (of reinsurance) undenvri t ing results. Cons-
equently in practice the terms of all reinsurance treaties are 
likely to represent a compromise between the opposing desires of 
the two parties. 
11.2.3 A Comparison of the Results of Quota Share 
and Stop Loss Treaties 
Having considered the two forms of reinSUTatl,e separately, 
the respective results for an insurer of employing each form to 
protect a particular account will now be examined. 
Complete equivalence of a quota share treaty and stop loss 
cover in a specific case is virtually a theoretical concept because, 
in practice the conditions required to provide such equivalence 
will be found only under exceptional circumstances. According 
to Sousselier (1955, pp.1171-2) these circumstances are: (i) 
when a quota share treaty includes a profit commission of 100 percent 
(which is highly unlikely in practice); (ii) \vhen the stop loss 
deductible, together with the premium payable for it is not more 
than 100 per cent (which may quite possibly be the case): and (iii) 
when the stop loss cover provides unlimited liability. With the 
sort of terms encountered in practice the outcomes from using the 
different forms of reinsurance will vary, so that in some cases 
a quota share treaty \vill produce the more favourable results for 
the ceding company, whereas in other cases a stop loss cover will 
prove best. This is illustrated by the following example: 
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Example 
Assume that an insurer has the choice of protecting an 
insurance portfolio with a gross premium income of $1 million by: 
either a stop loss reinsurance treaty with limits of 50 per cent 
or 
It is 
to 30 
70 per 
excess of a 75 per cent claims ratio, subject to: 
the ceding company retaining 10 per cent of the 
reinsured losses; and 
a reinsurance premium of 5 per cent of the ceding 
company's gross premium income, i.e. $50,000; 
quota share \vith a sliding scale commission, providing 
a maximum commission of 30 per cent (corresponding to the 
original expenses) for a loss ratio of up to 65 per cent 
and thereafter with the commission falling by ~ ~ per cent 
for every 1 percent rise in the loss ratio up to 85 percent, 
Le: 
Loss ratio 
65% 
7 5 ~ ~ ~
85?6 
further assumed that the insurer 
per cent of the original premiums 
s 
Reinsurance Commission 
rate 
2 5 ? ~ ~
2 0 ? ~ ~
expense ratio is equal 
(so that a loss ratio of 
cent would yield a zero underwriting result). 
By choosing either form of reinsurance the effect on the 
insurer's net undenvriting result \vould be as shm-m in Table 11.2. 
As compared with the position if the insurer effected no 
reinsurance (line (c)), both forms of reinsurance reduce the size 
Type of reinsurance 
(a) Quota share: 
0% retention 
50% r ~ t e n t i o n n
70% retention 
(b) Stop Loss 
(c) No reinsurance 
Table 11. 2 
The Results of effecting (a) Quota Share and 
(b) Stop Loss Reinsurance Treaties 
The insurer's underwriting result with a gross claims ratio of: 
45% 55% 65% 7 5 ~ { ' ' 85% 95% 105% 125% 145% 
$000 $000 $000 $000 $000 $000 $000 $000 $000 
0 0 0 50 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 
125 75 25 50 -125 -l75 -225 -325 -425 
175 105 35 50 -135 -205 -275 -415 -555 
200 100 0 - 100 -llO -120 -130 -150 -350 
250 150 50 - 50 -150 -250 -350 -550 -750 
.po 
....... 
.po 
240 
200 
160 
120 
80 
40 
o 
40 
80 
120 
160 
200 
240 
280 
320 
360 
400 
440 
480 
520 
560 
600 
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Figure 11.1 
The Results of Quota Share w1th Different Retentions 
Results 
SODO 
Compared with Stop Loss Cover 
~ o o reinsurance 
Claims ratio 
45 55 65, 85 95 105 115 125 135 145 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ , 
~ ~ % Retention 
--
---"- --""'I 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ Stop Loss 
5 0 ~ : ' ' Retention 
70% Retention 
No reinsurance 
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of the fluctuations in the underwriting result, but at the cost 
of a reduction in the profit which would be earned if the loss ratio 
fell below 70 per cent. 100 per cent reinsurance would produce 
the narrowest range of outcomes. Otherwise the stop loss reinsurance 
would produce a better outcome for the insurer if the loss ratio 
diverged substantially from the expected figure of 70 per cent. 
All of the results are plotted in Figure 11.1. 
As a further test of how an insurer's underwriting results 
on its retained account may vary depending on (a) the type of reins-
urance employed, and (b) the gross claims ratio, an Arab insurance 
company provided details of the premium income and claims experience 
on its general third party liability account and of the following 
terms which it was quoted for a quota share and a stop loss reinsur-
ance: 
1. a quota share treaty with 35 per cent commission (which 
corresponded to its original expense ratio); and 
2. a stop loss cover for 50 per cent in excess of 100 per 
cent loss ratio, with a reinsurance premium rate of 
5 per cent of the original premiums. 
The company was not willing to disclose (i) whether there was a 
profit commission on the quota share treaty; or (ii) \.hether it 
was required to participate in the re insured losses under the stop 
loss cover. 
Table 11.3 provides details of what would have been the comp-
any's underwriting results over eleven years if either of the two 
types of reinsurance had been in force subject to the above cerms. 
and assuming four possible retention levels with the quota share 
Year Premium 
Incorre 
US$ 
1 100.000 
2 111.000 
3 130.000 
4 140.000 
5 150.000 
6 160.000 
7 180.000 
8 200.000 
9 220.000 
10 240.000 
11 260.000 
Table 11.3 
Results of both Quota Share and Stop Loss Reinsurance Treaties 
Losses Loss ~ o t a a Share ~ o t a a Share ~ o t a a Share Q.lota Share 
Ratio 10% retention 20% retention 50% retention 80% retention 
US$ US$ IS$ US$ US$ 
45.000 45 + 2.000 + 4.000 +10.000 +16.000 
60.500 G + 1.100 + 2.200 I + 5.500 I + 8.800 
162.500 125 - 7.800 -15.600 
-39.000 -62.400 
105.000 75 - 1.400 - 2.800 - 7.000 
-11.200 
97.500 65 0 0 0 0 
136.000 85 - 3.200 - 6.400 
-16.000 -25.600 
153.000 85 - 3.600 - 7.200 
-]8.000 
-28.000 
370.000 Hi5 -24.000 -48.000 -120.000 -192 .000 
209.000 95 - 6.600 
-13.200 
-33.000 -52.800 
252.000 105 - 9.600 
-19.200 -48.000 -76.800 
403.000 B -23.400 -46.800 1-117.000 I -187.200 
----
_._-
--
Stop Loss 
US$ 
+15.000 
I + 5.500 I 
-52.000 
-21.000 
- 7.500 
-40.000 
-45.000 
-150.000 
-84.000 
-96.000 
[117.000 I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
.po 
-...J 
-...J 
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reinsurance. In this case the pattern of underwriting results would 
have been entirely different to that of the first example in that 
with a loss ratio of between 65 and 125 per cent a quota share treaty 
at any of the retention levels would have produced better results 
than the stop loss treaty. Only at the extremes of the loss ratio 
range would the stop loss cover have given better results than some 
of the quota share options : in years 2 and 11 it would have produced 
an identical result to that which would have been obtained from 
a 50 per cent quota share treaty. 
One may conclude from Table 11.3 that when selecting reinsur-
ance cover the insurer will have to consider two points: (i) the 
level of retention he finds suitable for a specific situation, and 
(ii) the claims ratio he anticipates for the coming year(s). However 
the choice of a quota share reinsurance or stop loss cover will 
also be affected by several other factors, such as the degree of 
variation in claim ratio fluctuations, the cost of reinsurance prot-
ection, the long-term or short-term security provided by the reinsur-
er, etc. In this contect Gerathewohl (1980, p.113) writes: 
"When comparing stop loss with quota share reinsurance in 
a specific case, one must note that any decision for or against 
one of these alternatives will be largely influenced by factors 
that cannot always be measured objectively. This is one of 
the reasons why direct insurers often choose a dual approach 
and take out a quota share reinsurance with a stop loss cover 
on the quota retention". 
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11.3 Retention Per Risk 
Unlike quota share and stop loss treaties, surplus reinsurance 
and per risk excess of loss cover (PRXL) are the two forms of rein-
surance most suitable for portfolios whose claims ratios are subject 
to random fluctuations caused by the occurrence of large losses 
affecting individual risks. Per risk retentions for these t\.JO 
types of reinsurance will be discussed separately. 
11. 3 .1 Retention Under Surplus Reinsurance 
The principle of a surplus treaty is to allow an insurer to 
retain those small risks which he is capable of keeping for his 
own account. Thus the premiums ceded away are proportionate to 
the potential claims liabilities transferred to the reinsurer in 
respect of individual risks written by the ceding company with sums 
insured exceeding its retention limit. Therefore the comp"/t.i will 
retain a larger proportion of its total original premium income by 
employing a surplus reinsurance treaty than with a quota share treaty 
designed to limit its maximum retained loss for anyone risk to 
the same figure as its surplus retention limit. This can be seen 
in the following example which is based on a fire portfolio. First, 
it is assumed that: 
(i) the company fixes a uniform retention limit of 
$400,000; and 
(ii) arranges a surplus treaty which provides cover up to 
a maximum $10,000,000 anyone risk (i.e. 24 surplus 
lines). 
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Given a distribution of risks by size of sum insured as shown 
in Table 11.4,all policies with sums insured that fall into classes 
1 to 6 are within the insurer's retention limit, whereas reinsurance 
is required for policies in classes 7 to 14, with the reinsurance 
ceded varying from 11.1 percent to 96 percent. The total retained 
premiums are $20.913.092 or 84.1 per cent and the reinsurance prem-
iums before deduction of reinsurance commission are $ 3.960.208 or 
15.9 per cent. 
If instead of arranging a surplus treaty the company chose 
to rely principally on a quota share reinsurance, in order to limit 
its maximum retained loss to $400,000, and at the same time provide 
the reinsurers with a well-balanced treaty, the company might arrange 
an 80 percent quota share subject to a treaty limit of $2 million. 
It would then also need to obtain additional facultative cover 
for cases in classes 11 14. The distri bu tion of the original 
premiums with such a reinsurance programme would be as shown in 
Table 11.5, with the proportion of the gross premium income retained 
by the company falling from the 84.1 per cent with the surplus treaty 
to only 19.2 per cent. Thus the premium income that would be retain-
ed under the surplus treaty is more than 4 times higher than under 
the quota share arrangement. However with the surplus treaty the 
ceding company would be exposed to all of the variability in claims 
costs for the smaller cases in classes 1 - 6 which it wholly retains 
for its own account and it would lose the benefit of the additional 
reinsurance commission deductible from the extra quota share and 
facultative reinsurance premiums. 
Reference has been made in Chapters 5 and 9 to the groHing 
Table 11.4 
Premium Retained and Ceded in Surplus Treaty 
No. Average sum Nwnber of Gross premilun R e t e n t 1 ~ o n n
insured per risk policies per class % Gross Premium 
S $ $ 
1 9,000 300,000 2,970,000 100 2,970,000 
2 18,000 180,000 3,564,000 100 3,564,000 
3 30,000 80,000 2,880,000 100 2,880,000 
4 60,000 45,000 3,240,000 100 3,240,000 
5 110,000 20,000 2,860,000 100 2,860,000 
6 200,000 7,000 1,960,000 100 1,960,000 
7 450,000 3,000 2,025,000 88.9 1,800,225 
8 720,000 1,200 1,382,400 55.6 768,614 
9 1,000,000 620 1,054,000 40.0 421,600 
10 1,500,000 310 837,000 26.7 223,479 
11 2,500,000 150 712,500 16.0 114,000 
12 3,200,000 80 512,000 12.5 64,000 
13 5,400,000 30 356,400 7.4 26,374 
14 10,000,000 20 520,000 4.0 20,800 
637,410 24,873,300 84.1 20,913,092 
-
% 
-
-
-
-
-
-
11.1 
44.4 
60.0 
73 .3 
84.0 
87.5 
92.5 
96.0 
15.9 
Reinsurance 
Gross Premium 
$ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
224,775 
613,786 
632,400 
613,521 
598,500 
448,000 
330,026 
499,200 
3,960,208 
• 
I 
I 
! 
.l:-
Q:) 
.... 
Table ll.5 
Premiums Retained and Ceded in a Quota Share Treaty 
Retention of swn insured Quota Share Reinsurance No. Average Sllll1 Nunber of Gross Premillll1 up to $ 2m 
insured per risk }Xllicies per class % Gross Premiwn % Gross Premiwn 
$ $ $ $ 
1 9,CXX) 300,000 2,970,000 20 594,000 80 2,376,000 
2 18,000 180,000 3,564,000 20 712,800 80 2,851,000 
3 30,000 80,000 2,800,000 20 576,000 80 2,304,000 
4 60,000 45,000 3,240,000 20 648,000 80 2,592,000 
5 110,000 20,000 2,860,000 20 572,000 80 2,288,000 
6 200,000 7,000 1,960,000 20 392,000 80 1,568,000 
7 450,000 3,000 2,025,000 20 405,000 80 1,620,000 
8 720,000 1,200 1,382,400 20 276,480 80 1,105,920 
9 1,000,000 620 1,054,000 20 210,800 80 843,200 
10 1,500,000 310 837,000 20 167,400 80 669,600 
11 2,500,000 1.50 712,500 16 114,000 64 456,000 
12 3,200,000 80 512,000 12.5 64,000 50 256,000 
13 5,400,CXX) 30 356,400 7.4 26,400 29.6 105,600 
14 10,000,000 20 520,000 4 20,800 16 83,200 
637,410 24,873,300 19.2 4,779,680 76.9 19,118,720 
Premillill ceded for 
facultative reinsurance 
% 
$ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- . -
-
-
- -
- -
- -
- -
20 142,500 
37.5 192,000 
63 224,400 
80 416,000 
3.9 974,900 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~ ~
00 
N 
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practice of fire insurers basing their surplus reinsurance reten-
tions on estimated maximum losses (EML) instead of sums insured. 
Suppose that in the above example the insurer calculated the EML 
of a risk with a sum insured of $10 million as $2 million. By main-
taining the retention limit at $400,000 he would reduce the propor-
tion ceded to the surplus reinsurers from 96 per cent to 80 per 
cent. The danger then lies in the possibility of EMLs being sub-
stantially under-estimated. If, for example, the above risk suffered 
a loss net of 20 per cent but of 80 per cent of the value at risk, 
as happened at Flixborough, the ceding company's net retained loss 
would be $1,600,000 as compared with its desired retention limit 
of $400,000. 
Besides basing their retention limits on EHLs for fire insur-
ances , some insurers have tried to extend the practice to engineer-
ing and construction insurances, though not very successfully because 
of the number of perils covered, each with differing loss potential 
characteristics. As for other classes of insurance which may be 
reinsured under surplus treaties, the EML basis is entirely inapp-
licable in the fixing of retention in such classes as life and per-
sonal accident, where all, or almost all, losses are total losses, 
as well as in aviation and marine where total losses may be possible, 
and where the extent of partial losses is difficult to determine. 
(Gerathewohl pp. 71-72). 
11. 3.2 Graded Retentions under a Surplus Reinsurance 
Particularly for fire surplus reinsurances, insurers normally 
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do not adopt a fixed retention limit for all risk groups, but rather 
grade retentions in accordance to loss exposure with the least hazar-
dous risks carrying the highest retention limits and vice versa. 
The available evidence regarding this practice indicates that 
the relative scales in use vary considerably between insurers and 
some observers maintain that graded retention limits tend to be 
determined arbitrarily according to the premium rate, reducing as 
the rate increases, though not proportionately (I.I.L. 1955-56, 
p.94). The table of retention limits shown in Table 11.6 confirms 
that the practice has been adopted by at least some Arab insurers. 
Table 11. 6 
The Fire Surplus Retention Table of an Arab Insurance Company 
Premium Rate 0/00 Retention limi t 
Up to 1.5 500.000 
1.5 to 3.00 420.000 
3.01 to 5.00 320.000 
5.01 to 7.00 240.000 
7.01 to 10.00 160.000 
10.01 to 15.00 80.000 
15.01 to 20.00 40.000 
20.01 to 30.00 26.000 
Over 30.00 16.000 
Note: no currency unit is shown for the retention 
limit in order to avoid the company being 
identified. 
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The validity of the general principle of grading retentions 
according to loss exposure is open to question. However, Gerathewohl 
(1980. p. 135) has reported that studies conducted into the experi-
ence of West German industrial fire and loss of profits insurances 
lend some support to the practice. The loss experience over time 
revealed that there is a directly proportionate relationship between 
the mean value and the standard deviation of the claims rates of 
different classes of risk. In other words risk groups with low aver-
age claims rates experience smaller fluctuations in claims costs. 
The counter argument is that if retention limits are to be 
graded the key fac tor should not be loss exposure as measured by 
loss expectancy but the size of the contingency loading built into 
the premium relative to the loss variance. 
In any event grading retention limits according to market 
premium rates is fraught with danger in that a change in rate may 
be due more to the effects of competition than to a change in the 
underlying risk factors. Thus if as the result of an increase in 
competition the premium rate for a particular class of risk fell 
by 30 per cent from 4 per mille to 2.8 per mille, according to Table 
11.6 the company should have increased its retention from 320,000 
to 420,000. (l ) As the reduction in the premium rate would have 
cut the profit and contingency loading of the premium, to increase 
the retention would be exactly opposite to what the company should 
have done according to the Benjamin's retention equation (see section 
(1) In the highly competitive market concerned in 1980, premium 
rates of various classes of insurance were reduced by not 
less than 25 percent in some classes. 
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9.3.5) . Sometimes insurers recognise that fact. (1) Therefore, 
if retentions are to be graded according to premium rates the correct 
rate to use is the risk premium rate. 
A risk premium is equal to the loss expectancy of the risk 
transferred to the insurer and so reflects the risk factors which 
determine loss frequencies and severities. In the case of fire 
insurance, the higher is the risk premium rate (which is applied 
to the sum insured to produce the risk premium) the higher is the 
insurer' 5 loss exposure in terms of the loss expectancy. and so 
the lower would be the insurer's retention limit. A table of reten-
tion limits based on risk premium rates given by Gerathewohl is 
reproduced in Table 11.7. According to Gerathewohl (1982, p.76) 
such tables are common because of their simplicity of application 
and the continuity they provide in that regular revision of retention 
limits is not required. 
An alternative system is to base retentions on certain key 
physical chracteristics of insured risks which are indicators of 
loss exposures. Under such a system retentions are generally graded 
according to the type of construction, the type of occupation the 
location of a risk, and the availability of external fire fighting 
facilities. The retention, for example, \.,ill be larger in risks 
suceptible to greater resistance to damage, and smaller in risks 
where a larger loss on the sum insured is possible (see Table 11.8). 
(1) 'In ocean hull, where premium rates move up and dmm according 
to certain cycles, the direct insurer will be inclined to 
apply lower retentions at times of low premium rates, as he 
must anticipate medium size and small losses consuming a large 
share of the premium and leaving little or nothing over for 
large losses. The situation is similar in industrial fire'. 
(Gerathewohl, 1980, p.133). 
487 
Compared with the tables of retentions based on risk premium rates, 
tables of retentions based on risk circumstances are far more compli-
cated to apply in practice. They generally require a high standard 
of underwriting expertise. 
Table 11. 7 
Table of Retention for Fire and Fire Loss of Profits Insurances 
Based on Risk Premium Rates 
Class Average Risk Premium Rate Retentions (Sum Insured 
or Pffi...) 
1 Up to 2 . 5 ? ~ . . DM. 1,000,000 
2 above 2. 5 ~ ~ ( ) ) to 5.0%", 800,000 
3 above 5.0%nto 7. 5 ~ ~ ( ' ) ) 700,000 
4 above 7.5%., to la. O ? ~ " " 600,000 
5 above 10. 0?60 to 12.5%,. 500,000 
6 above 12. 5?60 to 17. 5 ? ~ c c 400,000 
7 above 17.5%0 300,000 
Source: Gerathewohl (1982, p. 916) 
Note: 11 (1) lhe risk premium rate is the average risk premium 
rate derived from the fire and fire loss of profits 
insurances written. 
(2) The retentions apply both to fire insurances alone 
and to fire and fire loss of profit together. In 
the case of fire loss of profits insurances alone 
these retentions are reduced by 50%." 
Generally speaking, tables of retentions should be revised 
periodically and any modification should be made accordingly; such 
procedure \vill depend on the company's growth. A problem arises 
when the gross premium and the financial strength of the company 
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Table 11.8 
Table of Retentions for Fire and Fire Loss of Profits 
Insurances based on Risk Circumstances 
Type of Construction Class 1 Construction Class II 
Plant Location Class 1 Location Class 2 Location Class 1 Location Class 2 
A DM. 200,000 DM. 180,000 DM. 150,000 DM. 120,000 
B 180,000 150,000 120,000 90,000 
C 150,000 120,000 90,000 60,000 
Source: As for Table 11.7 (p.917). See pages 917-8 for definitions 
of the type of plant, construction class and location class. 
Note: As for note (2) in Table 11.7. 
are growing rapidly yet the level of retention remains small; 
this applies exactly to the example which has been given in Table 
11.6. Although the company is growing rapidly in terms of the 
gross premium written and financial strength, the graded table of 
retentions remained unchanged for the period 1977-1981 (figures 
provided in 1981). This, of course, has resulted in a decline in 
the retained premium income relative to gross premiums and a larger 
outflow of reinsurance. 
11. 3.3 Per Risk Excess of Loss Covers and the Level of Retention 
A per risk excess of loss (PRXL) reinsurance cover is 
designed to protect a ceding company against the possibility of 
incurring large losses on individual risks. The reinsurer accepts 
liability for the balance of any individual loss exceeding a specified 
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sum, the amount of his liability normally being subject to an upper 
limi t. that is. the cover is expressed as being for "£x in excess 
of £y". Therefore, the ceding company must decide not only at what 
level of loss it wishes the reinsurance to operate, but also the 
limit to the reinsurer's liability. The cost of such reinsurance 
is inversely related to the ceding company I slower re tent ion limi t 
and directly to the amount of the reinsurer's liability. Therefore 
if the company fixes a low retention limit to protect itself against 
an increase in the frequency of small losses. the reinsurance will 
lose its main advantage of enabling the company to retain a large 
proportion of its gross premiums. On the other hand, a too high 
retention will expose the company to large adverse fluctuations 
in retained claims costs. 
Gerathewohl (1980, p.140) has argued that the level of reten-
tion that the insurer should select for a surplus reinsurance should 
always be higher than the retention of PRXL reinsurance covering 
the same business. The reasonis that the insurer's retained claims 
cost is larger under a PRXL cover than under a surplus reinsurance 
treaty, and also under an excess of loss reinsurance the ceding comp-
any has no protection against an increase in the number of small 
claims on large risks that would be partially re insured under a 
surplus treaty. The differences in retained claims costs under 
the two types of reinsurance are illustrated by the following example: 
Example 
Assume that: 
(i) an insurer arranges either an excess of loss cover for 
S 2 million in excess of $200,000, or a ten line first 
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surplus treaty with a gross line of $ 200,000. 
(ii) that the following claims occur on risks with sum insured 
of $ 2.2 million for each risk. 
The insurer's retained claims costs would be as follows: 
Retained claims cost under: 
Loss Amount S u r r ~ l u s s Treaty PRXL Cover 
$ $ $ 
55,000 5,000 55,000 
110,000 10,000 110,000 
220,000 20,000 200,000 
440,000 40,000 200,000 
880,000 80,000 200,000 
1,760,000 160,000 200,000 
2,200,000 200,000 200,000 
515,000 1,165,000 
Although the aggregate retained claims costs would be greater 
under the PRXL cover than under the surplus reinsurance, the insurer 
on the other hand would retain a larger proportion of the gross 
premium income than for a surplus reinsurance with the same retention 
limit. Nevertheless, the two important factors which a company 
should consider in fixing a PRXL retention are: (1) the loss fluc-
tuations which it could retain for its own account, and (2) the 
rate charged by the reinsurer for the various retention levels. 
Therefore an insurer, in determining his PRXL' s retention, should 
look at the size and frequency of losses for the previous years. 
Two systems employed for that purpose are the loss ratio and the 
loss frequency met hods. The way they operate can be illustrated 
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by two examples using hypothetical data. 
The Loss Ratio Method 
As Reinarz has explained (pp. 112-4) this method depends on 
the variability in loss ratio of the portfolio to be re insured . 
First the insurer needs to divide the loss experience for several 
past years into classes according to size of loss. The annual total 
losses for each class are then computed as a percentage of that 
year's earned premium income. Next the average loss ratio per class 
for the period in question can be obtained. The level of retention 
should be the point at which the average loss ratio begins to decline 
rapdily. Losses falling into the smaller size bands are suitable 
for retention because with their high loss frequency the deviation 
of actual losses from expected loss will tend to be small. 
Table 11. 9 
Losses calculated as a Percentage of Annual Earned Premium 
YEA R Aver-
Class Size of Loss 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 age 
--
- - - - - - - -
loss 
ratio 
~ ~
1 1 - 4000 22 21 21 22 21 22 21 21 21. 37 
2 4001 - 6000 18 17 17 18 17 18 18 17 17.50 
3 6001 - 8000 15 15 14 15 14 14 15 14 14.50 
4 8001 - 10000 10 11 10 10 10 11 11 11 10.50 
5 10001 - 13000 4 7 6 6 4 4 5 8 5.50 
6 13001 - 16000 5 5 6 5 5 5 6 5 5.25 
7 16001 - 19000 2 4 5 3 1 4 5 2 3.25 
8 19001 - 22000 3 2 4 1 2 5 1 3 2.62 
9 22001 - 25000 2 0 2 2 3 0 2 2 1.88 
10 25000and uE 1 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0.88 1 
Total Loss Ratio 82 83 88 82 78 83 87 83 83.25 
Accordingly, for a portfolio displaying the sort of results shown 
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in Table 11.9 it would be appropriate to set the retention level 
at around $10,000. It is assumed that a variation of not more than 
five per cent from the eight year average loss ratio is the point 
beyond which the variation from the average is sufficient to be 
considered unpredictable. 
The Loss Frequency Method 
Like the loss ratio method, this method also focuses attention 
on the disturbing effect of large losses on aggregate claims exper-
ience. Again the total claims are broken down by size of claim 
but instead of calculating for each size band the loss ratio, the 
number of claims in each class is expressed as a percentage of the 
total number of claims to give the relative claims frequency. With 
this method the retention limit would be fixed at the size of loss 
where the loss frequency starts for fall significantly, for the 
same reason as applies with the loss ratio method. 
tion in Table 11.10 would be set around $13,000. 
Thus the re ten-
Both of these methods can be criticised on the grounds that 
they are based on ashort period loss experience which does not rec-
ognise some factors that should affect the level of retention, such 
as (i) possible changes in the insurer's portfolio during that time 
(e.g. a motor insurer that began to write insurances for heavy goods 
vehicles and buses as well as private cars) or in risk factors (e.g. 
inflation); and (ii) the insurer's capital resources. Also a diffic-
ulty with using either method is to choose appropriate size bands. 
For example, with the loss ratio method the broader the bands the 
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Table 11.10 
Loss Frequency in Relation to Total 
Losses per $1000 of Claims 
Size of Loss % of Total Loss 
S 
1 - 4000 28 
4001 - 6000 23 
6001 - 8000 19 
8001 - 10000 16 
10001 - 13000 13 
13001 - 16000 5 Retention 
Level 
16001 - 19000 4 
19001 - 22000 2 
22001 - 25000 2 
25000 and up 3 
smaller will tend to be the relative variations within those bands. 
11.3.4 Graded Retentions for Per Risk Excess of Loss Treaties 
For the same reasons as apply to surplus reinsurance, an ins-
urer may consider the possibility of applying graded retention lim-
its for an excess of loss treaty. In other words the treaty would 
be arranged with the deductible (and, possibly, the upper treaty 
limit) being varied according to the class of risk, as in the foll-
owing example: 
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Class Underwriting Insurer's Reinsurer's 
Limit Retention Liability 
Risk Category I $200.000 $60.000 $140.000 
" " II 180.000 54.000 126.000 
" " III 150.000 45.000 105.000 
" " IV 100.000 30.000 70.000 
" " V 80.000 24.000 56.000 
In practice, graded deductibles are most unusual. As Carter 
(1981, p. 2 /10) explains in connection with marine non-proportional 
reinsurances, there is a technical problem in determining a fair 
premium for a per risk excess of loss treaty subject to graded reten-
tions because: 
(i) the overall premium for a reinsured portfolio is based 
on the total account rather than on the original premiums 
for the individual risks; and 
(ii) changes in the content of the protected portfolio may 
lead to an increase or reduction in the reinsurer' s lia-
bili ties without an appropriate adjustment in the reins-
urance premium. Moreover, one of the advantages of excess 
of loss treaties is that the premium retained by insurers 
is larger than in proportional treaties. Therefore, there 
is little need to grade retentions, since high fluctua-
tions in claims expenses can be covered by the retained 
premiums. 
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11.4 Retention Under Catastrophe Covers 
As discussed in chapters 6 and 9, Arab insurance companies. 
like insurers in other parts of the world, are exposed to possible 
accumulations of losses from one loss producing event caused by 
either natural forces (e.g. earthquakes, windstorms, etc.) or human 
action (e.g. riots, strikes, etc.). Such losses may involve both 
many individual exposure units covered under one class of insurance 
and a number of losses under several classes of insurance. The 
main type of reinsurance available to protect an insurer against 
such events is catastrophe excess of loss cover whereby if the ceding 
company' s aggregate retained losses arising from one event exceed 
a specified sum, the reinsurer is liable for the balance subject 
to an upper limi t. Excess of loss reinsurances arranged to cover 
an accumulation of losses affecting more than one class of insurance 
are known as umbrella covers. 
As is the case with other excess of loss reinsurances, an 
insurer considering catastrophe excess of loss cover must decide 
on both his retention limit and the amount of reinsurance cover 
required. The latter factor, although as important as the retention 
limit in relation to both the protection afforded and the cost of 
the reinsurance, is beyond the scope of this study. Regarding the 
fixing of retention limits. there is no simple universal rule. 
However there is some measure of agreement between reinsurance auth-
orities as to the relationship between per risk and catastrophe 
retention limits. 
Buhlmann (1964, p. ,43) has pointed out that in practice it 
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is considered adequate for the catastrophe retention limit to be 
between two to four times the highest retention limit per risk. 
Other writers (e.g. Rubin, 1980, p.lOl), (Thorne, 1984, p.l71) 
and (Tickell, 1980, p. 321) have suggested that twice or a li t t le 
more than the insurer s retention level for anyone risk is the 
appropriate figure. 
Although retention limits under catastrophe covers of not 
less than two times the per risk retention seem to be the general 
rule, retentions usually differ between classes of insurance. For 
example, Gerathewohl (1980, pp. 154-5) says that for catastrophe 
reinsurances covering motor insurance portfolios the retention limit 
for damage to vehicles by natural hazards is rarely less than five 
to ten times the value of a medium-size car, even in the case of 
small insurers. On the other hand, in marine insurance where the 
risk of accumulations is substantial, the retentions under catastrophe 
covers are generally only slightly higher than the retention per 
risk. 
Clearly, one loss event affecting several classes of insurance 
may have a greater impact on an insurer's annual results than an 
accumulation loss involving one class only. Therefore, catastrophe 
retentions should be fixed at a point sufficient to protect the 
insurer against losses which may occur in several classes of insur-
ance unless, as discussed in Section 9.5.2 of chapter nine, the 
insurer also arranges an umbrella reinsurance to cover that conting-
ency. Regarding such reinsurances, Gerathewohl (1980, p. 155) is 
of the opinion that there can be no general guidelines for setting 
retention limits which cater for all or at least several classes. He 
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says an appropriate figure will depend on four factors (i) the insur-
er I scapi tal and free reserves; (ii) his premium income; ( Hi) 
the probability of one loss event affecting several classes of bus-
iness at the same time; and (iv) the scope of the separate types 
of reinsurance treaties already arranged for individual classes 
of insurance to prevent accumulations of retained losses. 
11.5 Types of Reinsurance Suitable for Different Classes 
of Insurance 
It is difficult to generalise on the matter of whether it 
is bet ter to protect a certain c lass of business under non-prop-
ortional or proportional treaties. The characteristics of each 
class of insurance and the particular insurer I s business, as well 
as reinsurance costs, will influence the • I lnsurer s choice as to 
the type of reinsurance he will purchase. To some extent that choice 
will be constrained by the class of insurance concerned and the 
nature of the different forms of reinsurance, as will now be explain-
ed. 
According to Kiln (1981, p. 41), the use of quota share rein-
surance generally prevails in the classes of insurance where the 
definition of one loss or a single risk is impossible. Obvious 
examples are hail, disease (such as foot and mouth in cattle) and 
medical insurances. Brown and Reed (1981, p.46) explain that quota 
share reinsurance frequently is used for marine cargo accounts, 
because it gives the insurer the protection he needs to increase 
his capacity. Marine cargo business is often susceptible to accumu-
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lations of losses from one event which derive from many small and 
medium sized losses. Therefore, a quota share reinsurance would 
enable the insurer to recover a part of e v e r y ~ s s s that is incurred. 
Conditions, however, may change over time. Carter (1979, 
p.386) cited the change that has occurred in reinsurers' attitudes 
to the use of quota share treatiesby new motor insurers, which was 
common practice in the 1960s. Now reinsurers are reluc tant to 
provide such cover unless the insurer is prepared to fix a high 
level of retention for his own account. Also it was widely reported 
that during the 1984 London market renewal season because of the 
high losses incurred by reinsurers on proportional business, many 
insurers were unable to renew their proportional reinsurance treaties 
and reluctantly had to switch to excess of loss covers. So in 
choosing the form of reinsurance to be employed it is not just a 
matter of what the insurer would like, but also what reinsurers 
are prepared to supply and the price they want for it. 
Like a quota share reinsurance, stop loss covers are mostly 
used for classes of business where great problems could arise as 
regards the definition of anyone event' or anyone risk', but 
they are considered most suitable for classes like crop insurance 
against hail which in addition are subject to considerable fluctua-
tions in underwriting results caused by differences in claims fre-
quency. Stop loss covers may be used to protect a whole account, 
. (l) pither in lieu of, or to supplement other forms of relnsurance. 
(1) "In the past years there have been many stop loss covers effec-
ected on marine accounts, particularly for Lloyd's underwriters. 
However, following the very unfavourable results in this branch, 
almost all have disappeared and a cover is only obtainable 
in respect of a very high deductibles, i.e. stop loss cover 
in the form of a catastrophe protection". '(Policy, 1970, 
p.328). 
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Surplus reinsurance is suitable only for those classes of 
insurance where the maximum liability of the insurer for each indi-
vidual risk is known such as fire, theft and personal accident insur-
ances. It cannot be used for classes of insurance that do not meet 
that condition, such as liability insurances, including in partic-
ular motor and workmen's compensa tion insurances which often are 
subject to unlimited liability. (1.1.L. 1951, p.88). Indeed, the 
special suitability of surplus reinsurance to property insurances 
makes it the most extensively used type of reinsurance for fire 
business. 
Excess of loss reinsurances are increasingly being used in 
lieu of, or in conjunction, with proportional (i.e. quota share 
and surplus) reinsurances to provide protection against large indi-
vidual losses in connection with most classes of non-life insurance. 
However, their main use is still for all types of liability insurance 
for which, as noted above, surplus reinsurance cannot be used. 
The attractions to direct insurers of excess of loss reinsurance 
treaties are the ease of administration and so low administrative 
costs, and the savings in premiums ceded. However Carter (1979, 
p.404) maintains that they are not suitable as working covers for: 
"(i) portfolios which are too small to provide the reinsurer 
with an adequate premium and reasonably stable loss 
experience; or 
(ii) new companies and companies commencing writing new 
classes of business, particularly specialist companies, 
who therefore do not possess a proven underwriting 
record; or 
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(iii) certain types of specialist classes of business (e.g. 
performance guarantees)". 
Also as excess of loss reinsurances are not suitable for re-
ciprocal exchanges of business, a fire insurer who is seeking recip-
roci ty might choose to employ a combined quota share and excess 
of loss treaty, using the premiums ceded on the former to obtain 
a reciprocal exchange. 
Finally, catastrophe excess of loss treaties are used to pro-
tect multiple losses arising out of a single event. In cases where 
multiple involvement of the insurer's various retentions in one 
class of insurance or different classes of insurance are exposed 
to a catastrophic event, he should affect a catastrophe cover to 
protect the whole of his net retained account. 
11.6 Formulating a Reinsurance Programme 
As already explained, the determination of a sound reinsurance 
programme is important to an insurance company for various reasons, 
not least being financial stability, profitability and the size 
of its retained premium income. So far the factors to be considered 
in choosing the formes) of reinsurance to be employed and the reten-
tion limit(s) have been discussed mainly from the standpoint of 
the ceding company but the reinsurer's interests must be allowed 
for too. For example, besides the ceding company's loss experience 
on its gross and net retained accounts, the reinsurer's past and 
potential future claims e:{perience on the business ceded must be 
taken into account too. Sometimes although the ceding company's 
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experience on its retained account may have been profitable, the 
reinsurer may have incurred a loss on the business ceded. If this 
should occur with a surplus treaty, the reinsurers may reduce the 
rate of reinsurance commission and/or profit commission in order 
to increase their treaty income at the expense of the ceding compan-
Y I S net retained income. Alternati vely, if the problem arose from 
the treaty being badly unbalanced (i.e., the reinsurers' maximum 
claims liability greatly exceeded the treaty premium income) the 
reinsurers, depending on the risk profile of the reinsured account, 
may either ask the ceding company to accept lower retention limits, 
or more likely reduce the treaty limit. The latter course would 
force the ceding company to reduce its own acceptance limits or 
for cases with sums insured exceeding the treaty limit, buy facultat-
ive reinsurance which would carry a lower rate of reinsurance commi-
ssion. In the case of quota share reinsurances the ceding comp-
any and the reinsurer participate proportionately in any change 
in the claims experience. The danger arises when (1) the ceding 
company retains only a very small proportion of the business written, 
and (ii) the reinsurance commission is at a rate sufficiently higher 
than the cedant I s own expense ratio to almost eliminate any risk 
of the company incurring an underwriting loss on its retained account. 
In such circumstances a low retention limit may encourage the company 
not to care about the quality of the business accepted. Therefore, 
the reinsurer may ask for a higher level of retention in order to 
oblige the ceding company to improve its underwriting standards 
and, ultimately, its business results. 
To summarise what has been said in this chapter so far, the 
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management of an insurance company in deciding on its reinsurance 
programme must choose: 
(i) the forms of reinsurance to employ; and 
(ii) the retention limits for each class of business and 
reinsurance treaty. 
Those decisions will involve consideration of all of the various 
factors discussed in this and the preceding two chapters. 
In addition, it will also need to decide how often it will 
review its reinsurance programme, including its retention limits. Po-
ssibly it may need to modify its retention limits every year in 
the light of its financial strength, premium growth, loss experience, 
etc. 
Two Arab companies supplied details of their existing reinsur-
ance programmes, and the following two examples show how restruc-
turing of those programmes could help the companies to increase 
h . . d .. (1) t e ~ r r r e t a ~ n e e p r e m ~ u m m ~ n c o m e s . .
Example 1, Company A 
In 1980 the company protected its fire account by a combination 
of quota share and surplus reinsurance treaties. The quota share 
provided 80 per cent reinsurance for anyone risk up to $ 800,000 
i.e. the company had a retention limit of $ 160,000. A first surplus 
treaty then provided automatic cover for up to 10 lines based on 
a gross line of $ 800,000, i.e. $ 8,000,000, and a second surplus of 
(1 ) Figures were provided by the 
non-disclosure of their names. 
two companies subject to the 
Therefore as an aid to confi-
dentiality monetary values have been converted into US dollars. 
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14 lines (i.e. $ 11,200,000). Thus, the company had a total accept-
ance limit of $ 20,000,000 anyone risk. It retained $ 1.1 million 
of its gross premium income of $ 12 million, with the quota share 
reinsurers receiving $ 4.4 million, and the balance of $ 6.5 million 
being ceded to the first and second surplus treaties. 
The Suggested Programme 
The simplest way for the company to increase its retained 
premium income would be for it to raise its retention limit. So, 
for example, if it doubled its quota share retention from 20 to 
40 per cent of the treaty limit of $ 800,000 for anyone risk (i.e. 
from $ 160,000 to $ 320,000), the premium income of $ 5.5 million 
shared with the quota share reinsurers would be redistributed to 
give the company a retained premium income of $ 2,200,000 and reduce 
the premiums ceded to $ 3,300,000. On the basis of its claims 
experience for the years 1977 to 1979 inclusive, the company esti-
mated that it would be able to buy a per risk excess of loss reinsur-
ance cover of $ 160,000 excess of S 160,000, to reduce its net expos-
ure on anyone risk to the original level, at a premium rate of 
3 per cent on its gross net premium income. Thus the cost of the 
excess of loss cover would be $ 66,000, so that the total premiums 
ceded to reinsurers would be reduced by $ 1,034,000, leaving the 
company with a retained premium income of £2,134,000. Figure 11.2 
shows the distribution of premiums in the existing and suggested 
programmes. 
The company would, of course, be retaining a higher propor-
tion of its potential gross claims costs and a larger risk of fluct-
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Figure 11.2 
Distribution of Gross Premium Income of US$ 12 million 
Existing programme Suggested programme 
Premiums ceded Premiums ceded 
to surplus to surplus 
reinsurers reinsurers 
US$ 6,500,000 US$ 6,500,000 
Premium ceded Premiums ceded 
to quota share to quota share 
US$ 4,400,000 US$ 3,300,000 
Premiums retained 
Premium retained US$ 2,134,000 
US$ 1,100,000 
... 
Premium 
ceded to 
XL cover 
US$66,000 
505 
uations in its retained claims costs. Horeover the saving in the 
net cost of its reinsurance would be less than $ 1,034,000, even 
if it proved possible to obtain the excess of loss reinsurance at 
the anticipated terms because: 
(a) the above figures make no allowance for the reinsurance 
commission, and possibly profit commission too, deduct-
ible from the quota share premiums; and 
(b) the company would enjoy the benefit of longer delays 
in paying reinsurance premiums to its quota share rein-
surers than to an excess of loss reinsurer, \.;ith the 
resulting effect on its investment earnings. 
Unfortunately the company was not willing to provide the details 
required to permit the estimation of the net saving in the reinsur-
ance costs. However, even on the basis of, say, a 30 per cent rein-
surance commission payable on the quota share treaty, against the 
premium saving of S 1 ,034 ,000 would need to be offset a loss of 
reinsurance commission of $ 330,000. That, however, would still 
leave the company with a substantial saving from which to meet any 
increase in its retained claims costs. 
Example 2 : Company B 
This case relates to a marine cargo insurance account of a 
company which is required to cede a fixed proportion of every risk 
it writes to the state reinsurance corporation under a compulsory 
quota share treaty : to preserve anonymity the proportion so reinsured 
will be assumed to be 20 per cent. The company then made the follow-
ing reinsurance arrangements for the remaining 80 per cent of its 
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business : all of the figures that follow relate only to that part 
of its total gross business accepted. 
Treaty limits based on 80% 
of sums insured (i. e. net 
of 20% compulsory quota share) 
50% Quota share treaty (nominal) 
Surplus treaty 
Excess of loss for common account 
of ceding company and quota share 
reinsurers 
1976 and 1977 
(= 
$ 
300,000 
4,200,000 
14 'gross 
net' lines) 
2,000,000 
excess of 
300,000 
1978 to 1980 
$ 
750,000 
3,750,000 
( = 5 'gross 
net t lines) 
4,500,000 
excess of 
750,000 
The company's total acceptance limits, therefore, would have been: 
1976 and 1977 - $6.5 million x l ~ ~ ~ = $8,125,000 
of which compulsory quota share $1,625,000 
1978 to 1980 - $9.0 million x l ~ ~ ~ = $11,250,000 
of which compulsory quota share $2,250,000 
Its retention limits anyone risk were $150,000 in 1976, rising 
to $375,000 in 1978. 
Therefore if in 1976 the company had incurred a loss on a 
case with a sum insured equal to its total acceptance limit, the 
loss would have been distributed as follows: 
Loss 
Recovery from compulsory 
quota share 
Balance (divided as 
follows) 
Ceding company 
less recovery from 
excess of loss 
cover 
Quota share 
reinsurers 
less recovery from 
excess of loss 
cover 
Surplus reinsurers 
Excess of loss 
reinsurers 
575,000 
425,000 
575,000 
425,000 
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$4,062,500 Loss $8.1.25,000 
$ $ 
812,500 1,625,000 
3,250,000 6,500,000 
1,150,000 
1,000,000 
150,000 150,000 
1,150,000 
1,000,000 
150,000 150,000 
2,100,000 4,200,000 
850,000 2,000,000 
After deducting the claims incurred and the company's expenses, 
the total underwriting profit on the gross net (80%) account for 
the period 1976-1980 amounted to approximately 10 per cent of the 
total gross net premium income of $107,087,457. The results of 
the business ceded by the company to its voluntary treaty re insurers 
were as follows: 
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Reinsurance Reinsurance Claims inc- Underwriting As 0, '0 of 
premiwns & profit urred by Results for reinsur-
corrmissions Reinsurers Reinsurers ance 
paid by premium 
Reinsurers 
$ $ $ $ 
50% quota 39,930,923 18,282,001 19,142,404 2,506,518 6.28 
share 
Surplus treaty 25,660,559 12,618,545 8,602,341 4,439,673 17.30 
EXcess of loss 782,526 483,242 299,284 38.25 
treaty 
(company's 
share 
only) 
66,374,008 30,900,546 28,227,987 7,245,475 10.92 
Note: the figures shown for the excess of loss treaty are for only a half of the 
annunts received and paid by that reinsurer. 
The above figures include the voluntary reinsurances share 
of all claims incurred on the portfolio. During the period there 
were only a small number of claims that exceeded the company's reten-
tion 1imi ts. The annual gross net costs of those claims and their 
pure burning costs relative to the company's gross net premium 
were as follows: 
Large c ~ ~ exceeding the company IS 
Year Gross net premium retention limit Pure turning 
income No. of claims Annual gross cost cost 
$ $ 
1976 11,809,526 1 354,828 3.00 
1977 11,868,483 1 388,594 3.27 
1978 14,840,815 1 238,545 1.61 
1979 28,869,253 5 3,037,431 10.52 
1980 39,699,380 3 2,577,560 6.49 
107,087,457 13 6,596,958 6.16 
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The company had no choice regarding the continuation of the 
compulsory quota share reinsurance but it could have considered 
replacing all of its voluntary treaties bya working excess of loss 
cover for: 
1 976 and 19 77 
1978 onward 
$6,350,000 excess of $150,000 
$8,625,000 excess of $375,000 
It is only possible to speculate as to the premium an excess 
of loss reinsurer would have required, particularly because: 
(i) the reinsurer might have calculated the premium rate 
on three or five years burning costs, but the company's 
loss experience prior to 1976 was not made available; 
(ii) the burning costs are subject to both substantial fluct-
uations and a deteriorating trend; and 
(iii) the reinsurer in calculating the burning cost might 
have adjusted it for inflation which rose from an annual 
rate of 7 per cent in 1976 and 1977 to an average 10 
per cent in the next three years. 
The last point presents the least difficulty because both 
marine cargo sums insured and claims costs are equally affected 
by rising prices, unlike liability and marine hull insurances where 
long delays in the settlement of claims disproportionately affect 
claims costs. Therefore any attempt by the reinsurer to adjust 
the burning costs for inflation would have had only a minor affect 
on the figures shown above. 
More problematic is the reinsurer's possible responses to 
(i) and (ii), including the size of premium loading and annual premium 
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adj ustment limits that would have been required. If, for example. 
the reinsurer had: 
(i) rated the risk on a year of account basis; 
(ii) 100 used a fairly conventional loading factor of 75 applied 
to the above pure burning costs; and 
(iii) set the annual adjustment limits for the loaded burning 
rate at 4-11 per cent of the ceding company's gross 
net premium income; 
the total reinsurance premium for the period would have been as 
follows: 
Year 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Loaded 
burning cost 
4.00 
4.36 
2.15 
14.03 
8.65 
Rate applied 
to GPNI 
0{ 
10 
4.00 
4.36 
4.00 
11.00 
8.65 
Reinsurance 
Premium $ 
472,381 
517,466 
593,633 
3,175,618 
3.433,996 
8,193,094 
As can be seen from the following accounts, under the reinsur-
ance arrangements in force during the period the company would have 
retained for its own account less than 40 per cent of its gross 
premium income net of the compulsory quota share cessions, and earned 
an underwriting profit of $4,971,587. By changing over to an excess 
of loss treaty on the terms suggested above, the company would have 
more than doubled both its retained premium income and underwriting 
profit . 
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Estimated Aggregate Underwriting Results 1976-1980 
Gross Net Premium Income 
Less Reinsurance Premiums Ceded 
Retained Premium Income 
Plus Reinsurance Commissions 
Less Retained Claims 
Less (estimated) Expenses 
Underwriting Profit 
Underwriting Profit as a percentage of 
gross net premium income. 
Reinsurance 
arrangements 
in force 
S 
107,087,457 
66,374,008 
40,713,445 
30,900,546 
71,613,791 
19,142,404 
52,471,587 
47,500,000 
4,971,587 
12.21% 
Suggested 
excess of 
loss cover 
S 
107,087,457 
8,193,094 
98,894,363 
98,894,363 
40,773,433 
58,120,930 
47,500,000 
10,620,930 
10.74% 
One might conclude from the above that the suggested excess 
of loss re insurance programme would have proved more beneficial 
to the company, despite the reduction in the underwriting profit 
relative to the retained premium income (though no allowance has 
been made for a possible reduction in the costs of administering 
non-proportional treaties). However, in practice sole reliance 
on excess of loss reinsurance may not have proved entirely satisfac-
tory for four reasons: 
(1) The impact on the company's solvency margin of a substantial 
increase in retained premium income would have to be considered. 
(2) The reinsurer's potential claims liability would have been 
large in relation to the treaty premium income, and the annual 
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claims experience might be subject to substantial fluctua-
tions. Allowance would have needed to have been made for 
both factors in the size of the premium loading and the premium 
adjustment limits. The former would increase the ceding comp-
any's reinsurance costs whereas wide adjustment limits would 
leave the company exposed to substantial variations in those 
costs from year to year. 
(3) An excess of loss reinsurance would have provided no protection 
against the fluctuations in the number of small losses which 
are inherent in the all-risks cover provided by marine insur-
ance. Unfortunately the company did not supply details of 
its aggregate annual claims experience. 
(4) As noted previously, the effect of the changeover to excess 
of loss reinsurance on the company's investment earnings would 
also need to be brought into account. 
Although the reinsurance programmes suggested in the above 
two examples may not be ideal, they at least demonstrate that if 
an insurance company studies its reinsurance programme carefully 
it may prove possible to increase its retained premium income and 
decrease its net reinsurance costs. Any analysis of an existing 
reinsurance programme may provide different solutions from which 
to choose the best type(s) of reinsurance. In practice, this is 
not an easy matter, because of the many factors involved but all 
reinsurance programmes should be subject to periodic revie\v and 
revision in the light of changes in a company's position. 
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11.7 Conclusions 
The fundamental difference between quota share and stop loss 
reinsurances on the one hand, and surplus and per risk excess of 
loss reinsurances on the other is that whilst the former are based 
on all risks within a portfolio, the latter are based on individual 
risks. Quota share and stop loss will provide protection against 
small and medium sized losses, whilst surplus and per risk excess 
of loss reinsurances mainly afford protection against individual 
large losses. 
As such, each type of reinsurance will provide protection 
for a specific claims structure, and thus the level of retention 
to be determined will differ in each case. One might ask whether 
one particular form of reinsurance for a specific class of business 
would provide better reinsurance protection than another form. 
It is difficult to find an alternative type of reinsurance ~ v h i c h h
provides a wholly satisfactory substitute o n ~ ~ Jor "11 other. To 
replace on reinsurance treaty by another is not always the best 
solution for improving a company's net operating result, particularly 
for small companies, and furthermore there could be specific disad-
vantages in any such replacement. 
Nevertheless, over the years an insurance company should pay 
out less actual absolute profit to non-proportional re insurers than 
would be paid (after commission) to proportional reinsurers. There-
fore the choice of a particular form of reinsurance should be made 
after careful study of the structure and characteristics of the 
insurance class in question, and it may be that those Arab companies 
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which rely on only proportional reinsurance for the protection of 
individual classes of insurance could beneficially employ a combina-
tion of proportional and working excess of loss treaties. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
APPLICATION OF RETENTION LIMITS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH 
RETAINED PREMIUM INCOME AND FREE CAPITAL - THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
12.1 Introduction 
As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, many varying and 
interrelated factors enter into the determination of retention limits, 
and as an insurer's circumstances change, so periodically its reten-
tion limit(s) should be readjusted accordingly. Yet whether insurers 
behave in that manner in practice is largely a matter of speculation, 
as little empirical research appears to have been conducted on the 
subject. 
In order to obtain data on the subject of retention limits, 
the questionnaireon corporate objectives which, as noted in Chapter 
ten, was sent to 143 Arab insurance and reinsurance companies, and 
to which . (l) 46 replled, , included three questions dealing with the 
fixing of retention limits. Therefore the purpose of this chapter 
is: 
(1) 
Ca) to present an analysis of the replies to those questions; 
Cb) to analyse and compare the relationship between retention 
limits on the one hand and retained premium income and 
capital/free reserves on the other in fire, marine 
and motor business for two Arab direct insurance compan-
ies; and 
(c) to see whether the questionnaire findings of these two 
Arab companies are consistent with the data analysis 
in Cb). 
See Table 10.2 for the analysis of respondents 
company, and the appendix to Chapter 10 for a 
questionnaire. 
by type of 
copy of the 
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12.2 Retention Limits in Practice 
The questionnaire sought to discover more about the practice 
of Arab insurance and reinsurance companies in regards to the fixing 
of retention limits. It was kept as short as possible in order 
to try to obtain a good response, and therefore concentrated on 
three matters which reinsurance theory indicates to be of key import-
ance in the formulation of optimum reinsurance programmes. 
First, the companies were asked (question 5) whether in fixing 
their retention limits they pay regard to (i) their capital and 
free reserves, and/or (ii) their net retained premium incomes. Summ-
aries of the answers from the 46 respondents given in table 12.1 
and 12.2 confirm the importance assigned to those two factors in 
practice. It can be seen that almost three-quarters of the companies 
relate retentions to their capital and free reserves, almost half 
take into account retained premium incomes, and almost one-third 
consider both factors. Only a tenth of the companies pay no regard 
to either factor. 
Secondly,in question 6 the companies were asked to state which 
of five factors listed they considered most important when they 
last fixed their retention limits: they were also invited to add 
others. The most significant findings are: 
(1) that most companies ranked maintaining financial strength 
and increasing retained premium income as their first two 
considerations, but the importance attached to the other fac-
tors varied by type of company. 
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Table 12.1 
The Proportion of Companies that pay regard to 
(i) Capital and Free Reserves and (ii) Net Retained 
Premium Income in Fixing Retention Limits 
No.of 
Type of Capital/Free Reserves Net Retained Premiwn Resp-
Ownership Yes 01 No % Yes 0; No ? ~ ~'0 ,0 
State 8 89 1 11 4 44 5 56 
Private 10 71 4 29 6 43 8 57 
Mixed 3 50 3 50 3 50 3 50 
Co-operative 2 100 - - - - 2 100 
Foreign 
subsidiary 1 100 - - - - 1 100 
Owned by Local 
and foreign 9 64 5 36 9 64 5 36 
interests 
Total 33 72 13 28 22 48 24 52 
Table 12.2 
The Proportion of Companies that Pay Regard to 
(i) Capital and Free Reserves and (ii) Net 
Retained Premium Income in Fixing Retention Limits 
Factors considered No. of % 
respondents 
a. Capital and free reserves only 19 41 
h. Net retained premium income only 8 17 
c. Both (a) and ( b) 14 31 
d. Neither capital/free reserves nor 
net retained premium income 5 11 
Total 46 100 
ond-
ents 
9 
14 
6 
2 
1 
14 
46 
% of 
tot-
al 
20 
30 
13 
5 
2 
30 
100 
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(2) 'expansion of gross premium income' was ranked third by state, 
private and mixed companies. 
(3) although Arab companies are much concerned about reinsurance 
costs, some companies when fixing their retention limits 
ranked this factor in the third place and others in the fourth. 
Table 12.3 and figure 12.1 show the type of companies and 
the importance attached to each of the five listed factors in fixing 
their retention limits .Four companies also added another fac tor to 
the list but as no indication was given as to its importance one 
may assume that it was of minor significance. The additional factors 
were: 
to improve the financial strength of the company. 
to increase the profitability of the company. 
to limit claims costs. 
to base business growth on the company's financial 
strength. 
The final question was designed to find out how often companies 
revise their retention limits. As shown in Table 12.4, 69 per cent 
of the companies said that they undertake an annual revision of 
their re tent ions . Possibly however. some of the companies meant 
that their retention limits are merely reviewedCand not necessarily 
changed) when reinsurance treaties are due for renewal each year. 
12.3 The Relationship of Retention Limits to Retained Premium Income 
and Capital/Free Reserves in Two Arab Insurance Companies 
The empirical studies of the two Arab insurance companies 
examined in this chapter represent two different insurance market 
State 
Factors Total Degree 
points of irrp-
a. ~ 1 a i n t a i n n
financial 42 1 
strength 
b. Premium 23 3 
growth 
c. Increase 
retained 31 2 
premium 
d. Limit 
retained 10 4 
premium 
e. Minimise 
reinsurance 23 3 
cost 
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TABLE 12.3 
The Importance attached by Arab insurers to {ffiOUS factors 
in determining Retention Limits 
Private ~ l i x e d d Co-operative Foreign Sub. 
Total I Degree Total Degree Total Degree Total Degree 
points of irrp- points of inp-- points of inp-- points of inp-
64 1 23 1 10 1 4 2 
40 3 11 3 9 2 2 4 
50 2 20 2 9 2 5 1 
25 4 7 4 2 4 - -
25 4 20 2 4 3 3 3 
204 81 34 14 
Local & Foreign Total 
Total Degree Total Degree 
mints of iIq.)- mints of irrp-
61 1 204 1 
31 4 116 3 
51 2 166 2 
7 5 51 5 
33 3 lOB 4 
183 645 
(1) The method of calculating the total points for the purpose of determining the importance of the factors was the 
same method as for Table 10.5 of Chapter 10. 
I 
I 
I 
VI 
I-' 
\C 
(/) 
r-
Z 
0 
CL 
-.J 
<. 
0 
r-
225: 
200 
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100 
75 
50 
25 
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Figure 12.1 
The Importance of some Factors in 
Determining of the Retention limits 
204 
166 
11 
I 
I 
116 
51 
108 
i 
~ ~________ ~ ~________ ~ ~___________ L-________ ~ ~_______ ~ ~
o a b c d e 
FACTORS 
TABLE 12.4 
Time Intervals for the Revision of Retention Limits 
Annually Two Years Three Years Four Years ~ 1 o r e e than 
Type of Ownership No. % No. % No. 
four years 
% No. % No. % 
--
State 6 67 1 11 1 11 - - 1 11 
Private 10 72 - - 2 14 1 17 1 17 
~ U x e d d 4 66 1 17 1 17 - - - -
Co-operative 1 SO - - 1 SO - - - -
Foreign Subsidiary 1 100 - - - - - - - -
O\med by Local and 
Foreign Interests 9 64 - - 4 29 - - - -
Total 31 69 2 4 9 20 1 2 2 4 
-
Note: Only one company did lIot mention how often its retention limits Here raised. 
U1 
N 
...... 
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structures: a free market with company A, and a monopoly market 
with insurance company B. Cl) Company B,a government owned insurer, 
has been opeating for over thirty years and is the sole non-life 
insurer in its country. Company A, founded around ten years ago 
and owned by local and foreign interests, operates in a market along-
side a large number of insurance companies. Both companies conduct 
their business in an expanding economy. Also both companies are 
among the largest in the Arab World in terms of volume of premium 
income. The gross premium income of company A has grown at an av-
erage annual rate of 52.2 per cent from 19.9 million monetary units 
in 1974 to 247.7 million in 1980. Company B's premium growth over 
ten years was 36.1 per cent from 7.5 million in 1971 to 120.5 million 
in 1980. Both companies have achieved a considerable underwriting 
profit on their overall business. 
Although a case could be made for an insurance company to 
fix common retention limits for all classes of insurances it writes, 
it is the normal practice for insurers to treat each class separately 
and to apply different retentions according to the nature and size 
of each account. Therefore, the two companies were asked for details 
of their reinsurance programmes for each of the main classes of 
insurance transacted for at least seven years. 
In order to evaluate the reinsurance policies pursued by the 
companies in regards to the sizes of their retention limits relative 
to (i) retained premium income and (ii) their capital and free reser-
ves, the retention limits for each class of insurance will be comp-
(1) Information was provided by the two companies subject to the 
non-disclosure of their names, therefore, they will be referred 
to as (A) and (B). As an aid to confidentiality no currency 
units will be named. 
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ared with the 'rules of thumb' discussed in Chapter 9, that is: 
Type of Relationship Small companies Large companies 
Retention Limit (eer risk) 
Retained premium income Up to 10% Around 1 01 ,0 
Retention Limit (Eer risk) 
Capital and free reserves Up to 5% Not more than 10f /0 
The status of the two companies was discussed with several 
reinsurance officials who were of the unanimous opinion that company 
A falls into the 'small company' category whereas company B by the 
end of the 1970s had reached medium size. 
12.3.1 Relationship Between Retention Limits Per Risk and Retained 
Premium Income 
12.3.1.1. Fire Business 
Both companies have excess of loss treaties to protect them-
selves against accumulations of losses from one event. Only in 
the case of company A however, is the excess of loss cover structur-
ed in a way that it also incorporates a working layer to reduce 
A's potential net retained loss for anyone risk after allowing for 
claims recoveries from the underlying proportional reinsurance treat-
ies. Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain details of the 
deductible on that excess of loss cover. 
Company A 
Table 12.5 shows the development of the company's gross premium 
income (GPI), retained premium income (RPI) and retention limits 
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(RLs) of its fire 1st, 2nd surplus and facultative obligatory treat-
ies; as noted above the company's maximum retained loss is further 
reduced by an excess of loss treaty which being of an unknown amount 
is ignored in the following analysis. The company has achieved 
a high rate of growth of GPI which has been accompanied by a higher 
rate of growth of RPI. GPI increased thirty-two fold during the 
period 1974-80, with an average annual growth rate of 78.3 per 
cent for these years. In comparison, the company has increased 
its RPI almost fifty-one fold and achieved an average annual growth 
rate of 92.3 per cent for the same period. Although the RPI hc;s 
increased faster than the GPI during the period under analysis, 
the retained proportion of the premium income remained very small: 
excluding 1973 it averaged 3.71 per cent .:ll1d ranged between 2.4 
per cent and 5.2 per cent. 
During the period 1973-80, out of a total of 93.046 million 
gross premiums written, only 3.358 million (3.6 per cent) was retain-
ed, with the balance of 89.688 million (96.4 per cent) being passed 
to reinsurers. 
Table 12.5 also shows that the company only revised its reten-
tion limit once during the p e r i o d , ~ o u b l i n g g it in 1977. During the 
whole period the maximum limit anyone 10 ss as a percentage of 
RPI was ext remely high and by 1980 it had only dropped to 47.1 per 
cent (see figure 12.2), though possibly its excess of loss cover 
would have brought that limit down to a much lower figure. The 
company, however, may have been prepared to have run a higher than 
nor.mal risk during its early years when it waS" crying to build-up its 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
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Table 12.5 
Development of Gross Premiums, Retained Premium Income, 
and Retention Limits of Fire 1st, 2nd Surplus and 
Fac/Oblig. Treaties - Company A 
(OOO's omitted) 
Year GPI RPI RPI 
x 100 RLs RL 100 -- - x GPI RPI 
(6 months) 135 9 6.7 250 2778.0 
892 21 2.4 250 1190.5 
1,691 69 4.1 250 362.3 
4,011 209 5.2 250 119.6 
10,278 395 3.8 500 126.6 
22 ,256 698 3.1 500 71.6 
25,111 895 3.7 500 55.9 
28,672 1,062 3.7 500 47.1 
business, particularly as most of the market's fire premium income 
comes from large risks. Moreover, as will be seen later, the company 
was well capitalised. 
Company B 
The comparable details for this company are sho\.;rn in Table 
12.6. Its GPI has increased almost ten times (an average annual 
compound rate of growth of 29.1 per cent) for the period 1971-80, 
which compares with an approximately nine fold increase in its RPI 
(an average annual growth rate of 27.8 per cent). The percentage 
of RPI to the GPI has varied between 31.1 per cent (1975) and 22.4 
per cent (1979). Since 1975 an increasingly higher share of the 
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Figure 12.2 
Retention Limit as a Percentage of Retained Premium Income 
for Fire 1st, 2nd Surplus and Fac/Oblig. Treaties - Company A 
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
Year 
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company's growing GPI was ceded to reinsurers, including a large 
share ceded to the local reinsurance company. (1) During the period 
1971-80, out of a total GPI of 50.749 million, the company was able 
to retain 12.908 million (i.e. 25.4 per cent). 
Table 12.6 
Development of Gross Premiums, Retained Premium Income, and 
Retention Limits of Fire Quota Share and 1st, 2nd, 
3rd Surplus Treaties - Company B 
(OOO's omitted) 
Year GP I RPI RPI 100 RLs RL 100 -- x -- x GPI RPI 
1971 1,281 329 25.7 40 12.2 
1972 1,484 400 27 .0 40 10.0 
1973 1,842 448 24.3 40 8.9 
1974 2,363 564 23.9 40 11.3 
1975 3,074 956 31.1 75 7.8 
1976 4,206 1,260 30.0 75 6.0 
1977 6,378 1,763 27 .6 75 4.3 
1978 7,168 1,907 26.6 75 3.9 
1979 10,207 2,286 22.4 75 3.3 
1980 12,746 2,995 23.5 75 2.5 
Table 12.6 also shows that, like company A, company B has 
only increased the retention limit of its fire quota share and surp-
lus treaties once over the period - from 40,000 to 75,000 in 1975. 
(1) Company (B) is ceding to the local reinsurance company more 
than 20% as a legal cession, and a very high proportion of 
its voluntary reinsurance treaties. 
528 
The percentage of RL to RPI has dropped from 12.2 per cent in 1971 
to 2.5 per cent in 1980. Apart from 1971, 1972, 1973 and 1974 this 
percentage was within the 'rule of thumb' guidelines (see Figure 
12.3) . Obviously the decline in these percentages resulted from 
the continuous increase in the company's RPI on the one hand, and 
the stabilisation of its RL during the period 1975-80 on the other. 
The willingness to allow such a relative decline in its RL may 
be due to the company having to underwrite the whole fire business 
of a market in which, in recent years, there has been a considerable 
increase in the number and size of very large risks. Therefore 
the company may prefer to follow a conservative policy in determining 
its fire RL. 
12.3.1.2 Marine Cargo Business 
Company A 
Table 12.7 shows that during the period 1974-80 the GPI increa-
sed almost seven-fold, and the RPI thirty-four fold. Despite such 
a rapid increase in RP!, the volume of reinsurance premiums paid 
to reinsurers was very large; during the years1973-80 the company 
ceded 105.696 million (Le. 92.0 per cent) out of a total GPI of 
114.849 million. 
Despite the retention limit having been increased twice the 
company was able to retain only a small, though over the period 
increasing, proportion of its gross premium income. Figure 12.4 
shows the rapid decline in the company's RL as a percentage to RPI 
from 131.6 per cent in 1973 to 4.5 per cent in 1980, which is well 
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Figure 12.3 
Retention Limit as a Percentage of Retained Premium Income 
for Fire Quota Share and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Surplus Treaties 
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below the 'rule of thumb' guideline of up to 10 per cent for a small 
company. 
Table 12.7 
Development of Gross Premiums, Retained Premium Income, 
and Retention Limits of Marine Cargo, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, Surplus 
and Quota Share Treaties - Company A 
(OOO's omitted) 
Year GPI RPI RPI XIOO! RLs RL x 100 --
GPI RPI 
1973(6 months) 833 19 2.3 25 anyone 131.6 
policy 
1974 4,977 97 1.9 25 25.8 
1975 8,873 243 2.7 40 16.5 
1976 10,444 547 5.2 75 13.7 
1977 15,276 415 2.7 75 18.1 
1978 17,020 1,703 10.0 150 8.8 
1979 24,263 2,788 11. 5 150 5.4 
1980 33,163 3,341 10.1 150 4.5 
Company B 
Marine cargo business is the largest class of insurance in 
the company's total business and Table 12.8 shows hm., the GPI, RPI 
and RL of marine cargo quota share and surplus treaties have all 
increased substantially over the period 1971-80, though the premium 
growth has been erratic with relatively very large increases in 
gross premiums in 1974 and 1979. By 1980, the GPI was twenty times 
higher than in 1971; the RPI has increased about twenty-nine fold 
..., 
!:: 
aJ 
U 
... 
aJ p... 
~ ~p... 
~ ~
---~ ~
531 
Figure 12.4 
Retention Limit as a Percentage of Retained Premium Income for 
Marine Cargo Quota Share and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Surplus Treaties 
- Company A 
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over the same period. During the period 1971-80, the average annual 
growth rates of GPI and RPI were 39.6 per cent, and 45.2 per cent 
respectively, so that the proportion of the gross premium income 
retained by the company has increased to over one-quarter. 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Table 12.8 
Development of Gross Premiums, Retained Premium Income, 
and Retention Limits of Marine Cargo Quota Share and 
Surplus Treaties - Company B. (000'0 omitted) 
GPI RPI RPI xlOO! RLs RL xlOO 
--
GPI (per policy) RPI 
3,006 549 18.3 45 8.2 
2,965 716 24.2 60 8.4 
4,536 947 20.9 60 6.3 
13 ,121 2,876 21.9 60 2.1 
20,918 4,282 20.5 120 2.8 
18,062 4,356 24.1 150 3.4 
18,153 4,803 26.5 150 3.1 
22,699 6,333 27.9 375 5.9 
44,155 11,966 27 .1 375 3.1 
60.719 15,787 26.0 375 2.4 
The company I s retention policy may have been shaped not only 
by the rapid growth of business but also by the rise in known and 
unknown accumulations of risk. Port and transport facilities \.rere 
inadequate to cope with the increase in trade. In the mid-1970s 
the waiting time for ships to enter the main port exceeded two months 
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and large amounts of imported goods were left in congested, extremely 
hazardous condi tians. However, the company did on four occas ions 
increase its retention limit which by 1980 was more than eight 
times its 1971 level. Figure 12.5 shows that over the ten years, 
the maximum limit anyone loss as a percentage to RPI ranges between 
8.4 per cent in 1972 and 2.1 per cent in 1974 which is within the 
'rule of thumb' limits. 
The regular increases in their retention limits suggest that 
both companies wanted to get more benefit from the recent develop-
ment in marine cargo business. Despite this fact the volume of 
RPI achieved by Company B from this class of business was relatively 
small. This is also the case with Company A, but the company's 
recent establishment justified such a small RPI. 
12.3.1.3 Motor Business 
Over the last ten years, motor insurance premium income in 
most Arab count ries has expanded rapidly due to inc reases in the 
numbers of vehicles, in the cost of repairs, and in the court awards 
to injured third parties, though the latter are still low relative 
to Western standards. 
Company A 
During the period 1974-80 company A's GPI increased almost 
eight-fold; the average annual growth rate being 41.2 per cent. 
The company has relied solely on excess of loss reinsurance to 
protect it against large claims, and as liability awards are still 
relatively low, it has been able to obtain the cover required for 
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Figure 12.5 
Retention Limit as a Percentage of Retained Premium Income for 
Marine Cargo Quota Share and Surplus Treaties - Company B 
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only a modest premium. Consequently it has retained 91.6 per cent 
of its GPI over the period, and its RPI has grown almost ten-fold 
at an average annual growth rate of 46.0 per cent. 
Table 12.9 shows that the company has increased its retention 
limit twice to maintain a ratio to RPI of under 1 per cent in marked 
contrast to fire and marine cargo business. The reasons for this 
difference in policy >vill be considered later \vhen discussing the 
motor excess of loss cover of Company B. 
Table 12.9 
Development of Gross Premiums, Retained Premium Income, 
and Retention Limits of Motor Excess of Loss Cover - Company A 
(OOO's omitted) 
Year GPI RPI RP! 
x 100 RLs RL -- - x 100 GP! RPI 
1973(6 months) 1,400 1,350 96.4 20 1.5 
1974 2,750 2,200 80.0 20 
I 
0.9 
1975 5,600 4,225 75.4 20 0.4 
1976 10,500 9,075 86.4 20 0.2 
1977 15,500 12,850 82.9 20 0.16 
1978 17,450 16,613 95.2 100 0.6 
1979 18,850 18,338 97.3 200 1.1 
1980 21 ,800 21,343 97.9 200 0.9 
Company B 
Company B also achieved a high rate of growth in both GPI 
and RPI during the 1970s, both having increased more than fifteen 
fold between 1971 and 1980 at an average annual growth rate of more 
than 35 per cent (see Table 12.10). However, Company B was unable 
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Figure 12.6 
Retention Limit as a Percentage of Retained Premium Income 
for Motor Excess of Loss Cover - Company A 
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to retain as high a proportion of its GPI as Company A because 
of the obligation to cede more than 20 per cent quota share to 
the state reinsurance company. It also effected an excess of 
loss reinsurance as protection against large claims for, apparently, 
a relatively small premium. 
The company has raised its retention limit at five year inter-
vals, and as can be seen from Table 12.10 and Figure 12.7, since 
1975 the ratio of the retention limit to its RPI has consistently 
been below 1 per cent. Like Company A, a lower retention limit 
has been fixed for motor insurance than for fire and marine cargo 
business. This is because: (i) retention limits under excess 
of loss covers should always be lower than for surplus treaties 
for the reasons mentioned in Chapter eleven; (ii) a serious accident 
under a comprehensive policy, for instance, may involve many 
seC tions of the policy, e. g. own damage, third party liabili ty. 
personal accident benefits, medical expenses, etc; and (iii) there 
is the risk of an accumulation of losses from collisions involving 
two or more policyholders. 
12.3.2 Retention Limits in Relation to Total Retained 
Premium Income 
Both companies in answering the questionnaire said that they 
fix their retention limits with regard to their retained premium 
incomes. However it is not known whether each class of insurance 
is considered in isolation, as in the above analysis. or \vhether 
the company's total retained premium income for all of its business 
is taken into account in fixing the individual class retention 
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Table 12.10 
Development of Gross Premiums,Retained Premium Income 
and Retention Limits for Motor Excess of Loss Reinsurance 
- Company B 
(OOO's omitted) 
Year GPI RPI RPI RLs RL 
GPI x 100 RPI xlOO 
1971 1,349 1,0/')4 74.4 20 2.0 
1972 1,607 1,187 73.9 20 1.7 
1973 1,775 1,310 73 .8 20 1.5 
1974 2,365 1,762 74.5 20 1.1 
1975 5,254 3,926 74.7 30 0.76 
1976 8,804 6,577 74.7 30 0.46 
1977 7,207 5,383 74.7 30 0.56 
1978 8,160 6,096 74.7 30 0.49 
1979 12,291 9.181 74.7 30 0.37 
1980 21,157 15,846 74.9 100 0.63 
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Figure 12.7 
Retention Limit as a Percentage of Retained Premium Income 
for Motor Excess of Loss Cover - Company B 
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limits. Therefore, and in order to see the differences between 
the class RLs on that basis, Tables 12.11 and 12.12 compare 
the retention limits for the three main classes of insurance against 
the companies' total retained premium incomes. As can be seen, 
apart from Motor business for Company A, both companies' retention 
limits expressed as a percentage of TRPI have fallen substantially, 
and by 1980 all were well below the rule of thumb ratio guidelines 
for companies of their sizes. 
Summary 
An overall picture of the development of GPI, RPI 
and RL, and the relationship between RL and RP! for fire, marine 
cargo and motor business is given in Table 12.13. 
As can be seen, both companies' GPI's increased 
very substantially over the periods covered, with the more ne\vly 
established Company A generally achieving the fastest growth rates. 
Whereas Company A increased the proportion of its premium income 
retained for its own account in all three classes of insurance, 
Company B did so only for marine cargo, and by 1980 both companies 
were still ceding to reinsurers a large proportion of their premium 
incomes other than for motor insurance. 
As noted above, both companies said in response 
to the questionnaire that they fixed their retention limits \vith 
regards to the retained premium income. Although with both companies 
the retention limits in both absolute terms and as a ratio to 
the retained premium income for each class of insurance varied 
substantially: 
I 
Year 
1973/74 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
- -
Table 12.11 
Relationship between RL and Total Retained Premium 
Income for all Classes - Company A 
TRPI RLs ~ x x 100 RLs ~ x l O O O RLs (OOO's) Fire TRPI Narine TRPI Hotor 
3,605 250 6.9 25 0.7 20 
4,720 250 5.3 40 0.8 20 
10,088 250 2.5 75 0.7 20 
14,007 500 3.6 75 0.5 20 
20,096 500 2.5 150 0.7 100 
24,126 500 2.1 150 0.6 200 
27 ,867 500 1.8 150 0.5 200 
~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - -
-------
~ - - - - - - - - -
~ ~ xlOO 
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Figure 12.8 
Retention Limit as a Percentage of Total Retained Premium 
Income for all Classes of Insurance - Company A 
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Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
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Table 12.12 
Relationship between RL and Total Retained Premium 
Income for all Classes - Company B 
TRPI RLs ~ x x 100 RLs RL -- xlOO RLs (OOO's) Fire TRPI ~ l a a r i ne TRPI Hotor 
2,168 40 1.8 45 2.1 20 
2,686 40 1.5 60 2.2 20 
3,178 40 1.3 60 1.9 20 
5,777 40 0.7 60 1.0 20 
10,399 75 0.7 120 1.2 30 
13,359 75 0.6 150 1.1 30 
14,047 75 0.5 150 1.1 30 
16,793 75 0.4 375 2.2 30 
26,187 75 0.3 J75 1.4 30 
38,265 75 0.2 375 1.0 100 
~ x x 100 
TRPI 
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Figure 12.9 
Retention Limit as a Percentage of Total Retained Premium Income 
for all Classes of Insurance - Company B 
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Table 12.13 
SU!IlIIlary of Development of GP!! RP!! TRP! and Rl.s for both Ca.pany . ~ ~ and ~ ~
._----, 
Class of Factors Company A Company B I I 
insurance 1974-80 I ~ 7 1 - B ( ) )
Fl re GP! lncredse over period X 32.14 X 9 . ~ ~ ~
RP! X 50.57 X 9.10 
RL X 2.00 X 1. B8 
RL fallen frail 1190.5% to fallen from 12.21 to 
RP! 47. II 2. ') 1 
RL fallen from 6.91 to fa llt!n from l.1l% to 
fap! 1.1l% o 'I" ... 
RP! fluctuated between fluctuated b e t " " ' ~ ~ n n , 
GP! 2.4% dnd 5.21 22.4% dnd 31.11 I 
~ a r i n e e Cdrgo GP! l.ncrease over period X 0.00 X 20.20 
j 
RP! X 34.44 X 28.76 
RL 0.00 X 8.33 
RI. fall"n from 2 5 .13% to fluctuated between 
RP! 4 . 5 ~ ~ 2.4% dnd 8.4% 
RL fluctudted between fluctuated bet .. e ~ n n
TRP! 0.51 and 0.8% 1.0% and l.21 
RP! fluctuated between fluctuated between 
GP! 1.9% and 11. 5% 18.3% and 27.9% 
Motor GP! increase over period X 7.92 X 15.08 
RP! 9.70 X 15.78 
RL X 10.00 X 5.00 
RL fluctudted betwet!n fluctudtt!d between 
RP! 0.2:1: dnd 1.1% 0.37l and 2.0% 
PL fluctuated b ~ l w e e n n fluctuated between 
TRPl O.U dnd 0.81 O.ll and 0.9: 
RP! iluctuated bet .. een fluctuated between 
I;P! /5.41 and H.9% 73.81 .. nd 74.9% 
(i) 
546 
as percentages of the class RPIs, by the end of the 
period, they were Hithin the ' rule of thumb' guidelines 
for companies of their size with the sole exception 
of Company A's fire retention limit for its proportiona 1 
treaties, though the maximum retained loss I"as further 
reduced by an over-riding per risk excess of loss reinsur-
ance; and 
(ii) expressed as percentages of the companies' total retained 
premium incomes, by 1980 all of their retention limits 
were Hell below the guidelines. 
Regarding the revision intervals for retention limits, in 
response to the questionnaire Company A said that the RLs of its 
fire and marine treaties are revised every three years. and its 
motor excess of loss cover every four years. Company B said 
that RLs of all its reinsurance treaties are reviewed every three 
years. In fact, the data in the above tables shows that generally 
the two companies have not adhered to those periods, and actual 
revision periods have ranged from one to six years. 
By leaving a retention limit unchanged for several years 
during a period of inflation its real value may fall substantially. 
It is not possible to show exactly how inflation affected the 
RLs of Companies A and B because of the lack of adequate inflation 
statistics for the countries concerned. However. if the average 
annual rate of inflation over the period is assumed to have been 
7 per cent (the 1969-78 average for Company B's country), the real 
values of the RLs on the companies' fire treaties, for instance, 
would have declined as shown in Table 12.14. 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
12.3.3 
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Table 12.14 
The Effect of Inflation on Retention Limits of 
Fire Treaties for Company A and B 
Company B Company B Company A Company A 
Original RLs RLs after apply- Original RLs RLs J.fter apply-
ing inflation ing inflation 
40,000 40,000 - -
40,000 37,200 - -
40,000 34,596 250,000 250,000 
40,000 32,174 250,000 232,500 
75,000 56,104 250,000 216,225 
75,000 52,177 250,000 201,089 
75,000 48,524 500,000 374,026 
75,000 45,128 500,000 347,844 
75,000 41,969 500,000 323,495 
75,000 39,031 500,000 300,850 
Relationship Between Retention Limits and Capital/Free 
Reserves 
Retention limits as a percentage of capitJ.1 and free 
reserves do vary substantially from one company to another and 
may lie well outside the 'rule of thumb' figures, depending on 
the company's size and other factors. In this section it is intended 
to discuss the relationship between RL and CFRs in fire, marine 
and motor business for Company A and B. 
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Company A 
Table 12.15 shows that from 1973 to 1980 the company's total 
CFRs increased almost twenty-two fold, with an average annual grolvt h 
rate of 55.4 per cent (i.e. capital (C) which has been raised twice 
has risen six-fold, while free reserves (FRs) have risen more than 
a hundred and forty-two fold). 
Throughout the eight years covered by the table the retention 
limits for all three classes of business were well below the rat ios 
to capital and free reserves indicated by the' rules of thumb' limits. 
The company succeeded in doing more than merely financing the growth 
of its retained premium income, as shown by the fall in the ratios 
of RLs to CFRs. Clearly in fixing its retention limits capital 
resources have not been an unduly burdensome constraint. 
Company B 
Although there was no change in the company's paid-up capital 
(C) during the period 1971-1980, its free reserves (FR) increased 
almost ten-fold. Possibly the management believed that, particular-
ly as the company is backed by the state, there is no need for 
it to increase its share capital so long as it can finance the 
growth of its business from retained earnings, though a case could 
be made for the capitalisation of some of its reserves. 
In fact the 28.9 per cent a v e r < x ~ e . . annual growth rate of the 
free reserves failed to match the 36.8 per cent annual growth rate 
of the company's total gross premium income. Nevertheless the 
percentages of RL to CFRs in fire and motor business have declined 
during the period 1971-80 due to the continuous increase in CFRs 
on the one hand, and the stabilisation of RLs on the other. In 
,.----. 
Year Cs 
1973 5,000 
1974 5,000 
1975 5,000 
1976 10,000 
1977 10,000 
1978 10,000 
1979 30,000 
1980 30,000 
TABLE 12.15 
The Relationship between the Capital/Free Reserves and Retention 
Limits for Fire, Marine and ~ I o t o r r Business - Company A 
(OOO's omitted) 
FRs CFRs RL RL RL RL 
Fire CFRs x100 Harine 
RI, 100 
CFRsx Hotor 
656 5,656 250 4.42 25 0.44 20 
3,598 8,598 250 2.91 25 0.29 20 
11,639 16,639 250 1.50 40 0.24 20 
15,019 25,019 250 1.00 75 0.30 20 
30,978 40,978 500 1.22 75 0.18 20 
48,543 58,543 500 0.85 150 0.26 100 
53,642 83,642 500 0.60 150 0.18 200 
93,537 123,537 500 0.40 150 0.12 200 
RL 
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Figure 12.10 
Retention Limit of Fire, Marine Cargo and Motor Business 
as a Percentage of Capital/Free Reserves - Company A 
74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
Year 
Year C 
! 
1971 1,000 
1972 1,000 
1973 1,000 
1974 1,000 
1975 1,000 
1976 1,000 
1977 1,000 
1978 1,000 
1979 1,000 
1980 1,000 
Table 12.16 
The Relationship between the Free Capital and Retention 
Limits for Fire, Marine, and Motor Business - Company B 
(OOO's omitted) 
--
FRs CFRs RLs ~ l O O O RLs RL Fire CFRs Harine CFRsx100 
---
1,547 2,547 40 1.6 45 1.6 
1,795 2,795 40 1.4 60 2.1 
2,143 3,143 40 1.3 60 1.9 
2,682 3,682 40 1.1 60 1.6 
3,711 4,711 75 1.6 120 2.5 
5,594 6,594 75 1.1 150 2.3 
7,218 8,218 75 0.9 150 1.8 
9,277 10,277 75 0.73 375 3.7 
12,382 13,382 75 0.56 375 2.8 
15,158 16,158 75 0.46 375 2.3 
-
RLs 
Hotor 
20 
20 
20 
20 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
100 
f{L 
CFEs x100 
0.79 
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both motor and fire business, except for the period 1971-76 in 
the latter, the percentages of RL to CFRs were below the 'ru10 
of thumb' limit; in marine business, however, it was within the 
guidelines. The relationship between RL and CFRs is illustrated 
in Figure 12.11. 
Summary 
The above findings on the relationship betIVeen RL and CFRs 
are summarised in Table 12.17. 
From Table 12.17 it can be seen that the rate of gro\.Jth in 
Company A's CFRs has increased much faster than in Company B. 
The main reason for this may be attributed to the difference in 
the attitudes of the two companies' management towards the achieve-
ment of their financial strength objectives. Apart from marine 
business in Company B, both companies continued to show a decrease 
in the RL as a percentage of CFRs during the period of analysis, 
and by 1980 this percentage was well below the 'rule of thumb' 
limit. 
12.3.4 Retention Limit Per Event 
The two companies also provided details of their marine cargo 
retention limits for accumulations of losses arising from anyone 
event, and these too will be compared with the 'rule of thumb' 
. d . d' Ch .. Cl ) guidelines flrst lscusse ln apter nlne, l.e. :-
(1) Details of catastrophe cover for their fire accounts are not 
available. 
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Figure 12.11 
Retention Limit of Fire, Marine Cargo and Motor Business 
as a Percentage of Capital/Free Reserves - Company B 
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FRs 
C&FHs 
Fire RL 
RL 
CFRs 
t-larine RL 
Cargo 
RL 
CFRs 
Hotor RL 
RL 
CFRs 
Table 12.17 
Summary of Development of CFRs and their Relationship with 
RLs for both Company A and B 
~ ~
Factors Company A Company B 
1974-80 1971-80 
increase over X 6.00 X 0 
period 
" " X 26.00 X 9.80 
" " X 14.37 X 6.34 
tI tI X 2.00 X 1. 88 
fallen from 2.91% to 0.40% fallen from 1.6% to 
0.46% 
increase over X 6.00 X 8.33 
period 
fluctuated between fluctuated between 
0.12% and 0.3010 1 . 6'/0 and 3. no 
increase over X 10.00 X 5.00 
period fluctuated between fluctuated between 
0.05'Z. and 0.24% O. 2 2 f ~ ~ and 0.79;c 
- ---
VI 
VI 
~
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Retention Limit Guidelines for Catastrophe Risks: 
Type of Relationship Non-Life ~ j a a ri ne ~ ~branches 
Retention Limit (Eer event) - As high as 5" 
" 
Retained premium income 
Retention Limit (per event) Around O. 5 : ~ ~ -
Capital and free reserves to 1. 5 ~ : ' '
Company A 
Over the six years RL per event for marine cargo \>1as revised 
twice and increased by 250 percent, from 80,000 in 1975 to 200,000 
in 1978, as shown in Table 12.18. The percentage of RL to the 
RPI dropped from 32.92 per cent in 1975 to 5.97 per cent in 1980, 
which is abovethe 'rule of thumb' limit. By 1980 the RL as a percent-
age of CFRs was far belotv the 'rule of thumb' limit (see Figure 
12.12 and 12.13). 
Table 12.18 
Retention Limits Per Event as a Percentage of Retained Premium 
Income and Capital/Free Reserves for Marine Cargo Excess of Loss 
- Company A 
(OOO's omitted) 
Year I RPI I CFRs r RLs I RL 
RPl x100 
I RL 
CFRsx100 
1975 243 16,639 80 32.92 0.48 
1976 547 I 25,019 100 18.28 0.40 
1977 415 40,978 100 24.10 0.24 
1978 1,703 58,543 200 11.74 0.34 
I 
1979 2,788 83,642 200 7.17 0.24 
1980 3,341 123,537 200 5.97 0.16 
I I I 
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Figure 12.12 
Retention Limit per Event as a Percentage of Retained 
Premium Income of Marine Cargo Business - Company A 
76 77 78 79 80 
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Figure 12.13 
Retention Limit per Event as a Percentage of Capital 
and Free Reserves of Marine Cargo Business - Company A 
76 77 78 79 80 
Year 
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Company B 
Table 12.19 shows that, during the period 1975-80, the maximum 
limit of anyone event as a percentage of RPI was relatively high, 
although by 1980 it had dropped to 4.75 per cent, which is still 
above the 'rule of thumb' guidelines; unlike Company A, the percent-
age of RL to the CFRs was high and far above the 'rule of thumb' 
limit. The percentage of RL to RPI and CFRs is illustrated in 
Figure 12.14 and 12.15 respectively. 
\.Je have seen in Chapter eleven that, in practice, the RL per 
event could be ranged between two to four times the RL per risk 
or individual loss. In this context, apart from 1975, RLs for 
Company A's marine cargo were less than twice its RLs per risk, 
while for Company B they were exactly twice its RLs per risk. 
Nevertheless. although catastrophic events are comparatively 
infrequent, companies should accumulate special reserves to meet 
such events when they do occur. Therefore companies when determining 
their RL per event should also take these reserves into consideration. 
Table 12. 19 
Retention Limits Per Event as a Percentage of Retained Premium 
Income and Capital/Free Reserves for Marine Cargo Excess of Loss 
- Company B 
(OOO's omitted) 
Year RPI CFRs RLs RL 
RPI x100 
RL 10 CFRsx 0 
1975 4,282 4,711 300 7.01 6.37 
1976 4,356 6,594 300 6.89 4.55 
1977 4,803 8,218 300 6.25 3.65 
1978 6,333 10,277 750 11.84 7.30 
1979 11,966 13,382 750 6.27 5.60 
1980 15,787 16,158 750 4.75 I 4.64 
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Figure 12.14 
Retention Limit per Event as a Percentage of Retained Premium 
Income of Marine Cargo Business - Company B 
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Figure 12.15 
Retention Limit per Event as a Percentage 
of Capital/Free Reserves of Marine Cargo Business - Company B 
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12.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to discuss the results of the quest-
ionnaire, and analyse the relationship between RL. RPI. and CFRs 
in three classes of insurance (i. e. fire, marine cargo and motor) 
for two Arab insurance companies. The main conclusions are: 
1. During the period under discussion, the GPI, RPI, RLs, and CFRs 
of Company A and B have experienced rapid growth. 
2. Both companes' RLs have not been revised soon enough, and 
have been too far out of step with the increase of the GPI 
or CFRs. This has resulted in the companies' GPI growth being 
exposed to more reinsurance premiums ceded, and the consequent 
hampering of the development of RPI. It may be, however, 
that the companies do review their RLs at regular intervals, 
but for various undisclosed reasons (e.g. market conditions) 
they may not revise them despite RL/RPI and RL/CFRs ratios 
becoming unaligned in relation to their targets. 
3. Owing to the markedly different economic and political situa-
tions in which Company A (competitive market) and Company 
B (monopoly market) operate, it is difficult to make any real-
4. 
istic comparison of their relative performance. All that 
can meaningfully be noted is that the more recently established 
Company A has experienced more rapid overall growth rates 
in GPI, RPI and CFRs than has Company B. 
For both companies RL as a percentage of RPI or CFRs has 
fluctuated highly for all classes under study. Unless the 
companies have a certain policy in determining their RLs, 
then the two ratios might well diverge in the ways shotvn. 
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5. Although the RL as a percentage of RPI may be more consistent 
when \ve measure RP! on total business than on a class basis, 
in practice it is unusual to fix RL to total retained premium 
income. This is especially so given the possibility of an acc-
umulation risk which may involve several classes of insllrance 
when the total retained claims costs may amount to an unaccept-
ably large proportion of the company's TRPI. 
6. It is neither really practical to revise RLs at yearly intervals 
(especially given the uncertainty regarding business development 
for a company in a competitive market), nor to maintain them 
unrevised for several years. Therefore, RLs should be revised 
at short intervals (e.g. every two years), and normally inc-
creased in line with inflation. 
7. Obtaining the proper relationship between RL, RP I, and CFRs 
is only part of the required solution; the determination 
of an adequate RL is also necessary. Therefore, those involved 
in fixing RLs should be well aware of hmv much the maximum 
loss per risk or per event would take from RPI or CFRs. They 
must also look not just to the past but must also try to formul-
ate a view of the future. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
Summary and Conclusion 
13.1 Introduction 
The investigation into the available domestic retention capa-
city and the demand for international reinsurance in the Arab World 
comprised: 
(i) a survey of relevant information and literature on the de-
velopment of Arab insurance industries; 
(ii) an analysis of some restrictions imposed on retention 
capacity; 
(iii) a discussion of unusual demands for market capacity; 
(iv) the establishment of reinsurance companies and pools 
as measures of increasing retention capacity; 
(v) an extensive theoretical and empirical study of the 
determination of retention limits; and 
(vi) a discussion on related points arising from the research. 
This chapter provides, by way of conclusion, a presentation of the 
study's objectives, techniques, results, findings, and implications 
of the work as a whole. 
13.2 Presentation of the Study 
1. An initial discussion of economic development in the 
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Arab World provided a background to the main study, .:Jnd in 
particular to the available domestic retention capacity and 
the demand for foreign reinsurance. Special significance 
was given to the major developments in the various sectors 
of the economy during the period studied. 
2. An examination of the development and current situation of 
Arab insurance industries provided a general framework for 
the study of retention capacity. The main points that emerged 
were: 
(i) Modern insurance in the Arab World began with foreign 
insurance companies; but since the 1960s national ins-
urance industries have developed in most Arab countries 
and locally owned Arab companies have acquired a pre-
dominant share of Arab direct insurance business. 
(ii) The structure of the insurance markets of Arab countries 
ranges from monopoly to highly competitive markets, 
including national and foreign insurers. 
(iii) By 1979 the total life and non-life insurance premiulll 
income of all Arab insurance markets still amounted 
to only 0.82 per cent of the world's direct premiulll 
income (excluding the Communist bloc), despite the former 
having grown at an average annual rate of 31.5 per cent 
(for both non-life and life business) during the period 
1974-79. Although all Arab countries suffered from 
inflation, real growth of premium income was high. 
(iv) Despite considerable growth in the premium expenditure 
per capita in Arab countries during the period 1974-
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79, it is still small when compared with the developed 
countries. 
Cv) Despite the problems of instability in the Arab region, 
the future will see, on the whole, a great increase 
in the volume of insurance business, and the non-life 
business will continue to be predominant in the compan-
ies' portfolios. 
3. Restrictions on retention capacity derived from the existence 
or absence of insurance legislation and supervision were dis-
cussed. The need for new legislation to replace or improve 
inadequate regulations, in order to meet the rapid development 
in the Arab insurance industries, was noted. The urgent need 
for legislation in some Arab countries, where regulation and 
supervision are minimal was observed. 
regulations two suggestions were made; 
To improve insurance 
firstly, that an advis-
ory committee be established within the General Arab Insurance 
Federation, or - if this were not forthcoming - recourse should 
be led to the United Nations Development Programme. 
4. The rapid growth in the number and size of large risks through-
out the Arab region, due to economic development, was examined. 
The conclusions from that study were that the increase in 
both the numbers and the size of these risks was impressive 
considering the short period of time in which they have emerged 
in the region. It has led to problems of risk assessment, prem-
ium rating, claims settlements, and unbalanced portfolios 
with which local insurers are ill-equipped to handle. Cons-
equently only a minute part of the gross premium income for 
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large risks is retained locally and for the fouseeable future 
large risks will continue to be heavily reinsured abroad. 
Various suggestions were made for increasing retention capaci-
ty in respect of individual large risks. These suggestions 
were aimed at overcoming the inability of individual insurers 
to retain more than a small proportion of such risks, and 
therefore it was recommended that: (i) attention should be 
paid to the possibility of Arab insurers making greater use 
of coinsurance; and (ii) there should be subregional and reg-
ional co-operation to provide both the technical expertise 
and the capac ity required for the insurance of large risks 
which is beyond any single insurance market. 
5. A discussion of natural hazards in the Arab World gave an 
important indication of the demand for market capacity. The 
main points of the discussion were as follows: 
(i) The Arab World has had considerable losses due to natural 
hazards throughout recorded history. 
(ii) Many of the rapidly expanding Arab cities industrial 
and other developments are located in areas exposed 
to natural hazards, and are thus of major concern to 
both insurers and reinsurers, as well as to the govern-
ment. The need for the assessment of accumulation of 
risk - through establishing natural hazards zones, loss 
accumulation and assessment zones - and the demand for 
catastrophe cover become of paramount importance to 
insurers and reinsurers in an attempt to control their 
exposure to catastrophic disasters resulting from natural 
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hazards. 
6. A study was made of the establishment of reinsurancc companies 
and the use of pools as measures for increasing retention 
capacity, and the following points emerged: 
(i) Where reinsurance companies have been formed, they have 
increased the national retention capacity, as borne 
out by study of data over seven years for the Egyptian 
Re and ten years for Iraq Re. However, although both 
companies had retained a high proportion of their foreign 
and domestic business, the outflow of reinsurance premiums 
abroad was still large. One major criticism may be 
made of their operational methods, and this concerns the 
payment of commission to local insurers, which is lower 
than the rates available on the international reinsur-
ance markets. This has the effect of creating a major 
constraint on the growth of domestic insurers, and inc-
reasing the cost of insurance to policyholders. 
(ii) The formation of Arab re insurance pools was a much less 
successful measure in the attempt to increase the amount 
of retained premium income within the region. 
7. International insurance and reinsurance transactions and their 
effects on the balance of payments was analysed, and it was 
apparent that the demand for international insurance and rein-
surance may result in a large foreign exchange outflow. This 
depends largely on the size of business transacted, and the 
profitability of the business. Despite the Iraq Re improving 
its country's net foreign cash flow on reinsurance trade, 
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the study of the Iraqi insurance market as a \.;hole, however, 
showed that reinsurance transactions constantly resulted in 
a considerable balance of payments deficit during the period 
1971-80. Indeed, although this is the case with most count-
ries worldwide (even the USA, the largest country in the world 
in terms of premium income) one major disaster, particularly 
in the Third World countries, may bring an inflow of foreign 
exchange in a single year on a scale far greater than several 
yeari premiums outflows. 
8. The different factors relevant to the study of fixing retention 
limits were discussed. Where possible, empirical studies of 
the Arab insurance market were inc luded concerning the extent 
to which factors discussed influenced the determination of 
retention limits. It was shown that insurers should pay regard 
to many factors in fixing retention limits and that there 
is no general empirical method for determining the optimum 
level of retention. The implication of this is that a careful 
and objective analysis must be made before decisions are taken 
on the fixing of retention limits. 
9. A survey of the corporate objectives of Arab insurance compan-
ies and an analysis of insurers I corporative objectives in 
relation to retention limits provided an important framework 
for the study of retention capacity and the demand for inter-
national reinsurance. It was shmm that retention capacity 
and thus retained premium income could be affected by overall 
company objectives and therefore, the determination of reten-
tion limits was discussed in terms of their contribution to 
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overall company objectives and performance. In this way impor-
tant decision areas were defined and delineated, along wi th 
the problems which must be solved in order to achieve a proper 
inter-relationship between retention limits and company objec-
tives. The conclusion to be drawn was that there is a strong 
link between retention limits and company objectives. An 
additional point emerged from the questionnaire findings 
companies in the Arab World tend to be orientated towards 
social objectives, i.e. providing a service for insured clients 
at a fair price, rather than being motivated solely by profit 
objectives. 
10. Retention limits and retained premium income were described 
in different forms of reinsurance where each has a specific 
purpose. It has been shown that the size of retained premium 
income differs from one type of reinsurance to another. Intui-
tive reasoning, knowledge of the structure and characteristics 
of a certain class of insurance, past experience, reinsurance 
costs, etc., are factors influencing the choice of a particular 
type of reinsurance, as well as the level of retention of 
that type. It was indicated that by arranging a proper rein-
surance programme, the advantages to the ceding company would 
be twofold; firstly, the supply of insurance at direct level 
would be increased, and secondly, the demand for reinsurance 
would be reduced, thus lessening reinsurance costs. 
11. An empirical study of the relationship between retention limits 
(RL) on the one hand, and retained premium income (RP!), and 
capi tal and free reserves (CFR) on the other, was hampered 
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by the fact that detailed information was only supplied by 
two Arab insurance companies, though 46 companies did response. 
to a questionnaire on the subject. The questionnaire findings 
revealed that 41 per cent of the respondents fixed their RLs 
with regard to CFRs, 17 per cent to RPI, and 31 per cent to 
both; only 11 per cent did not relate RLs to either CFRs 
or RPI. The analysis also centred on comp.'1: ring these relation-
ships for both Company A and B within the field of fire, marine 
cargo, and motor business with the 'rule of thumb' limits 
which revealed that for all classes the companies' RL as a 
percentage of RPI or CFRs, in general, was either ,yell above 
or below the 'rule of thumb' limit. For both companies the 
fact that no specific method was used when relating RL to 
RPI and CFRs was noted. 
13.3 The Contribution to Knowledge 
From the study, the contribution to knowledge is as follows: 
1. The research provides the first detailed study and analysis 
of available domestic retention capacity and the demand for 
international re insurance in the Arab World; 
2. A comparative study is made of the nature and development 
of the Arab insurance industry and the development as seen 
in the insurance industries of both other developing and devel-
oped countries; 
3. The potential risk of different types of natural hazards, 
and the potential damage to life and major development projects 
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are examined, discussed, and analysed, and certain inf()rma-
tion is displayed cartographically; 
4. The increasing domestic and regional retention capacity result-
ing from the establishment of reinsurance companies and pools 
is presented and evaluated; 
5. The effect of insurance and reinsurance transactions on the 
balance of payments is presented and analysed; 
6. The theoretical and practical inter-relationship between RLs 
and the possible prime objectives of companies I ~ ~ described 
and discussed; 
7. The practical relationships between RLs, RP!, and CFRs are 
investigated. 
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